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On Brzozowski’s Presence and Absence in 
Poland and Beyond 
Introduction 
Jens Herlth 
 
 
In 1924, the German physician and writer Alfred Döblin undertook a journey of 
two months to Poland. In the account of his journey he noted, writing about the 
current situation in Polish literature and criticism: “The essayist and writer 
Brzozowski continues to have a strong impact; he, too, is a Europeanist.”1 This 
remark, as intriguing as it is for everyone interested in Brzozowski and his leg-
acy, leaves us with some questions as to the actual circumstances or sources that 
allowed Döblin to assess this “strong impact.” He was not entirely unfamiliar 
with Brzozowski; he had included some enthusiastic remarks on the latter’s 
novel Płomienie (Flames) in a short critical piece published four years earlier.2 
But Döblin did not know Polish, therefore he is not much of an eyewitness when 
it comes to critical debates in contemporary Poland. In this, he entirely depended 
on his Polish interlocutors. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure who exactly was 
his informer in this specific case.3 
                                                             
1  “Der Essayist Brzozowski wirkt stark nach, auch er Europäer.” Alfred Döblin, Reise 
in Polen [Journey to Poland] (München: DTV, 1987), 60.  
2  Alfred Döblin (pseud. Linke Poot), “Leidenschaft und Landleben” [Passion and 
country life], in Schriften zur Politik und Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 
2015), 180−190, 189 (first published in: Die Neue Rundschau, September 1920, Vol. 
2, 1098−1105). 
3  According to Marion Brandt’s commentary to Döblin’s Reise in Polen, this anony-
mous “connoisseur of Polish literature,” as Döblin introduces him (Reise in Polen, 
60), could have been Jacek Frühling, a Polish-Jewish translator and journalist. Marion 
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It was of course wholly justified to stress Brzozowski’s presence in the intel-
lectual debates of the new Polish republic. Some of Brzozowski’s friends or sup-
porters of the pre-war years were still alive and active; some, such as for exam-
ple Zofia Nałkowska, Witold Klinger, Ostap Ortwin, or Karol Irzykowski, had 
made their way into the cultural establishment of the new state. Brzozowski was 
considered the informal “Patron” of the mainstream literary journal Wiadomości 
Literackie (Literary News), the most important literary review in Interwar Po-
land, founded in 1924.4 During the 1920s and 1930s, his works were read by 
ardent Catholics, by supporters of Piłsudski, and even attracted radical national-
ists.5 Still, in all its generality and superficiality, Döblin’s statement is somewhat 
typical of the destiny of Brzozowski’s afterlife in Poland—and beyond: It is 
nothing more than a mere proposition, without any further arguments or refer-
ences—and it is, of course, heavily compromised by its author’s ignorance of 
Polish. Although, even in Poland references to Brzozowski, despite all their ste-
reotypical emphasis, are often quite superficial in their actual treatment of his 
ideas. 
During and beyond his lifetime the reception of Brzozowski’s writings has 
been overshadowed by what became known as “the Brzozowski affair.” In 1908, 
the Galician social-democratic party newspaper Czerwony Sztandar (The Red 
Banner) published a list of alleged informers of the tsarist secret police with 
Brzozowski’s name at the top. The allegations were never fully clarified. Due to 
his tuberculosis Brzozowski lived mostly in Florence since 1906; he was able to 
attend the first part of the citizens’ court trial convened by various social-demo-
cratic parties in 1909, but his poor health did not allow him to return to Cracow 
for a continuation of the trial. There is tragic irony in his situation: The writer 
who most loudly attacked Polish Romanticism and fin de siècle modernism for 
their self-complacent isolation from society found himself secluded in his Flor-
entine sickroom, banned and despised not only by his long-term adversaries 
from the national-conservative camp, but also by an overwhelming part of the 
left-wing activists in partitioned Poland. When he died in 1911, Brzozowski was 
despised by some parts of the trans-imperial Polish public and nearly forgotten 
                                                             
Brandt, “Erläuterungen zu Alfred Döblins ‘Reise in Polen’”; http://www.alfred-
doeblin.de/data/erlaeuterungen-zu-doeblins-reise-in-polen.pdf 
4  Małgorzata Szpakowska, “Wiadomości Literackie” prawie dla wszystkich [“Literary 
news”: almost for everyone] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo W.A.B., 2012), 373. 
5  For a comprehensive study of the debates around Brzozowski and his intellectual leg-
acy in Interwar Poland: Marian Stępień, Spór o spuściznę po Stanisławie Brzozowskim 
w latach 1918−1939 [The controversy about Stanisław Brzozowski’s legacy in the 
years 1918–1939] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie), 1976. 
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by others. Thus, for instance, the Dziennik Poznański (Poznań Daily) wrote in a 
short obituary that he had “once been popular amongst circles of young radicals 
in Warsaw.”6 
Ever since the Interwar Years, Polish intellectuals have tried to change this; 
in 1928 a monument to Brzozowski was erected in the Trespiano cemetery in 
Florence. In the same year the young critic and painter Józef Czapski vigorously 
complained about the Polish intellectuals’ “failure to fulfill their basic duties” 
towards Brzozowski’s legacy and called for the creation of a “Stanisław 
Brzozowski Society.”7 The 1930s saw the appearance of several monographs on 
various aspects of Brzozowski’s writings and the project of an edition of his 
collected works was launched.8 In 1961, the poet Czesław Miłosz, a member of 
the “generation of 1911,” for whom the encounter with Brzozowski’s writings 
had been a crucial moment in his biography, wrote: 
 
Editors and critics always approach Brzozowski with alarm and trepidation, although the 
reasons for their attitude change according to fluctuations in political circumstances. This 
means that he is always our contemporary, and that he has not yet become a subject of 
literary-historical research.9 
 
“Always our contemporary”—it would be difficult to come up with a higher 
rating of Brzozowski’s continuing relevance for at least Polish cultural history. 
In the early 1960s, Miłosz planned not only to launch a revival in Brzozowski 
studies in the circles of the Polish émigrés gathered around the Paris journal 
                                                             
6  “[…] w swoim czasie głośny wśród młodych radykalnych sfer Warszawy.” Dziennik 
Poznański 102 (04.05.1911): 3. 
7  Józef Czapski, “O Towarzystwo im. Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [On the Stanisław 
Brzozowski Association], Wiadomości Literackie 28 (1928): 1. 
8  Only three volumes were actually published, the project was then abandoned and re-
newed in the early 1970s. 
9  Czesław Miłosz, “A One-Man Army: Stanisław Brzozowski,” in Emperor of the 
Earth. Modes of Eccentric Vision (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 
188. This is a translation from his monograph on Brzozowski, originally published in 
1962: Człowiek wśród skorpionów. Studium o Stanisławie Brzozowskim [Man among 
scorpions. A study on Stanisław Brzozowski] (Kraków: Znak 2000), 12 (“…jest cią-
gle nam współczesny…”). “Always our contemporary” was also the title of a confer-
ence held at the University of Fribourg in October 2014, where first versions of the 
essays collected in this volume were discussed. For more on this conference see An-
drzej Mencwel’s “Epilogue,” 351ff. 
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Kultura and its editor Jerzy Giedroyc (himself a devoted ‘Brzozowskian’),10 in 
addition he aimed to make Brzozowski known in the West. He intended that 
Brzozowski’s basic writings be translated and discussed by critics and philoso-
phers in Paris and New York. Not much of this could be realized indeed. Only 
some chapters of Miłosz’s book on Brzozowski were translated into English and 
published, first in a scholarly journal, then in his collection of essays Emperor of 
the Earth.11 The overall echo was disillusioning. 
Despite a recent rise in interest in Brzozowski in Poland—due to a number of 
contemporary critics and scholars, but also due to the activities of the “Krytyka 
Polityczna” publishing house with the “Stanisław Brzozowski Foundation” at its 
basis—publications on Brzozowski in ‘Western’ languages remain extremely 
rare and often difficult to access. A highly interesting dissertation on Brzozowski 
by Jan Goślicki, defended at the University of Zurich, was only partly published 
in 1980.12 Rena Syska-Lamparska’s book on Brzozowski and Vico gives 
invaluable insight into the Italian contexts of Brzozowski’s thought; she deals 
with Vico’s, but also with Labriola’s, Sorel’s, and Croce’s influence.13 Holger 
Politt’s dissertation Stanisław Brzozowski. Hoffnung wider die dunkle Zeit (Hope 
against Dark Times) puts the emphasis on the political ideas of the Polish 
critic.14 Lately, a special issue of Studies in East European Thought offers some 
articles on various aspects of Brzozowski’s writings.15 There exists a highly 
valuable entry on Brzozowski in the Encyclopedia of the Essay, and the Literary 
Encyclopedia published an entry on Brzozowski as well.16 Of course, language is 
                                                             
10  Jerzy Giedroyc, Autobiografia na cztery ręce [Autobiography for four hands], ed. 
Krzysztof Pomian, Warszawa: Towarzystwo Opieki nad Archiwum Instytutu Lite-
rackiego w Paryżu, 2006, 185, 18. 
11  Czesław Miłosz, “A One-Man Army,” 186–253.  
12  Jan Goślicki, Der junge Brzozowski. Das Werk von Stanisław Brzozowski bis 1906 
[The young Brzozowski: Brzozowski’s works until 1906] (Zürich: Juris, 1980). This 
brochure has 59 pages, the original manuscript 379 (I am grateful to the author’s 
widow, Annemarie Frascoli, who for making it accessible to me). 
13  Stanisław Brzozowski: A Polish Vichian, preface by Wiktor Weintraub (Firenze: Le 
lettere, 1987).  
14  Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996. 
15  Jens Herlth, Edward M. Świderski (eds.), Stanislaw Brzozowski (1878–1911), special 
issue of Studies in East European Thought 63, 4 (2011). 
16  Stanisław Eile, “Brzozowski, Stanisław,” in Encyclopedia of the Essay, ed. Tracy 
Chevalier (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997), 120f. (unfortunately, the bib-
liography lists Syska-Lamparska’s abovementioned book as “Stanisław Brzozowski: 
A Polish Vision”); Jens Herlth, “Stanisław Brzozowski,” The Literary Encyclopedia 
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a crucial obstacle in the international reception of Brzozowski. Only few of his 
texts were translated into Western languages, with a characteristic preference for 
his literary works: The novel Płomienie (Flames) was even translated into Ger-
man twice, his Pamiętnik (Diary) was published in French.17 Recently, a collec-
tion of his essays was published in Italian—to my knowledge this is the only 
edition of a selection of Brzozowski’s critical and philosophical writings in any 
language other than Polish.18  
Arthur O. Lovejoy once stated that “ideas are the most migratory things in 
the world.”19 More than four decades earlier, the Polish sociologist Ludwik 
Krzywicki had developed the concept of the “migration of ideas” to explain the 
detachment of the superstructure from the social bases in the development of so-
cieties. The “migration of ideas,” he argued, allowed societies to incorporate 
concepts that normally would have taken more time to develop were it not for 
the exchange of ideas across borders and the transmission of “foreign experi-
ence” from more to less developed countries.20 Brzozowski’s writings are a good 
example of this. From his early years on, he ardently followed the newest ideas 
in European philosophy, literature, psychology, and sociology. His activity was 
embedded in a broader context of so-called non-governmental, social endeavors 
of popular education; the early years of the twentieth century saw a considerable 
popularity of cheap brochures on science and philosophy. There was a peculiar 
fashion for intellectual work and a high esteem for its proponents.21 Brzozowski 
not only popularized the ideas of Taine, Sorel, Nietzsche, and others, but also 
checked them against his own experiences and historical background. He used 
and reworked them according to his needs—his own and those of Polish culture 
as he understood it. His own highly non-systematic world-view was a peculiar 
                                                             
(first published 17 July 2017). http://www.litencyc.com/php/speople.php?rec=true& 
UID=13829 
17  Stanisław Brzozowski, Histoire d’une intelligence: journal 1910−1911, trans. Woj-
ciech Kolecki (Paris: le Bruit du temps, 2010). 
18  Stanisław Brzozowski, Cultura e vita [Culture and life], ed. Anna Czajka (Milano: 
Mimesis, 2017). 
19  Arthur O. Lovejoy, “Reflections on the History of Ideas,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 1,1 (1940): 3−23, 4. 
20  Ludwik Krzywicki, “Wędrówka idei” [The migration of ideas], Szkice socjologiczne, 
cz. I (Dzieła, vol. 9), Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1974, 189−202, 
190 (first published in 1897).  
21  Bohdan Cywiński, Rodowody niepokornych [Genealogy of the defiant], 5th ed. (War-
szawa: PWN, 2010), 72; Janina Żurawicka, Inteligencja warszawska w końcu XIX 
wieku (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1978), 222. 
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blend of Marxist social critique, a Vico-inspired philosophy of history and a 
voluntarist approach in the understanding of man and society. Although none of 
the single features of this world-view was entirely original, Brzozowski’s ener-
getic plea to the Polish people to adopt a position of self-conscious, creative, and 
heroic historical activity was in fact something new in the context of East-Cen-
tral European literary criticism and the philosophy of culture of the time. 
How can we explain then, that Brzozowski’s ideas did not migrate to other 
languages and cultures, that his intellectual heritage has been practically ignored 
outside of Poland for more than over a century since his death in 1911? Most 
likely, this is because his contribution to Polish philosophy, literary theory and 
criticism—so esteemed by Polish experts in the field—did not so much consist 
of ideas than of something else, something that can approximately be described 
as a posture, a certain ethos. In an insightful statement, the literary critic Kazi-
mierz Wyka called Brzozowski “a great creator of philosophical emotions.”22 
There is reason to assume that philosophical emotions are more emotional than 
philosophical—and the channels for their transmission are probably others than 
those we typically deal with in the history of ideas. This is why it is so difficult 
to capture them appropriately. Andrzej Mencwel, for example, who speaks of the 
intense reception of Brzozowski in the circle associated with the nationalist 
underground journal Sztuka i Naród (Art and the Nation) as well as in the social-
ist-orientated group “Płomienie” (Flames) in Nazi-occupied Warsaw, simply 
argues that these young enthusiasts referred to Brzozowski “more as to an ideol-
ogist than to a philosopher.”23 Maybe it was not so much the ideological content 
but rather the elevated emotional temperature and the morally engaging, truly 
challenging nature of Brzozowski’s essays that made them so popular, especially 
among young socially sensitive readers, throughout the first decades of the 
twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, ‘Brzozowski’ as a figure, as a point of reference, has been of 
continuous importance in many contexts and configurations of Polish intellectual 
history of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. A quote from Brzo-
zowski or the mere mention of his name or his works was perceived as endowed 
with symbolic capital, a capital, alas, that has practically not been convertible to 
non-Polish areas. Eminent scholars, such as Bronisław Baczko, Leszek Koła-
                                                             
22  Kazimierz Wyka, “O ocenie myśli Brzozowskiego” [On the assessment of Brzozow-
ski’s thought], in Stara szuflada (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1967), 57–64, 
59. The original article was published in 1934 in the weekly Pion (Plump) 
23  Andrzej Mencwel, Stanisław Brzozowski. Postawa krytyczna. Wiek XX [Stanisław 
Brzozowski. The critical attitude. The twentieth century] (Warszawa: Krytyka Poli-
tyczna, 2014), 588. 
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kowski, or Krzysztof Pomian, who were responsible for a revival in Brzozowski 
studies after the years of Stalinist prohibition and were forced to leave the PRL 
at the end of the 1960s or early 1970s, did not publish a single line devoted to 
the hero of their pre-émigré theoretical quests—the only (though important!) 
exception being the chapter on Brzozowski in Kołakowski’s Main Currents of 
Marxism.24 The new-comer from the outside often has a special feel for formal 
and informal intellectual hierarchies and how ideas and figures are rated in his or 
her new frame of reference.25 Apparently, Baczko and his former colleagues 
understood well that, in the context of Western scholarly debates, there was 
nothing to gain by dealing with or even only referring to Brzozowski’s writings. 
Back in Poland in the 1960s, ‘Brzozowski’ had been for them, maybe in the first 
place, a vehicle to explore the field of Marxist revisionism, an area they were 
inclined to abandon, moving forward to other fields of research and other theo-
retical affiliations in the 1970s.26 
In a conversation with Bronisław Baczko in his Geneva apartment in July 
2013, we asked him directly why he did not refer to Brzozowski in any of his 
later writings. Baczko simply stated that, when he arrived in Geneva in the early 
seventies, other topics were of far higher interest to him. At the time, he consid-
ered Brzozowski a closed chapter in his professional career, and there was no-
body around who would have shown interest in Brzozowski. We insisted that he 
is considered one of the leading figures of the “Warsaw School of the history of 
ideas” after all and that one of the common points of reference for this school’s 
exponents was notably Brzozowski. But Baczko retorted by pointing out that the 
whole construct of a “Warsaw School” seemed highly doubtful to him and that it 
was only Walicki who had proclaimed and continuously nourished the idea. As 
far as Baczko himself was concerned, there was no and had never been such 
thing as a “Warsaw School of the history of ideas.”27  
To study Brzozowski’s presence in twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
Polish culture requires, among other things, confronting the problem that this 
presence cannot be reduced to situations of actual, textually verifiable real ‘im-
pact’ or ‘influence’. References to Brzozowski can often be found in personal 
memories, they are articulated and transmitted in the sphere of emotions, they 
take the form of symbolic gestures. In fact, a good part of Brzozowski criticism 
                                                             
24  Leszek Kołakowski, “Stanisław Brzozowski: Marxism as Historical Subjectivism,” in 
Main Currents of Marxism. Its Origins, Growth and Dissolution, vol. 2, The Golden 
Age, trans. Paul S. Falla (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1981), 215–239. 
25  Pascale Casanova, La république mondiale des lettres, 2nd ed. (Paris: Seuil, 2008), 70. 
26  I am grateful to Edward Świderski for pointing this out to me. 
27  The conversation was led by Edward Świderski and me on July 2, 2013. 
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is devoted to typological parallels and resemblances, in the realm of the possible 
rather than that of the real. Thus, for instance, in his Brzozowski and the Begin-
nings of ‘Western Marxism’, the abovementioned Andrzej Walicki highlighted 
the hidden affinities between Brzozowski’s thought and that of non-orthodox 
twentieth-century Western Marxists, above all Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci by all 
probability never came across any of Brzozowski’s writings, neither did any 
other relevant representative of twentieth-century Western Marxism. Still, 
Walicki’s discussion of the topic is highly instructive for everyone interested in 
the matter. One could continue in this direction: Cornelius Castoriadis’s influen-
tial reflections on the social imaginary as deeply entangled in social practice, his 
rejection of a primordial naturality and, above all, his postulate of history as “the 
domain of creation,” his emphasis on the self-creation of (a new) society,28 
strongly remind us of Brzozowski’s ideas on the role of man in history. This is 
obviously not due to any hidden influence, but rather because of a common line 
of thought, a common perspective on modern societies, which Brzozowski 
shared with some of the most theoretically advanced minds in post- or neo-
Marxist social theory of the twentieth century. Even Brzozowski’s seemingly 
idiosyncratic recourse to the “soul” in his late essays on Polish society and on 
what he called “the crisis in European consciousness” seems a lot less outdated 
when we think of the crucial role ascribed to psychoanalytical models in critical 
interventions in contemporary society as practiced in the wake of Lacan’s writ-
ings during the last decades. Castoriadis extensively refers to Lacan; the “psy-
che” is one of the central categories in his book on the social imaginary. One 
could also quote a recent example from Poland, namely Andrzej Leder’s study of 
the paradoxes of consciousness in Polish society of the Post-War period.29 Leder 
does not mention Brzozowski as a reference for his approach, but his heavy 
indebtedness to Lacanian metaphors makes him an interpreter of the cultural 
“soul” in the—methodologically problematic, though critically inspiring—sense 
that Brzozowski ascribed to this concept in the essays of Legenda Młodej Polski 
(1909, The Legend of Modern Poland) and in his posthumously published col-
lection Głosy wśród nocy (1912, Voices in the Night). 
The quest for parallels between Brzozowski’s writings and representatives of 
European thought and literature dates back to the Interwar Years. Maksymilian 
Boruchowicz (later Michał Borwicz), in an essay published in the monthly 
                                                             
28  Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen Blamey 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 202, 45. 
29  Andrzej Leder, Prześniona rewolucja. Ćwiczenie z logiki historycznej [The slept-
through revolution: an exercice in historical logic] (Warszawa: Krytyka Polityczna, 
2014). 
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Sygnały (Signals), analyzed “obvious parallels” between Brzozowski and the 
French writer Malraux.30 The focus falls on a comparative reading of Flames and 
Malraux’s La condition humaine (The Human Condition, 1933), but he also 
takes a look at the theoretical ideas of the two writers, their views on aesthetics 
and Marxism. The parallels, as he says, are all the more astonishing as they 
cannot be explained by a direct influence, since Malraux, for all we know, could 
not have read Brzozowski.31 
One of the explicit goals of the present volume is to take into account this 
tendency in the reception of Brzozowski’s work. Our special focus is not only on 
hitherto neglected configurations or individual readings of Brzozowski, but also 
on typological patterns and lines of thought, on affinities that might not have 
been consciously elected, but that still shed a light on what Brzozowski meant or 
at least could have meant for Polish culture in its European and global context. 
Indeed, this last aspect is not entirely new: One could go so far as to state that 
traditionally there is an important strand of “had it been the case that …” in the 
history of Brzozowski criticism. Tomasz Burek once suggested a prospective 
reading of Brzozowski’s novels which meant to analyze them against the back-
ground of the works of the great writers of modernism (Thomas Mann, Robert 
Musil, Hermann Broch).32 Marta Wyka drew parallels between Brzozowski and 
György Lukács and above all Walter Benjamin, for whom, as she says, 
Brzozowski was a kind of “progenitor” (“protoplasta”).33 And Czesław Miłosz’s 
abovementioned book is a long lament about the ignorance of twentieth century 
philosophers and critics as far as their Polish precursor is concerned. The bottom 
line of all these speculations is: Brzozowski would have been a great, widely-
read twentieth century philosopher and literary critic had he opted for a language 
other than Polish. Still, for honesty’s sake, one should probably add some more 
‘would-be’s’ to this: had Brzozowski been born in the Austro-Hungarian (as 
opposed to the Russian) Empire, had his family been well-off (and not pre-
cariously impoverished), had he studied in Heidelberg or Berlin (rather than at 
the Russian-language Imperial University of Warsaw), had he been granted a 
chair at the University of Lwów…34 It is instructive to note that the first one to 
                                                             
30  Maksymiljan [sic] Boruchowicz, “Brzozowski i Malraux” [Brzozowski and Malraux], 
Sygnały. Miesięcznik. Sprawy społeczne, literatura, sztuka 28 (1937): 2. 
31 Ibid., 3. 
32 Tomasz Burek, “Arcydzieło niedokończone” [The unfinished masterpiece], Twór-
czość 6 (1966): 73–96, 81f. 
33  Marta Wyka, Czytanie Brzozowskiego [Reading Brzozowski] (Kraków: Universitas, 
2012), 190, 337. 
34  Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 98. See also: Mencwel, Stanisław Brzozowski, 572. 
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have adopted this mode of counterfactuality in dealing with Brzozowski’s legacy 
was actually Brzozowski himself. In the diary he wrote during the last few 
months of his life he stated that had he been given some more time he would 
certainly have been able to “change the character of Polish literature for whole 
generations.”35 However, as we know today, this—and far more—did not hap-
pen. Brzozowski did not overcome his illness and died only four months after he 
noted this conviction. 
This is a book about parallels and converging vistas, it reveals hidden paths 
and neglected contexts. It is a book about failures, missed encounters and possi-
ble, but never pursued paths. It is also a book about cultural domination, about 
intellectual contagion—and immunity. We (re)construct intellectual encounters 
which, although not all of them actually ‘happened’, still might help in assessing 
the significance of Brzozowski’s specific contribution to Polish culture. There is 
little probability that Emil Cioran or Richard Rorty ever heard of Brzozowski, 
nevertheless a comparative glance at some aspects of their thought reveals strik-
ing resemblances to Brzozowski’s own peculiar version of ‘Kulturphilosophie’. 
Particular attention is paid to the relevance of Brzozowski’s legacy for recent 
developments in literary criticism and cultural theory. Due to their openness and 
a lack of systematic coherence Brzozowski’s writings have turned out to be 
highly suggestive for later generations of cultural theorists and literary schol-
ars.36 His most important contributions in this regard appear to be the performa-
tivity of the reading act, the implication of the reader, and the heightened atten-
tion to the relationship between reading and the creation of communities. These 
are crucial issues in any substantial discussion of the role of literature and intel-
lectual activity in contemporary societies.  
In the end, it might as well turn out that Brzozowski was just a provincial 
intellectual, provincial in a triple sense: geographical, linguistic, and historical. 
Geographical, because he spent his formative years in the remote region of 
Podolia, at the outskirts of the old Polish-Lithuanian Empire. Later he came to 
the centers of development of modern Polish culture, the cities of Warsaw and 
Lwów—for many contemporaries the provinciality of these very centers was a 
steady issue of complaint. Linguistic, because he published his works in Polish—
                                                             
35  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 48. 
36  Two recent book projects of significant scope and insight should be mentioned here: 
Stanisław Brzozowski – (ko)repetycje [St. Brzozowski: private lessons], 2 Vols., ed. 
Dorota Kozicka, Joanna Orska, and Krzysztof Uniłowski (Katowice: FA-art, 2012), 
and Konstelacje Stanisława Brzozowskiego [St. Brzozowski’s constellations], ed. Ur-
szuła Kowalczuk et al. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 
2012).  
Introduction | 17 
a language that is unfortunately traditionally marginalized and neglected in the 
so-called West. Historical, because he did not live to see the Interwar period 
when Poland established its own state-financed institutions. During his lifetime, 
Polish society was partitioned between the three zabory with their diverging 
legislation and restrictions in the field of press and public education. The social-
ist movement in the first decade of the twentieth century was marked by fierce 
internal struggles. The unfortunate affair around Brzozowski’s alleged activities 
as an informer of the Tsarist secret police, his illness, and, not to forget, his 
precarious position as a freelance writer led to his isolation. György Lukács, who 
is so often quoted as a counterfactual role model for Brzozowski, came from a 
wealthy family, moved to Berlin, Heidelberg, and later to Moscow—each of 
these cities being an intellectual bastion in its own right. He was in touch with the 
Max Weber and Stefan George circles and later became the core of the so-called 
Lukács-Lifshits “Current,” a circle around the journal Literaturnyi kritik (Literary 
Critic),37 that is, one of the hatcheries of the theory of socialist realism in the 
1930s, the literary ideology that reigned in Post-World War II Poland when publi-
cations by and on Brzozowski were prohibited for some years (this being one of 
the many bitter ironies, in which Brzozowski’s life and afterlife abound). 
However, from today’s point of view, ‘provinciality’ does not mean irrele-
vance, quite to the contrary: Pre-World War I Central Europe was a cultural field 
of extreme variety and enormous intellectual richness. The various literary and 
philosophical contexts that Brzozowski absorbed and digested and the manifold 
intellectual processes that he triggered and inspired (up to the present) testify to 
this. It is worth reading Brzozowski notably for the space of possibilities that his 
intellectual legacy introduces to us. To think about what could have been proves 
a useful tool to understand the actual functioning of a cultural setting, a historical 
configuration. We acquire new perspectives and often unexpected insights in the 
history of philosophy and literary criticism—not only in Poland. Brzozowski’s 
province really is the “world of human history,” in the sense once proposed by 
Erich Auerbach: 
 
Whatever we are, we became in history, and only in history can we remain the way we are 
and develop therefrom: it is the task of philologists, whose province is the world of human 
history, to demonstrate this so that it penetrates our lives unforgettably.38 
                                                             
37  Natalia Poltavtseva, “Platonov i Lukach (iz istorii sovetskogo iskusstva 1930-kh 
godov)” [Platonov i Lukács (from the history of Soviet art of the 1930s)], Novoe lite-
raturnoe obozrenie 107 (2011): 253–270. 
38  Erich Auerbach, “Philology and ‘Weltliteratur’,” The Centennial Review 13.1 (1969): 
1–17, 6. 
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NOTE ON QUOTATIONS FROM BRZOZOWSKI’S WORKS 
 
Quotations from Brzozowski’s work are cited according to the Dzieła (Works) 
edition. The volumes of this edition are not included in the “Works Cited” sec-
tions of the single chapters. In the footnotes, they are referred to by the name of 
the author and a short title. The full bibliographical references of these volumes 
are as follows: 
 
Listy [Letters]. 2 vols. Edited by Mieczysław Sroka. Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
Literackie, 1970. 
Kultura i życie [Culture and life]. Edited by Mieczysław Sroka. Warszawa: Pań-
stwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1973. 
Wczesne prace krytyczne [Early critical works]. Edited by Mieczysława Sroka 
(Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1988. 
Współczesna powieść i krytyka [The contemporary novel and contemporary criti-
cism]. Edited by Mieczysław Sroka and Janina Bahr. Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
Literackie, 1984. 
Idee [Ideas]. Edited by Mieczysław Sroka and Stefan Góra. Kraków: Wydaw-
nictwo Literackie, 1990. 
Legenda Młodej Polski [The legend of modern Poland]. 2 vols. Edited by Janina 
Bahr. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2001.39  
Sam wśród ludzi. Książka o starej kobiecie [Alone among people. A book about 
an old woman]. Edited by Maciej Urbanowski. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Lite-
rackie, 2011. 
Pod ciężarem Boga. Wiry. Płomienie [Under the weight of God. Whirlpools. 
Flames]. Edited by Maciej Urbanowski. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 
2012. 
 
The following two works have not yet been included in the Dzieła edition. They 
too are referenced by a short title and are not listed in the “Works Cited” sec-
tions: 
 
Głosy wśród nocy. Studia nad przesileniem romantycznym kultury europejskiej 
[Voices in the night. Studies on the romantic crisis in European culture]. Ed-
ited by Ostap Ortwin. Lwów: Księgarnia Polska B. Połonieckiego / War-
szawa: E. Wende i Sp., 1912.  
                                                             
39  All references are to the first volume of this edition. 
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Pamiętnik [Diary]. Edited by Maciej Urbanowski. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy 
imienia Ossolińskich, 2007. 
 
 
NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION OF TEXTS FROM POLISH 
 
We translate all Polish (German, Ukrainian…) quotations to English. The origi-
nal Polish text is given for Brzozowski’s works and in cases where it is essential 
for the sake of argument.   
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TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

“Sounding out idols”: Brzozowski and 
Strindberg as Nietzsche Readers 
Jan Balbierz 
 
 
There can be no strong, canonical writing with-
out the process of literary influence, a process 
vexing to undergo and difficult to understand. 
[…] The anxiety of influence is not an anxiety 
about the father, real or literary, but an anxiety 
achieved by and in the poem, novel or play. Any 
strong literary work creatively misreads and 
therefore misinterprets a precursor text or texts. 
An authentic canonical writer may or may not 
internalize her or his work’s anxiety, but that 
scarcely matters: the strongly achieved work is 
the anxiety.1 
 
The formation of a new literary canon and the displacement of the boundaries of 
the classical one played a crucial role in the cultural debates around the turn of 
the twentieth century; this era included Nietzsche finally being received in Eu-
rope, which led to one of the most spectacular canonical shifts in European 
modernism. Nietzsche’s dramatic rise in influence from a virtually unknown 
private scholar before 1890 to a cultural icon and the philosopher of modernity, 
was mostly created by three Scandinavian writers: Georg Brandes, Ola Hansson, 
and August Strindberg.  
                                                             
1  Harold Bloom, The Western Canon. The Book and Schools of the Ages (New York: 
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), 8. 
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The European Nietzsche Boom 
 
The European Nietzsche boom began in the spring of 1888 at the University of 
Copenhagen, when Georg Brandes, a Danish critic and culture historian, deliv-
ered a groundbreaking series of lectures on Nietzsche; these were later published 
under the title “Friedrich Nietzsche. En Afhandling om aristokratisk Radika-
lisme” (Friedrich Nietzsche: An Essay on Aristocratic Radicalism).2 Around the 
same time, the Swedish author Ola Hansson published an article on Nietzsche, 
which, when translated into German, played an important role in the European 
reception of Nietzsche at the end of the nineteenth century.3 Brandes had proba-
bly heard of Nietzsche as far back as early 1880, and their correspondence began 
in 1887 when Brandes wrote:  
 
Aber vieles stimmt mit meinen eignen Gedanken und Sympathien überein, die Gering-
schätzung der asketischen Ideale und der tiefe Unwille gegen demokratische Mittelmäßig-
keit, Ihr aristokratischer Radikalismus.4  
 
Much of it coincides with my own thoughts and sympathies, the ascetic contempt of ideals 
and the profound disgust with democratic mediocrity—your aristocratic radicalism. 
 
Nietzsche answered with his famous and often quoted compliment, “ein solcher 
guter Europäer und Kultur-Missionär” (such a fine European and cultural mis-
sionary).5   
Brandes’s presentation of Nietzsche in Aristokratisk Radikalisme may seem 
antiquated for today, but it was groundbreaking for the time. The main focus of 
the text is on Nietzsche’s critique of the liberal-democratic developments in Eu-
rope and his aversion to Christianity, and yet, most importantly, he did not give 
considerable attention to the formal developments of art and literature. Despite 
Brandes’s fierce diatribes against romantic aesthetics in the text, he exudes the 
influence of the romantic “cult of genius.” For him Nietzsche was one of those 
                                                             
2  Georg Brandes, “Friedrich Nietzsche. En Afhandling om aristokratisk Radikalisme 
(1889),” Samlede Skrifter, vol. 7 (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 
1901), 596–664. 
3  Ola Hansson, Friedrich Nietzsche. Seine Persönlichkeit und sein System [Friedrich 
Nietzsche: his personality and his system] (Leipzig: Fritzsch, 1890). 
4  Paul Krüger, Correspondance de Georg Brandes III, L’Allemagne (Copenhagen: Ro-
senkilde og Bagger, 1966), 439. 
5  Friedrich Nietzsche, Briefe 1861–1889 [Letters], ed. Karl-Maria Guth (Berlin: Con-
tumax, 2013), 339. 
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great minds who shared many of the same views as the “Modern Breakthrough,” 
a movement that contested the remnants of romanticism which emerged in the 
literatures of Scandinavia from the end of the 1860s onward. Brandes mainly fo-
cuses on Nietzsche’s critique of the liberal-democratic developments in Europe 
and his aversion to Christianity. 
Brandes also introduced Strindberg to Nietzsche by giving him Der Fall 
Wagner; in October 1888, Strindberg thanked him for the gift: 
 
Thank you for so kindly sending me Nietzsche in the midst of my desolation, an acquaint-
ance for which I am greatly indebted to you, since I find him the most liberated, the most 
modern of us all (not least, of course, on the Woman Question).6 
 
Then for a few weeks between 1888 and 1889, Strindberg began a correspond-
ence with Nietzsche, but it was interrupted by Nietzsche’s nervous breakdown.7 
The small but well-known cache of letters between them is mainly concerned 
with the possibility of translating and promoting each other’s works. More inter-
esting though are the passages on Nietzsche in numerous other letters that 
Strindberg mainly sent to other fellow writers. Strindberg wrote to Brandes’s 
brother, 
 
I am studying a German philosopher. His ideas and mine agree so completely that I find 
him excellent, the only philosopher alive that I have any use for. We have been in touch 
with each other for a few years. His name sounds strange and he is still unknown. His 
name is Friedrich Nietzsche. But he is a genius.8 
 
                                                             
6  August Strindberg, Strindberg’s Letters Vol. 2, 1892–1912, trans. Michael F. Robin-
son (London: The Athlone Press, 1992), 285. 
7  Directly after Nietzsche’s collapse Strindberg wrote to Brandes: “Dear Doctor, I know 
I am pestering you with letters, but I now believe our friend Nietzsche is mad, and 
what’s worse, that he can compromise us. Unless, that is, the crafty Slav (remember 
Turgeniev-Daudet, bear in mind the cunning Tolstoy) isn’t playing a trick on all of us! 
Read his letters in succession. In No. 1 he asks me to translate Ecce Homo—into 
French! To discourage him, I let him know what I had to pay for the translation of 
Mariés (1,000 Francs). In No. 2 he draws back—and sends me The Genealogy of 
Morals. I’m amazed to find I had already speculated about ‘Remords’ (Pangs of Con-
science) before I ever heard of him, and send him my story. Whereupon he replies 
with No. 3, signed Nietzsche Caesar. Was thun? In haste, Yours August Strindberg.” 
Strindberg, Letters Vol. 2, 299.  
8  Ibid., 125. 
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To the writer Verner von Heidenstam he wrote, “Buy a modern German philoso-
pher called Nietsche [sic], about whom G.B. has been lecturing. Everything is 
there! Don’t deny yourself this pleasure! N. is a poet too.”9 Some months later he 
added: “Read Friedrich Nietzsche. (Jenseit von Gut und Bose [sic!]).”10 In yet 
another letter he wrote that Nietzsche enabled the “fermentation of my ideas” 
and that “the uterus of my mental world has received a tremendous ejaculation of 
sperm from Friedrich Nietzsche, so that I feel like a bitch with a full belly.”11 
Strindberg was suffering from a strong anxiety of influence, he declared that his 
ideas were astonishingly similar to Nietzsche’s proposals even though he 
claimed to have developed them independently. In a letter to Brandes, he wrote 
that he himself had “anticipated the man [Nietzsche] […] he entered my life 
immediately after I had arrived at his position, without my knowing him, his 
point of view coincided with mine.”12  
Karin Hoff argues that Nietzsche’s correspondence with the Scandinavians in 
part contained debates on the canon which were always intertwined with issues 
of power and authority and that Strindberg’s and Nietzsche’s writings from this 
time were a kind of dialogue on the questions of social and biological hierarchy 
as well as symbolic capital. Along with this, Hoff claims that the dispositifs of 
power and the will to power are the “ideological nucleus”13 of Strindberg’s play 
The Father, which Nietzsche praises in one of his letters. The play presents 
mechanisms of violence and subjugation; it shows how attributes of power are 
transmitted and acquired through language games and how rhetorical devices 
help to maintain prestige, or on the contrary, lead to the destruction of traditional 
values established under the authority of the main character. A large part of the 
drama deals with symbolic capital and its transmission and substitution before 
concluding in the breakdown of social conventions.14  
 
Brzozowski’s Analysis of Nietzsche 
 
Brzozowski analyzes Nietzsche in two texts, the philosophical dialogue “Fry-
deryk Nietzsche,” which was written in 1906 and then published in 1907, and the 
                                                             
9  Ibid., 277. 
10  Ibid., 288. 
11  Ibid., 283. 
12  Ibid., 328. 
13  Karin Hoff, “…‘Ein angenehmer Wind von Norden’. Nietzsche und Strindberg im 
Dialog” [“A pleasant wind from the North.” Nietzsche and Strindberg in dialogue], 
Arcadia—International Journal for Literary Studies 39,1 (2004): 61. 
14  Ibid., 56. 
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essay “Filozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego” (Friedrich Nietzsche’s Philosophy) 
from 1907, which was published in Przegląd Filozoficzny (Philosophical Re-
view) in 1912. Along with these essays, Brzozowski makes numerous references 
to Nietzsche that are scattered throughout his works. Brzozowski’s writings can 
be viewed in the context of the first phase of Nietzsche’s reception in Europe, 
like Strindberg he makes frequent references to the “superman,” “will to power,” 
and the “revaluation of all values.”15  
Strindberg and Brzozowski were both compulsive readers and had a vora-
cious appetite for books; along with reading, the two were obsessive canon-
makers. Much of their works deal with removing or adding to the canon; the 
body of works they drew from was huge and always in flux so that there were 
constant reevaluations of the same texts, making these canons impossible to 
define. On several pages of Brzozowski’s Pamiętnik (Diary), for example, there 
are varying references to writers such as Arnold, Swinburne, Newman, Cole-
ridge, Blake, Keats, Meredith, and Shelley.  
Nietzsche occupies a central place in the personal canons of Strindberg and 
Brzozowski; both of them recognized the novelty and modernity of his philo-
sophical thought and vindicated different aspects of his philosophy. In order to 
justify their own poetics and philosophies, both Strindberg and Brzozowski were 
selective in their readings of their respective canonical authors. For Strindberg, 
Nietzsche was a modern perspectivist (like Strindberg himself) and he was, as 
well, an antidemocrat, an aristocratic radical, who foresaw the downfall of Euro-
pean culture through its decadence.16 In December 1888, Strindberg summarized 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, stating: 
 
Nietzsche heralds the downfall of Europe and Christianity [...]. Nietzsche is the modern 
spirit who dares to preach the right of the strong and the wise against the stupid and small 
                                                             
15  The topic of Brzozowski and Nietzsche is one of the earliest in the study of the works 
of the Polish philosopher and critic; in the mid-1930s Kazimierz Wyka delivered a 
paper on the topic and he was followed by Czesław Miłosz, Paweł Pieniążek, and An-
drzej Walicki. 
16  By the Open Sea (I havsbandet, 1890) is usually interpreted as a part of the Über-
mensch debate with its main character, the fishery inspector Axel Borg, being seen as 
a Swedish appropriation of the concept. Tobias Dahlqvist sees it as the most “Nie-
tzschean” of Strindberg’s novels that was “clearly conceived within a decadent hori-
zon of expectations.” Tobias Dahlkvist, “By the Open Sea—A Decadent Novel? Re-
considering relationships Between Nietzsche, Strindberg and Fin-de-Siècle Culture,” 
in The International Strindberg. New Critical Essays, ed. Anna Westerståhl Stenport 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012), 201. 
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(the democrats), and I can imagine the suffering of this great spirit under the sway of the 
petty host which dominates this feminized and cretinous age. And I hail him as the liber-
ator, ending my letters to my literary friends like his catechumen with: Read Nietzsche!17 
 
In the preface to the Twilight of the Idols (a book that Strindberg received from 
Nietzsche in 1888) Nietzsche coins the “phrase sounding out idols”: 
 
Another mode of convalescence […] is sounding out idols. There are more idols than real-
ities in the world [we must] pose questions with a hammer, and sometimes to hear as a 
reply that famous hollow sound that can only come from bloated entrails—what a delight 
to one who has ears even behind his ears, for me, an old psychologist and pied piper 
before whom just that which would remain silent must finally speak out.18 
 
In Brzozowski’s texts, Nietzsche appears among a rather heterogeneous group of 
predecessors such as Novalis, Vico, Boehme, Kleist, and Słowacki and contem-
porary philosophers such as Marx, Sorel, Simmel, or Avenarius. He is one of the 
cultural maiores and becomes one of the most important figures in Brzozowski’s 
cultural canon. Brzozowski’s reading of Nietzsche focuses on his critique of 
contemporary culture, life-philosophy, and the reevaluation of historicism. Like 
Nietzsche, Strindberg, and Ibsen, Brzozowski, especially in Legenda Młodej 
Polski (The Legend of Young Poland), sounds out the idols of contemporary 
Polish social life and public debate, revealing the “mystified consciousness” 
(zmistyfikowana świadomość)19 of the cultural Philistines; he criticized archaic 
rituals, conspicuous consumption of the ruling classes, and eventually the cler-
ics’ futile aspiration of living outside of history. If we employ the classifications 
that Nietzsche proposed in Untimely Meditations, the central agenda for 
Brzozowski is a critical approach to history that opposes its nationalist monu-
mentalization as well as the naive positivist quest for objectivity. The introduc-
tory chapter of Legenda, entitled “Nasze ‘ja’ i historia” (Our “Self” and History), 
is an attack on ahistorical thinking in which he writes that the fictions produced 
by literary historians “are only the specific form, the specific result of more 
general, and more fundamental delusions that one could describe as delusions of 
cultural consciousness” (są tylko poszczególną postacią, poszczególnym wyni-
kiem złudzeń bardziej ogólnych i zasadniczych, które nazwaćby można złudze-
                                                             
17  Strindberg, Letters Vol. 2, 295. 
18  Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Holling-
dale. 
19  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 16. 
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niami kulturalnej świadomości).20 One cannot liberate oneself from history, one 
can only misapprehend it. Contrary to Nietzsche he offers a remedium to that 
grand “system of delusions and illusions” (system złudzeń i iluzji) and the “flights 
from history” (ucieczek przed historią)—“labor” (praca).21 
Leszek Kołakowski’s Main Currents of Marxism provides a chapter on Brzo-
zowski that continues to be the main source of information on the writer for non-
Polish speakers. Kołakowski notes that Brzozowski’s concept of the worker goes 
beyond the Marxist relations of production and the distinction between the pro-
letariat and capitalists; instead, “to him the proletariat was the instrument of a 
Promethean ideal derived from metaphysical reflection and not from observation 
of the actual tendency of the workers’ movement.”22 And that “it was only from 
the point of view of labor that men could understand the meaning of their own 
efforts, it was from the class of direct producers that humanity must learn to un-
derstand itself and be imbued with the necessary hope and confidence to govern 
its own destiny.”23 The free, efficient worker is not subjected to any superior 
power; he is a messenger for a better world in which he serves as a sort of secu-
lar messiah. Brzozowski continues to use quasi-religious language to describe 
this ideal society when he states: 
 
Póki społeczne życie nie stanie się współżyciem dopełniających się i potęgujących się 
wzajemnie, w niczym zaś nie krępujących jedne drugich – wolnych duchów, póty zada-
niem sztuki będzie ponad społeczeństwem stwarzać dla wszystkich – promienne państwo 
bezgranicznej swobody, dziedzinę, w której każdy wreszcie będzie mógł wyżyć sam siebie 
całkowicie, w której nie będzie skłonności tak odrębnej, tak nowej, która by nie mogła 
znaleźć dla siebie całkowitego, nie pohamowanego niczym wyrazu.24 
 
As long as social life does not become a community of free spirits that complement and 
strengthen each other, that do not embarrass one another, the mission of art is to create the 
shining state of limitless freedom above society for everyone, a sphere in which everybody 
can finally fully realize oneself, in which there would not be a penchant so special, so new 
that could not find for itself an expression that is not restricted by anything. 
 
                                                             
20  Ibid., 13. 
21  Ibid., 26. 
22  Leszek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution. 
Vol. II. The Golden Age, trans. P.S. Falla (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 234. 
23  Ibid., 231. 
24  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Teatr współczesny i jego dążności rozwojowe” [Contempo-
rary theater and its development] in Wczesne prace krytyczne, 342–343. 
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His prophecy of the resurrection of the working class has failed, as all historio-
sophical prophecies do. Despite this, the figure of the worker does not neces-
sarily need to be understood in terms of class struggle because Brzozowski’s 
opposition is between anyone who actively changes the course of history and the 
material foundations of society, i.e., the workers, and what Thorstein Veblen 
called “the leisure class,” which Brzozowski equated with unproductive intel-
lectuals who “consider their adventures in acquiring culture, their ideological 
development, their state of mind to be the core of history” (uważają swoje 
perypetie w nabywaniu kultury, swoje przejścia ideologiczne, stany dusz, za 
właściwy rdzeń dziejów).25 
Most critics recognize Brzozowski’s philosophy as being rooted in Marxism. 
If this is correct, his idea of the workers and the proletariat would be another var-
iation of the phantasma of the “working class” as the driving force of history, 
which has been so dear to the academic upper-middle class since the nineteenth 
century. However, Brzozowski’s affiliations to Marx and his followers, espe-
cially, were complicated. In Legenda Młodej Polski he writes, “historical materi-
alism was forged […] initially as a method of research that finally turned into 
some sort of socialist Esperanto” (Materializm dziejowy został sfałszowany […] 
z metody badania, stał się tylko pewnym rodzajem socialistycznego Espe-
ranto).”26 In his essay on Nietzsche, he expresses even more strongly his disgust 
with left-wing group-thinking, “Nothing is more infamous than the modern 
theories of social solidarity that throw around the notion of altruism” (Nic dla 
nas nie ma ohydniejszego niż szermujące terminem altruizm nowoczesne teorie 
solidarności społecznej).27 The main aim of the proletariat is not class struggle 
but rather the creation of the new man—one of the central myths of early 
modernism: 
 
Ruch klasy robotniczej rozpatrywany z tej strony posiada całkiem inne znaczenie niż to, 
jakie mu się nadaje zazwyczaj, jest to tworzenie się nowej arystokracji, powstawanie no-
wego typu człowieka, zdolnego objąć świadomy ster dziejów. Różni się on głęboko od de-
mokratycznych dążeń, z którymi splatają go jednodniowe interesy polityki.28 
 
From this perspective, the working-class movement has a fundamentally different signifi-
cance from that which it is normally ascribed to; it entails the creation of a new aristoc-
racy, the emergence of a new type of man who will be able to take the helm of history in 
                                                             
25  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 13. 
26  Ibid., 231. 
27  Brzozowski, “Filozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego,” in Kultura i życie, 683. 
28  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 231. 
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hand. It profoundly differs from the democratic aspirations with which it is merged by 
ephemeral interests of politics.  
 
In his essay on Nietzsche, Brzozowski makes a lengthy argument for the role of 
the worker in history and how “the ideal of freedom today is the worker” 
(ideałem swobody ludzkiej jest dziś robotnik),29 who is supposed to be skillful 
and flexible. He defines “true freedom” in relation to labor and not as something 
spiritual because a free man produces the basis of his life for himself. 30 This 
philosophy focuses on the formulation of ideas rather than on knowledge (espe-
cially with the creation of the idea of labor instead of the earlier idea of being) 
which results in the creation of a new type of man whose existence is based on 
freedom. This man, as opposed to the rest of the world, is a worker.31 
Kołakowski notes that Brzozowski’s proletariat is “a collective warrior with 
the traits of a Nietzschean hero”;32 indeed Brzozowski’s “worker” and his 
“working class” share certain characteristics with Nietzsche’s concepts of the 
artist and superman. For Nietzsche, the artist is not only someone who writes 
poems or stands at an easel, instead he is anyone who is capable of changing his 
own life by exceeding its boundaries and recreating himself. The concept of the 
worker for Brzozowski is emblematic of an existence that is free, creative, and 
open to continuous transgression. In place of being a class-related category, it 
becomes an existential imperative of self-mastery, and thus an important part of 
Brzozowski’s moral philosophy. This similarity is explicitly stated in the dia-
logue “Fryderyk Nietzsche” in which Brzozowski refers to the superman as a 
“creator” (twórca) and writes that “every creation is always tantamount to this 
slogan: beyond the man!” (wszelka twórczość zawsze i wszędzie równoznaczną 
jest z tym hasłem: ponad człowieka!)33 Nietzsche also appears in the article “Fi-
lozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego” as an example of an ideal man who is “capable 
of a free life”34 (zdolny do swobodnego życia) and reliant on the chaos of his-
tory. Here the argument continues with a critique of an earlier philosophy that 
could only provide “mythological falsifications” (mitologiczne falsyfikacje). Brzo-
zowski states that Nietzsche’s writings are a document of the “decomposition of a 
certain type of consciousness” (rozkładu pewnego typu świadomości),35 but also 
                                                             
29  Brzozowski, “Filozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego,” 650. 
30  Ibid., 679. 
31  Ibid., 673. 
32  Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 233. 
33  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Fryderyk Nietzsche,” in Kultura i życie, 643. 
34  Brzozowski, “Filozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego,” 648. 
35  Ibid., 657. 
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the heralds of a new consciousness. In his interpretation of Nietzsche, Brzo-
zowski first criticizes the idea of “being” as something that is granted to human-
kind and then relying on Nietzsche he proposes a philosophical project built on 
the idea of the individual subject actively fighting with and changing reality in 
its material aspects. Brzozowski states that “Nietzsche’s philosophy is essen-
tially a philosophy of courage: dare to live, dare to struggle for life” (Filozofia 
Nietzschego jest właściwie filozofią śmiałości: śmiej żyć, śmiej walczyć o ży-
cie)36 and that in dealing with the forces of life, courage is more important than 
unchangeable moral values, laws, or ethical systems. 
If we interpret Brzozowski’s philosophy in this post-Nietzschean context, it 
radically changes from a variant of Marxism to a philosophy of existential cour-
age. In the chapter “Odrodzenie indywidualizmu” (The Rebirth of Individual-
ism) of his lecture “Estetyka poglądowa” (The Aesthetics of Perception), he 
writes that according to Nietzsche, the end of the nineteenth century is charac-
terized by a “fear of responsibility”37 (obawa przed odpowiedzialnością): 
 
Współcześni nasi boją się wprost – mówi on – być sprawcami czegokolwiek, lękają się 
każdego czynu, który by był prawdziwie ich czynem, nie śmią oprzeć się nigdy wyłącznie 
na samych sobie, szukają poza sobą lub ponad sobą czegoś, co by nimi kierowało i uświę-
cało ich kroki, co by działało niejako za nich.38 
 
Our contemporaries—he [Nietzsche] says—are simply afraid of being the agents of some-
thing, they are dreading every act which would really be their own, they do not dare to 
rely exclusively on their own selves, they are searching for something beyond or above 
themselves that would guide them and illuminate their path, that would somewhat act for 
them. 
 
This new philosophy proclaims a sovereign life based on the concept of labor. 
Only when labor is recognized as the sole form of “life that produces effects in 
the world beyond man” (życia wytwarzającą pozaludzkie, bytowe skutki)39 can 
human existence become sovereign: “Nie miej religii, lecz bądź religią – tak 
formułuje się stanowisko Nietzschego. […] Sam dla siebie musisz zostać bo-
giem, stworzyć swego boga”40 (You should not have a religion but be one—that 
is how Nietzsche’s attitude can be defined. […] You have to become a god for 
                                                             
36  Brzozowski, “Filozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego,” 664. 
37  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Estetyka poglądowa,” in Wczesne prace krytyczne, 79. 
38  Ibid., 79n. 
39  Brzozowski, “Filozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego,” 688. 
40  Ibid., 690. 
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yourself, to create your own god). Or, as Brzozowski puts it elsewhere, “All of 
our everyday reality is our constant achievement. Nietzsche knew about this as 
well as all the other deep religious moralists” (Cała powszednia nasza rzeczy-
wistość jest naszym nieustannym dziełem. Wiedział o tym zarówno Nietzsche, 
jak i każdy z głębokich moralistów religijnych).41 The affirmative aspects of 
Brzozowski’s idea of labor are also derived from Nietzsche, whose “reckless 
individualism” (indywidualizm bezwzględny) means to utter “the holy and crea-
tive word ‘yes’” (świętego i twórczego słowa “tak”).42  
One of the most important features of the literary and philosophical discourse 
of the turn of the twentieth century was the instability of the narrative point of 
view. Nietzsche’s perspectivism, for example, his reflections on the impossibil-
ity of creating neutral perspectives, the incommensurability of truth(s), and the 
necessity of interpretation, can be seen in the broader context of the changing 
narrative patterns in modernist literature.43 Despite numerous recurring themes in 
Nietzsche (as well as in Brzozowski and Strindberg), the narrative points of view 
change synchronically and diachronically, their discourses are often incoherent, 
concepts are turned upside-down, and the twisting and turning of ideas never 
ends. Since conventional philosophical language had degenerated to clichés as a 
columbarium of mummified truths and “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms 
and anthropomorphisms,”44 the only way to renew philosophy was to make the 
language performative. “Creativity” (twórczość) then must have its own life, it 
must grow directly out of the “active relations of the given, living person” (czyn-
nych stosunków danej, żywej istoty), and yet be unprecedented and radically 
new. A performative act of language then can transform reality: 
 
Twórczość – powstanie absolutne, początek bezwzględny, jest poza nawiasem tego, co 
jest. Można mówić o niej słowem „będzie”, a właściwie i tak nawet nie, lecz jakimś 
nieokreślonym i nieustającym „niech się stanie”.45 
 
Creativity—absolute emergence, the unconditional beginning is outside the realm of what 
exists. One could depict it with the words “it will be,” but even this is not exact, rather 
some indefinite and continuous “let it emerge.”  
                                                             
41  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Prolegomena filozofii pracy,” in Idee, 244. 
42  Brzozowski, “Estetyka poglądowa,” 83. 
43  Cf. Michał Paweł Markowski, Nietzsche. Filozofia interpretacji [Nietzsche. A philo-
sophy of interpretation] (Kraków: Universitas, 2001). 
44  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Penguin, 1982), 46. 
45  Brzozowski, “Fryderyk Nietzsche,” 614.  
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The most profound consequence of the shift from representation to the performa-
tivity of language are the perpetual inconsistencies of discourse in Nietzsche, 
Strindberg, and Brzozowski which make it impossible to construct a coherent 
worldview—they were all anti-systematic thinkers. In a letter to Brandes from 
December 1888, Strindberg wrote: “Strange that through Nietzsche I should now 
find the method in my madness of ‘opposing everything’. I reassess and put new 
values on old things!”46 Brzozowski also commented: “Ważne jest to, co stawia 
opór spójności myślowej i jedności perspektywicznej, co nie daje się objąć w 
jednym i tym samym planie” (The important thing is to resist the coherence of 
thought and the unity of perspective, so that it could not be comprehended on 
one single level).47 
Brzozowski’s “Fryderyk Nietzsche” exemplifies the narrative inconsistencies 
typical for the subversive thinking of Brzozowski and Nietzsche. From the dia-
logue a cultural canon evolves, and Brzozowski shows how his own works are 
embedded in that canon. Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, introduced over-
looked philosophical problems that develop new issues associated with the con-
cepts of life, action, and labor; Brzozowski declares himself to be among the 
same philosophical tradition as he strives to solve these problems through the 
two main pillars of his philosophy—life and labor. Nietzsche is presented as a 
precursor of the “philosophy of life,” and Brzozowski postulates a “socio-psy-
chological” point of view that takes into account both the individual and what is 
socially conditioned.  
“Fryderyk Nietzsche” plays on the narrative tradition of Platonic dialogue 
with all the aporias and contradictions that are associated with this genre. Two 
key issues with the text would be whose voice does the speaking and what its 
significance is in relation to the overall narrative. The irony of the introduction 
encapsulates the text whose plot takes place during a symposium between a 
handicapped sculptor who can no longer use his tools, a tubercular actress, and a 
philosopher. The characters have all their “possibilities blocked in their devel-
opment” (możliwości powstrzymane w rozwoju)”48 and they are left discussing 
philosophy because “for those who do not live themselves, nothing remains 
except to scrutinize life” (tym bowiem, którzy sami nie żyją – nie pozostaje nic 
prócz zgłębiania życia).49 
Nietzsche’s fundamental place in Brzozowski’s cultural canon is merited by 
the fact that he created a new anthropology: 
                                                             
46  Strindberg, Letters Vol. 2, 296. 
47  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 39. 
48  Brzozowski, “Fryderyk Nietzsche,” 605. 
49  Ibid., 606. 
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Usiłuje on [Nietzsche] wydobyć, przeżyć jak najwięcej „stanów duchowych”, czy jak się 
to nazywa, uwolnionych spod władzy i kontroli koordynujących perspektyw. Ma się prze-
cież wrażenie, że Nietzsche śmieje się prosto w twarz wszelkim teoriom, normom i idea-
łom: „tyle chcecie zostawić z człowieka, tyle znacie; a to? a to? I tych „a to?” jest bez 
końca. Filozofowie badają człowieka zazwyczaj z punktu widzenia przydatności jego do 
takich a takich celów, a tu mamy samorodność żywą, drgającą, nerwowo zmienną, chwiej-
ną, wielokształtną. Cel – cel? Jam jest, który stawiam, stwarzam cele!50 
 
He [Nietzsche] tries to retrieve, to live through, the greatest possible number of “states of 
mind,” or how should one call it, which are free from the power and control of perspec-
tives. There is a saying that Nietzsche simply laughs in the face of all theories, norms, and 
ideals: “so this much is what you would like to leave of the man, this is what you know; 
and this? and this? And there is no end to these “and this?”. Philosophers usually study 
man from the point of view of his applicability to these or other goals, but here we have a 
living self-creation, twitching, nervously variable, unstable, multifaceted. A goal—a goal? 
It is I who sets, who creates goals!   
 
Nietzsche represented “the new type of philosopher” who was anticipated by 
Giambattista Vico. Philosophy today puts new issues on the agenda, it has to 
awaken to the “self-government” (samowładza) of humankind. Thus, it becomes 
a part of personal and social liberation. Nietzsche’s radical novelty lies in the 
fact that he reformulated the undertaking of philosophy: “człowiek sam wy-
znacza sobie ten cel, dla którego ma żyć, chce żyć. […] Filozofia przestaje być 
poznawaniem idei – staje się ich tworzeniem” (man himself sets the goal that he 
wants to live for. […] Philosophy ceases to be the cognition of an idea—it be-
comes its creation).51 For Brzozowski, Nietzsche’s uniqueness lies in his explo-
ration of the tragedy of existence and, as Rüdiger Safranski puts it, his struggles 
with the “enormity” of life.52 The merit of Nietzsche’s philosophy is that no one 
ever represented better the erratic, pulsating, irrational, creative “life.” More-
over, Nietzsche’s discourse is characterized by “breaking up with bookish ‘theo-
reticizing’” (zerwanie z książkowym “teoretyzmem”).53 Just as the ancient meta-
physicians were apologists for religious beliefs, Nietzsche writes apologias for 
the unrestrained life.  
                                                             
50  Brzozowski, “Fryderyk Nietzsche,” 622. 
51  Brzozowski, “Filozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego,” 646. 
52  The term “das Ungeheure” (the uncanny) is used in: Rüdiger Safranski, Nietzsche. 
Biographie seines Denkens [Nietzsche: a biography of his thought] (Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer, 2002), 15ff. 
53  Brzozowski, “Filozofia Fryderyka Nietzschego,” 645. 
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There is an entire body of writings, shared by early Nietzsche readers like 
Strindberg and Brzozowski. The most prominent authors figuring in this list 
were Charles Darwin and Arthur Schopenhauer—“the educator” of a whole gen-
eration. Other, more forgotten influences were Ernst Haeckel, with whom Strind-
berg corresponded; Henry Buckle and his History of Civilisation in England (he 
appears several times in Strindberg’s autobiographical novel The Son of the 
Servant); Maurice Barrès’s trilogy Le culte du moi;54 and eventually, though 
surprisingly, Emanuel Swedenborg, a major influence on late Strindberg whom 
Brzozowski described as an “uncommon […] thinker […] and scholar” (niepospo-
lity[…] myśliciel[…] i uczony) who will be fully appreciated along with “prog-
resses in preternormal psychology” (postępy psychologii ponadnormalnej).55  
The array of cultural topics is also easily recognizable: physiology and the 
politics of the body, the mythologies and rituals of the upper middle-classes, 
emancipation, the decay and possible healing of European culture, objectivity, 
and the Was-ist-Wahrheit question. In her book on Ibsen, Toril Moi argues that 
our understanding of the term modernism is a result of historical amnesia: 
 
Most of the numerous nineteenth-century struggles over realism had nothing to do with 
modernism, and everything to do with idealism. […] What we have forgotten is that ideal-
ism did not simply die with romanticism, but that it remained a powerful aesthetic norm 
for most of the nineteenth century, and that weak, degraded forms of idealism lasted until 
just about all the aesthetic conflicts that raged in Europe throughout the century, and 
particularly in the bitter struggles that mark the period after 1870.56 
 
Most aspects of modernism in Nietzsche, Strindberg, and Brzozowski can be 
seen in the light of the discreditation of the idealistic assumptions of late post-ro-
mantic culture and the operative delusions of the European upper-middle classes 
that were usually referred to under the umbrella-term of idealism. In a European 
context, Brzozowski’s rewriting of Nietzsche can be seen as the backdrop of a 
cultural movement whose main aim was the debunking of this idealism.  
 
Translated by Zofia Ziemann 
                                                             
54  To his friend Leopold Littmansson, Strindberg commented on his own essay “Moi” in 
Summer 1894: “The only thing that exists is the self (le culte du moi), and I know 
nothing about the world and ‘other people’ except through myself.” Quoted and trans-
lated by Robinson in: Strindberg, Letters Vol. 2, 241. 
55  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 115n. 
56  Toril Moi, Henrik Ibsen and the Birth of Modernism. Art, Theatre, Philosophy (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3. 
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“Ibsen! Oh, let us not invoke this name in 
vain!”1 Brzozowski’s Ibsen Not-quite-read2 
Ewa Partyga 
 
 
Although Stanisław Brzozowski truly admired Henrik Ibsen in his early years, 
he did not publish very much on the playwright. Before 1905 he only reviewed 
two Ibsen productions—Samfundets Støtter (Pillars of Society) in February 1903 
and Gengangere (Ghosts) in November 1904. Between late 1905 and early 1906 
he wrote two works devoted to Ibsen following Wilhelm Feldman’s lectures on 
his dramaturgy in Zakopane. Both of the latter texts were published in Przegląd 
Społeczny (Social review) soon after Ibsen’s death in 1906. Brzozowski’s ideas 
from the dialogue in verse “Nad grobem Ibsena” (Over Ibsen’s Grave) were 
subsequently presented in a more systematic way in the important essay “Styl 
Ibsena” (Ibsen’s Style). Finally after 1906, Ibsen became one of the negative 
protagonists of Legenda Młodej Polski (The Legend of Young Poland) where he 
appears in varying chapters with the unrewarding role of a consoler of his gener-
ation.3 In Legenda, Brzozowski announces his intentions of discussing Ibsen in 
greater detail in a future work. As he writes in a letter to Ostap Ortwin, the Ibsen 
passages that were eventually not included in Legenda, figured in Idee (Ideas) 
under the title “Herezje o Ibsenie” (Heresies about Ibsen).4 However, they did 
not make it into the eventual publication of the work; what is more, Ortwin could 
not find them in Brzozowski’s papers after his death. It is possible that Brzo-
                                                             
1  “Ibsen! O, nie wzywajmy imienia tego nadaremno!” Brzozowski, Wczesne prace kry-
tyczne, 655. 
2  The research for this article was supported by the National Science Center Grant, no. 
UMO-2013/11/B/HS2/02494 (Narodowe Centrum Nauki). 
3  Cf. Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 215. 
4  Cf. Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 2, 175. Ortwin quotes this letter in his introduction to 
Głosy wśród nocy [Voices in the night]. 
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zowski came to regard these considerations as backward with respect to The 
Legend. In any case, there is a lot to suggest that he deemed Ibsen’s case a 
closed chapter by the end of 1909. 
In 1906 Brzozowski wrote, “Ibsen – to jedno z najdroższych kłamstw na-
szych. Mówić o nim spokojnie niepodobna; i dlatego warto jeszcze mówić”5 (Ib-
sen is one of our most precious lies. It is not possible to speak about him calmly; 
and that is why it is still worth while talking about him). Did he decide three 
years later that Ibsen was no longer worth talking about? Did he want to sym-
bolically kill his Ibsen with silence? Even if this were the case, Brzozowski did 
not forget his love for Ibsen’s plays. This is evident from a letter to Feliks Brzo-
zowski from late December 1910:  
 
Każdy z nas wyrobił sobie swój własny świat wewnętrzny, w który wierzy. Świat wew-
nętrzny każdego człowieka jest ciasny w porównaniu z wielkim, jaki istnieje, choć nie jest 
nigdy poznany, więc właściwie ja i Ty, i wszyscy możemy być pewni, że jesteśmy raczej 
błędem drukarskim historii niż czymś innym. No, ale jeżeli tak, to ponieważ i tak zecer 
wyjmie nas z formy i rzuci do kaszty (plagiat robię z Ibsena i jego odlewacza guzików w 
Peer Gyncie, którego, jeżeli nie znasz, przeczytaj – w jakim chcesz języku, choćby po 
rosyjsku, bo jest to jeden z fragmentów najszczerszej i najmędrszej, odważnej poezji, jakie 
zostały w tych nie bardzo mądrych i nie bardzo odważnych czasach wytworzone […]).6 
 
All of us have created our own inner world that we believe in. Every man’s inner world is 
narrow in comparison to the big world that exists, although it is never perceived, hence 
you and I and all the others can be sure that we are rather a misprint of history than any-
thing else. But if this is the case, then the typist will take us out of the form and throw us 
to the type case anyway (I am plagiarizing Ibsen with his Button-Moulder in Peer Gynt, 
which you should read if you haven’t read it yet—no matter in what language, even in 
Russian, since this is one of the pieces of the sincerest and wisest poetry that has ever been 
created in our not so wise and not so brave times […]).  
 
In the abovementioned texts that were written between 1903 and 1909, Brzo-
zowski constructed a picture of Ibsen by commenting on a relatively small body 
of the playwright’s works. In the review of Pillars of Society, Brzozowski men-
tions three texts in passing: Bygmester Solness (The Master Builder) and En 
Folkefiende (An Enemy of the People), both are spoken of favorably, and Fruen 
fra Havet (The Lady from the Sea), which he criticized for its light-hearted end-
ing. Rosmersholm appears as context for a conversation between a playwright 
                                                             
5  Brzozowski, Kultura i życie, 211. 
6  Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 2, 507. 
Brzozowski’s Ibsen Not-quite-read | 41 
and an actress in “Nad grobem Ibsena.” Legenda mentions the earlier plays, Peer 
Gynt and Brand, as well as Ibsen’s last play, Når vi døde vaagner (When We 
Dead Awaken), which Brzozowski held in highest regard. In Pamiętnik (Diary), 
he lists texts that constitute a still valuable Ibsen canon: Kongs-Emnerne (The 
Pretenders), Peer Gynt, Vildanden (The Wild Duck), The Master Builder (or at 
least parts of it), and, again, When We Dead Awaken. Brzozowski’s references to 
Ibsen are always cursory and the plays do not seem very closely read. Moreover, 
Brzozowski’s reading is not as original as would be expected and one can easily 
identify the words of other critics. 
Ibsen’s reception in Poland was always somewhat superficial because re-
viewers discussed his plays along the lines of the current intellectual and artistic 
concepts rather than offering an original approach to the texts. Although Jan 
Michalik7 and Michał Głowiński8 consider Brzozowski’s voice as one of the 
most profound in the chorus of shallow Ibsen exegetes, it should be noted that he 
rarely overturned established criticism on Ibsen, he merely develops and deepens 
others’ perspectives by translating them into the terms of his own critical idiom. 
Moreover, there are strong indications that Brzozowski, following his deep con-
viction for the existential dimension of any significant text, reads Ibsen’s works 
in the context of the playwright’s biography and general worldview. In the re-
views, Brzozowski seems to have specific passages from Ibsen’s letters in mind 
as some excerpts of his letters were published and discussed in Poland in Czas 
(Time), Prawda (Truth), or Biblioteka Warszawska (Warsaw Library) in 1904 
and 1905.9 Critics, including Brzozowski, employed his epistolary utterances and 
polemical remarks, which were fragmented and taken out of context, as his 
worldview—gleaning his ideological/artistic declarations or his “theory” of 
literature from them.10  
                                                             
7  Jan Michalik, Twórczość Ibsena w sądach krytyki polskiej 1875–1906 [Ibsen’s work 
in Polish criticism] (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1971), 39–41. 
8  Cf. Michał Głowiński, “Deux critiques littéraires sur Ibsen (Ortwin – Brzozowski),” 
in Swedish-Polish Literary contacts, ed. Nils Åke Nilsson (Stockholm: Almqvist & 
Wiksell International, 1979), 61. 
9  Polish translations were based on letters published in 1904 in Die neue Rundschau. 
10  Some of the passages most popular with Ibsen commentators constitute an interesting 
background for observations developed by Brzozowski: “For a man of a certain spir-
itual development, the old notion of motherland is no longer sufficient […]. I believe 
that the sense of nationality is already dying out, and is going to be replaced by the 
sense of tribe.”; “For an individual, in turn, it is by no means necessary to be a citi-
zen.” (from letters to Brandes, translated into Polish by Józef Flach, “Listy Ibsena do 
Brandesa” [Ibsen’s letters to Brandes], Czas 201 [1904]): 1; “Everything that I have 
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Brzozowski considered Ibsen to be an important part of his own spiritual and 
intellectual biography and counted him among the writers and thinkers whom he 
cherished. Therefore, for Brzozowski, criticizing Ibsen was like criticizing him-
self. By undermining Ibsen’s beliefs and judgments, he reevaluates and over-
comes his own views. What were these judgments and beliefs? First of all, Brzo-
zowski portrays Ibsen as a spokesman for “absolute individualism,” which he 
also advocated for at the beginning of his writing career. Later on though, he po-
lemicized against this stance and denounced it for its futile indulgence in con-
templative attitudes—a habit Brzozowski persistently sees in Ibsen’s protag-
onists. Secondly, Ibsen, in Brzozowski’s view, advocated for the idea of society 
as the coexistence of free spirits; a topic that Brzozowski repeatedly revisited in 
order to better define the social dimension of individual existence.11  
Brzozowski’s whole dispute with Ibsen is very coherent and consistent. The 
texts on Ibsen can be read as a kind of three-act autobiographical drama with 
Ibsen as a foil. These portraits may differ in some detail, yet the principles and 
perspectives in them are much less unstable than those of his other critical pro-
jects. As a result, the image of Ibsen in these texts is not as polemically loaded as 
that of Stanisław Wyspiański, for example,12 but it grows stable and becomes 
increasingly unequivocal and one-dimensional.  
 
Act One: Ibsen in Brzozowski’s Play Reviews 
 
In his review of Pillars of Society from February 1903, Brzozowski clearly had 
his doubts about Ibsen’s early play, which he regarded as outdated and immature 
                                                             
created remains strongly connected with what I have lived through, but have not 
experienced. Every new work fulfilled its aim with respect to myself, serving as a lib-
erating and cleansing process. For man is never without his share of responsibility and 
blame before the society to which he belongs. This is why I wrote the following dedi-
cation in a copy of my book: To live—means to defeat in oneself / the spectre of dark 
nights. / To create—to pass judgement / over one’s own self.” (translated into Polish 
by Bertold Merwin, “Listy Ibsena”, Prawda (49): 1904). 
11  These explorations are discussed, e.g., by Andrzej Mencwel and Paweł Pieniążek in 
their books on Brzozowski.  
12  The ambivalence in Brzozowski’s attitude towards Wyspiański was recently discussed 
by Magdalena Popiel, “Brzozowski – Wyspiański. Dwie formuły ‘pathosu wyjątko-
wości’” [Brzozowski—Wyspiański: Two formulas for the “pathos of exceptionality”], 
in Konstelacje Stanisława Brzozowskiego, ed. Urszula Kowalczuk et al. (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2012).  
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in terms of its depth.13 He ridicules the “abundance of naive excitement” (zbytek 
naiwnego oburzenia) and the “varnish of commonplaces” (pokost komunałów) 
that smother “every sincere and frank outburst” (każdy szczerszy i śmielszy 
wybuch).14 Optimism was always “an ideological mask for passivity” (ideową 
maską bierności)15 for Brzozowski, so he was particularly put off by the play’s 
happy ending and bluntly describes it as a lie, “Even Ibsen, his Viking power 
notwithstanding, sometimes had to lie to himself in order to live” (nawet Ibsen, 
pomimo swej mocy Wikinga, potrzebował niekiedy kłamać przed samym sobą, 
by żyć).16 However, he also highlights some points on Ibsen that invariably 
fascinate him; namely the expression of creative fervor, the deliberate incom-
pleteness of some of his other plays, and his refusal to be contented with what he 
had already done. This appeals to Brzozowski because Ibsen—fortunately—
could not be entitled a perfect artist. Thus, Brzozowski’s appreciation at the time 
stems from the formation of his philosophical belief in the “primacy of function 
over product.”17 What matters above all is the deep conviction that Ibsen’s writ-
ing was not art for art’s sake: “Sztuka nigdy nie była u Ibsena sama przez się i 
sama dla siebie celem, nigdy nie była czemś ostatecznem i jedynem”18 (For 
Ibsen, art never was a goal in and for itself, was never something final and 
unique). 
This idea, which is concurrent with Brzozowski’s conception of art, is based 
on the prevalent thoughts that had already been a critical key to Ibsen’s works at 
the time. Since the mid-1890s, these thoughts were regarded as Ibsen’s “con-
frontation with himself, an attempt to consider, analyze, and overcome his own 
illusions, mistakes, ideals.”19 Some critics like Feliks Konieczny analyzed Ib-
sen’s writing through his biography so that in his plays his “personal problems 
are given a universally human dimension, and in this way become objecti-
vized,”20 while others treated it as his method of acquiring spiritual maturity or 
development. Thus, when Brzozowski writes that Ibsen’s works “were always 
                                                             
13  Brzozowski, Wczesne prace krytyczne, 558. 
14  Ibid., 556. 
15  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 191. 
16  Brzozowski, Wczesne prace krytyczne, 558. 
17  Ryszard Nycz, “Wywoływanie świata. Zadania krytyki i sztuki w pisarstwie filozo-
ficznym Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [Invoking the world: the tasks of criticism and 
art in Stanisław Brzozowski’s philosophical writings], in Język modernizmu. Prolego-
mena historycznoliterackie (Wrocław: Fundacja na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej, 1997), 123. 
18  Brzozowski, Wczesne prace krytyczne, 557. 
19  Michalik, Twórczość Ibsena, 84. 
20  Quoted from: Michalik, Twórczość Ibsena, 85. 
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for him [Ibsen] only stages: they did not exist for and through themselves, but 
were always just the efforts of some inner liberation” (były zawsze dla niego 
tylko stopniami: nie istniały one same dla siebie i przez siebie, lecz były zawsze 
tylko usiłowaniami jakiegoś wewnętrznego wyzwolenia),21 he does not do any-
thing groundbreaking in Ibsen criticism. However, he does include Ibsen in his 
reflections on the contradiction between artistry and creative work. The latter is 
characterized by incompleteness and openness on the one hand and a tight link 
between artistic or cultural activity and the process of self-definition on the 
other.   
In the review of Ghosts, Ibsen becomes Brzozowski’s accomplice in a pas-
sionate and ruthless attack against the “Lechitic idleness” (lechicka gnuśność) 
and the “urban self-adulation” (mieszczuchowskie samouwielbienie)22 of the 
Warsaw psyche. Brzozowski portrays the blabbering Oswald who loses touch 
with reality as a symbol of the future of Polish audiences who watch tragedy 
with the indifference of condescension. In a highly affected manner, Brzozowski 
calls for a deeper reading of Ghosts that would draw back the conventional lan-
guage of the moment and reveal something more. At the time, Ghosts was con-
ventionally regarded as the epitome of naturalism, but Brzozowski tried to reveal 
a deeper meaning in the play:  
 
Jest tylko jeden grzech, za który nie ma przebaczenia, grzech przeciwko wiecznie twór-
czej, wiecznie rwącej się w świat poza siebie żądzy życia. Jest jeden tylko grzech: wy-
przeć się własnych bogactw duchowych, które się ma, i tych, które się zdobyć może. Jest 
jeden tylko grzech: zabić tę żądzę życia, żądzę piękna, potęgi w sobie lub kim innym.23 
 
There is only one sin for which there is no forgiveness, the sin against the eternally crea-
tive will to life, eternally striving for the world beyond itself. There is only one sin: to 
renounce one’s own spiritual riches, those which one already has and those which one can 
obtain. There is only one sin: to kill the will to life, the will to beauty, to the power in 
oneself or in someone else. 
 
Brzozowski is not alone in this view of Ghosts. In Polish criticism after 1900, 
such concepts as “żądza życia” (the will to life) or “żądza mocy” (the will to 
power) were frequently used with reference to Ibsen’s protagonists in order to 
                                                             
21  Brzozowski, Wczesne prace krytyczne, 557. 
22  Ibid., 649.  
23  Ibid., 651. 
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bring out their Nietzschean traits,24 even though these approaches were contested 
as well.25 In these reviews Brzozowski still presents Ibsen as an author who 
fulfills the critic’s then valid postulates regarding art. However, it turns out that 
the Norwegian playwright no longer meets Brzozowski’s demands towards 
creative work. 
 
Act Two: Brzozowski’s Ibsen in 1906 
 
The first of Brzozowski’s two texts on Ibsen, “Nad grobem Ibsena,” was a dia-
logue in verse that staged a conversation between actress and playwright after a 
showing of Rosmersholm. This setup was probably inspired by Stanisław 
Wyspiański’s “Studium o Hamlecie” [Study on Hamlet], a work that links the 
dramatis personae with the actors’ true bodies and personalities, including 
Shakespeare. Brzozowski gradually blurs the boundaries between the actress 
playing a character, the character itself, and its maker. Wyspiański presents these 
relations in a constant flux while in Brzozowski they are clearly defined. The 
actress and playwright discuss the inevitable and permanent rupture between art 
and life experienced by Ibsen’s protagonists, the actors struggling with playing 
their roles, and finally the author himself. Thus, Ibsen himself eventually be-
comes the protagonist of the dialogue—Ibsen made to resemble an Ibsenian 
character. The act of consigning the author into the fictional world of his own 
works emphasizes the key topic of Brzozowski’s text, the problem of unem-
bodied desires, which turns Ibsen’s fight for individuality into a dead end: 
 
Wszedł w ciszę śmierci / Człowiek, co błyskawic łaknął chrztu / […] / Lecz by zobaczyć 
Boga piorun jasny, / Trzeba uwierzyć / W szczyt, że jest nasz własny. / Trzeba stać na nim 
nie myślą – marzeniem, / Lecz ciałem – pracą. / Bezcielesnymi Bóg gardzi myślami.26 
 
And the Man who yearned for the baptism by lightning entered the silence of death […]. 
But to see God’s bright thunderbolt, you have to believe in the summit that is ours. You 
have to stand on him not in thoughts or in dreams, but as a body—by labor. God despises 
those who are bodiless. 
 
The key concept of this stage of Brzozowski’s reflection on Ibsen is the lack of 
corporeality within experience which he sees as being manifested in these works. 
                                                             
24  At that time, Brzozowski also readily associates Ibsen with Nietzsche, cf. Wczesne 
prace krytyczne, 104. 
25  Cf. Michalik, Twórczość Ibsena, 82f. 
26  Brzozowski, Kultura i życie, 174f. 
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This idea was not new in Ibsen criticism as there were frequent claims that his 
protagonists came from forms of self-reflection and purely intellectual explora-
tions, a certain “algebraism of thought.”27 Their primary role in the inner 
development of Ibsen’s individuality was noted by Ortwin,28 while Feldman 
underscored that the author’s late plays occur “only in the realm of the soul: all 
characters only signify the states of the artist’s soul; […] here, the material body 
is only an appearance, and the symbolized experience of the soul is every-
thing.”29 In a side remark to his discussion of Rosmersholm, Feldman claims that 
“Ibsen aimed to separate man from the directness of any life, to bridle all forces 
of nature, and throw them at the spirit’s feet.”30 Brzozowski does not explore 
such critical views or set them against the concrete text; instead, he uses them as 
an argument in constructing his philosophy of action and labor. First of all, he 
places Ibsen among those whose thought and art are occupied with the mind and 
are thus solely contented with theatrical gestures that do not live up to action. 
This finally undermines Ibsen’s individualism, which, as Brzozowski sees it, 
always remains sentimental and contemplative so that it never becomes heroic 
nor tragic. 
Aphoristic and poetically phrased, the propositions of the dialogue were dis-
cursively expanded and specified in the essay “Styl Ibsena.” Brzozowski’s dis-
tinction between dream and work is reformulated as he revises and generalizes 
both categories under the evaluative framework of a confrontation of idealism 
and tragicality.31 For the first time Brzozowski sketches a fuller portrait of Ibsen 
as someone representing his whole generation, a generation that realized its 
worldview in the playwright’s style. Connecting Ibsen with his era allows 
Brzozowski to portray a characteristic attitude toward the world termed “Ibsen’s 
style” that serves as an inspiration for his contemporaries. In the essay, Ibsen 
plays the role of “one of the—devilishly rare—arguments that allow us to be-
lieve in the spiritual dignity of modern man” (jednej z racji – diabelnie nielicz-
nych – pozwalających wierzyć w godność duchową nowoczesnego człowieka).32 
Yet, at the same time he has already become “one of our most cherished lies” 
                                                             
27  Michalik, Twórczość Ibsena, 122. 
28  Cf.: Ostap Ortwin, “Ibsen w rozwoju dramatu” [Ibsen in the development of drama], 
in O Wyspiańskim i dramacie, ed. Jadwiga Czachowska (Warszawa: Państwowy In-
stytut Wydawniczy, 1969) (Ortwin’s article was first published in 1900). 
29  Quoted from: Michalik, Twórczość Ibsena, 131. 
30  Ibid., 90. 
31  This essay is discussed from a comparative perspective (Brzozowski–Ortwin) by Mi-
chał Głowiński, “Deux critiques littéraires sur Ibsen (Ortwin – Brzozowski).” 
32  Brzozowski, Kultura i życie, 211. 
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(jednym z najdroższych kłamstw naszych). His plays have helped the whole 
generation to maintain certain illusions: “Ibsen – to nasza legenda o wewnętrznej 
wolności człowieka, to baśń o jaźni oczyszczającej się przez duchowy samosąd 
w filisterskim ciele”33 (Ibsen is our legend of man’s inner liberty, the fairy tale of 
the “I” that purges itself through a spiritual trial against oneself in a philistine 
body). Thus, Ibsen turns into a symbol of absolute individualism—the shielding 
of the self against the world in order to safeguard one’s inner spiritual freedom. 
According to Brzozowski, his own generation always heard the same call in 
Ibsen’s plays, namely to be, and be faithful to, oneself as well as to one’s own 
truth. However, the fascination with this seemingly radical call turned out to be 
merely a substitute for life, a dangerous form of idealism. This leads to the inev-
itable mind-body split that goes so far as to disregard the body altogether; it also 
makes the structural basis for “Nad grobem Ibsena” in that “[t]he body is the 
organ of our relations with the universe; in thought we are only communicating 
with ourselves” (Ciało jest organem naszych stosunków z wszechświatem; myślą 
obcujemy tylko sami ze sobą).34 Ibsen’s protagonists nurture their dreams of 
inner freedom and are attuned to their “beautiful souls,” yet they are deaf to the 
calls of the external world and thus doomed to “their souls becoming rotten.” He 
concludes the essay by explaining how Ibsen’s characters remain forever “sub-
tragic”35 because they are devoid of their bodies. Tragic destruction cannot result 
from the fulfillment of one’s self in the framework of individualistic spiritual-
ism; it can only follow from the transcendence of one’s self, which Brzozowski 
defines as labor. After 1906, he no longer doubted that Ibsen’s self did not know 
this kind of labor and thus could not long for it in the first place. 
 
Act Three: Ibsen in Legenda Młodej Polski 
 
As Głowiński correctly notes on the capricious, paratactic narrative of Legenda, 
Ibsen first appears at random, momentarily becomes a lead character and then 
                                                             
33  Ibid. This conviction echoes Stanisław Przybyszewski’s view of Ibsen. Cf. Stanisław 
Przybyszewski, O dramacie i scenie [On drama and scene] (Warszawa: Księgarnia 
Naukowa, 1905). Perhaps indeed it was the model of Ibsen reception proposed by 
Przybyszewski that influenced the young Brzozowski’s views, which later petrified 
him as he was rethinking his old beliefs. 
34  Brzozowski, Kultura i życie, 216. 
35  Ibid., 216. 
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slips into the background as a generic example.36 Brzozowski seems to be much 
more extreme in his evaluation of Ibsen in Legenda through stressing the barren-
ness of the playwright’s relations with his generation. His Ibsen counts among 
those who are not able to go “beyond the limits of this historical phase, which 
brought about, which produced our entire psyche” (poza granice tego odłamu 
dziejów, który wysnuł, wyprządł całą naszą psychikę).37 Through a confinement 
in himself, Ibsen becomes the representative of the modern mind; one that can 
merely be cultured but never creative since it turns “the result of historical labor” 
into “an individual adventure without any way out.”38 Thus, Ibsen is the exclu-
sive symbol of ruined romanticism in Legenda. Unlike Adam Mickiewicz or 
Andrzej Towiański, he is unable to overcome the literary movement because he 
considers the problem of individuality “from the point of view of an individual 
who lost his individuality, or never did have one.” (“z punktu widzenia jed-
nostki, która indywidualność utraciła lub nie miała jej nigdy”).39 He becomes an 
example of someone who intentionally separates one’s self-creating effort from 
one’s corporeal and collective life. As well, he is someone with a self-alienating 
tendency, a tendency described by Brzozowski as “our psyche’s striving for 
separation” (pęd naszej psychiki ku odosobnieniu).40 The deliberate separation of 
self and community inevitably leads to one’s disregard for the specific cultural 
and historical grounds that are essential for an individual. Ibsen can leave social 
life indefinitely, if—as Brzozowski has it—what counts is only “the freedom in 
the domain of the personal self” (swoboda w obrębie własnego ja).41 However, a 
self that renounces reflection and work on the conditions that shape it ceases to 
be an individual. Under these circumstances, Ibsen’s idea of faithfulness to one-
self turns out to mean faithfulness to an illusion while “limitless individualism is 
nothing but poeticized slavery” (bezgraniczny indywidualizm jest tu tylko upo-
                                                             
36  Michał Głowiński, “Wielka parataksa. O budowie dyskursu w Legendzie Młodej 
Polski Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [The great parataxis. On the construction of dis-
course in The Legend of Young Poland] Pamiętnik Literacki 4 (1991): 50. 
37  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 16. 
38  Ibid., 10. 
39  Ibid., 188. 
40  Ibid., 220. 
41  Paradoxically, Brzozowski restores some accusations from the “social medics,” a 
group of critics from the 1890s who regarded Ibsen as a fanatic individualist and deaf 
to national and social problems. An example of this would be: Władysław Bogu-
sławski, “Skandynawizm w literaturze. Henryk Ibsen” [Scandinavism in literature. 
Henrik Ibsen], Biblioteka Warszawska 4 (1891). 
Brzozowski’s Ibsen Not-quite-read | 49 
etyzowaną niewolą).42 This line of reasoning recurs several times in Legenda in 
order to transform Ibsen into the patron of living in the fiction of one’s own self.  
Based in part on his interpretation of When We Dead Awaken, Brzozowski 
intermittently tones down his criticism in order to stress that “Ibsen felt his inner 
contradictions himself. He felt that his severe self-examination was still a com-
promise […], that he confronts a full life with psychological dialectics” (Ibsen 
sam czuł wewnętrzną sprzeczność. Czuł, że jego surowy samosąd jest jeszcze 
kompromisem […] że pełnemu życiu przeciwstawia dialektykę psychologicz-
ną).43 Yet, he is ever more resolute in denying Ibsen’s modernity because he re-
duces experience to the feelings and dilemmas of “a lonely psyche that is hov-
ering somewhere above life” (samotnej i unoszącej się ponad życiem psychiki)44 
Ibsen’s individualism is more of a ritualized or representative category (należy 
do kategorii obrzędowych, reprezentatywnych).45 As well, Brzozowski contrasts 
Ibsen’s individualism with Knut Hamsun who has what Ibsen mostly lacks in 
“the extension of creativity to the whole, so to say, the zoological domain of life, 
to the sphere in which the psyche is liberated from the very process of organic 
life” (rozszerzenie twórczości na cały rzecby można zoologiczny obszar życia, 
na całą tę dziedzinę, w której wydobywa się psychika z samego procesu organ-
icznego życia).46 Thus, in Hamsun it is not the psyche, not the soul, but the body 
that becomes the principium individuationis.  
The negative portrait of Ibsen concludes with the charge that his works are 
only serious, and contrary to this seriousness, Brzozowski states:  
 
Humor jest postawą duchową, pozwalającą nam myśleć o samych sobie nie w kategoriach 
słuszności, lecz tworzącego się życia. […] Wyprowadza on nas poza szranki podmiotowo-
ści – a jednocześnie nie zamraża w żadnym gotowym, wykrystalizowanym już przedmio-
cie.47 
 
Humor is the spiritual attitude that permits us to think about ourselves not in terms of 
rightness but in terms of life creating itself. […] It guides us beyond the limits of our 
subjectivity—and at the same time it does not freeze us in any ready-made, crystallized 
object.  
 
                                                             
42  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 220. 
43  Ibid. 216f. 
44  Ibid., 220. 
45  Ibid., 243. 
46  Ibid., 245. 
47  Ibid., 294. 
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Brzozowski cannot hear Ibsen’s laughter; he only sees him as a stern fanatic. 
Again, the sentimentally contemplative Ibsen is contrasted with another author, 
namely Robert Louis Stevenson. According to Brzozowski, sometimes 
 
[…] wobec uśmiechniętej mądrości tego Szkota rozpływa się cała tragiczna mgła otacza-
jąca postacie Ibsena, że ponad nimi wszystkimi: Rosmerem, Borkmanem, rzeźbiarzem z 
epilogu – dźwięczy oceaniczny śmiech tego pisarza”48 
 
[…] in comparison to the humorous wisdom of the Scotsman [Stevenson], the whole 
tragic fog that is surrounding Ibsen’s characters clears and the oceanic laughter of this 
writer resonates over all of them: Rosmer, Borkman, and the sculptor of the epilogue.  
 
At the same time, Brzozowski makes it clear that Stevenson’s writing does not 
really come from his talent but rather from the superiority of British culture.49 
The aim of this brief comparison of Ibsen and Stevenson is to confirm, yet again, 
Brzozowski’s fundamental assertion, which recurs in Legenda in many varieties: 
“the artist’s form is always a reflection of the state of values in a specific nation” 
(forma artysty odbija zawsze stan wartości w narodzie50). 
Although the remarks and observations on Ibsen are scattered throughout 
Legenda, they still constitute a coherent image that becomes a gradually solidi-
fying mask. Brzozowski wants to show that Ibsen is dangerous since he affirms 
the audience’s impuissance and encourages each person to retreat inside him or 
herself. It is as though, in this case, Brzozowski forgot that it is up to the reader 
to determine what the text produces for the reader. 
 
Performative Dialogue or Theatrical Monologue? 
 
Jan Władysław Dawid’s often-quoted view is relevant to Brzozowski’s state-
ments on Ibsen: “Coming into contact with a new system of thought, Brzozowski 
did not care to familiarize himself with it thoroughly and present it as it was; he 
treated it as a point of departure, as a thread on which he could weave out his 
own dealings.”51 These reflections on Ibsen formed a kind of autobiographical 
play in three acts. Ibsen is supposed to be a partner for discussion or a dialogue, 
yet does he appear on the stage of this “drama”? In the first act we only get his 
                                                             
48  Ibid., 296.  
49  Ibid., 297. 
50  Ibid., 373. 
51  Jan Władysław Dawid, Psychologia religii [Psychology of religion] (Warszawa: “Na-
sza Księgarnia”, 1933), 104. 
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after-image, for Brzozowski’s interpretation contains few references to Ibsen’s 
work, yet there are still pre-processed echoes of criticism in it. We cannot hear 
Ibsen’s voice. In the second act, the after-image disappears and there is only 
Ibsen’s corpse, stiff in his mask of the “ruins of romanticism,” and, to make it 
worse, only playing an extra. It is impossible to recognize Ibsen behind the 
mask. Brzozowski stays center stage in act three to continue—without the doubts 
that had appeared in the previous acts—his monologue in which he sticks a final 
dagger in Ibsen’s body to prevent him from haunting the living, from producing 
the feeling of powerlessness in those who take him seriously.  
Ibsen cannot be present in this autobiographical play because it seems that, 
despite writing about him, Brzozowski does not read him and seems to only rely 
on his memory.52 Ibsen’s own words do not serve as a vantage point for Brzo-
zowski. He creates his own Ibsen using labels and critical formulas taken from 
the existing criticism on the playwright. Out of this material he forms the portrait 
of an Ibsen who is characteristic of Young Poland. Indeed, when translated into 
Brzozowski’s critical thought, much of these empty interpretative slogans are 
gradually filled with meaning. Moreover, this method seems quite fitting for 
Brzozowski’s aim. After all, Brzozowski repeatedly underscores that he is inter-
ested in Ibsen as a legend for himself personally as well as for his generation. 
Thus, the negative portrait that was sketched in several takes in Legenda was on 
the one hand made and shaped by Scandinavian or Germanic culture, while on 
the other, the Ibsen as seen by Young Poland. Hence, it comes as no surprise that 
the contours of this image of Ibsen were largely determined by the preexisting, 
already-used terminology. By taking over the language that described Ibsen, 
Brzozowski also appropriates the public’s conception of the playwright so that 
he can present Ibsen’s impact on the culture of Young Poland by deconstructing 
the “Ibsenizing” tendency of the age as a form of group thinking. At the same 
time, however, he cements Ibsen’s image in this form and thus makes it a part of 
his legend. 
In refraining from a dialogue with Ibsen in Legenda, Brzozowski prevents 
Ibsen’s texts from really coming to life. His criticism of Ibsen, read as an autobi-
ographical drama with Ibsen as a foil, seems to be more of a spectacle than a 
performance. It is a spectacle that did have an effect on the reader thanks to its 
well paced suspense and several perfectly played out climaxes, however, there 
are no traces of performative reading or writing. Although Brzozowski does 
                                                             
52  Although perhaps he would have liked to: his letters from Nervi contain repeated 
pleas for a delivery of Ibsen’s collected works dating back to 1906. When in late au-
tumn 1910 he finally received several volumes, he complained about still not having 
the particular texts that he wanted most. 
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consider Ibsen’s works several times at different stages of his intellectual devel-
opment, they never qualified for the “reading between texts,” which Andrzej 
Zawadzki understood as Brzozowski’s hermeneutical practice.53 Hence, coming 
back to Ibsen Brzozowski is not interested in the creative dispersion of discov-
ered or constructed meanings, on the contrary, he aims at specifying or hyperbo-
lizing the already established horizon of a legend whose substance is constituted 
by Ibsen’s not-quite-read dramas. Writing from memory, Brzozowski does not 
allow these dramas to resonate within himself so that only his own preconceived 
thoughts about their author work. Thus, it is difficult to share Głowiński’s view 
that Brzozowski reads Ibsen using a hermeneutic strategy.54 In Legenda, he is 
rather a teacher-cum-pamphleteer.  
In Brzozowski’s critical autobiographical play, Ibsen appears as an afterim-
age and corpse and was thus cast in a clearly defined role. This Ibsen is a purely 
nineteenth-century product and Brzozowski uses him to explain how to over-
come those times. To a certain extent, Brzozowski mimics the early-twentieth-
century critics who make Ibsen seem antiquated in order to avoid giving his 
works thorough consideration. In his discussion of the allures and threats of 
Ibsenizing, Brzozowski is much more consistent and precise than the rest of the 
Young Poland Ibsen interpreters. Like the other critics of his time, Brzozowski 
fails to really understand Ibsen’s work, but, in a way, he values the somewhat 
out-of-date Ibsen. Brzozowski makes the playwright a gauge to the crisis of 
culture, yet this aspect is limited because it exhausts itself in idealistic dreams 
that offer no solutions for this crisis. For this reason, Brzozowski questions the 
“real-life productivity” (życiowa wydajność)55 of Ibsen’s plays. Ibsen may have 
indeed accurately represented nineteenth-century dilemmas and anxieties, but he 
was incapable of transgressing them creatively and this results in him offering 
nothing new in a creative sense. In other words, Ibsen’s plays lack the power to 
bring forth reality and due to the sterile nature of his diagnosis of the world as 
seen by Brzozowski, the features of his texts that were formerly assessed posi-
tively for their incompleteness and openness later become symptoms of power-
lessness and stupor. 
                                                             
53  Andrzej Zawadzki, “‘Między tekstem czytać’. Kilka uwag o hermeneutyce Stanisława 
Brzozowskiego” [“Reading in between the text.” Some remarks on Stanisław Brzo-
zowski’s hermeneutics], in Stanisław Brzozowski – (ko)repetycje, vol. 2, ed. Tomasz 
Mizerkiewicz, Andrzej Skrendo, and Krzysztof Uniłowski (Katowice: FA-art. 2013), 
92f. 
54  Głowiński, “Wielka parataksa,” 66. 
55  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 23. 
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In order to see if Ibsen could be read as a twentieth-century author, one 
would have to pose new questions about his plays rather than limit oneself to the 
old repertoire of often-repeated questions. As a relic of romanticism, i.e., a relic 
of the nineteenth century, Ibsen has nothing interesting to say to Brzozowski. 
Thus, it is no wonder that Brzozowski’s utterances on this subject are invariably 
monologic and increasingly unambiguous in character. Does Brzozowski lose 
much from not listening to Ibsen? After all, the twentieth-century Ibsen inspired 
the likes of Sigmund Freud, Rainer Maria Rilke, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, 
and many others. What could Brzozowski have talked about with Ibsen if he had 
chosen a performative dialogue over a one-sided, domineering monologue? We 
should recall that Brzozowski, before his death, recommended Peer Gynt to his 
brother and also how he waited with impatience, first in Nervi and then in Flor-
ence, for the delivery of Ibsen’s plays. It is as though he felt that he had not fully 
read Ibsen. 
If this were the case, Brzozowski was right. Had he read Ibsen more care-
fully, he could have found a partner that would have challenged his portrayal of 
absolute individualism because Ibsen repeatedly questioned this concept. Brzo-
zowski, following Przybyszewski, reduced Ibsen’s ideas to “being true to one-
self,” which actually constituted only one stage in the development of Ibsen’s 
thinking on the condition of modern man and the status of human subjectivity. In 
the majority of the plays written after Rosmersholm (a text that was undeserv-
ingly disregarded by Brzozowski), Ibsen’s characters mostly differ in their ap-
proach to identity, which is experienced more often as decentralized, processual, 
or incomplete, identity understood as a self-transforming practice. 
Also, Ibsen always considered the social dimension of individual existence. 
As early as in Peer Gynt, he stressed the negative effects of an absolutization of 
the individual’s autonomy and freedom and searched for a way out of the vicious 
circle of individualism’s isolating factors. One of the key themes of the play was 
the relational nature of subjectivity. It was also one of Ibsen’s reasons for 
choosing theater as a privileged form of artistic creation that enabled him to 
present subjectivity as a result of interpersonal bonds, and language as an “an 
organ of human living-together” (organ ludzkiego współżycia)56—to cite an 
expression from Legenda, which is fitting for Ibsen’s plays. Even when they 
look for a private language or try to tear away from a network of relations, Ib-
sen’s protagonists confirm that this network is constitutive for human identity. 
Brzozowski and Ibsen could have also been brought together by their similar 
approach to the duties of art. After all, they both shared a deep conviction that art 
is meaningful only if it is critical and has an impact on the world; they were as 
                                                             
56  Ibid., 86f. 
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well averse to any alienating forms of artistic creation. This theme recurs in 
many of Ibsen’s plays and it is a central subject in his later works. This is why in 
the second half of the twentieth century Ibsen influenced critical theatre in Ger-
many and Asia, but in Poland the critical potential of his plays still remains 
unused. 
Thus, it seems that at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was none 
other than Brzozowski who would have been in a position to undertake a signifi-
cant dialogue with Ibsen by introducing the Ibsen of the twentieth century to 
Polish culture and it is even more a pity that Brzozowski’s conversation with the 
playwright never took place.  
 
Translated by Zofia Ziemann 
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Stanisław Brzozowski and Die Neue Zeit 
Gábor Gángó 
 
 
Stanisław Brzozowski’s contribution to Die Neue Zeit (The New Times), “Der 
Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie: Ein philosophisches Programm” 
(Historical Materialism as Philosophy of Culture: A Philosophical Project), has 
long been known to scholars.1 The original Polish version, which was published 
in Przegląd Społeczny (Social Review) and in Brzozowski’s book Idee (Ideas), 
has been subject to intensive analysis. In this paper, I will argue that although the 
German version of the article does not considerably enrich Brzozowski’s work 
from a strictly thematic point of view, it cannot be dismissed as a re-issue either. 
The circumstances of its publication in Die Neue Zeit, the theoretical journal of 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), do help us to understand Brzo-
zowski’s intellectual and political dilemmas, especially in regards to his personal 
relationship with German and Polish Social Democracy between the Russian 
Revolution of 1905 and the outbreak of the “Brzozowski affair” in early 1908, 
when he abruptly abandoned all efforts to gain an international reputation. Thus, 
this article challenges the commonly held view on the lamentable ignorance of 
Brzozowski outside of Polish literature through the contextual reconstruction of 
the story of his sole appearance in the most important forum of German Social 
Democracy.2 
                                                             
1  Andrzej Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi myśli [Stanisław Brzozowski—paths 
of thought] (Kraków: Universitas, 2011), 124; 365f., 405; Holger Politt, Stanisław 
Brzozowski: Hoffnung wider die dunkle Zeit [Stanisław Brzozowski: Hope Against 
Dark Time] (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996), 155. 
2  Concerning Brzozowski’s international reputation, it must be noted that his novel, 
Płomienie [Flames], was published posthumously by Bong Verlag in 1920 in a Ger-
man translation, Flammen. Richard Bong (1853–1935) was a woodcut printmaker in 
Berlin who founded his publishing house in 1891 (Frank C. Kempe. “Galerie Saxo-
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Die Neue Zeit: A Forum for Marxist Theory 
and Polish Social Democracy 
 
At the time of Brzozowski’s interest in the journal, Die Neue Zeit was the main 
organ for the international Social Democratic movement,3 which remained from 
its very beginning under the editorial management of Karl Kautsky until 1917.4 
The profile of the journal was revamped several times with its main profile being 
the broadening of sociology as scientific support for the routine struggle in the 
                                                             
nica,” http://www.saxonia.com/cgi-bin/dynfs.pl?Kuenstler_liste=/galerie/008619.htm). 
Besides art books, he also published books by and on Richard Wagner, William 
Shakespeare, and others. Leon Richter, Brzozowski’s translator, also translated 
Władysław Stanisław Reymont’s novel Wampir (The Vampire), which came out in 
1914. Further research about the reception of Flammen in the interwar German and 
East European Zionist youth movements is still missing in Brzozowski scholarship, 
although significant contributions are available for scholars speaking Hebrew (cf. Ofer 
Nordheimer-Nur, “Die anarchistische Ästhetik der Jugendbewegung ‘HaShomer 
HaZa’ir’ in den 1920er Jahren und das Tragische in ihrer Weltanschauung,“ in 
Deutsch-Jüdische Jugendliche im “Zeitalter der Jugend”, ed. Yotam Hotam (Göttin-
gen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 67f.; concerning Matityahu Mintz’s works on 
the history of Hashomer Hatzair in Poland, see Aharon Oppenheimer, “Matityahu 
Mintz at 80,” in SHVUT. Studies in Russian and East European Jewish History and 
Culture No. 11 (27) 2002–2003. Matityahu Mintz Jubilee Volume, ed. Benjamin 
Pinkus (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2004), 11. According to Yosef Gorny’s sum-
marizing account, “the Marxism of Hashomer Hatzair was diluted with the national 
socialist ideals of Brzozowski” (Josef Gorny, “New man’s land,” review of ‘Ha'adam 
Hahadash’ Shel Hamahapekha Hatzionit: Hashomer Hatzair Veshorshav Ha'ero-
payim [The ’New Man’ of the Zionist revolution: Hashomer Hatzair and its European 
roots], by Rina Peled, Haaretz, November 15, 2002. http://www.haaretz.com/new-
man-s-land-1.28337). 
3  Brigitte Emig, Max Schwarz, and Rüdiger Zimmermann, Literatur für eine neue 
Wirklichkeit. Bibliographie und Geschichte des Verlags J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. 1881 bis 
1981 [Literature for a new reality: bibliography and history of the publishing house 
J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. 1881–1981] (Berlin: Dietz, 1981), 85. 
4  Angela Graf, J.H.W. Dietz 1843–1922. Verleger der Sozialdemokratie [J.H.W. Dietz 
1843–1922: publisher of Social Democracy] (Bonn: Verlag von J.H.W. Dietz Nach-
folger, 1998), 96–102; Till Schelz-Brandenburg, introduction to Die Neue Zeit, On-
line-Edition der Bibliothek der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, http://library.fes.de/nz/nz-
intro.html  
ó
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labor movement. It encompassed such themes as the women question, coloniza-
tion, the living conditions of the working class, modernization, discoveries in 
natural sciences and technology, healthcare, industry and capitalism, Russia, 
contemporary naturalistic and socially engaged novels, the economy, alcoholism, 
prostitution, and periodical overviews of the workers’ movement in various 
European countries, including the Polish movement as part of or connected to 
the Russian, German, and Austrian Social Democracy. 
After Die Neue Zeit became increasingly involved in the fate of German So-
cial Democracy, it equally grew more open to the application of theoretical is-
sues. When Brzozowski’s study was published, the journal was a general philo-
sophical forum of the Left, so they included a number of authors who contrib-
uted but did not belong to the core group of contributors to the journal. Despite 
this, Brzozowski was the only one audacious enough to challenge the orthodox 
interpretation of historical materialism. 
After 1890, Die Neue Zeit became an important forum for Polish Social De-
mocracy as Polish authors and subjects concerned with it started to appear regu-
larly; articles from the journal were translated for the Polish socialists as well.5 
These articles generally reported on the situation of socialism in Poland for the 
labor movements in Germany, Russia, and Austria. Such Polish authors from 
around the turn of the century included Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, who discussed 
theoretical issues from a Polish perspective, and Salomea Perlmutter, who wrote 
articles for the journal and, along with this, a review of her dissertation was 
published as well.6 Besides her articles, a letter she wrote to Kautsky that was 
sent along with her “Ein Beitrag zur Agrarfrage” (A Contribution to the Agrarian 
Question) also remains.7 
Kautsky was moderately interested in Polish issues, at least as far as the 
problem of the Russian-Polish rivalry was concerned. He wrote two articles on 
Poland in his journal: “Finis Poloniae?” (The End of Poland?), which was pub-
                                                             
5  For example: Kwestja polska a ruch socjalistyczny. Zbiór artykułów o kwestji polskiej 
R. Luxemburg, K. Kautsky’ego, F. Mehringa, Parvusa i innych, z przedmową R. Lu-
xemburg i uwagami wydawców oraz dodatkiem [The Polish question and the socialist 
movement: a volume of studies on the Polish question by R. Luxemburg, K. Kautsky, 
F. Mehring, Parvus and others, with a foreword by R. Luxemburg, with Remarks by 
the publishers, and with an appendix] (Kraków: Rudolf Moszoro, 1905). 
6  Dr. Salomea Perlmutter, “Tolstois Weltanschauung und ihre Entwicklung” (1902/ 
1903 I); mzm. [M. Zetterbaum]: “Dr. Salomea Perlmutter, ‘Karl Menger und die 
österreichische Schule der Nationalökonomie’” (1902/1903 I); Dr. Salomea Perlmut-
ter, “Ein Beitrag zur Agrarfrage” (1904/1905 II). 
7  International Institute of Social History. Karl Kautsky Papers. D XVIII 486. 
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lished in 1895/1896, while “Das neue Polen” (The New Poland) in 1916/1917 
reflected a more optimistic stance towards the reestablishment of the Polish 
state. The former article argued that St. Petersburg was a more likely revolution-
ary center than Warsaw so that the international proletariat did not have to stand 
up for the restitution of Poland. The Russian Revolution of 1905 seemed to 
fulfill Kautsky’s most sanguine hopes8 and he encouraged the Polish to integrate 
with democratic Russia.9 Kautsky occupied a definitive pro-Russian stance and 
he regarded the never-ending skirmish between Polish and Russian Social Dem-
ocrats as a mutually detrimental and regrettable event for the international work-
ers’ movement,10 thus he wanted to keep his journal free from these bitter polem-
ics.11 
Although it had some discussion of Polish issues, Die Neue Zeit was primar-
ily the forum where new trends in Marxism were discussed. From the very be-
ginning, a number of renowned Marxists—many had been long-time activists in 
the labor movement—contributed to Die Neue Zeit with studies on historical 
materialism, which played a part in the evolution of Marxist thought. Brzo-
zowski’s article was consequently one text among many others, and to add more 
to its obscurity, the author was relatively unknown in the socialist movement. 
 
                                                             
8  As he wrote in 1905 to an unknown correspondent, “Die russische Revolution macht 
mich zehn Jahre jünger” (BArch NY 4055/11, fol. 60). I would also like to thank Grit 
Ulrich (Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde) for her help during my research in German 
State Archives. 
9  Feliks Tych, “Karl Kautsky und die polnische Frage. Aus dem Polnischen von Jürgen 
Hensel” [Karl Kautsky and the Polish Question. Trans. Jürgen Hensel], in Marxismus 
und Demokratie. Karl Kautskys Bedeutung in der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung, 
ed. Jürgen Rojahn et al. (Frankfurt: Campus, 1992). 
10  “Im übrigen kann ich Ihnen nicht verschweigen, daß, so weit ich in Basel über die 
rußischen Dinge sprechen konnte, ich überall die größte Erbitterung und Mißachtung 
gegen die rußischen und polnischen Genoßen wegen ihres ewigen Haders gefunden 
habe. […] Man hat in der Internationale keinen Respekt mehr vor Euch – dieß ‚Euch‘ 
gilt allen Fraktionen” (Karl Kautsky to Julian Marchlewski, Berlin-Friedenau, 9 De-
cember, 1912, BArch NY 4055/22Ü, fol. 14). 
11  “Was ich anstrebe, ist von der N. Z. jede Diskussion russischer Streitpunkte fernzuhal-
ten. […] Von diesem Standpunkt aus lehne ich jeden polemischen Artikel über rus-
sisch-polnische Streitpunkte ab, stamme er von rechts oder links. Ich mußte auch den 
Ihren ablehnen” (Karl Kautsky to Julian Marchlewski, Berlin-Friedenau, 13 Decem-
ber, 1912, BArch NY 4055/22Ü, fol. 16). 
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Brzozowski’s “Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als 
Kulturphilosophie” and Its Journey to Die Neue Zeit 
 
At least from the beginning of 1906, Brzozowski wanted to make himself known 
to the German-speaking world, so he turned to Salomea Perlmutter who later 
became his translator as well as his mediator for communicating with Kautsky.12 
First, he was thinking about a text entitled “Czy wracamy do Kanta?” (Back to 
Kant?), although there is nothing more that is known about this project.13 In-
stead, Perlmutter translated two of his other articles into German and recom-
mended them to Die Neue Zeit and to the Austrian Socialist review Der Kampf 
(The Struggle) respectively.14 Der Kampf published his “Polnische Literatur in 
der Revolution” (Polish Literature in the Revolution) in January 1908.15 
The Polish version of “Historical Materialism as a Philosophy of Culture” 
was published in February 1907 in Przegląd Społeczny and then was translated 
and sent to Die Neue Zeit by early April. In his commentary to Perlmutter, 
Brzozowski downplayed the significance of his manuscript and braced himself 
against Kautsky’s rejection. He apologetically wrote to Perlmutter telling her to 
expect rejection, “The article was neither well-written nor new in its content. 
Whatever, I do not care about Kautsky’s inevitable refusal. But it’s a pity for 
your time” (Artykuł nie był ani dobrze napisany, any nowy w treści. Mniejsza o 
to zresztą: nie zmartwię się nieuchronną odmową Kautskiego. Szkoda tylko mi 
Waszego czasu).16 He again wrote the same sentiments to the Buber family, 
“Sądzę, że Kautsky nie wydrukuje artykułu, i będzie miał słuszność”17 (I assume 
that Kautsky is not going to publish the article, and he will be right to do so). 
Brzozowski was probably pleasantly surprised when he received the news of 
the May 1907 publication of his article and he began formulating projects for 
further contributions to Die Neue Zeit. He considered writing on the topics of 
                                                             
12  For her biography, see Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 107n1; Angelique Leszczawski-
Schwerk, “Die umkämpften Tore zur Gleichberechtigung:” Frauenbewegung in Gali-
zien (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014). 
13  Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 7 February, 1906. Stanisław 
Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 155. 
14  Ibid., 159n10, 318, 321n1, 354. 
15  Ibid., 338n14. 
16  Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 10 April, 1907. Ibid., 319. 
17  Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, around 10 April, 1907. 
Ibid., 325. 
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Machiavelli,18 the “social foundations of Nietzscheanism,” and “contemporary 
art.”19 His publication was a rite of passage to the working class, which he la-
beled as his belonging to an “inferior class” (minderwerthiger klasy).20 It reveals 
a telling analogy of how he viewed the Poles as inferior compared to the Ger-
mans, referring to them as the “minderwerthige Nation” in his letter to Wula and 
Rafał Buber on 4 January 1906.21 
  
Brzozowski’s Polemic with Karl Kautsky’s Ethik und 
materialistische Auffassung 
 
In the initial Polish version, “Historical Materialism as Philosophy of Culture” 
was a creative effort to reinterpret some fundamental theses of historical materi-
alism with a fearless confidence in the intellectual strength of Polish culture vis-
à-vis the German Socialist mainstream; for its contemporary readership, the 
German translation must have given a very different impact. The reference to the 
orthodox Marxist interpretation of ethical issues in the first sentence of the arti-
cle suggests that Brzozowski was specifically addressing Karl Kautsky. The 
beginning surprises the reader with its sharply polemical tone that invokes an 
“unpleasant” and “thoroughly non-philosophical custom” of using the word 
“Marxism” as a brand that is fit for all subject matter. As well, it mentions an 
example for an imaginary title of a book very similar to that of Karl Kautsky’s 
entitled, Ethics and the Materialist Concept of History. Brzozowski writes, 
 
In der sozialistischen wissenschaftlichen Literatur findet sich bisweilen die unangenehme 
und durchaus unphilosophische Gewohnheit, an allerhand Dinge den Marxismus einem 
Schilde gleich anzuhängen, das sich ab- und ankleben läßt: „Die Kunst vom marxistischen 
Standpunkt“, „Die Ethik vom Gesichtspunkt des historischen Materialismus“ usw.22  
 
In socialist scientific literature one encounters from time to time the unphilosophical habit 
of attaching all sorts of things to Marxism as if it were a signpost where one could hang 
                                                             
18  Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 2–3 June, 1907. Ibid., 346. 
19  “Czy dla Neue Zeit nie byłoby dobrze napisać: społeczne podstawy nietscheanizmu 
[!] lub raczej ‘nowej sztuki’?,” Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 7 
June, 1907. Ibid., 354. 
20  Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 7 June, 1907. Ibid., 353. 
21  Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, 4 January, 1906. Ibid., 109. 
22  Stanislaus Brzozowski, “Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie: Ein 
philosophisches Programm,” Die Neue Zeit 25 (1906/1907), vol. 2, Heft 31: 153f. 
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something up or take it down: “Art from a Marxist standpoint,” “Ethics from a Historical 
Materialist Perspective,” and the like.  
 
Accordingly, the critique of the usual treatment of questions of ethics and aes-
thetics in Marxist literature seems to be directed at Karl Kautsky’s book, which 
had a Polish translation.23 
In his book, Kautsky intended to elucidate the difference between Kantian 
and historical materialist ethics to prove that Kant’s position was very far from a 
Socialist one,24 and thus, Kautsky separated ethics from historical materialism.25 
Brzozowski, in contrast to Kautsky, argues that there is an essential relation 
between the cultural superstructure and its economic base.26 Although he did 
agree with Kautsky that the ethical ideal had always been and would always 
remain in the hands of the bourgeoisie,27 he tried to formulate another solution to 
this problem by provocatively distinguishing the truth of political socialism with 
that of philosophical Marxism. While political socialism uses Marxism as its 
instrument in the struggle for changing society’s economic basis, philosophical 
Marxism is concerned with the method of approaching the superstructure in a 
Hegelian approach: 
 
Denn der Geschichtsmaterialismus ist nichts anderes als die Methode, alles zu erforschen, 
was das Werk der Menschheit ist, also auch die Moral, das Recht, die Wissenschaft und 
die Kunst […]. Der Geschichtsmaterialismus ist das Selbstbewußtsein der geschichtlichen 
Schöpfungskraft, die aus sich Kunst und Literatur, Wissenschaft, Recht, Moral, Religion 
                                                             
23  Karol Kautsky, Etyka w świetle materjalistycznego pojmowania historji. Szkic [Ethics 
in the light of a materialist conception of history. A sketch], trans. A. Warski (War-
szawa: “Bibljoteka naukowa” – Wyd. St. Kucharskiego, 1906). Holger Politt attrib-
utes the translation to Jan Władysław Dawid. Politt, Stanisław Brzozowski, 47n27. 
24  Karl Kautsky, Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung (Stuttgart: J. H. W. 
Dietz Nachf., 1906), vii, 34. 
25  “Auch die Sozialdemokratie als Organisation des Proletariats in seinem Klassenkampf 
kann das sittliche Ideal, kann die sittliche Empörung gegen Ausbeutung und Klassen-
herrschaft nicht entbehren. Aber das Ideal hat nichts zu suchen im wissenschaftlichen 
Sozialismus, der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung der Entwicklungs- und Bewegungs-
gesetze des gesellschaftlichen Organismus zum Zwecke des Erkennens der notwendi-
gen Tendenzen und Ziele des proletarischen Klassenkampfes. […] Die Wissenschaft 
steht über der Ethik, ihre Resultate sind ebensowenig sittlich oder unsittlich, als die 
Notwendigkeit sittlich oder unsittlich ist.” Kautsky, Ethik, 141f. 
26  Brzozowski, “Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie,” 154. 
27  Kautsky, Ethik, 135f. 
64 | Gábor  
und Sozialwirtschaft gebärt […]. [D]er Geschichtsmaterialismus zeigt uns die Geschichte 
der Menschheit und deren Kultur, als ihr eigenes selbst geschaffenes Werk und ihre Ver-
antwortlichkeit.28 
 
Historical materialism is nothing else than the method to explore everything that is the 
work of man, that means morals, right, science, and art […]. Historical materialism is the 
self-consciousness of the historical creative force issued from art, literature, science, right, 
morals, religion, and social economy […]. Historical materialism shows us the history of 
mankind and its culture as a self-created work and its responsibility.  
 
By establishing an analogy between historical materialism and cultural creation 
on the one hand and natural sciences and technical praxis and discoveries on the 
other,29 Brzozowski modifies Kautsky’s approach to the relationship between 
technical progress and historical materialism.30 Brzozowski also argues with 
Kautsky’s interpretation of moral ideals, saying that  
 
Moral, Ästhetik, Kunst, Philosophie, Geschichtsauffassung und Kultur bleiben noch 
immer unter dem überwiegenden Einfluß der Autoritäten und Ideale, welche der ritterlich-
priesterliche Lebens- und Denktypus ausgearbeitet hat. Dieser Typus hatte seine inneren 
Gegensätze und Zerrissenheiten; der Priester kämpfte hier mit dem Ritter. Und heute noch 
kämpfen in unseren Köpfen diese Gespenster, die Stelle moderner Kämpfe vertretend. Die 
Probleme treten eine lange Zeit in historischen, anachronistischen Masken auf, bevor sie 
in ihrer wahren, nackten Gestalt auftreten.31 
 
Morality, aesthetics, art, philosophy, and concepts of history and culture still remain under 
the predominant influence of authorities and ideals that were produced by the chivalric 
and priestly way of living and thinking. It has always had its inner contradictions and 
disunities; the priest always struggled against the knight. Even today these specters still 
                                                             
28  Brzozowski, “Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie,” 154, 155. 
29  “Der Geschichtsmaterialismus ist das im Verhältnis zur kulturellen und historischen 
Schaffungskraft, was die theoretische Wissenschaft gegenüber der technischen Praxis 
und der Erfindungskraft.” Brzozowski, “Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilo-
sophie,” 155. 
30  “Kein Zweifel, es besteht eine Wechselwirkung zwischen der Ökonomie und ihrem 
geistigen Überbau – Moral, Religion, Recht, Kunst usw. –: von dem geistigen Wirken 
des Erfindens reden wir hier nicht, es gehört zur Technik, in der ja der Geist auch eine 
Rolle spielt, neben dem Werkzeug; die Technik ist die bewußte Erfindung und An-
wendung von Werkzeugen durch den denkenden Menschen” (Kautsky, Ethik, 128). 
31  Brzozowski, “Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie,” 159. 
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fight in our heads, replacing modern struggles. Problems tend to appear for a long time in 
historical and anachronistic masks, before appearing in their real, naked shape. 
 
A Further Effort to Strengthen Contacts: Brzozowski’s Letter to 
Karl Kautsky 
 
Once Brzozowski received his copy of Die Neue Zeit, he intended to continue 
his success; the very next day, on 8 June 1907, he wrote the following letter to 
Karl Kautsky: 
 
Hochgeehrter Genosse! 
Gestern habe ich die N. der Neuen Zeit erhalten, wo mein Artikel, den meine gute Freun-
din Genossin dr. Salomea Perlmutter so gütig war zu übersetzen und Ihnen übersenden. Es 
freut mich sehr, dass meine Arbeit so günstig von Ihnen beurtheilt war, und lasse mir 
hoffen dass auch andere meine Beiträge werden von Zeit zu Zeit auf Spalten Neuer Zeit 
Platz für sich finden[.] Wenn ich aber jetzt mir erlaube Ihnen mit meinem in schlecht 
deutschen geschriebenen Brief Zeit zu verderben, dann thue ich es um Ihre Aufmerksam-
keit auf eine Kleinigkeit zu lenken, die vielleicht einer Besprechung und Abfertigung in 
Neuer Zeit nicht unwerth ist. In dem neuen Buch von Arturo Labriola uber die Pariser 
Komune, finde ich folgenden „geistreichen“ Einfall über Karl Marx. Ich schreibe die 
Stelle buchstablich ab: 
[“]Ma il guidizio di Marx è soggetto a revisione. Marx non amò mai i suoi concorrenti 
socialistici, la qual cosa mentre teneva all’indiscutibile superiorità della sua mente 
sovrana, rivela in lui una inclinazione poco simpatico dello spirito[.] Successivamente egli 
si ruppe col Willich, col Weitling, col Proudhon, col Bakunine, col lo St. Mill, col Lassalle 
cuoi con tutto quanto d’un certo rilievo e d’una certa importanza produsse l’intelligenza 
socialista[.] La sua intimità col’Engels resta certamente un enigma psicologico, messo in 
rilievo dalla circonstanza che i socialisti tedeschi hanno sempre evitato di pubblicare una 
biografia di Marx.” 
1) Da notare: Marx era molto povero ed Engels molto ricco. Inoltre Engels lasciò eredi 
della sua fortuna proprio le figlie le di Marx. Arturo Labriola. La “commune” di Parigi. s. 
71–72. 
Genosse Labriola hat überhaupt sein Buch mit forcirter Originalität verdorben. Er will 
partout Entdeckungen machen obgleich alle allgemeinen Gesichtspunkte seines neuesten 
wie früheren Buches vom Georg Sorel stammen. Ich glaube aber dass hier hat seine Origi-
nalitätssucht jede Grenzen passiert[.] Wenn ich Ihnen geehrter Genosse nicht unerlaubt 
andringend scheinen werde, so werde ich sie noch mit einer persönlichen Bitte belastigen. 
Ich arbeite an einem kleinen Werk über die Philosophie von Karl Marx[.] Leider muss ich 
Gesundheit wegen in schlimmsten Bücherbedingungen arbeiten[.] So, habe ich bisher 
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keine Möglichkeit gefunden mir Aufsatz von Marx über Max Stirner zu verschaffen[.] Die 
Buchhandlungen antworten mir, dass es nicht kauflich ist. Da es meine Arbeit, die erste in 
unserer armen theoretischen Literatur dem grossen Gegenstande sein wird, so vollkommen 
informiert sehen möchte, als es für mich möglich ist, so macht mir der Mangel dieser 
Marx’schen Arbeit grosse Sorge. Wenn Sie so freundlich gegen einen Unbekannten sein 
wollten und mir den Aufsatz zu leihen, würde ich Ihnen sehr dankbar sein und den Auf-
satz in einer Woche wiederschicken. Natürlich ist es meinerseits fast eine Frechheit Ihre 
kostbare Zeit so in Anspruch zu nehmen und ich bin nicht so romantisch um zu sagen 
Marx’ens willen thun Sie das. Vielleicht werden Sie es aber meiner polnischen Leser 
willen es thun und damit unendlich verpflichten Ihren Sie hoch verehrenden Genossen 
Stanislaus Brzozowski 
Nervi. pension Bismarck (Leider! sogar in Italien lebt man in seinem Zeichen)32 
 
Highly esteemed comrade! 
Yesterday I received the copy of Die Neue Zeit where my article is published which my 
good friend comrade Dr. Salomea Perlmutter had the kindness to translate and send to 
you. I am glad that my work was judged so benevolently by you and I hope that other of 
my contributions will from time to time appear in the columns of Die Neue Zeit. If I now 
permit myself to spoil your time with my letter written in bad German, then I do it in order 
to point your attention to a detail which maybe is not unworthy of a review and discussion 
in Die Neue Zeit. In Arturo Labriola’s new book about the Paris Commune I found the 
following “witty” idea about Karl Marx. I copy the passage literally: 
“However, Marx’s judgment is put into question. Marx never loved his socialist rivals, the 
reason of which is the undisputed superiority of his sovereign and an unpleasant spiritual 
penchant. Successively he broke with Willich, with Weitling, with Proudhon, with Baku-
nin, with St. Mill, with Lassalle, and with everything produced by the socialist intelli-
gentsia that was of a certain importance and certain renown. His intimacy with Engels will 
surely remain a psychological mystery, still increased in importance by the fact that the 
German socialists have always avoided publishing a biography of Marx.” 
1) Note: Marx was very poor and Engels very rich. Moreover, Engels made Marx’s 
daughters heirs of his fortune. Arturo Labriola. The Paris “Commune”. Pp. 71–72. 
                                                             
32  Stanisław Brzozowski to Karl Kautsky, Nervi, 8 June, 1907. International Institute of 
Social History. Karl Kautsky Papers. D VI 714. Downloaded from: http://hdl.handle. 
net/10622/ARCH00712%2ED%20VI%20714?locatt=view:pdf. I am thankful to Dr. 
Till Schelz-Brandenburg for his help in finding the original copy and for his critical 
remarks on the first draft of this paper. The transcription of this letter in the edition of 
Brzozowski’s correspondence is riddled with incorrect readings and thus unsuitable 
for scholarly use (Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 375–377). 
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Comrade Labriola generally spoilt his book by excessive originality. He wants to make 
discoveries at any cost although all general ideas of his recent and his earlier book are 
indebted to Georges Sorel. I believe his obsession for originality has exceeded all limits 
here. Hoping not to seem impermissibly intrusive, I would like to bother you with a per-
sonal demand. I am working on a small piece on Karl Marx’s philosophy. For now, I have 
not yet found an opportunity to purchase Marx’s article about Max Stirner. The bookshops 
have been telling me that it cannot be bought. Since I would like to have my first work, 
the first in our poor theoretical literature devoted to this great topic, as well informed as 
possible for me, the lack of this work of Marx is a cause of great concern for me. If you 
could be so friendly to an unknown person and lend me the article, I would be very grate-
ful and send the article back in a week’s time. Of course, it is an impertinence from my 
part to take up your precious time and I am not so romantic to say that you will do this for 
the sake of Marx. Perhaps you will do it for the sake of my Polish readers and infinitely 
indebt your highly admiring you comrade 
Stanislaus Brzozowski 
Nervi. Pension Bismarck (Unfortunately! Even in Italy one lives in his sign)33   
 
The letter’s poor German probably did not create a favorable impression as 
Brzozowski colloquially addresses Kautsky and Arturo Labriola, a renowned 
mastermind of socialism, as comrades despite the fact that he had never met 
either of them. Even Perlmutter, who was herself well-known in the movement, 
addressed her letters to Kautsky quite formally. It was also a failure because 
Brzozowski, speaking mainly about himself, used a great number of expressions 
of submission to Kautsky; his reverence was in odd discrepancy with the over-
sized intellectual ego of the ambitious Brzozowski. Apparently, Brzozowski 
believed that Kautsky had a high opinion of his article and he subsequently 
vowed to send more. He then denounces Labriola for plagiarism and finally, he 
shares his idea for writing a groundbreaking work on Marx that would be a first 
“in our poor theoretical literature.” He as well assures Kautsky of many more 
theoretical contributions on Marx and Marxism but also tries to borrow an article 
by Marx from him. Kautsky left this letter unanswered. 
The tone of the letter is quite contrary to his sharply critical tone when Brzo-
zowski wrote about German Social Democracy in February and April 1907.34 It 
appears that the publication of his article in Germany affected him so strongly 
that he had a sudden urge to endorse the theoretical side of the German Social 
                                                             
33  As Brzozowski says himself, the letter is written in clumsy and faulty German lan-
guage. The translation tries to render this style without reproducing the errors. 
34  Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, 18 February 1907 and Nervi, 
beginning of April, 1907. Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 307f. and 312–316. 
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Democratic movement. This gesture, however, was most likely insincere since 
he had already declared himself a non-Marxist (at least from an orthodox per-
spective) at the beginning of April 1907. Therefore, he must have written the 
article in question as an outsider, not as an engaged Social Democrat: “Sooner or 
later what is true must come to light, although I am not a Marxist and I do not 
possess a redemptive belief in the providence of a silent evolution of economic 
factors” (Prędzej czy później to, co jest prawdziwe, wydobędzie się, chociaż nie 
jestem marksistą i zbawiającej wiary w opatrzność milczącej ewolucji czyn-
ników ekonomicznych nie posiadam).35 
In any case, once the article was published, Brzozowski thought that he was 
welcomed by the Social Democrats, so much so that he was thinking about going 
to Stuttgart for the 18–23 July Congress of the Socialist International (like his 
friend Buber).36 Additionally, he considered sending another article to the review 
Mouvement Socialiste (Socialist Movement).37 His rather poor opinion of the 
Germans and German Social Democrats had by no means changed after the 
publication of his article, but it turned even more bitter when he received no 
answer from Karl Kautsky. Around mid-November 1907 he wrote about be-
stialità tedesca (German bestiality) and vented his ambitiously destructive plans 
to criticize the position of the Stuttgart Congress and to prove in general that 
“German Social Democracy undeservedly occupies the leading position among 
the socialist organizations in the world” (socjaldemokracja niemiecka niezasłu-
żenie zajmuje przodujące miejsce pośród organizacji socjalistycznych świata).38 
 
Brzozowski’s German Publication in the Context of the Polish 
Social Democratic Movement 
 
Brzozowski’s aim for the article’s publication was not only to gain German 
readers but he also wanted to flaunt his success to his fellow Polish Social Dem-
                                                             
35  Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, beginning of April 1907 
Brzozowski, Ibid., 314f. 
36  Walentyna Najdus, SDKPiL a SDPRR 1908–1918 (Social Democracy of the Kingdom 
of Poland and Lithuania and the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party 1908–
1918) (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo Polskiej Aka-
demii Nauk, 1980), 133. 
37  Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, the first ten days of July 1907. 
Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 372f. 
38  Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Florence, mid-November, 1907. 
Ibid., 394, 398n21. 
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ocrats (he had a complicated relationship with many of them). Although the 
article had already been printed in Polish, the fact that it was translated and pub-
lished in German would raise Brzozowski’s standing within Polish Social De-
mocracy. Not only were Brzozowski’s relations to Polish Social Democracy 
complicated,39 the labor movement itself was in a precarious situation because 
Poland was partially controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.40 The labor 
movement in the German-occupied territories in Brzozowski’s time consisted of 
the Polska Partia Socjalistyczna zaboru pruskiego (PPS zp), which had seceded 
from the German Socialist Party (SPD) in 1901, and the Polska Partia 
Socjaldemokratyczna Galicji (PPSD), which operated in Austro-Hungarian 
Galicia.  
                                                             
39  Stanisław Brzozowski to Rafał Buber, Florence, 7 Mai, 1908. Ibid., 502f.; Aleksander 
Kochański, Socjaldemokracja Królestwa polskiego i Litwy w latach 1907–1910 [So-
cial Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania in the Years 1907–1910] 
(Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1971), 274f.;  Walicki, Brzozowski, 187–194. 
40  Robert Blobaum, Feliks Dzierżyński and the SDKPiL: A Study of the Origins of Polish 
Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Franciszek Hawranek, 
Polska i niemiecka socjaldemokracja na Górnym Śląsku w latach 1890–1914 [Polish 
and German Social Democracy in Upper Silesia in the years 1890–1914] (Opole: In-
stytut Śląski, 1977); Kochański, Socjaldemokracja; Żenna Kormanowa, Kwestia na-
rodowa w rewolucji 1905-1907 roku [The national question in the 1905–1907 revolu-
tion] (Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1958); Edmund Makowski, Od socjaldemo-
kracji do „solidarności”. Organizacje robotnicze w Wielkopolsce w XIX i XX wieku 
(do roku 1990) [From Social Democracy to “Solidarity”: workers’ organizations in 
Great Poland in the nineteenth and twentieth century (to the year 1990)] (Poznań: 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1991); Najdus, SDKPiL a SDPRR; Walentyna Naj-
dus, Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna Galicji i Śląska 1890–1919 [The Polish 
Social Democratic Party in Galicia and Silesia, 1890–1919] (Warszawa: Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1983); Marian Orzechowski, Rewolucja, socjalizm, trady-
cje. Przeszłość narodowa i tradycje w myśli politycznej rewolucyjnego nurtu pol-
skiego ruchu robotniczego [Revolution, socialism, traditions: national past and tradi-
tions in the political thought of the revolutionary current of the Polish workers’ 
movement] (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1978); Aleksandra Tymieniecka, ed., Ma-
nifest zjazdu zjednoczeniowego SDKPiL i PPS-Lewicy [The manifesto of the unifica-
tion meeting of SDKPiL and Left-PPS] (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1918); 
Anna Żarnowska, Geneza rozłamu w Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej 1904–1906 [The 
origins of the schism in the Polish Socialist Party 1904–1906] (Warszawa: Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1965). 
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Brzozowski associated more with the PPSD because Perlmutter and Buber, 
who were working in Jewish socialist organizations that were associated with the 
party on varying degrees, were his contacts in the party. Eventually, Brzozowski 
published some of his own material in the party’s journal.41 Brzozowski did have 
problems though with the two parties who later formed the Polish Communist 
Workers’ Party in 1918. Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy (SDKPiL) 
(Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania) operated in the 
Russian territories and they had a more orthodox platform, which meant that 
they were Brzozowski’s enemies. Their newspaper, Czerwony Sztandar (The 
Red Banner), reported on Brzozowski’s alleged espionage scandal in early 1908 
partly because of his criticism of Rosa Luxemburg,42 who was the party’s most 
well-known member, and because of his opinion that Polish philosophy was 
greater than Marxism.43 Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (PPS) (Polish Socialist Par-
ty), on the other hand, valued Poland over Marxism and thus PPS’s position was 
closer to that of Brzozowski; they regarded him more as a rival than an enemy.44 
During the Russian Revolution of 1905, Brzozowski was a sympathizer of the 
PPS45 and he took the position of an official journalist and theorist for the PPS 
the following year.46 In the early 1930s Robotnik (The Worker), the party’s 
paper, had a more lenient perspective of the Okhrana affair.47 In any case, the 
publication in Germany did not improve Brzozowski’s positions among Polish 
Social Democrats. 
 
An Echo of Brzozowski’s Article: Max Adler’s 
“Das Formalpsychische im historischen Materialismus” 
 
Kautsky decided to publish Brzozowski between the renowned Marxists, Rudolf 
Hilferding and Franz Mehring, which may reflect Kautsky’s reservations about 
Brzozowski as the two were perfect foils for Brzozowski’s unorthodox views. 
Brzozowski would never be published again in Die Neue Zeit after his letter to 
                                                             
41  Najdus, Polska Partia, 510. 
42  See Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, 28 January, 1906, Listy, 
vol. 1, 136. 
43  Walicki, Brzozowski, 51–53. 
44  Mieczysław Sroka, introduction to Brzozowski’s Listy, vol. 1, xxxi. 
45  Żarnowska, Geneza, 34. 
46  Walicki, Brzozowski, 194f. 
47  Mieczysław Niedziałkowski, “Sprawa Stanisława Brzozowskiego [The Brzozowski 
affair],” Robotnik 265 (1933): [1]. 
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Kautsky, but they did publish an article thoroughly refuting his position without 
mentioning his name. Soon after Brzozowski’s article was published, Max Adler 
issued his “Das Formalpsychische im historischen Materialismus” (The Formal 
Psychical in Historical Materialism), which gave an overview to the theoretical 
approaches that were printed in Die Neue Zeit.48 Adler gives some details on the 
international repercussions of Brzozowski’s article. Unfortunately, scholarship 
has taken into account nearly exclusively Anatolii Lunacharskii’s reflections on 
Brzozowski.49 
                                                             
48  “Das Grundproblem der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung ist die Frage nach 
dem Verhältnis des Materiellen zum Ideellen, nach der Art der zwischen beiden be-
stehenden Beziehung. Es wäre jetzt, da diese Zeitschrift auf ein Vierteljahrhundert un-
ermüdlicher Arbeit an den theoretischen Grundanschauungen des Sozialismus zu-
rückblickt, nicht bloß naheliegend, sondern auch sehr lohnend, der Geschichte der 
Weiterbildung des historischen Materialismus an den Blättern der ‘Neuen Zeit’ nach-
zugeben. Hat sie doch mit vielen bedeutungsvollen Abhandlungen in diese Weiter-
entwicklung eingegriffen; ich erinnere nur an die Aufsätze von F. Mehring zu diesem 
Thema, an die Arbeiten von H. Cunow und Sadi Gunter, vor allem aber an die Arti-
kelserie von K. Kautsky im XV. und von Max Zetterbaum im XXI. Jahrgang dieser 
Zeitschrift.” Max Adler, “Das Formalpsychische im historischen Materialismus,” Die 
Neue Zeit 26 (1907/1908), vol. 1, Heft 2: 52. Among others, Adler must have had the 
following articles in mind: Franz Mehring: “Zur historisch-materialistischen Me-
thode” (1893/1894 II); Franz Mehring: “Vom ‘wahren’ Marxismus” and “Ein letztes 
Wort über den wahren Marxismus” (1899/1900 I); Heinrich Cunow: “Ein Kritiker der 
materialistischen Geschichtstheorie” (1898/1899 II); Sadi Gunter, “Die materialisti-
sche Geschichtsauffassung und der praktische Idealismus” (1897/1898 II); Karl Kaut-
sky: “Darwinismus und Marxismus” (1894/1895 I); Karl Kautsky, “Die materialisti-
sche Geschichtsauffassung und der psychologische Antrieb” (1895/1896 II); Karl 
Kautsky: “Bernstein und die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung” (1898/1899 II); 
Max Zetterbaum: “Zur materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung” (1902/1903 II). 
49  Anatol Łunaczarski, “Stanisław Brzozowski a materializm dziejowy” [Stanisław 
Brzozowski and historical materialism], Pisma wybrane [Selected writings], trans. 
Adam Galis et al., introduction and notes Leszek Turek (Warszawa: Książka i Wie-
dza, 1969), vol. III, 853–64. For the monistic theory of history, see Walicki, Brzozow-
ski, 44. For Brzozowski’s acquaintance with Lunacharskii, see Stanisław Brzozowski 
to Salomea Perlmutter, Florence, beginning of December 1907; Brzozowski, Listy, 
vol. 1, 409. For Lunacharskii’s critique, see Andrzej Walicki, “Stanisław Brzozowski 
i rosyjscy ‘neomarksiści’ początku XX wieku” [Stanisław Brzozowski and the Rus-
sian “neomarxists” of the early twentieth century], in Wokół myśli Stanisława Brzo-
zowskiego, ed. Andrzej Walicki and Roman Zimand (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Litera-
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From Adler’s retrospective account, it seems that Brzozowski’s provocative 
study helped end the debate on historical materialism in Die Neue Zeit and it 
paradoxically contributed to the consolidation of the orthodox interpretation to 
Marxism. Adler considered the orthodox interpretation of the base and super-
structure as a dogma that was not open to revision.50 Criticizing this position was 
nothing else than a bourgeois chimaera, “Auch seither hat kaum ein Marxist von 
wissenschaftlicher Bedeutung eine derart skurrile Ansicht vertreten, und alle 
bürgerliche Polemik gegen dieses Phantom ist pures Mißverständnis”51 (never 
before has any Marxist of some scientific reputation held such a bizarre view, 
and all the bourgeois polemics against this ghost is a pure misunderstanding). 
This statement, applied to Brzozowski’s argument, meant that Brzozowski was 
“no Marxist of scientific significance” and his critique was a bourgeois polemic 
directed against phantoms that originated from a misunderstanding. Adler’s 
response to Brzozowski’s attack (or one much like it) was that historical materi-
alism is essentially related to real life and it has nothing to do with materialism 
in natural philosophy.52 In connection with this, Adler refuted the Hegelian read-
ings of Marx53 and then his summarizing statement on the nature of art and eth-
ics seems to reject Brzozowski’s viewpoint, 
                                                             
ckie, 1974), 214–219; Krisztina Mänicke-Gyöngyösi, „Proletarische Wissenschaft“ 
und „sozialistische Menschheitsreligion“ als Modelle proletarischer Kultur [“Prole-
tarian science” and “socialist religion of humankind” as models of proletarian culture] 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1982), 222; Politt, Brzozowski, 91. In Holger Politt’s inter-
pretation, Lunacharskii’s main objection was directed towards Brzozowski’s all-too 
Hegelian stance in which the Marxist position was hardly recognizable. According to 
Politt, Brzozowski failed to understand Lunacharskii’s response and mistook it for a 
sign of approval. See also: Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 401. 
50  “Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung bestimmt das Verhältnis des Ideellen zum 
Materiellen in der Weise, daß sie bekanntlich das letztere zum bedingenden oder, wie 
der Ausdruck auch lautet, bestimmenden Element des ersteren macht.” This is a thesis 
that both Marx and Engels held (i.e., Adler defended Engels against any revisionist 
attack): “Die Unterstellung, als ob die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung je be-
hauptet hätte, das Materielle, das heißt die ökonomischen Lebensverhältnisse bewir-
ken oder erzeugen erst die geistigen Lebensformen, so daß also diese in Idee, Sitte, 
Recht, Kunst usw. nur eine Art von Reflex wären, ohne jede eigene, selbständige We-
senheit – erscheint schon durch den Wortsinn der bezüglichen Stellen bei Marx und 
Engels widerlegt.” Adler, “Das Formalpsychische,” 53. 
51  Ibid., 53. 
52  Ibid., 54. 
53  Ibid., 55. 
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[D]ie bewußt gewordenen Richtmaße unserer geistigen Natur, also die Ideen der Wahr-
heit, der Sittlichkeit, des Rechtes, der Kunst, sind somit nichts anderes als die Formen der 
sozial gewordenen Selbsterhaltung, als die Art, in welcher sich die soziale Beschaffenheit 
des menschlichen Lebens inmitten seines individuellen Entwicklungsprozesses immer 
wieder herstellt.54   
 
The standard gauges of our spiritual nature, hence the ideas of truth, morality, rights, and 
art are nothing else than forms of self-preservation having become social, than the way in 
which the social shape of human life is constantly reproducing itself in the middle of its 
individual process of development. 
 
It was in this sense that Adler rejected Prometheism as well as determinism, 
considering the sphere of the economy to be nothing else but the fundamental 
layer of the spiritual, thereby concluding that the “superstructure” could never be 
independent of the “base”—or even less could their relation be reversed.55 
 
Conclusion 
 
Brzozowski’s efforts to make a name outside of the Polish-speaking world 
peaked in the first half of 1907 when his position was close enough to Marxism 
that he looked for contacts with the Austrian and German Social Democrats. But 
jealousy limited his ambition, because he wanted to stand on a more equal foot-
ing with the Polish Social Democratic leaders who had urged him to seek sup-
port and recognition in the German-speaking world. In his haste to be known, 
Brzozowski unwittingly (or deliberately?) reversed his priorities—being an 
author in Die Neue Zeit did not make a Social Democrat but instead it was being 
an engaged Social Democrat that made one an author of the journal. Brzozow-
ski’s publication in Die Neue Zeit was an exception and the reasons for his ap-
pearance in the journal remain a mystery. 
At first it seemed that he was about to realize his dream: two of his articles 
were published in Perlmutter’s translation, but this came to nothing and it was 
very much his loss. The letter he wrote to Kautsky delivered the coup de grâce 
to their possible personal, political, or professional relations. Adler’s devastating 
rectification concerning the “correct” interpretation of historical materialism, 
Luxemburg’s denunciation of Brzozowski at Der Kampf, and the accusations of 
his being a collaborator with the Tsarist Okhrana56 swept all of his hopes away 
                                                             
54  Ibid., 58. 
55  Ibid., 60. 
56  Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 487n7; Kochański, Socjaldemokracja, 22f. 
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of gaining a greater intellectual reputation in a national and international context. 
These accusations finally alienated Brzozowski from the Polish Social Demo-
crats and he also maintained resentment against the German Party,57 most likely 
because of the negative reception of his article and the rejections of anymore of 
his work. 
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Gángó
Les Déracinés: Brzozowski and Barrès1 
Maciej Urbanowski 
 
 
Although the work of Stanisław Brzozowski has been extensively described and 
discussed, his sketch of Maurice Barrès, published in Głosy wśród nocy (Voices 
in the Night), has not received much scholarly attention. It was not discussed 
even in the recent collective volume Stanisław Brzozowski (ko)repetycje (Stani-
sław Brzozowski: Private Lessons), devoted largely to Głosy wśród nocy.2 Nor 
has it been mentioned, as a rule, by the most prominent scholars of Brzozowski’s 
works. 
Is this as it should be? Voices in the Night holds an especially important 
place in Brzozowski’s oeuvre. The author compiled it literally on his deathbed, 
repeatedly changing its composition and content, yet each time retaining the 
essay on Barrès, which clearly suggests that he regarded this text as significant. 
Was the eponymous protagonist equally important to him? Brzozowski men-
tioned Barrès already in his earlier articles and books, and his attitude towards 
the French author underwent an evolution. He read him as a spokesman of mo-
dernity, a representative of contemporary French thought, and finally—as the 
author of Les Déracinés (The Uprooted), a novel about which Brzozowski wrote 
with much regard towards the end of his life. 
Let us admit right away that from the present-day perspective Brzozowski’s 
interest in Barrès, and especially the appreciation suggested above, may surprise, 
raise doubts, or even offend. After all, today scholars consider the French author 
interesting as a political thinker, and specifically as the originator of modern 
                                                             
1  A Polish version of this article (“Les Déracinés: Stanisław Brzozowski i Maurice 
Barrès”) was published in my book Prawą stroną literatury polskiej [On the right side 
of Polish literature] (Łomianki: Wydawnictwo LTW, 2015), 39–63 (M. U.).  
2  Stanisław Brzozowski – (ko)repetycje, ed. Dorota Kozicka, Joanna Orska, and Krzysz-
tof Uniłowski, vol. 1 (Katowice: FA-art, 2012). 
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nationalism of the conservative, integral, organic, and even fascist kind;3 or as a 
representative of “anti-Enlightenment” in European thought,4 but he is no longer 
held in high esteem as a literary figure. One must not forget, however, that 
among twentieth-century continuators of Barrès, critics and biographers list such 
acclaimed writers as Mauriac, Montherlant, Drieu la Rochelle, Malraux, Ver-
cors, Aragon or Camus.5  
Brzozowski’s interest in Barrès cannot be surprising if one remembers that in 
the first decade of the twentieth century the French author was at the peak of his 
political and literary career, and his writings were widely commented on in 
France and abroad.6 The same was true in Poland, although here the reception of 
his work was rather restricted and had a specific character. During Brzozowski’s 
lifetime, two of Barrès’s novels were published in Polish translation: Wyrwani z 
gruntu ojczystego (Ripped out of Native Ground), a 1904 rendition of Les Dé-
                                                             
3  Cf. Robert Soucy, Fascism in France. The Case of Maurice Barrès (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press); David Carroll, French Literary Fascism. Nationalism, Anti-
Semitism, and the Ideology of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 
19–41; Zeev Sternhell, Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français [Maurice Barrès 
and French nationalism] (Paris: Fayard, 2000); Jacek Bartyzel, “Umierać, ale po-
woli!” O monarchistycznej i katolickiej kontrrewolucji w krajach romańskich 1815–
2000 [“To die, but slowly.” Monarchist and Catholic counter-revolution in Romance 
countries 1815–2000] (Kraków: Arcana, 2002), 453–480; Arkadiusz Barut, Egotyzm, 
etyka, polityka. Myśl konserwatywna Maurycego Barrèsa [Egotism, ethics, politics. 
The conservative thought of Maurice Barrès] (Kraków: Arcana, 2009). In the most re-
cent Polish textbook of the history of French literature, the author is discussed in the 
chapter entitled “Antysemityzm i nacjonalizm” [Antisemitism and nationalism] in less 
than a page-long section: “Maurice Barrès – nacjonalizm integralny” [Maurice Barrès: 
integral nationalism], Katarzyna Dybeł, Barbara Marczuk, Jan Prokop, Historia liter-
atury francuskiej [The history of French literature] (Warszawa: PWN, 2005), 334f. 
4  Zeev Sternhell, Les anti-Lumières. Une tradition du XVIIIe siècle à la guerre froide 
[The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition] (Paris: Fayard, 2010). 
5  Pierre Boisdeffre, Métamorphose de la littérature. De Barrès à Malraux [Meta-
morphosis of literature: From Barrès to Malraux] (Paris: Editions Alstatia, 1963), 23–
90; Yves Chiron, Barrès. Le Prince de la jeunesse [Barrès. The prince of youth] 
(Paris: Perrin 1986); Sarah Vajda, Maurice Barrès (Paris: Flammarion, 2000).  
6  For a discussion of Barrès’s influence on Brzozowski’s French contemporaries, see: 
Henri Massis, Barrès et nous. Suivi d’une correspondance inédite (1906–1923) [Bar-
rès and we. With unpublished correspondence (1906–1923)] (Paris: Plon, 1962).  
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racinés,7 and, published soon afterwards, two (!) translations of Au service de 
l’Allemagne (In the Service of Germany).8 For the sake of completeness, let us 
add that a year after Brzozowski’s death, the novel Colette Baudoche was pub-
lished, followed in 1921 by Un Jardin sur l’Oronte (A Garden on the Orontes).9 
Here ended the history of Polish editions of Barrès, who, as can be seen from 
this enumeration, did not enjoy particularly great renown among Polish publish-
ers or readers.10  
Although some of Barrès’s novels were available in Poland, the same cannot 
be said about his essays or diaries; moreover, the published novels included 
those expressing the writer’s nationalistic sympathies, but not his first, decadent 
works, voicing the “cult of the self,” praising “proud egotism, which is to serve 
the deepening of inner experience and the winning of happiness.”11 This is inter-
esting, since it is the trilogy Le culte du moi (The Cult of the Self, 1881–1891) 
that was valued more highly by the few Polish critics who wrote about Barrès 
before Brzozowski. For example, in his extensive study from 1903, devoted 
mainly to Barrès’s early works, Jan Lorentowicz finds in them a “frenetic hymn 
to individualism,” and calls their author an “enthusiastic sceptic,” “ironical 
dandy,” and “first-class master of language.” This “elegant juggler of ideas” 
appealed to the critic more than the later Barrès “of deed with not too original a 
                                                             
7  Maurice Barrès, Wyrwani z gruntu ojczystego, vol. 1–2, trans. J. P. (Warszawa: Dru-
karnia A. T. Jezierskiego, 1904). 
8  Maurice Barrès, Pod pikielhaubą, trans. Maria Rakowska (Warszawa: Drukarnia A. T. 
Jezierskiego, 1906); Maurice Barrès, W usługach Niemiec, trans. Karol Scipio (Kra-
ków: Spółka Wydawnicza Polska, 1908). 
9  Maurice Barrès, Colette Baudoche. Historia młodej dziewczyny z Metzu [Colette 
Baudoche. A history of a young girl from Metz], trans. Zofia Potocka (Lwów: „Słowo 
Polskie”, 1912); Maurice Barrès, W ogrodzie nad Orontem, trans. Maria Ruszczyńska 
(Poznań: Eos, 1921). 
10  In 1929, Adolf Nowaczyński complained about Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński wanting to 
translate Proust when “in Polish there are so few translations of, for example, a prose 
writer such as Barrès” whose novels are “powerful, solid, ideological, arch-Gallic, sa-
tirical-political, and for us—pedagogical” (Adolf Nowaczyński, “Do Prusa, nie do 
Prousta!,” [To Prus, not to Proust!] Myśl Narodowa 6 (1929): 83. 
11  Antoine Adam et al., Literatura francuska [French literature], ed. Antoine Adam, 
Georges Lerminier, Éduard Morot-Sir, trans. Joanna Arnold-Ejsmond et al., vol. 2. 
(Warszawa: PWN, 1980), 380f. 
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physiognomy,” who “started calling to duties and shaking his fists like any 
passing street chauvinist.”12  
Also telling is Władysław Jabłonowski’s remark in his introduction to the 
Polish edition of Les Déracinés: “In Barrès’s views, there is much bias; the 
theses which he develops are guilty of doctrinarism, at times he overly narrows 
the notion of homeland to traditional virtues of a particular portion of the whole 
country, and to the borders of one province […].”13 
Leaving aside for the time being Brzozowski’s remarks on Barrès, let us add 
here that after 1918, the French author was not very widely discussed, and if 
such discussions did take place, it was usually among writers associated with the 
political right (understood in broad terms). This is exemplified by Jan Emil 
Skiwski’s 1929 extensive study “Maurice Barrès. Próba charakterystyki twór-
czości” (Maurice Barrès. An attempt to characterize his works).14 The last echo 
of the Polish reception of Barrès, especially interesting in the context of the 
present paper, was Andrzej Trzebiński’s sketch “Korzenie i kwiaty myśli współ-
czesnej” (The roots and flowers of modern thought), published in German-occu-
pied Warsaw in 1942, in the underground journal Sztuka i Naród (Art and the 
Nation). Trzebiński’s contribution contained a thesis about the wartime “disap-
pointment with the lures of modern thought” and about the necessity, stemming 
from that disappointment, of returning to four thinkers who overcame the mis-
takes of contemporary civilisation, namely Bergson, Barrès, Brzozowski, and 
Heidegger.  
This is a surprising constellation of names, especially in that Trzebiński saw 
all four figures as representatives of “the thought of nationalism.”15 As regards 
                                                             
12  Jan Lorentowicz, “Maurycy Barrès,” in: Jan Lorentowicz, Nowa Francya literacka. 
Portrety i wrażenia [New literary France. Portraits and impressions] (Warszawa: Wł. 
Okręt, 1911), 216.  
13  Władysław Jabłonowski, introduction to Wyrwani z gruntu ojczystego, by Maurice 
Barrès (Warszawa: Drukarnia A. T. Jezierskiego, 1904), ix. 
14  Published in Skiwski’s volume of essays Poza wieszczbiarstwem i pedanterią. Żerom-
ski – pisarz i apostoł – oraz inne szkice krytyczne [Beyond prophecy and pedantry. Że-
romski—writer and apostle—and other critical essays] (Poznań: Księgarnia Akade-
micka Fiszer i Majewski, 1929), 93–115. 
15  Andrzej Trzebiński, “Korzenie i kwiaty myśli współczesnej” [Roots and flowers of 
contemporary thought], Sztuka i Naród 5 (1942): 1–5, in Andrzej Trzebiński, Aby 
podnieść różę. Szkice literackie i dramat, ed. Maciej Urbanowski (Warszawa: Fronda, 
1999), 50f. Commenting on his remarks, Elżbieta Janicka notes that Trzebiński’s es-
say gives a “pastoral” and “highly inconclusive” impression of Barrès; see: Elżbieta 
Janicka, Sztuka czy naród? Monografia pisarska Andrzeja Trzebińskiego [Art or na-
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Barrès and Brzozowski, the critic portrayed the first as “[…] the author of the 
now legendary novel Les Déracinés, the ideologist of so-called ‘regionalism’,” 
and contrasted him with “cosmopolitan European intellect.”16 Elsewhere in his 
essay, he evokes Les Déracinés again, arguing approvingly: “The thought of Na-
tionalism fights against the déraciné man, the extra-environmental man, against 
this whole nineteenth-century nomadism of man without a place in the world. It 
fights devotedly and bravely.”17 Hence the similarity of Brzozowski’s thought 
and that of nationalism so defined. According to Trzebiński, “In Brzozowski’s 
writings, his famous metaphorical definition of Romanticism as a revolt of the 
flower against its roots, is not only beautiful, but also astonishingly consistent.”18  
 
Barrès in Brzozowski’s Texts 
 
Yet Brzozowski himself never fully identified with Barrès. He first mentioned 
the French author in passing in his 1903 discussion of Karol Irzykowski’s Pału-
ba (The Hag). Writing about “weak individuals” (jednostkach słabych), who 
“struggle to create surrogate ideals for themselves” (usiłują sobie wytworzyć 
surogaty ideału) and “attempt to make themselves have faith” (starają się wmó-
wić w siebie wiarę), among other figures he mentioned Barrès and his “patriotic 
activity” (patriotyczną działalność).19 
Brzozowski’s reserve towards the French writer did not change over the next 
years. This is corroborated by passages in Legenda Młodej Polski (The Legend 
of Young Poland, 1909) devoted to the author of Colette Baudoche. Here, Brzo-
zowski rejects the Barrèsian vision of relations between the individual and the 
society, regarding it as deterministic (“[…] society is not a sphere of human 
responsibility here, it is a fact that one has to accept”),20 and deems the French 
author’s anti-Romanticism illusive and superficial. “Did Maurice Barrès really 
                                                             
tion? A literary monograph on Andrzej Trzebiński] (Kraków: Universitas, 2006), 
150–154. 
16  Trzebiński, “Korzenie i kwiaty myśli współczesnej,” 51.  
17  Ibid., 52.  
18  Ibid., 53. 
19  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Cogitationes morosae,” Głos 47, 48 (1903), in Brzozowski, 
Wczesne prace krytyczne, 371. See: “C’est curieux, remarquait Mme Gallant, mon 
père et mes frères, qui parlaient très bien le patois, n’en tiraient ni vanité ni plaisir. 
Toi, Henri, tu ne le sais pas, et il te rend heureux et fier!” Maurice Barrès, Le roman de 
l’énergie nationale. L’appel au soldat (Paris: Bibliothèque Charpentier, 1900),  268. 
20  “[…] społeczeństwo nie jest [tu] dziedziną odpowiedzialności ludzkiej, jest faktem, 
który trzeba przyjąć.” Brzozowski, “Cogitationes morosae,” 34f. 
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get completely rid of romanticism, did he overcome it, was he cured from it 
[…]” (Czy istotnie tak całkowicie wyzbył się romantyzmu, przezwyciężył go, 
uleczył się z niego Maurycy Barrès), Brzozowski asked rhetorically, and evoked 
a scene from L’Appel au soldat (Appeal to a Soldier, 1900), in which the grand-
mother of one of the protagonists says to him: “[…] it’s astonishing, your an-
cestors lived here and did not bother too much about the dialect, but you make 
speaking patois a solemnity” (to dziwne, twoi przodkowie mieszkali tu i nie 
troszczyli się tak bardzo o dialekt, ty zaś robisz z mówienia gwarą jakąś uro-
czystość).21 Brzozowski commented mockingly: “How many times a converted 
romantic idealized and apotheosized his abandoned home and, having thrown 
away the rebellious standards, found a dish towel, a napkin or an apron in the 
trenches of his soul!” (Ileż to już razy idealizował i apoteozował nawrócony 
romantyk porzucony ład domowy i porzuciwszy buntownicze sztandary, zatykał 
na okopach swego ducha ścierkę, serwetkę, albo fartuszek!).22 
Even more pointed remarks can be found in the chapter “Naturalizm, deka-
dentyzm, symbolism” (Naturalism, Decadence, Symbolism) of Legenda, where 
Brzozowski speaks of Barrès’s “outrageously brutal […] dilettante soldierdom” 
(niesłychanie brutalnym […] dyletanckim żołdactwie).23 However, the core of 
his criticism remained the same: deep within, the Frenchman is a romantic and a 
determinist: 
 
Pierrot stał się tu pachołkiem oprawcy – konieczności. Dla Barrèsa rzeczywistość pozo-
staje […] procesem niezależnym od świadomości; świadomość ma zrezygnować ze swego 
ja, swego jałowego buntu, wsiąkać w wielki zbiorowy proces, który ją wyłonił. Nie po-
trzebuję mówić, jak wiele romantyzmu jest w tej Barrèsowskiej walce z romantyzmem. 
Dla Barrèsa rzeczywistościami stają się pewne przeciwstawienia świadomości romantycz-
nej. Istnieje dla niego jako rzeczywistość pewien jednolity, zbiorowy proces, wytwarza-
jący świadomość, wystarczy go uznać i zająć w nim miejsce.24 
 
In this case Pierrot became the lackey of the assassin—of necessity. For Barrès, reality 
remains […] a process independent of consciousness; consciousness is to renounce its ego, 
its effete revolt [and] sink into the great collective process which brought it forth. It hardly 
needs saying how much Romanticism there is in Barrès’ struggle with Romanticism. For 
Barrès, what is real stands in opposition to romantic consciousness. Reality for him is a 
                                                             
21  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 31. 
22  Ibid., 31.  
23  Ibid., 275. Unless indicated otherwise, the emphasis is Brzozowski’s. 
24  Ibid., 275f.  
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homogeneous, collective process that creates consciousness; it suffices to recognize it and 
take one’s place in it.  
 
Given the radically anti-German tone of much of Barrès’s writing, including the 
famous novel series Les Bastions de l’Est (Bastions of the East), Brzozowski’s 
juxtaposition of the French author with the Prussians was especially malicious. 
This is true as well regarding his allusions to the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, 
whose damaging consequences for French mentality (“un Sedan intellectuel”)25 
Barrès was trying to overcome. However, the author of Legenda saw this as a 
case of imitating what one attempted to overcome: 
 
Pruscy oficerowie w 1870–71 roku, czytając Hartmanna i Schopenhauera, dla odpoczynku 
notowali swe filozoficzne aforyzmy ostrogami po zwierciadłach, mozaikach, inkrusta-
cjach mebli: jakaś porcelanowa pasterka rozkochała się w pruskim bucie i z tego związku 
wbrew naturze narodził się patos Barrèsowski. Jest to marzenie rzeczy kosztownych i 
jedynych, zmiażdżonych przez koła wozu, o tym, jak z kolei one miażdżyć będą, nie 
marzenie nawet, ale jakieś stopienie się myślą, sercem z gwałcącym procesem.26 
 
During 1870–71, Prussian officers, who were reading Hartmann and Schopenhauer, while 
resting inscribed their philosophical aphorisms with their spurs on mirrors, mosaics, the 
inlays of furnishings: a certain porcelain shepherdess fell in love with a Prussian boot, and 
out of this liaison was born, contrary to nature, Barrès’s pathos. It is dreaming of costly 
and unique things, crushed by the wheels of a cart, of how, in turn, they will crush, in fact 
not really dreaming, but some kind of fusion of thought, the heart with the violent process. 
 
Brzozowski repeated the same observation in his polemic with Wilhelm Mitar-
ski, who compared Barrès to Wyspiański: “W stylu Barrèsa czuje się nieustannie 
trzask i zgrzyt, głuchy jęk deptanej subtelności”27 (In Barrès’ style one senses 
constantly a sundering and grating, the mute cry of downtrodden subtlety). 
Summarising his outrightly critical view, exemplified above, Brzozowski 
concluded: 
 
                                                             
25  This is how Sturel refers to it in Les Déracinés: “Avec l’intégrité du territoire à 
reconstituer, il y a aussi l’intégrité psychologique à sauvegarder.” Maurice Barrès, Les 
Déracinés (Paris: Nelson: undated), 310. 
26  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 276. 
27  Ibid. 
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Nie na zrzeczeniu się samoistności, lecz na samoistnym, świadomym tworzeniu kultury, 
na tworzeniu form życia, które są w stanie uczynić dziełem swobody dzisiejszy automa-
tyczny i bezwiedny proces zbiorowego istnienia, zasadzać się może jedyne wyzwolenie.28 
 
Emancipation can occur not by relinquishing self-sufficient existence, but in the course of 
the self-sufficient, deliberate creation of culture, in the creation of forms of life able to 
turn today’s automatic and senseless process of collective existence into the work of 
freedom.  
 
Interestingly, the Polish thinker turned out to be more amicable towards Barrès 
in Idee (1910, Ideas), including the Frenchman’s works among those which 
exerted a “constant influence” upon him.29 In Brzozowski’s Pamiętnik (1913, 
Diary), in turn, written during the last months of his life, Barrès features along-
side thinkers such as Nietzsche, Sorel, Maurras, Lafrogue, Pareto, Chesterton, 
Croce, Seillière, Loisy, Bergson, James, Wells, Kipling and Browning, all highly 
                                                             
28  Ibid., 276.  
29  See: “[…] sam w sobie odnajduję wpływ nieustanny Sorela i Proudhona, ale także 
prac krytycznych Lasserre’a, Seillière’a, pisma Barrèsa, Maurrasa i Chestertona; a 
byłbym niewdzięcznym, gdybym nie wspomniał Carlyle’a, Carducciego i Sainte-
Beuve’a” (I find in myself the ceaseless influence of Sorel and Proudhon, but likewise 
of the critical works of Lasserre, Seillière, Barrès’s writings, Maurras and Chesterton; 
I would be ungrateful were I not to mention Carlyle, Carducci and Sainte-Beuve) 
(Brzozowski, Idee, 352). In a side-remark in his study “Anty-Engels” (Anti-Engels), 
Brzozowski also disagreed with Karl Lamprecht, who argued that Barrès could not be 
compared to Nietzsche: “Jest to więcej niż niewątpliwe, jeżeli chodzi o siłę, głębię in-
dywidualności, talentu; jeżeli jednak rozważać to porównanie jako pewien rodzaj 
oceny dwóch kultur, to jest rzeczą bardzo wątpliwą, czy stanowisko Nietzschego, jego 
styl, jest dowodem większej dojrzałości, większego wyrobienia kulturalnego środowi-
ska. Barrès reprezentuje punkt widzenia rozpatrywany przez nas pod literą b, Nietz-
sche jest najwybitniejszym i najtragiczniejszym przedstawicielem stanowiska i prze-
żyć pozostających w związku z punktem widzenia rozpatrywanym pod a” (It is more 
than doubtless in regard to his force, the depth of his individuality, his talent; if how-
ever this comparison is considered as a kind of evaluation of two cultures, then it is 
doubtful whether Nietzsche’s standpoint, his style, is proof of greater maturity, of a 
greater sophistication of the cultural milieu. Barres represents the point of view we 
consider under the letter b, Nietzsche is the most distinguished and tragic representa-
tive of the standpoint and experiences related to the point of view considered under a 
(Brzozowski, Idee, 330). 
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important for the Polish philosopher.30 Thus, Barrès, after all, turns out to count 
among “modern minds, minds expressing the mood and spiritual structure of our 
times (umysłów nowoczesnych, umysłów wyrażających nastrój i strukturę du-
chową naszych czasów).31 
 
On the Fictional Man: Ground and Blood 
 
It was the aforementioned sketch from the 1912 Głosy wśród nocy, however, that 
features Brzozowski’s most exhaustive discussion of Barrès. “Maurycy Barrès 
(Ze studiów nad myślą francuską)” (Maurice Barrès: Studies on French Thought) 
is a difficult text, exhibiting many typical features of Brzozowski’s essay-writ-
ing: it is digressive, associative, oscillating between repetition and ellipsis (to 
recall Michał Głowiński’s formulation), lacking clear argumentative sequences 
on top of which the reader is often left to ponder whether in a particular passage 
the critic is speaking on his own behalf or reconstructing Barrès’s views.32 Brzo-
zowski employs characteristic vocabulary, or, to put it in broader terms, imagery, 
which paraphrases, it seems, the Barrèsian categories of “ground” and “soil,” 
derived from his emblematic organic and medical imagery.33 For example, al-
ready in the second sentence of his sketch Brzozowski writes: “Dusza jest jak 
gleba wytwarzająca pewną właściwą sobie roślinność psychologiczną myśli, 
uczuć, pożądań”34 (The soul is like soil that gives rise to the psychological plant 
of thinking, feeling, demanding). Further on, he claims: 
 
Pora już byśmy zaczęli się żywić chlebem z własnych pól, by przestała być dla nas nowo-
czesność czymś, co jest dostępne tylko w nastroju chwili. Jest to rzeczywistość i musimy 
poznać jej prawa i poznać naturę gruntu i jego uprawy.35  
 
                                                             
30  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 38, 89. 
31  Ibid., 89. 
32  See: Henryk Markiewicz, “Krytyka literacka Brzozowskiego” [Brzozowski’s literary 
criticism], in Od Tarnowskiego do Kotta (Kraków: Universitas, 2010), 143–225; Mi-
chał Głowiński, “Wielka parataksa. O budowie dyskursu w Legendzie Młodej Polski” 
[The great parataxis: Discourse of The Legend of Young Poland], in Ekspresja i em-
patia. Studia o młodopolskiej krytyce literackiej (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 
1997), 265–305.  
33  See: Jean-Michel Wittmann, Barrès romancier. Une nosographie de la decadence 
(Paris: Honoré Champion, 2000). 
34  Brzozowski, “Maurycy Barrès,” in Głosy wśród nocy, 232. 
35  Ibid., 235. 
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It is time that we start feeding ourselves with the bread from our own fields, that moder-
nity ceases to be for us something only accessible in the mood of the moment. It is reality 
and we need to come to know its laws and the nature of its ground and its cultivation. 
 
Another key word of Brzozowski’s text is “blood”—again, important in the 
Barrèsian lexicon, to recall the title of his famous collection of travel writings 
from Italy, Spain, and Grece: Du sang, de la volupté, de la mort (1893, Of 
Blood, Voluptuousness and Death), also mentioned by the Polish critic.36 In 
Brzozowski’s sketch we read about “the organism of today’s thinking” (organiz-
mie myśli dzisiejszej), whose “blood flows in our brains” (krew krąży przez na-
sze mózgi)37, and about nostalgia “producing directly a feverish tremor in our 
blood” (działającej bezpośrednio w samej krwi naszej gorączkowym dresz-
czem).38 Nor is it easy to define with certainty the genre of Brzozowski’s text 
about Barrès. It oscillates between an essay, a portrait,39 and a polemic, 
approaching the kind of writing which Tomasz Burek once named a critical 
parable.40 
It is worth adding that in his letter to Ostap Ortwin of October 1909, Brzo-
zowski mentioned “Maurycy Barrès”—among the pieces left out from the mate-
rial for Legenda Młodej Polski.41 Later he was consistent in including this text in 
the successive versions of his next planned volume, which was initially meant as 
the second part of Legenda, entitled Dusze i zagadnienia (Souls and Problems), 
and which eventually became Głosy wśród nocy. We do not know, however, to 
what extent the 1912 version differs from that of 1909. 
Finally, also significant is the place of this text in the context of the volume 
Głosy wśród nocy. It comes after the essay “Kryzys w literaturze rosyjskiej” 
(The Crisis in Russian Literature) that ended with the warning that, 
 
Niebezpieczeństwo Rosji nie słabnie, lecz wzmaga się i wymaga wzmożonej pracy, wy-
maga skupienia i podniesienia energii narodowej i tworzenia raz jeszcze nowoczesnej 
                                                             
36  Ibid., 247. 
37  Ibid., 234. 
38  Ibid., 240. 
39  “[…] obchodzi mnie psychologia autora” (I am concerned with the author’s psychol-
ogy), the author writes towards the end. Ibid., 252. 
40  Tomasz Burek, introduction to Humor i prawo [Humour and Law], by Stanisław 
Brzozowski (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1988), v–xviii. 
41  See: Ostap Ortwin, introduction to Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy, xii–xiii. 
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świadomości; wychowania młodych pokoleń polskich do zwycięskiej biologicznej i eko-
nomicznej walki w nowoczesnym świecie.42 
 
The danger Russia poses is not weakening but growing greater, and it requires increased 
work, concentration, raising the nation’s energy and creating once again a contemporary 
consciousness; the education of Poland’s young generations to a victorious biological and 
economic struggle in the contemporary world. 
 
And it comes before Brzozowski’s discussion of Saint-Simon’s memoirs, which 
in turn begins with the claim that “everything that ever was history concerns us 
(wszystko, co było kiedykolwiek bądź dziejami jest naszą sprawą)—a truth 
which “Polish minds” (polskie umysły)43 are reluctant to admit.  
Thus, clearly apparent here is the context of the “Polish question,” or, to be 
more precise, the problem of “raising the nation’s energy.” The category of 
“national energy” recurred in Legenda Młodej Polski; it also constitutes a crucial 
term in Barrès’s lexicon, who, after all, authored Le Roman de l’énergie natio-
nale (The Novel of National Energy). As Robert Soucy observes, “It was one of 
Barrès favorite themes: reality and energy were inseperable; to know one was to 
fulfill the other.”44  
It is no accident that almost at the very beginning of the essay under analysis, 
Brzozowski warns against “lyricism” (liryzmem) as “the most insidious tempta-
tion within Polish thought” (najniebezpieczniejszą pokusą myśli polskiej).45 “It 
is certain that only what speaks out against democracy is worth reading in France 
today” (To pewna, że tylko to, co występuje przeciw demokracji, jest dzisiaj we 
Francji godne czytania […]),46 he also notes, specifying another reason for his 
interest in Barrès, whose criticism of democracy he seemed to embrace. Above 
all else, however, he saw in Barrès an author whose work reveals “the profound 
and tragic trait of modernity” (głęboki i tragiczny rys nowoczesności)47 and 
gives insight into “the very essence of contemporary reality” (w samą istotę 
współczesności),48 exposing its “most hidden temptations, the subtlest errors, 
                                                             
42  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Kryzys w literaturze rosyjskiej,” in, Głosy wśród nocy, 199.  
43  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Z powodu pamiętników Saint-Simona” [On account of Saint-
Simon’s memoirs], in Głosy wśród nocy, 217. 
44  Soucy, Fascism in France. The Case of Maurice Barrès, 167. 
45  Brzozowski, “Maurycy Barrès,” 234. 
46  Ibid., 244. 
47  Ibid., 247. 
48  Ibid., 234. 
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and its most instructive downturns” (najtajniejsze pokusy, najsubtelniejsze błę-
dy, najbardziej pouczające upadki).49 Brzozowski believed that Barrès’s writings 
 
[…] zapewniają mu bardzo poważne stanowisko nie tylko w literaturze francuskiej, lecz 
wśród umysłów europejskich naszej doby. Są to [bowiem] bardzo cenne przyczynki do 
świadomości kulturalnej, książki niezbędne dla każdego, kto chce zapoznać się z nowo-
czesnością jako stwarzaniem konkretnego życia.50 
 
[...] ensure that he will have a very important status not only in French literature, but 
likewise among European minds of our day. For they are very valuable contributions to 
the cultural consciousness, indispensable for anyone who wants to come to know moder-
nity as the creation of concrete life. 
 
Barrès’s evolution reveals fundamental problems of the modern man who, hav-
ing at first taken relish in his “self” and experienced “the sense of autonomous 
creativity” (poczucia samowiednego stwarzania),51 comes to doubt the self-suffi-
ciency of the self, and asks with uncertainty “what in my psyche truly comes 
forth from me, and what is the product of accidental, disoriented actions?” (co w 
mojej psychice wyrasta naprawdę ze mnie, a co jest dziełem przypadkowych, 
dezorientujących działań).52 
In contrast to Lorentowicz or Jabłoński, both quoted above, the author of 
Głosy wśród nocy had more reservations about Barrès’s “early” or “transitional” 
texts. Brzozowski saw in them a gesture typical of the intelligentsia, namely 
breaking with life in its particularity, and “a critical nostalgia for unknown forms 
of existence sensed across the entire span of history” (krytyczną tęsknotę dla 
form istnienia nieznanych, przeczuwanych na całym przestworzu dziejów).53 In 
his description of such longing, Brzozowski refers to the imagery of illness,54 as 
he believes that this kind of attitude is something “poisonous.” It assumes an 
external, as if actor-like approach to reality and oneself; it means recreating the 
world instead of creating it. What matters for this attitude are aesthetic rather 
than ethical choices, namely “how will I manage to make of this life something 
                                                             
49  Ibid., 234f. 
50  Ibid., 247. 
51  Ibid., 247. 
52  Ibid., 253. 
53  Ibid., 238. 
54  Cf. “trawiący duszę organ nostalgii” (the organ of nostalgia besetting the soul), “sub-
telna trucizna” (subtle poison), “tajemna gorączka” (mysterious fever). Ibid., 238, 
237. 
Brzozowski and Barrès | 89 
that will suit my taste” (w jaki sposób zdołam z życia uczynić coś […] co mi 
przypadnie do smaku).55 
For Brzozowski, this is what the early Barrès is like; he is a man who, “when 
he is something regards it from without, as if he only seemed to be so” (gdy jest 
czymś, patrzy na to z zewnątrz, jakby wydawał się tylko),56 and who took the 
recreation of somebody else’s (alien) states of mind to a certain extreme. As 
Brzozowski sarcastically puts it, 
 
Poszukiwał [on bowiem] ostatecznie indywidualizującego dreszczu; właśnie tak całkowi-
tego skomplikowania, by obca dusza stała się toksyną, weszła w krew, zaraziła swą go-
rączką i potem, tą gorączką, tym wykrzywieniem, zwężeniem świata aż do granic czapki 
Hiszpana, dajmy na to, z XVI wieku: iść w nasz czas i chwytać na gorącym uczynku 
paradoksalne odbicie.57 
 
He was searching for the ultimate individualizing shudder; complication on such a com-
plete scale that the alien soul becomes a toxin, enters the blood, infects it with its fever and 
sweat, this fever, this contortion, this narrowing of the world to the outer limits of a Span-
iard’s hat of, say, the sixteenth century: to march in our own time and to catch the para-
doxical reflection red-handed. 
 
On the other hand, though, Brzozowski believed that the surplus of self-aware-
ness accompanying such imitations makes Barrès’s efforts incomplete, and thus 
feeble when compared to Bourget’s or Pater’s, with whom the Polish critic con-
trasted him. The author of Un amateur d’âmes (An Amateur of Souls):  
 
[…] nieustannie pamięta, że to chce wywołać w sobie, wytworzyć tę lub inną psychikę i ta 
umyślność przesłania mu samo wywołanie; nie może poprzestać on na ziszczeniu. Być 
może dlatego właśnie, że nie jest, nie bywa ono nigdy zupełne, umie on wydobyć zawsze 
co najwyżej pewne momenty tylko jakiegoś stanu duszy, i to te, które leżą na pograniczu 
krwi i umysłu: sama krew działa słabo mimo toksyny, być może dzięki temu, że i nie 
zatruta, nie jest ona bogata.58 
 
[...] he remembers constantly that he wants to invoke this in himself, to create this or that 
psyche, and this intention only conceals the very invocation; he cannot rest content with 
fulfillment. Perhaps because it is not, can never be complete, at most he knows how to 
                                                             
55  Ibid., 246f.  
56  Ibid., 237. 
57  Ibid., 240. 
58  Ibid., 241. 
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extract certain moments of only some state of the soul, and only those lying at the border 
separating blood and the mind: despite the toxins the blood acts ineffectively, perhaps 
thanks to not being infected it is not rich. 
 
Finally—but still with regard to the early Barrès—Brzozowski sees here “a 
historical psychic diletantism and an abstract point of view of the pure will to 
unconditional action” (dyletantyzm historyczno-psychiczny i abstrakcyjny punkt 
widzenia czystej woli bezwzględnego czynu),59 whose patrons would be two 
“educators of careerists and the déclassés” (wychowawcy karierowiczów i 
zdeklasowanych): Ignatius of Loyola and Napoleon Bonaparte. Indeed, both 
were Barrès’s masters: Loyola in the period of the “cult of the self,” and Napo-
leon practically throughout his life. Especially telling here is the famous, oft-
discussed chapter eight of Les Déracinés. The seven young protagonists of the 
novel, “ripped out of native ground,” gather at Napoleon’s grave. As the narrator 
remarks, 
 
Le tombeau de l’Empereur, pour des Français de vingt ans, ce n’est point le lieu de la 
paix, le philosophique fossé où un pauvre corps qui s’est tant agité se défait; c’est le 
carrefour de toutes les énergies qu’on nomme audace, volonté, appétit. […] On n’entend 
pas ici le silence des morts, mais une rumeur héroïque; ce puit sous le dôme, c’est le 
clairon épique où tournoie le souffle dont toute la jeunesse a le poil hérissé.60 
  
This is how Sturel and his Lorrainian friends feel. For them, Napoleon is “un 
professeur d’énergie” and “un excitateur de l’âme”; someone who has “puis-
sance de multiplier l’énergie” and “une vertu de lui émanera encore pour déga-
ger les individus et les peuples d’un bon sens qui parfois sent la mort et pour les 
élever à propos jusqu’à ne pas craindre l’absurde.”61 
Brzozowski, who does not directly refer to this scene, gives a completely dif-
ferent, radically critical image of Napoleon. He disagrees not only with Barrès’s 
cult of the “master of energy,” but also with the closely related “caesarism,” i.e., 
the faith in a strong individual who is able to “self-knowingly” direct the course 
of history. For Brzozowski, Napoleon was a troublemaker who, “being imma-
nently alien in the very society over which he had gained power” (wewnętrznie 
obcy temu społeczeństwu, którym zawładnął),62 could “utilize France, cut into 
interior knots, injure its organ [...] as no one else could have done who under-
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stood and loved this society” ([…] posługiwać się Francją, rozcinać jej wewnęt-
rzne węzły, kaleczyć jej organizm […], jak nie mógłby czynić tego żaden czło-
wiek pojmujący i kochający to społeczeństwo).63 Consequently, Brzozowski sees 
Napoleon rather as a model for “attending to an easy, superficial relation to life” 
([…] do pielęgnowania łatwego, powierzchownego stosunku do życia),64 who 
represented the attitude of “arbitrary romantic individualism” (romantycznego 
indywidualizmu arbitralnego).65 
Therefore, Brzozowski will take the most interest in the “late” Barrès, who 
discovers that “consciousness is born in connection with life” (świadomość rodzi 
się w związku z życiem) and that it is always an awareness “of just this concrete, 
specifically determined life” (takiego a takiego właśnie, konkretnego, ściśle 
określonego życia),66 and hence—let us be clear—the national life. “Already the 
fact that one is French is mere chance, but that one is from the Lorraine and born 
in Nancy needs to be recalled without delay” (Już to, że się jest Francuzem jest 
przypadkiem ale o tym, że się jest Lotaryńczykiem urodzonym w Nancy, należy 
jak najspieszniej przypomnieć)67—Brzozowski recapitulates ironically the stand-
point of “the professors of philosophy, scholars, intellectuals” (profesorów filo-
zofii, uczonych, intelektualistów), thus clearly referring to Barrès’s biography 
and to Les Déracinés. He also agrees with the French author that the beliefs of 
intellectuals are “horrible errors” (potwornymi błędami),68 and he deems them 
characteristic of democracy: 
 
Dziś to jest fikcja demokratyczna – twierdził – fikcja, opierająca się na pojęciu, że oddarty 
od pracy, wyrwany ze swego środowiska człowiek niezależnie od tego, jaką rolę spełnia w 
życiu, stwarza je wolą swą i myślą. Ten fikcyjny człowiek ma swój fikcyjny świat: świat, 
                                                             
63  Ibid., 246. 
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65  Commenting on this problem, Stefan Kołaczkowski explained: “The individual does 
not impose ideas which he draws from his tradition or background, nor those which 
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66  Brzozowski, “Maurycy Barrès,” 247. 
67  Ibid., 249. 
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którego charakter polega na tym, aby mógł być zawsze całkowicie scharakteryzowany w 
terminach dostępnych każdemu wyborcy.69 
 
Today it has become a democratic fiction, a fiction based on the idea that torn from his 
work, ripped out of his environement a man, regardless of his role in life, creates it with 
his will and thinking. This fictional man has his fictional world: a world which is such that 
it can at every moment be characterized in terms accessible to every voter. 
 
Like Barrès, Brzozowski contrasted the fictional man, “ripped out of his envi-
ronment,” with the “localised” man, connected to his country: 
 
Można na pewno twierdzić, że sam proces powstawania konkretnej woli tworzy zindywi-
dualizowane, konkretnie zabarwione życie umysłowe i że myśl działa tu najsilniej, jeżeli 
jest zrośnięta z lokalnymi wyobrażeniami, doświadczeniami osobistymi. 
Organem pracy jest życie całego kraju, zlokalizowane, związane z ziemią rodziną, z 
bezpośrednimi pamiątkami: konkretne, zlokalizowane życie umysłowe, przekazywane w 
rodzinie obyczaje, wypróbowane metody tworzenia woli.70 
 
It can certainly be affirmed that the very process, in which the concrete will emerge, 
creates an individualized, concretely tinged life of the mind, and that thinking is most 
effective when it is fused with local representations and personal experiences. 
The organ of labor is the life of a country as a whole, it is local, tied to the family’s land, 
to direct heirlooms: the concrete local life of the mind, customs transmitted within the 
family, tried and tested methods of constituting the will. 
 
This is why Brzozowski shared the Barrèsian critique, expressed in Les Déraci-
nés, of the modern educational system which “at every level strives to treat the 
                                                             
69  Ibid., 251. Brzozowski probably developed a distaste for democracy, a system which 
he could not have known well in practice, by reading Sorel, Maurras and Barrès, see: 
Bronisław Baczko, “Absolut moralny i faktyczność istnienia (Brzozowski w kręgu 
antropologii Marksa)” [The moral absolute and factual existence (Brzozowski in the 
context of Marx’s anthropology)], in Wokół myśli Stanisława Brzozowskiego, ed. An-
drzej Walicki and Roman Zimand (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1974), 172. 
About the relations between Barrès and Maurras and their views on democracy: Mi-
chael Curtis, Three Against the Third Republic. Sorel, Barrès, and Maurras (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1959); François Huguenin, L’Action Française. Une 
historie intellectuelle [Action Française. An intellectual history] (Paris: Perrin, 2011), 
63–66. 
70  Brzozowski, “Maurycy Barrès,” 250. 
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child as an abstract entity lacking a determinate past and a probable future” (na 
wszystkich swoich szczeblach dąży […] do tego, aby traktować dziecko jako 
istotę abstrakcyjną bez określonej przeszłości i prawdopodobnej przyszłości) and 
in this way produces people who “know nothing about their country, know 
nothing of its workings, its beliefs” (nie wiedzą nic o swoim kraju, nie wiedzą 
nic, jak on pracuje, w co wierzy).71 He also considered “exceedingly true” (nie-
zmiernie słuszne) the postulates of administrative decentralisation, regionalism 
as the basis of the life of a nation, and also the critique of “the frivolous self-
deception of today’s official France” (lekkomyślnej obłudy dzisiejszej Francji 
oficjalnej).72  
Notwithstanding that, Brzozowski remained strongly and consistently op-
posed to Barrès’s determinism. He rejected not so much the very claim that “our 
soul is created by the deceased who preceded us on our ground, our soul is cre-
ated so that we can pull farther, continue their labor” (dusza nasza stworzona jest 
przez umarłych, którzy poprzedzili nas na naszej ziemi, dusza nasza stworzona 
jest do tego, byśmy snuli dalej, ciągnęli ich dzieło),73 but rather—I believe—its 
conservative or even reactionary interpretation, topped with arty egotism.74 
Brzozowski underscores that 
 
Nie znalazło się w Barrèsie siły zdolnej przezwyciężyć izolację intelektualną, zerwanie 
ciągłości z życiem, charakteryzujące świadomość kulturalną, zabrakło mu tej siły, która 
napływa do myśli strugą gorącej krwi i dlatego do swojej Francji doszedł on zewnętrznym 
procesem, przez wyobraźnię i zżył się nią tylko o tyle, o ile da się ona pomyśleć en bloc, i 
o ile en bloc współczuć z nią można. Jest to [więc] pisarz nie wzrostu życia, lecz zacho-
wania narodowego. Nie wie on, jak życie rośnie: może on myśleć i mówić o życiu już 
gotowym.75 
 
There were no forces within Barrès able to overcome [his] intellectual isolation, to break 
the continuity of a life characterized by a cultural consciousness, he lacked the power 
which flows into the mind like a warm bloodstream, which is why he attained his France 
by an external process, in his imagination, and he achieved vital contact with it only inso-
                                                             
71  Ibid., 252. 
72  Ibid., 254. 
73  Ibid.. 
74  Concluding his sketch, Brzozowski also quotes Nero’s qualis artifex pereo—words 
which Barrès planned to use as the title of what became Le jardin de Bérénice (The 
Garden of Berenice, 1891), the last part of the trilogy Le culte du moi—thus, I believe, 
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75  Ibid., 255. 
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far as it can be conceived en bloc and to the degree that it is possible to empathize with it 
en bloc. He is [thus] a writer not at the height of life, but restricted to a nation’s behavior. 
He knows not how life grows: he can think and speak only of already determinate life. 
 
What Brzozowski has in mind is an attitude towards life which puts emphasis 
not on “recovering one’s own boundaries” (odnajdywanie własnych granic) of 
that which is national (Brzozowski believed that this was the case with Barrès), 
but rather on their “ceaseless widening” (nieustanne rozszerzanie), on the crea-
tion of “ever newer, ever more distant determinants, that is, ever newer contexts 
of nature’s elements subjected to human will (tworzenie coraz nowych, coraz 
odleglejszych determinizmów, to jest coraz nowych zakresów żywiołu pod-
danych ludzkiej woli).76 Thus, Brzozowski’s answer to the Barrèsian defense of 
national “dignity” is the national “strength”; he claims—clearly with his own 
readers in mind—that “not traditionalism but concrete creativity, creation of life 
across its entire stretch is the law of a nation’s expansion” (nie tradycjonalizm, 
lecz konkretna twórczość, lecz tworzenie życia całą powierzchną jest prawem 
narodowego rozrostu).77  
For Brzozowski, then, his encounter with Barrès’s work became an oppor-
tunity to mark points of juncture and disjuncture with the then rising modern 
nationalism. What is interesting, though, is that Brzozowski did not use terms 
such as “nationalism” or “national socialism,” which were coined by Barrès. Nor 
did he mention at all the problems which were the focus of attention or even 
outrage of the French author’s readers: his racism, chauvinism or anti-Semitism. 
Instead, Brzozowski regarded as significant and relevant the Barrèsian attempts 
at overcoming the intelligentsia’s detachment from “life” and “nation,” and espe-
cially his warnings against the “abstract” and “fictional” Cartesian subject,78 
coupled to a defence of the “concrete” subject, “rooted” as Barrès would say, or 
“localized” in Brzozowski’s terms.79  
This criticism was in line with Brzozowski’s search for sources of national 
strength and energy, undertaken especially in his last works. Here, the Polish 
writer resembled Barrès in that he, too, diagnosed and criticized his nation’s 
powerlessness, weakness, and decadence. What turned out to be a point of con-
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tention, however, was their approach to tradition and work, as well as to 
“foreignness.” Barrès’s vision of the nation was far more exclusive than 
Brzozowski’s, even though both writers had behind them the crucial experience 
of living in the borderlands. After all, each grew up at a crossroads of nations: 
the Frenchman in the French-German borderland, the Pole in the Polish-Ukrain-
ian-Jewish-Russian melting pot. And yet the narrator of Les Déracinés notes: 
 
S’il est constant qu’un esprit vigoureux, bien assuré de ses assises, peut se hausser de son 
étroite patrie, de son milieu et de sa race, pour atteindre à d’autres civilizations, on n’a 
constaté chez personne l’énergie de faire de l’unité avec des elements dissemblables.80 
 
This claim is significantly illustrated by the story of François Sturel’s affair with 
the Armenian girl Astiné, who in Barrès’s novel represents “un principe qui 
n’était de sa nature,” i.e., “un précipité de mort.”81 The “Asian” mistress tears the 
protagonist away from his native land, from “intérêts de la vie française.”82 
Barrès gives a similar treatment to French-German relations. Suffice it to recall 
Colette Baudoche, a novel of which Brzozowski thought highly.83 Its eponymous 
protagonist refuses to marry a young German professor for the sake of protecting 
her French soul (“ce n’est pas une question personnelle, mais une question fran-
çaise”).84 From this perspective, these works can be contrasted with Brzozow-
ski’s Płomienie (Flames, 1908) or Dębina (Oakwood, 1911), which tell about 
their protagonists’ tearing free of their nation, but here, this tearing free of the 
native land has a much more ambivalent nature. In his commentary to Płomienie, 
Brzozowski claims: 
 
[…] usiłowałem przedstawić, że brak twórczej świadomości narodowej prowadzi od 
odrywania się jednostek samoistniejszych od narodowej wspólności, do widzenia życia w 
abstrakcyjnych, upraszczających dogmatach, do niemożności odnalezienia związku z 
narodem bez zrzeczenia się własnej swobody. Przedstawiłem dzieje Kaniowskiego nie 
jako błąd, lecz jako cenny, dodatni w danych stosunkach proces myślowy […].85 
 
                                                             
80  Barrès, Les Déracinés, 117. 
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83  Brzozowski, “Maurycy Barrès,” 255. 
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[...] I struggled to show how the absence of creative consciousness leads from more self-
sufficient individuals severing their ties with the nation’s community to looking at life 
with abtract, simplistic dogmas, to the impossibility of recovering a connection with the 
nation without forsaking one’s own freedom. I set forth Kaniowski’s history not as an 
error, but, in the given circumstances, as a valuable, positive intellectual process. 
 
Finally, the nation is for Barrès “la terre et les morts,” and hence the special 
significance of the symbolic imagery of the grave, the cemetery, or the funeral in 
his works. This is exemplified by the famous description of Victor Hugo’s fu-
neral in Les Déracinés.86 Brzozowski’s vision of what a nation is was much 
more dynamic. In the second edition of Legenda Młodej Polski, he wrote about it 
in very vivid terms, at the same time leaving no illusions: 
 
Barrès o całym życiu narodowym myśli w kategoriach higieny osobistej. Jego powieści 
rozpatrują naród raczej jako pewien gatunek automatycznie utrzymującego się zakładu 
hydroterapeutycznego, a nie zaś jako wielki walczący ze światem otaczającym o samoist-
ność swą i ciągłość organizm. Dość postawić Barrèsa obok takiego nacjonalisty jak Do-
stojewski lub nawet takiego jak Kipling. Nacjonalizm Barrèsa to przyrząd ortopedyczny, 
nacjonalizm Kiplinga to natura.87 
 
Barrès conceives a nation’s entire life in the categories of personal hygiene. His novels 
look upon the nation rather as a certain kind of automatically self-regulating hydrothera-
peutic plant, and not as a mighty organism waging a struggle with the surrounding world 
in order to achieve self-sufficiency and continuity. It suffices to juxtapose Barrès with a 
nationalist such as Dostoevsky or even Kipling. Barrès’s nationalism is an orthopedic 
instrument, Kipling’s nationalism is nature itself. 
 
Thus, the milieu of French modern nationalism turned out too conservative, too 
narrow for Brzozowski, and thus too feeble to be able to enhance national en-
                                                             
86  At the funeral, Hugo Sturel “a distingué la grande source dont sa vie n’est qu’un petit 
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ergy. What he found more appealing was the imperial model of British nation-
alism of Kipling’s variety, i.e., expansive and conquest-oriented. 
 
The “Uprooting”  
 
In this light, Brzozowski’s opinion of Les Déracinés, expressed in the aforemen-
tioned essay Kryzys w literaturze rosyjskiej, may seem surprising or even puz-
zling. What he did there was to compare Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks with 
Barrès’s novel, deeming them both as “from the point of view of philosophy and 
society the most profound novel of recent times” (najgłębszą z punktu widzenia 
myśli filozoficznej i społecznej koncepcję powieściową ostatnich czasów).88  
Marta Wyka argues with reference to this statement that Brzozowski saw in 
Buddenbrooks a work that “describes the crumbling foundations of nineteenth-
century Europe.” Tomasz Burek, in turn, points to the theme which would reso-
nate with Poles, namely the fall of a family and “the exhaustion of practical 
capacities of a given [bourgeois, M. U.] kind of life.”89 But what was it in Bar-
rès’s novel that so interested Brzozowski?  
Let us recall that it was published in 1897 as the first volume of the trilogy 
entitled Le Roman de l’énergie nationale, and enjoyed tremendous success, 
winning Barrès the status of a classic of French fiction.90 Józef Heistein, a Polish 
historian of French literature, not long ago still described Les Déracinés as a 
masterpiece, and at the same time a “bible of nationalism.”91 Albert Thibaudet 
wrote in the 1930s about the entire trilogy that “[…] these theses put into fiction 
do not lack in artificiality or bad faith; nevertheless, the books which contain 
                                                             
88  Brzozowski, “Kryzys w literaturze rosyjskiej,” 179; however, he made the proviso: 
“jeśli naturalnie pozostawić na stronie powieść angielską” (if of course one leaves 
aside the English novel). Let us add that in the first version of “Kilka uwag o stanie 
ogólnym literatury europejskiej i o zadaniach krytyki literackiej” (Some Remarks 
about the General Situation of European Literature and the Tasks of Literary Criti-
cism), Brzozowski included Les Déracinés among the books “that can stimulate 
thought about the issues raised here” (które mogą przyczynić się do rozbudzenia 
umysłu dla zagadnień tu poruszanych). Głosy wśród nocy, 75. 
89  Marta Wyka, Czytanie Brzozowskiego [Reading Brzozowski] (Kraków: Universitas, 
2012), 346; Tomasz Burek, Dalej aktualne [Still relevant] (Warszawa: Czytelnik 
1973), 70. 
90  Chiron, Barrès, 161. 
91  Józef Heistein, Historia literatury francuskiej: od początków do czasów najnowszych 
[The history of French literature: from the beginnings to the present times] (Wrocław: 
Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1987), 503. 
98 | Maciej Urbanowski 
them are among Barrès’s liveliest works, and have provided the French intelli-
gentsia with topics for discussion for thirty years.”92 Louis Aragon saw in Les 
Déracinés the first modern political novel in France, and even the point of de-
parture of the novelistic avant-garde.93 Pierre Boisdeffre considered Barrès’s text 
to be one of the greatest books of the last quarter of the nineteenth century; he 
wrote about its great success at the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
deemed it “the only real novel” of the French writer.94  
It should be added that Les Déracinés was one of the most influential novels 
of the twentieth century. The “uprooting” (déracinement) present in the title, as 
well as the closely related “rootedness” (enracinement), was to play an enor-
mous role throughout the whole century. This was pointed out by, e.g., Andrzej 
Mencwel in his recent book on Brzozowski. Mencwel notes, first, that this no-
tion was popular with conservatives in the twentieth century and, second, that in 
order to establish what it meant back then, “one would need to write a thorough 
study, almost amounting to a history of mid-twentieth-century literature.”95 The 
theme recurred in the works of many eminent authors, from Przybyszewski and 
Chesterton to Márai or Tolkien. To Mencwel’s long list of names we should 
certainly add Simone Weil and her study L’Enracinement (1943, The Need for 
Roots). What is significant is that Mencwel himself applies the notion of “up-
rooting” when speaking about Brzozowski’s life, e.g., “His family history is a 
story of uprooting,” or “The student of the Niemirów gymnasium, Leopold 
Brzozowski, uprooted from tradition, certainly was a fine-tuned instrument of 
progress.”96 
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This explains to a certain degree why it was Les Déracinés and not any other 
of Barrès’s works that Brzozowski was most keen to evoke, whether directly or 
indirectly. Already in the chapter Kryzys romantyzmu (The Crisis of Romanti-
cism) of Legenda Młodej Polski he wrote the following words, as though fore-
stalling future polemics, and especially the accusations that his critique of Young 
Poland is an echo of Barrès’s novel: 
 
Przede wszystkim chciałbym zaznaczyć swoje stanowisko względem pewnego zestawie-
nia, które nasuwa się samo przez się. Déracinés Barrèsa są mi dobrze znani. Wiem, że 
niejednemu z czytelników nawinie się to przypomnienie, gdy czytać będzie o [...] samot-
nej jednostce. Nie będę walczył przeciwko samemu terminowi. Tak jest, ruch Młodej 
Polski był usiłowaniem znalezienia gruntu pod nogami, wrośnięcia w żywą sprawę, zlania 
się z nią, zapuszczenia korzeni w istotny czarnoziem97. 
 
Foremostly, I would like to state my position with regard to a comparison that comes 
readily to mind. Barrès’s Déracinés are by no means unknown to me. I am aware that not 
a few readers will naively make this association when reading about […] the lonely indi-
vidual. I won’t struggle against the term itself. Yes, the movement Young Poland sought 
to find a basis to stand on, to meld with something vital, to sink roots into authentic black 
earth. 
 
In Barrès’s writing, the antinomy uprooted-rootedness had an ethical, and at the 
same time nationalistic character. After all, it is possible to take root only in 
something that is both national and local, provincial: in the “native ground” 
(today we would perhaps phrase it as the “mała ojczyzna”—“little homeland”). 
This is a desirable state, synonymous with moral health, but also—what was 
especially important for Barrès—enabling the development of personal individu-
ality. Hence, the individual self has, or rather should have, its “roots” in its na-
tive land. However, the self is not “a greenhouse plant,” but “a tree growing deep 
into native ground,” that is, as Jacek Bartyzel clarifies, “into its nation and 
homeland.”98  
Speaking about rootedness, the French writer evokes an organic, or, to be 
more precise, dendrological metaphor, where the tree is a symbol of the relation-
ship binding the invidual and the nation; it represents the perfect society. As 
Thibaudet noted, “In his rich and complex work, Barrès employs an image, 
perhaps banal, yet completely refreshed, of a growing tree, which draws every-
thing from its native soil: reflection, patience, logic, inner relations among 
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seemingly contradictory and inimical forms of life.”99 In Les Déracinés, this is 
illustrated by the beautiful parable about a plane tree, told to Roemerspacher by 
Hippolyte Taine.100 For him, the tree is an image, i.e., “une belle existence,” 
“l’éternelle unité” and “l’éternelle énigme qui se manifeste dans chaque forme.” 
He calls it “une fédération bruissante,” and underscores that, 
 
Cette masse puissante de verdure obéit à une raison secrète, à la plus sublime philosophie, 
qui est l’acceptation des necessités de la vie. Sans se renier, sans s’abandonner, il a tiré des 
conditions fournies par la réalité le meilleur parti, le plus utile. Depuis les plus grandes 
branches jusqu’aux plus petites radicelles, tout entier il a opéré le même mouvement…101 
 
From this perspective, the nation is a tree, and the individual a leaf, i.e., a part of 
a larger whole, a transient part, fed by the roots of the tree. Tearing away from 
these roots, or being torn away from them, individuals doom themselves to 
weakness, and then defeat, fall, decadence.102 This is why, as Jean-Michel Witt-
man notes, Barrès associates the term “uprooted” with “decapitated” (décapité), 
with images of a body with a severed head, a body left to itself, disintegrated, 
doomed to degradation and wasting away.103  
This is illustrated by Barrès’s story of the young citizens of Lorraine “ripped 
out of the native ground.” Their uprooting is the result of several factors, a cru-
cial one being the educational system, as embodied by Professor Bouteiller. Bou-
teiller is a follower of Kant, whose philosophy was highly important for Brzo-
zowski. In the words of the narrator of Les Déracinés, Bouteiller “[…] allait 
hausser ces enfants admiratifs au-dessus des passions de leur race, jusqu’à la 
raison, jusqu’à l’humanité.”104 The Professor believes that “Le monde n’est 
qu’une cire à laquelle notre esprit comme un cachet impose son empreinte…”105 
and he does not want to adapt his teaching system to the character and intellec-
                                                             
99  Thibaudet, Historia literatury francuskiej, 432. 
100  Barrès, Les Déracinés, 193f.  
101  Ibid., 194.  
102  Soucy, Fascism in France, 203. See also: „Je suis une des feuilles éphémères, que, 
par milliards, sur les Vosges, chaque automne pourrit et, dans cette brève minute, où 
l’arbre de vie me soutient contre l’effort de vents et des pluies, je me connais comme 
un effet de toutes les saisons qui moururent.” Maurice Barrès, Les Bastions de l’Est. 
Au service de l’Allemagne (Paris: Félix Juven, 1906), 100f. 
103  Wittman, Barrès romancier, 93f. 
104  Barrès, Les Déracinés, 18. 
105  Ibid., 19. 
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tual make-up of his students. The narrator of Barrès’s novel describes this in the 
following way: 
 
Déraciner ces enfants, les détacher du sol et du groupe social où tout les relie, pour les 
placer hors de leurs préjugés dans la raison abstraite, comment cela le gênerait-il, lui qui 
n’a pas de sol, ni de société, ni, pense-t-il, de prejugés? […] Ses moeurs, ses attaches, il 
les a discutées, préférées et decidées.106 
 
As a result, an “uprooted” individual is born, compared to a colourful balloon, 
aimless, dependent on external forces: “Ces lycéens frémissants dans sa main, on 
peut les comparer à ces ballons captifs de couleurs éclatantes et variées, que le 
marchand par un fil léger retient, mais qui aspirent à s’envoler, à s’élever, à se 
disperser sans but.”107  
 
Commenting on Bouteiller’s activity, the narrator notes:  
 
Ses élèves […] ne comprennent guère que la race de leur pays existe, que la terre de leur 
pays est une réalité et que, plus existant, plus réel encore que la terre ou la race, l’esprit de 
chaque petite patrie est pour ses fils instrument d’éducation et de vie. […] On met le 
désordre dans notre pays par des importations de verités exotiques, quand il’y a pour nous 
de vérités utiles que tirées de notre fonds.108 
 
He also adds: 
 
Mais précisément, un bon administrateur cherche à attacher l’animal au rocher qui lui 
convient; il lui propose d’abord une raison suffisante de demeurer dans sa tradition et dans 
son milieu; il le met ensuite, s’il y a lieu, dans une telle situation qu’il ait plaisir à s’agré-
ger dans un groupe et que par son intérêt propre se soumette à la collectivité.109 
 
The question is whether this was the kind of “uprooting” that Brzozowski had in 
mind when in Legenda Młodej Polski he wrote of Romanticism as “the revolt of 
the flower against its roots” (buncie kwiatu przeciw swym korzeniom)?110 Here, 
                                                             
106  Ibid., 24f. 
107  Ibid., 38. 
108  Ibid., 37. 
109  Ibid., 36. 
110  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 32. According to Mencwel, Brzozowki bor-
rowed this expression from Nikolai K. Mikhailovskii. See: Mencwel, Brzozowski, 
185.  
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the dendrological metaphor—Barrès would have probably spoken of a revolt of 
leaves against the tree/roots—is replaced by a botanical one, while pathos, it 
seems, evolves towards irony. The intention, however, appears to be similar: 
both Brzozowski and Barrès point out the social loneliness of individuals, re-
sulting from their conscious or unconscious tearing away from their “roots” or 
“ground.” The writers also share a very critical view of this phenomenon. The 
difference lies in the fact that for Brzozowski “soil” does not necessarily need to 
have national connotations; he speaks rather about rootedness in the “historical 
soil” (glebie dziejowej), and even about “labor putting down roots ever more 
deeply” (coraz głębiej zapuszczającej korzenie – pracy).111  
The root metaphor returns in Brzozowski’s unfinished novel Dębina, whose 
first book bears the title Gałęzie i korzenie (Branches and Roots). But is it possi-
ble that as he wrote it Brzozowski drew inspiration from Les Déracinés? This is 
difficult to ascertain today, although the story of the Ogieński family, as 
sketched in Brzozowski’s novel, could be interpreted in terms of the protago-
nists’ “déracinement,” at least in the manner employed by Konstanty Troczyński 
with reference to Wacław Berent’s Próchno (Rotten Wood).112 
                                                             
111  See: “Dusze jednostkowe tkwią korzeniami swej psychiki w jednej i tej samej dzie-
jowej glebie. Glebę tę odnajdziemy we wszystkim, co jest w danej epoce głębokie, a 
więc silnie i samoistnie żyje”; “[…] Polak nie wie jeszcze, w swej świadomej myśli, 
jak twardo już umie walczyć ze światem: – pora już tylko, by to twarde, silne ży-
ciowe jądro przedarło powłokę niedojrzałości myślowej, aby świadomość zbiorowa 
przestała się wyrażać w formach marnotrawiących, osłabiających wyniki bezwied-
nego życiowego procesu, pora, by jako jedyna ukazała się samej sobie Polska za-
wziętej, zapamiętałej woli życia i niestrudzonej, niesłabnącej pod ciosami, przeciw-
nie, wciąż krzepnącej i coraz głębiej zapuszczającej korzenie – pracy” (The psyches 
of individual souls are rooted in one and the same historical soil. We will find this 
soil in everything that is profound in a given epoch, that lives forcefully and self-suf-
ficiently; […] the Pole does not yet know, as he thinks, how tough-minded he is al-
ready in his struggle with the world—it is time, though, that this tough-minded, 
forceful vital core tore away the surface layer of immature thinking, in order that the 
collective consciousness cease to express itself in petty forms that weaken the results 
of the mindless vital process; it is time that Poland becomes one, shows itself as a 
committed, fully cognizant, wilful vitality—as labor that is tireless, undaunted by 
blows, that takes form and sinks roots ever more deeply). Brzozowski, Legenda 
Młodej Polski, 344, 122. 
112  Konstanty Troczyński, “Artysta i dzieło. Studium o Próchnie Wacława Berenta” 
[Artist and work. A study about Próchno by Wacław Berent], in Pisma wybrane. 
Tom I: Studia i szkice z nauki o literaturze, ed. Stanisław Dąbrowski (Kraków: Wy-
Brzozowski and Barrès | 103 
A separate problem is the poetics of Les Déracinés, a modern political novel, 
as Aragon had it, but also—quite simply—a thesis novel, whose protagonists, 
and readers together with them, are students, constantly educating themselves 
and the educated.113 As Skiwski accurately observed, “A characteristic feature of 
Barrès’s novel is [also] a certain abstractness. The author is not trying to achieve 
realistic effects—he always treats external situations as opportunities to express 
an abstraction.”114 Such is the case with Les Déracinés, whose “modernity” 
consists in saturating the plot with “the authentic.”115 This was also noted by 
Jabłonowski in his introduction to the Polish edition of Barrès’s book: 
 
History and fiction combine here; invention melts away in the didactic, journalistic ele-
ment; poetry, artistry are bent to serve real aims, vital issues, which the author considers 
or sheds light on in long, animated discussions.116 
 
Jan Lorentowicz, in turn, pointed out the characteristics of Le roman de l’énergie 
nationale: the foregrounding of the narrator, who intrudes in the protagonists’ 
actions, “pushes them to the background,” and who “himself speaks, explaining 
things, preaching political and social sermons, or expressing thoughts inspired 
by the observation of his own protagonists,”117 so that the novel lacks composi-
tional unity. “We have here,” the critic notes, “a historical treatise, and alongside 
it—a course in philosophy, a study in aesthetics, and finally several moments of 
a Stendhalian romance,” and all this put together constitutes “an attempt at ap-
plying metaphysics to social or individual life.”118 
Again, what remains open to consideration and discussion is the extent to 
which these aspects of the poetics of Les Déracinés could have not only inter-
ested Brzozowski, but also inspired his novels, in particular the works written 
                                                             
dawnictwo Literackie, 1997), 436f. Phrases such as “uprooted soul” or “people al-
ready completely ripped out ‘of native soil’” were used with reference to Brzozow-
ski’s novel by Tomasz Burek in his sketch “Arcydzieło niedokończone” (An Unfin-
ished Masterpiece). See: Burek, Dalej aktualne, 68f. 
113  Wittmann, Barrès romancier, 95. 
114  Skiwski, Maurice Barrès, 103.  
115  Starting with the second volume of Le roman de l’énergie nationale, Barrès’s novels 
become less and less “novelistic”: fiction is abandoned for the sake of documentary, 
chronicle, and testimony; see: Wittman, Barrès romancier, 121. 
116  Jabłonowski, Introduction, viii. 
117  Lorentowicz, “Maurycy Barrès,” 253. 
118  Ibid., 257. 
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towards the end of his life: Dębina and Książka o starej kobiecie (A Book about 
an Old Woman). 
  
Towards Catholicism  
 
Brzozowski died in 1911 at the age of thirty-two, Barrès in 1923 at sixty-one. 
The author of Głosy wśród nocy could not read the works the Frenchman wrote 
in the last decade of his life. We cannot tell whether Brzozowski would have 
taken an interest in them or what he might have thought of them. 
It is worth noting, however, that those later works of Barrès’, from the novel 
La colline inspirée (1913; published in English as The Sacred Hill in 1929) 
onwards, signalled his turn towards Catholicism, personalism, and universalism, 
and eventually his “conversion,” to a large extent conditioned by Henri Brémond 
and the works of Pascal and Newman.119 I mention this because, as we know, 
Brzozowski’s evolution took a very similar course. For both thinkers, ultimately, 
the milieu of modern nationalism, whether conservative or imperialist, proved to 
be too restrictive. 
 
Translated by Zofia Ziemann 
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The Cult of Will and Power: Did Brzozowski 
Inspire Ukrainian Nationalism?1 
Jens Herlth 
 
 
Reference to the works or the mere name of Stanisław Brzozowski can be re-
garded as a basso continuo in twentieth-century Polish intellectual debates. Ever 
since his premature death from tuberculosis in 1911, his writings as well as his 
critical posture have served as a vantage point, as a source of inspiration or of 
symbolic authority for several generations of Polish intellectuals up to recent 
times. Although it is not always easy to assess how precisely Brzozowski may 
have inspired religious thinkers of the 1920s, literary critics of the 1930s, Marx-
ist-revisionist philosophers of the 1960s, or left-wing activists of the 2000s (to 
name only a few settings in which references to Brzozowski have been particu-
larly frequent)—the sheer fact of his presence is something that can hardly be 
called into question. If this holds true for Poland, the opposite must be said for 
the rest of the world. Brzozowski’s relevance as a writer and thinker somehow 
vanishes completely as soon as we cross the borders of Polish culture. Several 
attempts were made to mark at least Brzozowski’s potential to exert an influence 
on the history of twentieth-century literature, criticism, and social philosophy. 
The most prominent example is Andrzej Walicki’s book on Stanisław Brzo-
zowski and the Polish Beginnings of ‘Western Marxism’.2 However, there is 
something inevitably melancholic in these endeavors. It simply has to be admit-
ted that Brzozowski was practically ignored by intellectuals outside Poland. 
Exceptions were few—one could point to his encounters with Anatolii Lu-
                                                             
1  I would like to express my gratitude to the colleagues and friends who helped me with 
finding materials or gave me their advice during the writing of this essay: Lyudmyla 
Berbenets, Andrej Lushnycky, Dorota Kozicka, Olesya Omelchuk, and Dariusz Pa-
chocki. 
2  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
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nacharskii and Maksim Gor’kii in Florence in 1907;3 to his programmatic article 
on “Historical Materialism as Cultural Philosophy” in the German socialist jour-
nal Die Neue Zeit,4 and maybe as well to his plan to collaborate with the Flor-
ence-based journal La Voce,5 which unfortunately remained aspirational.6 How-
ever, these few examples confirm rather than disprove the assertion that one 
cannot speak of any impact whatsoever exerted by Brzozowski’s writings on 
non-Polish debates in the twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, there was one exception. Brzozowski was in fact read and ap-
preciated by a small number of Ukrainian intellectuals in the interwar period. 
There even is some (admittedly scarce) evidence that his ideas were picked up 
and developed in the context of Ukrainian nationalist thought in the 1920s and 
1930s. The goal of the present chapter is to shed some light on this episode in the 
history of the reception of Brzozowski’s works, to collect hints that point to a 
possible affiliation between the Polish philosopher and his Ukrainian readers, 
and to assess if we can indeed speak of an ‘influence’ wielded by the former’s 
writings in this specific context. 
 
Did it Happen? Brzozowski’s Encounter with Dmytro Dontsov  
 
In Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi’s Dmytro Dontsov: A Political Portrait we read that 
Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973), possibly the most influential representative of 
Ukrainian nationalist thought during the interwar years and one of the intellec-
tual leaders (though not a formal member) of the “Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists” (OUN),7 had spent some months during 1908 and 1909 in Za-
                                                             
3  Daniela Steila, “A philosophy of labour: comparing A. V. Lunačarskij and S. Brzo-
zowski,” Studies in East European Thought 63 (2011): 315–327. 
4  Stanislaus Brzozowski, “Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie: ein phi-
losophisches Programm,” Die neue Zeit: Wochenschrift der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 
31 (1907), 153–160. http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/neuzeit.pl?id=07.06297&dok=1906-
07b&f=190607b_0153&l=190607b_0160&c=190607b_0153. The article was reviewed 
by M. S. H. in American Journal of Sociology 13, 3 (1907): 429. For more on this see 
Gábor Gángó’s essay in this volume, 57ff. 
5  As mentioned in a letter to Ostap Ortwin on May 3, 1910. Cf.: Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 
2, 419. 
6  Cf. annotation in: Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 2, 412, and also in: Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 
121. All these plans were balked by the “Brzozowski affair.”  
7  Cf.: Tomasz Stryjek, Ukraińska idea narodowa okresu międzywojennego [The Ukrai-
nian national idea in the interwar period] (Toruń: Wyd. Naukowe Uniwersytetu Miko-
łaja Kopernika, 2013), 116. 
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kopane for treatment. Sosnovs’kyi further states that, in Zakopane, Dontsov had 
“made the acquaintance of the outstanding Polish philosopher and journalist of 
the so-called ‘Young Poland’ generation, whose works, as some people suppose, 
bore a considerable influence on Dontsov.”8 Unfortunately, this is the only oc-
currence of Brzozowski’s name in this extensive study of Dontsov’s intellectual 
biography. 
Sosnovs’kyi’s laconic remark could not fit better with a general conclusion I 
reached during my research on the forms and representations of Brzozowski’s 
intellectual heritage. Many key figures in Polish twentieth-century intellectual 
history claim to have been influenced or inspired by Brzozowski. Nevertheless, 
only very rarely does one get to know more about the specific ideas, terms or 
concepts of the author of The Legend of Modern Poland, which were actually 
picked up by his readers. This observation raises the problem of ‘intellectual 
influence’ as such. We have no clear definition of what it means to be ‘influ-
enced’ by an author—his person or his writings. Does it suffice that his name is 
mentioned as a source of inspiration or would we expect references to his works, 
direct quotations or other explicit or implicit marks of intertextuality? In Brzo-
zowski’s case, we frequently get the impression that reference to his writings—
or, unfortunately more often, solely to his name—is not so much meant to call 
up specific ideas as to declare a personal affiliation to a certain group, camp or 
intellectual and generational cluster. Thus, ‘Brzozowski’ becomes a label, a 
common denominator that is employed to declare one’s kinship with a group of 
likeminded peers. Recently, Małgorzata Szpakowska has shown that the en-
gagement with Brzozowski’s heritage in the interwar journal Wiadomości Li-
terackie (Literary News) was actually rather superficial, despite the fact that 
Brzozowski was generally considered the journal’s intellectual “patron.”9 
For a clarification of what can be understood as ‘intellectual influence’ we 
can turn directly to Brzozowski’s ideas on the matter. In his Diary, he stated, 
“what is not biography does not exist at all.”10 Presumably Brzozowski’s most 
often quoted statement, this phrase considerably disturbs scholars who are used 
to rely on structures and networks more than on the subject as an agent in a 
historical process. It certainly needs further explanation to be of use for a discus-
                                                             
8  Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov: politychnyi portret. Z istoriï rozvytku ideo-
logiï ukraïns’koho natsionalizmu [Dmytro Dontsov: a political portrait. From the his-
tory of the development of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism] (New York – To-
ronto: Trident International, Inc., 1974), 76. 
9  Małgorzata Szpakowska, “Wiadomości Literackie” prawie dla wszystkich [“Literary 
news”: almost for everyone] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo W.A.B., 2012), 373f. 
10  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 164. 
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sion of Brzozowski’s own sphere of influence. In an annotation to his translation 
of John Henry Newman’s writings he developed this idea somewhat more fully: 
every “thing” and every “principle” or “idea” is of historical relevance only 
insofar as it enters the concrete life of an individual. It is this individual who 
introduces the idea to a greater community: “Everything must be a moment of 
someone’s biography.”11 The concept of “entering one’s biography” oscillates 
between the claim to historical and biographical factuality, or at least verifiabil-
ity, and a rather blurred symbolic or charismatic meaning. And it is precisely 
thanks to this semantic ambivalence that it can be useful as a tool for intellectual 
historians who are interested not so much in a free flow of ideas in some sub-
lime, depersonalized empyrean, but in the institutional, social and concrete his-
torical context which produces and shapes these ideas—as well as their impact. 
The person is situated at the very intersection of these factors. Moreover, she is 
an acting part in the process. However, we must not forget that the mere mention 
of an author’s name as a source of authority or symbolic capital can also be 
completely misleading. It is often more fruitful to ask for which specific interest 
or motivation does someone choose to claim ‘Brzozowski’ as an authoritative 
point of reference for her own intellectual biography or public image, rather than 
to try to detect traces of Brzozowski’s ideas in her writings. But this assessment 
can only be made after a thorough examination of the philosophical or critical 
concepts that are at stake in the respective context. 
In this regard, Dmytro Dontsov’s case is exceptional. Whereas in certain 
contexts of Polish culture, Brzozowski’s name clearly served as a source of 
symbolic capital, nothing similar can be stated for cultures outside Poland. Why 
should the Canada-based author of a 1974 biography about the mastermind of 
Ukrainian interwar nationalism resort to this device? One would normally not 
expect that a reference to Brzozowski in the context of Ukrainian émigré schol-
arship could produce the same charismatic effect as in the Polish context. Should 
we not conclude therefore that there must be more behind this reference than a 
simple attempt to confer significance on Dontsov’s person and writings? Never-
theless, it would be risky to conclude from the pure fact of this somewhat iso-
lated reference that Brzozowski actually did inspire Dontsov’s political ideas or 
world-view. Unfortunately, Sosnovs’kyi’s version of an encounter in Zakopane 
is at best circumstantial evidence—or rather no evidence at all. However, this 
did not hinder later Dontsov scholars from reiterating it: Thus, Oleh Bahan 
stressed the importance of Dontsov’s encounter with Brzozowski in Zakopane in 
                                                             
11  Cf.: John Henry Newman, Przyświadczenia wiary [Testimonies of faith], trans. Stani-
sław Brzozowski (Lwów: Księgarnia Polska B. Połonieckiego / Warszawa: E. Wende 
i Ska., 1915), 221. 
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1909. He even assumed that the pen-name “Zakopanets’,” adopted by Dontsov 
in some of his publications should be read as an acknowledgment of the pivotal 
role of this encounter for the development of his political thought.12 Unfortu-
nately, Bahan, too, spares us any references that could tell us more about the 
sources from which he builds his assessment. In all likelihood, he simply follows 
Sosnovs’kyi here. As did the Polish writer and critic Józef Łobodowski in a 1981 
essay on Dmytro Dontsov; speaking of Sosnovs’kyi’s account of Dontsov’s 
meeting with Brzozowski, he asserted that “this is an interesting fact for Polish 
cultural history” (Tu interesujący polonik).13  
It is hard not to agree with this assessment: Dontsov’s meeting with Brzo-
zowski would indeed be an interesting fact—if it were a fact at all. The problem 
is that, for all we know, Brzozowski did not stay in Zakopane in 1908 or 1909.14 
If Dontsov met him there, this must have been in 1905. In July and August 1905, 
Brzozowski held lectures at the “Holiday University” (Uniwersytet Wakacyjny) 
in the Tatra resort.15 But this date seems improbable for a meeting of the two, 
given that we have no evidence that Dontsov could have come to Zakopane 
during the years of his studies at St. Petersburg University.16 Zakopane was in 
the Austro-Hungarian part of Poland; reliable biographical accounts state that 
Dontsov left the Russian Empire for the first time (and for good) in 1908.17 
                                                             
12  He also mentions Dontsov’s meetings with the leader of Ukrainian conservatism 
V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi (1882–1931) in Zakopane in 1909: “Особистостями, які по-
сприяли цьому, можна припустити, були польський критик і мислитель волюн-
таристського спрямування Станіслав Бжозовський (1878–1911) і український 
історик та теоретик консерватизму В’ячеслав Липинський (1882–1931), з якими 
він познайомився у 1909 р., вже на еміграції, у польському курортному містечку 
Закопане. (Можливо, не випадково один час його псевдонімом був «Закопа-
нець», що ніби вказував на значущість зустрічей у мальовничих Татрах).” Oleh 
Bahan, “Ideoloh natsional’noï velychi” [An ideologue of national greatness]. http:// 
dontsov.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121:oleg-bagan-qideo 
log-nacionalnoji-velychiq-&catid=36:poslidovniki&Itemid=41 
13  Józef Łobodowski, “Dmytro Doncow: życie i działalność” [Dmytro Doncow: life and 
deeds], Zeszyty Historyczne 55 (1981): 146. 
14  Cf.: Mieczysław Sroka, “Ważniejsze daty z życia i działalności Stanisława Brzozow-
skiego” [The most important dates in the life and the deeds of Stanisław Brzozowski], 
in Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 2, 871–876. 
15  Cf.: ibid., 861. 
16  Cf. Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, 68. 
17  Oleh Bahan, “Dzherela svitohliadnoho natsionalizmu Dmytra Dontsova” [The sources 
of Dmytro Dontsov’s ideological nationalism], in Dmytro Dontsov, Vybrani tvory u 
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The references quoted above are not the only sources which claim a link 
between Brzozowski and Dontsov. In Mieczysław Sroka’s introduction to his 
edition of Brzozowski’s letters, we find the following sentence: “The Ukrainian 
nationalist Dymitr Doncow will bе enthusiastic about Brzozowski.”18 This re-
mark, too, is obviously highly intriguing, given that Sroka’s thoroughly com-
mented and annotated edition remains until this day one of the authoritative 
cornerstones in Brzozowski studies. But, unfortunately and quite uncharacteristi-
cally for such a scrupulous philologist, Sroka, just like Sosnovs’kyi, does not 
supply any reference that could document Dontsov’s alleged “enthusiasm” for 
Brzozowski.19  
Recently, Trevor Erlacher, in a highly interesting essay on Dontsov’s intel-
lectual development prior to World War I, took up Sosnovs’kyi’s assumptions, 
specifying that Dontsov met Brzozowski in L’viv and in Vienna in 1908.20 It 
seems that this is an unfounded conjecture, given that Brzozowski did not stay in 
either of these cities in 1908.21 Moreover, it is not very likely that Dontsov who 
just had “escaped abroad to L’viv […] on 12 April 1908”22 should have sought 
the company of a man who was suspected of being an informant of the Okhrana. 
The infamous list with Brzozowski’s name at the top was published on April 25, 
                                                             
desiaty tomakh, vol. 1: Politychna analityka (1912–1918 rr.), ed. Oleh Bahan (Droho-
bych – L’viv: Vidrodzhennia, 2011), 8. 
18  “Brzozowskim entuzjazmował się będzie nacjonalista ukraiński Dymitr Doncow.” 
Mieczysław Sroka, “Przedmowa,” in Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, xxxix. 
19  In contemporary Ukrainian scholarship Sosnovs’kyi’s version of a personal acquaint-
ance between Brzozowski and Dontsov continues to persist. In a recent book on Don-
tsov and the ideological background of his journal Vistnyk, Olesia Omel’chuk names 
Brzozowski among the thinkers who influenced Dontsov, adding that Dontsov “knew 
him personally.” Olesia Omel’chuk, Literaturni idealy ukraïns’koho vistnykivstva 
(1922–1939) [The literary ideals of the Ukrainian “Vistnyk” circle] (Kyïv: “Smolo-
skyp”, 2011), 20. Cf. also: Hanna V. Davlietova, “D. I. Dontsov: pochatok formuvan-
nia svitohliadu” [D. I. Dontsov: the beginning of the forming of his world-view], 
Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fak-tu ZNU 21 (2007): 141. 
20  Trevor Erlacher, “The Birth of Ukrainian ‘Active Nationalism’: Dmytro Dontsov and 
Heterodox Marxism before World War I, 1883–1914,” Modern Intellectual History 
11, 3 (2014): 531f. 
21  Sroka, “Ważniejsze daty z życia i działalności Brzozowskiego,” 871–873. All of 
Brzozowski’s 1908 letters were sent from Florence, Italy (cf.: Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, 
430–767).  
22  Erlacher, “The Birth of Ukrainian ‘Active Nationalism’,” 531. 
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1908.23 This latter point is of marginal importance though, since Brzozowski 
simply did not leave Italy in 1908. Nonetheless, relying exclusively on Sos-
novs’kyi (for Dontsov’s biography) and on Walicki and Kołakowski (for refer-
ences from Brzozowski’s works), Erlacher cannot resist stating that “in Brzo-
zowski we find the most immediate inspirations for Dontsov’s later attitudes on 
ethics, nationality, and the primacy of will, ideas, and power in human his-
tory.”24 Even if based on second-hand sources (in Brzozowski’s case), Erlacher’s 
observations regarding parallels between Dontsov’s ideology of “active nation-
alism” and Brzozowski’s ideas on the modernization of Polish culture are not 
without valuable insight. As it turns out, a comparative analysis of Brzozowski’s 
and Dontsov’s writings is arguably the only viable way to assess, if not the ‘im-
pact’ or ‘influence’, then at least the common ideological standpoints and ap-
proaches that link the two authors. Still we have to acknowledge that the attempt 
to establish a factual biographical link between them has not led to convincing 
results. Possibly, we are dealing with just another legend here, comparable to 
Wilhelm Feldman’s conjecture concerning a meeting between Brzozowski and 
Lenin in Switzerland.25 Maybe some day, archival research will provide us with 
reliable information about a meeting between Dontsov and Brzozowski. For the 
time being we have to note that, according to the published sources of which we 
dispose, such a meeting could not have taken place either in 1908/1909 in Za-
kopane or in 1908 in L’viv or Vienna. This means that the ground for a discus-
sion of Brzozowski’s impact on the emergence of Ukrainian nationalist thought 
in the first third of the twentieth century is at best very shaky. 
 
“The cult of will and power”: Did Brzozowski “give birth” 
to Dontsov? 
 
As it turns out, all speculation about Brzozowski’s weighty influence on Don-
tsov can be traced back to Michał Rudnicki, or rather Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi 
(1889–1975), a former collaborator of Ostap Ortwin in the Bernard Połoniecki 
publishing house in Lwów. According to Mieczysław Sroka, Rudnyts’kyi, to-
                                                             
23  Cf. Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 1, between pp. 512 and 513. 
24  Erlacher, “The Birth of Ukrainian ‘Active Nationalism’,” 532. 
25  Wilhelm Feldman, Współczesna literatura polska, 1864–1917 [Contemporary Polish 
literature, 1864−1917], part III, 6th ed. (Warsaw: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze w War-
szawie, 1919), 81. Cf. also: Sroka, “Przedmowa,” xxxf. 
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gether with Ostap Ortwin, transcribed manuscripts for the editions of Brzo-
zowski’s works that were issued by “Księgarnia B. Połonieckiego.”26 
During the interwar years, Rudnyts’kyi was a well-known literary critic, 
writer, and literary scholar, as well as an important figure on the Ukrainian cul-
tural scene in Galicia. He worked as a journalist and published books of prose 
and essays in Ukrainian. In Soviet times, he became a professor for literature at 
L’viv University.27 It is essential here to take into account the status of Ukrainian 
culture in Poland as a ‘subordinate culture’ that was, moreover, divided between 
two hostile states—Poland and the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian intellectuals in 
L’viv and the region of Galicia could function perfectly well in a Polish lan-
guage environment, but because Polish culture was dominant Poles did not need 
Ukrainian. The Ukrainians had their own public sphere with a number of news-
papers and journals. But a closer look, for example at the issues of the daily 
newspaper Dilo (to which Rudnyts’kyi contributed as a literary critic from 1923 
on), tells us more about the severe and sometimes hostile environment in which 
Ukrainian culture developed in Poland. For reasons of censorship, many pages of 
this newspaper were partly left blank, a fact that the German writer Alfred Dö-
blin noted with astonishment in his account of a visit to Lwów in 1924.28  
Talking about the status of Ukrainian literature for the contemporary Polish 
reader at a meeting of the “Zawodowy Związek Literatów” (Professional Writ-
ers’ Union), Rudnyts’kyi stated that “Ukrainian literature is more exotic and 
unknown for the Polish community than for instance Spanish literature.”29 In 
Poland, Ukrainian culture was dominated and subordinated much like Polish 
culture was on the European level. In an article, published in the Warsaw-based 
Ukrainian language journal My (We), Rudnyts’kyi declared in 1934 that Brzo-
zowski could well have been acknowledged as one of the leading European 
intellectuals of his time, if only he had chosen a different language for his publi-
cations—or if someone would have prepared a selection of his works translated 
                                                             
26  Cf. Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 2, 228. Cf. also: Karol Kuryluk, “Krytyk ukraiński o 
Stanisławie Brzozowskim” [A Ukrainian critic on St. Brzozowski], Tygodnik Ilustro-
wany 34 (1935): 676.  
27  Cf.: Ivan Koshelivets, “Rudnytsky, Mykhailo.” http://www.encyclopediaofukraine. 
com/display.asp?linkpath=pages\R\U\RudnytskyMykhailo.htm 
28  Alfred Döblin, Reise in Polen [1925] (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1987), 191. 
29  “[…] literature ukraińska jest dla polskiego społeczeństwa czemś bardziej egzotycz-
nym i nieznanym niż n. p. literatura hiszpańska.” bwl. [=author], “Współczesna lite-
ratura ukraińska,” Słowo Polskie, April 24, 1931, 6. http://jbc.bj.uj.edu.pl/dlibra/plain-
content?id=200345 
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into a language more accessible than Polish.30 It is not astonishing that Rud-
nyts’kyi had high esteem for Brzozowski. It was he who accomplished the 
translation of the missing fragments of Brzozowski’s edition of articles by John 
Henry Newman, published as Przyświadczenia wiary (Testimonies of Faith) in 
1915.31 In his preface to a volume of Georges Sorel’s essays Rudnyts’kyi trans-
lated for the same series,32 he repeatedly quoted Brzozowski who, for his part, 
was a great admirer of Sorel.33 For Rudnyts’kyi, Brzozowski was one of the first 
to discover the significance of Sorel’s thought and he considered Brzozowski’s 
essay on Sorel to be “the only fruit of real reflection about Sorel.”34 Moreover, 
the authors Rudnyts’kyi referred to were very much the same that Brzozowski 
dealt with in his late writings: Vico, Hegel, Renan, Blondel, Newman—to name 
only a few. Rudnyts’kyi’s article in My testifies to a deep and sympathetic un-
derstanding of Brzozowski’s ideas. It was not devoid of criticism, but generally 
paid tribute to Brzozowski’s mission as that of an intellectual who belonged to a 
stateless nation and wanted to show this nation the path to Europe.  
It is more the context than the content of Rudnyts’kyi’s article that allows me 
to highlight a connection between Brzozowski and Ukrainian nationalist thought: 
In a commentary signed by the “editorial team”35 of My,36 Brzozowski’s writings 
are credited with an “acute actuality.” Brzozowski is seen as the progenitor of a 
“new epoch of nationalism” that emerged “in the coulisses” (на лаштунках) of 
the old and decaying prewar-world. The authors of the commentary draw a direct 
connection to the contemporary state of Ukrainian culture in Poland: 
 
                                                             
30  Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi, “Muchenyk neprymyrennykh idealiv. Stanislav Bzhozov-
s’kyi” [A martyr of irreconcilable ideals: Stanisław Brzozowski], My. Literaturnyi ne-
periodychnyi zhurnal 3 (1934): 174. 
31  According to Leopold Staff’s “Editor’s Remark,” this was about one third of the text. 
Cf.: Newman, Przyświadczenia wiary, s.p. 
32  “Symposion,” ed. Leopold Staff. 
33  Cf.: Michał Rudnicki, “O konkretności myśli Jerzego Sorela” [On the concreteness of 
Georges Sorel’s thought], in Georges Sorel, O sztuce, religii i filozofii, trans. Michał 
Rudnicki (Lwów: Księgarnia Polska B. Połonieckiego / Warszawa: E. Wende i 
Spółka, 1913), xxvi, xxxiii, xlviif., lii. 
34  Ibid., lxv. Brzozowski’s essay on Sorel was published in the Kiev journal Świt (Dawn) 
in 1907 (reprinted in his Kultura i życie, 515–522).  
35  The journal was edited (in 1934) by Ivan Dubyts’kyi and Andrei Kryzhanivs’kyi. 
36  For My cf.: Serhii Kvit, Dmytro Dontsov: ideolohichnyi portret, 2nd ed. [Dmytro 
Dontsov: an ideological portrait] (L’viv: Galyts’ka vydavnycha spilka, 2013), 56. 
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Now, when Ukrainian life is undergoing a renaissance under the sign of a “cult of will and 
power” [культу волі та сили], when a new Ukrainian individuality is crystallizing and 
solidifying, the works of this famous Pole, this tragic, impulsive and romantic man, gain a 
new, peculiar, sharp relevance for us.37 
 
In these few words, one recognizes, of course, the late Brzozowski’s metaphors: 
In Voices in the Night he had dealt with the link between literature and thought 
on the one hand and forms of political (national) community on the other, ap-
plying the notion of “crystallization.”38 Also the word “гартуватися” is quite 
characteristic of Brzozowski’s rhetoric. However, there is something more going 
on here: The authors speak of a renaissance of Ukrainian life and even quote the 
formula of a “cult of will and power.” It is here, according to them, that the link 
between Brzozowski and the contemporary Ukrainian intellectual scene in Po-
land can be observed. The formula “культ волі та сили” had been propagated 
by none other than Dmytro Dontsov, the author of a book on Nationalism, pub-
lished in 1926 by the L’viv publishing house “Nove Zhyttia” (New Life).39 The 
authors of the commentary were even more specific about the connection be-
tween Dontsov’s ideas and Brzozowski’s writings, claiming that “in our life, 
Brzozowski’s influence is only in one case wholly unquestionable. No one else 
but Brzozowski gave birth to [породив] the well-known critic and publicist 
Dmytro Dontsov.”40 They point to parallels between Brzozowski’s and Don-
tsov’s ideological development from “passionate Marxism” to a “no less pas-
sionate nationalism and traditionalism,” and they stress the fact that Dontsov, 
“being trapped by the reading of Brzozowski,” incessantly borrowed “names, 
complete quotes, metaphors, and thoughts” from the works of the Polish philos-
opher.41  
                                                             
37  Ivan Dubyts’kyi and Andrei Kryzhanivs’kyi, “Prim. Redaktsiï” […], My. Literaturnyi 
neperiodychnyi zhurnal 3 (1934): 174. 
38  Cf.: Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy, 192. 
39  Dmytro Dontsov, Natsionalizm (L’viv: Vydavnitstvo “Nove Zhyttia”, 1926), 211. Cf. 
also: Myroslaw Yurkevich, “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” in Internet En-
cyclopedia of Ukraine. http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath 
=pages\O\R\OrganizationofUkrainianNationalists.htm (“Their [the OUN’s] outlook 
was influenced strongly by Dmytro Dontsov, who propounded a cult of will and 
power and indiscriminately praised fascist and Nazi leaders.”). 
40  Dubyts’kyi and Kryzhanivs’kyi, “Prim. Redaktsiï,” 175. 
41  Ibid. It is important to note that these passages are in fact to be found in the “Editorial 
Remark” and not in the actual text of Rudnyts’kyi’s essay (Erlacher quotes them as 
Rudnyts’kyi’s text; apparently, he did not have access to the issue of My).  
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Apparently, they wanted to denigrate Dontsov’s rank as a thinker and literary 
critic by presenting him as a kind of ‘second-hand-Brzozowski’ who had nothing 
original to offer to his Ukrainian readers. Accordingly, they concluded their 
introductory commentary by asserting that “Brzozowski is such an independent 
and characteristic figure that the educated Ukrainian reader should take a direct 
interest in him.”42 
It is important to add that the editorial team of My polemicized on numerous 
occasions against Dontsov and his Lwów-based journal Vistnyk (Herald; for-
merly Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk—Literary-Scientific Herald). Both journals 
propagated nationalist ideas, My representing a more liberal and moderate ap-
proach to questions of literature and aesthetics than the politically more radical 
and aesthetically more utalitarian Vistnyk. Oleh Bahan, in an introduction to a 
recently published collection of Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi’s writings, indicates that 
My was financed by “Soviet special services” and that Kryzhaniv’skyi was a 
hired agent of the U.S.S.R. However, he does not provide us with any evidence 
for these assertions.43 It is difficult for me to assess whether Bahan is right. As a 
Dontsov scholar and, to judge by the ideological tendency of his articles, as an 
ardent follower and devotee of Dontsov’s ideology, Bahan apparently has some 
interest in saving the honor of his hero. All we can note is that Ivan Dubyts’kyi 
and Andrei Kryzhanivs’kyi, the editors of My, did their best to defame Dontsov 
as a second-rate thinker, if not a plagiarist. However, it remains unclear if we are 
dealing with a struggle between different ideological positions or also with a 
struggle for the supremacy in the—extremely narrow—field of Ukrainian lan-
guage press and criticism in interwar Poland44 in this instance, or if there was 
                                                             
42  Ibid., 175. 
43  Oleh Bahan, “Koryfei liberal’noï literaturnoï krytyky” [An eminent authority of lib-
eral criticism], in Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi, Vid Myrnoho do Khvil’ovoho. Mizh ideieiu i 
formoiu. Shcho take “Moloda Muza”?, ed. Oleh Bahan (Drohobych: Vidrodzhennia, 
2009), 14. According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, My had been “founded 
by supporters of the Government-in-exile of the Ukrainian National Republic.” http:// 
www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages\M\Y\MyIT.htm 
44  The editors of My launched polemical attacks against Dontsov on other occasions, too. 
Cf.: Ivan Dubyts’kyi and Andrei Kryzhanivs’kyi, “Patetychna peredmova, napysana 
hlybokim znavtsem chytal’nyts’koï psykhiky na zamovlennia redaktsiï ta v ïï imeni” 
[An impassionate foreword, written by a deep connoisseur of the readers’ psyche, or-
dered by the editorial team and in its name], My 3 (1934): 9–14. This was a reaction to 
a polemical review of My in Dontsov’s Vistnyk. Cf. also: “Z presovoho fil’mu” [From 
the press] Vistnyk II, 3 (1934): 228–231 (no author indicated). The polemics was 
about ideological but also personal issues; Dubyts’kyi, Kryzhanivs’kyi as well as 
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some sort of political conspiracy behind it, secretly orchestrated by Soviet au-
thorities who wanted to undermine Dontsov’s authority among Ukrainian na-
tionalists. The allegation of collaboration with Soviet secret services is of course 
not without irony in the context of Brzozowski studies. It should also be noted 
that Dontsov himself was suspected of a secret collaboration with Russian agen-
cies at the time of his break with the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in 
1913.45 
One point is clear, though: it is Brzozowski’s name and works that serve as a 
central point of reference in these polemics. The question remains to what extent 
his writings could possibly have contributed to the renaissance of “Ukrainian 
life” in the 1930s.46 Polemics and conspiracies apart, from the words of the edi-
tors of My we can conclude that the Ukrainian intellectual community in Poland 
was not yet very familiar with Brzozowski’s works. Nevertheless, they postu-
lated that his writings had an impact on the latest developments in the field of 
nationalist discourse ascribing the role of a mediator to Dmytro Dontsov.47 Once 
more, was there any connection between Dontsov and Brzozowski? Mykhailo 
Sosnovs’kyi, in his Dmytro Dontsov: A Political Portrait, commented on the 
above-quoted commentary to Rudnyts’kyi’s article: According to him, to state 
that Dontsov was “trapped by the reading of Brzozowski” would be an exagger-
ation. He did not fail to note that, “Rudnyts’kyi” (he does not pay attention to the 
fact that the commentary was signed by the “editorial team”) did not give any 
reference for “his” hypothesis. However, as for the general assumption of Brzo-
                                                             
Rudnyts’kyi were sharply criticized on both levels. Cf. also Dontsov’s article “Da ca-
po,” (first published in 1929) in Dmytro Dontsov, Literaturna eseïstyka, ed. Oleh Ba-
han (Drohobych: Vidrodzhennia, 2009), 284–291, esp. 288–291 (attacks against Rud-
nyts’skyi).   
45  Oleksandr Zaitsev, Ukraïns’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm (1920–1930-ti roky). Narysy 
intelektual’noï istoriï [Ukrainian integral nationalism, 1920–1930. Sketches of intel-
lectual history] (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2013), 160. 
46  “[…] українские життя віроджується.” Dubyts’kyi and Kryzhanivs’kyi, “Prim. Re-
daktsiï,” 174. 
47  Interestingly enough, we find a similar (non-)link to Brzozowski in an essay on the 
Ukrainian poet Mykola Ievshan, published in Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk in 1929. 
The author puts much emphasis on the claim that the common idea of Brzozowski’s 
influence on the works of Ievshan, widely present, as he writes, in the literary circles 
in Galicia of the time, was completely unfounded. Oles’ Babii, “Mykola Ievshan (Fe-
diushka),” Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk 28,11 (1929): 976. It is however somewhat 
suspicious that Babii devotes two whole pages of his short piece (six pages on the 
whole) to the refutation of this idea.  
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zowski’s influence on Dontsov, he agreed: “We do not call into question the 
influence of Brzozowski’s (and other authors’) writings on Dontsov.”48  
In Dontsov’s publications references to Brzozowski are scarce: In an essay 
on the main representatives of Russian culture, dating from 1919, Dontsov ap-
provingly quotes Brzozowski’s depiction of the Russian writer Mikhail Artsyba-
shev’s works as based on a “philosophy of spermatoidism.”49 However, the 
remainder of the essay, even though in its polemical stance it reminds one of 
Brzozowski’s “Kryzys w literaturze rosyjskiej” (The Crisis in Russian Litera-
ture) from his posthumously published Głosy wśród nocy (Voices in the Night, 
1912), does not contain any further hint of Brzozowski. In a 1936 article from 
Vistnyk, Dontsov takes a quote from Brzozowski which he found “in one Polish 
newspaper”50 as a point of departure, yet there is no mention of Brzozowski in 
the further course of the text. Both quotations are rather superficial and not quite 
exact. Surely, they do not allow us to conclude that Dontsov was heavily influ-
enced by Brzozowski’s writings. But they do prove that he was at least familiar 
with Brzozowski’s name and some of his texts in a general way. 
For lack of direct quotations from Brzozowski in Dontsov’s writings, I sug-
gest casting a comparative glance at both thinkers’ personal background and 
intellectual formation. In his student years, Dontsov joined and co-founded par-
ties and groups of a socialist orientation.51 He remained a member of the Ukrain-
ian Social Democratic Party which he had co-founded in 1905, at least until 
1913 or, according to other sources, until the outbreak of World War I.52 Not 
only does the development of Dontsov’s ideological stance remind us of Brzo-
zowski’s own evolution from Marxism to nationalism.53 When we read Don-
tsov’s book on Nationalism, which upon its publication in 1926 gained him the 
position of a leader in the Ukrainian nationalist camp in Galicia (and beyond), 
we can in fact note parallels with Brzozowski’s merciless analysis of the 
shortcomings of Polish national culture. Dontsov claimed a categorical priority 
                                                             
48  Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, 77. 
49  Dmytro Dontsov, “Kul’tura prymityvizmu,” in Vybrani tvory u desiaty tomakh, vol. 2: 
Kul’turolohichna ta istoriosofs’ka eseïstyka (1911–1939) rr., ed. Oleh Bahan 
(Drohobych / L’viv: “Vidrodzhennia”, 2012), 96. See Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy, 
194 (“panspermatoidyzm Arcybaszewa”). 
50  Dmytro Dontsov, “Zgoda v simeistvi,” in Vybrani tvory u desiaty tomakh, vol. 2: 
Kul’turolohichna ta istoriosofs’ka eseïstyka (1911–1939) rr., 311. 
51  Cf. Stryjek, Ukraińska idea narodowa okresu międzywojennego, 118. 
52  Zaitsev, Ukraïns’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 160. Cf. Stryjek, Ukraińska idea naro-
dowa okresu międzywojennego, 119. 
53  Cf.: Dubyts’kyi and Kryzhanivs’kyi, “Prim. Redaktsiï,” 175.  
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of the nation above all other political and axiological principles. For him, the 
nation was a self-sufficient ideal that did not need to be justified by suprana-
tional, common human values.54 Brzozowski himself had declared that the main 
item on the political agenda of his time was to “create Poland as a power that 
will prevail in the world.”55 He had tackled Poland’s “infantilism” whereas Don-
tsov denounced the provinciality of Ukrainian thought and society. Very much in 
the style of Brzozowski, Dontsov ridiculed the Ukrainian aversion towards all 
kinds of heroism and historical greatness: 
 
The construction of pyramids, medieval cathedrals, great empires, crusades—all these are 
products of a “barbaric” epoch, talk of which today, in this “age of reason,” is ridiculous. 
Their ideal is to sit quietly in their rural “peaceful country,” awash in milk and honey, and 
God forbid that Moses should come and lead them out of there.56 
 
Dontsov denounced this stance as “provansal’stvo” (‘provençalism’). Referring 
to the region in southern France, he understood “provansal’stvo” as a world-
view and a way of life that was based on provincial self-sufficiency and idyllic 
mediocrity.57 His own idea of the nation referred to biological and racial fea-
tures. It involved a struggle for survival and even a rivalry between currently 
living and future members of a national community (with preference given to the 
latter).58 All this reminds us of Brzozowski’s understanding of the role of the 
nation in the modern world as presented notably in his Legend of Modern Po-
land.  
As the editor-in-chief of Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk from 1922 on,59 Don-
tsov had made clear that the journal’s main goal was to give shape and form to 
the Ukrainian “national idea.”60 His decision to pursue this aim by means of 
literature and literary criticism can be seen as consistent with Brzozowski’s 
conviction that by means of literature and literary criticism a society could gain 
                                                             
54  Dontsov, Natsionalizm, 27. Cf.: Omel’chuk, Literaturni idealy ukraïns’koho vistnykiv-
stva (1922–1939), 17. 
55  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 197. 
56  Dontsov, Natsionalizm, 34. For a discussion of Dontsov’s “psychological portrait” of 
Ukraine and “the Ukrainians” cf.: Stryjek, Ukraińska idea narodowa okresu między-
wojennego, 164–181. 
57  Dontsov, Natsionalizm, 6–148 (chapter: “Ukraïns’ke provansal’stvo”). 
58  Ibid., 37. 
59  The journal existed until 1932 and was later continued by Dontsov under the title 
Vistnyk (1933–1939).  
60  Cf.: Dmytro Dontsov, “Nashi tsily,” Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk 1 (May 1922): 1. 
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self-consciousness and develop a political platform. Dontsov’s idea of the nation 
was based on merging features he took from contemporary ‘Lebensphilosophie’ 
(Bergson’s “élan vital”) and its philosophical precursors (Nietzsche’s “will to 
power”),61 combining them with a concrete political agenda: independent Ukrai-
nian statehood, defense of Ukrainian national interests, and even expansion for 
the sake of self-preservation.62    
Brzozowski’s proximity to proto-fascist ideas and terminology was noticed 
as early as the 1920s. Maciej Urbanowski has given a sober and sophisticated 
account of these possible affinities, concluding that, for simple reasons of chro-
nology, the question “did Brzozowski uphold fascist ideas?” is ill-posed: Brzo-
zowski died in 1911, roughly a decade before fascism came into being as a po-
litical movement in Italy.63 Nevertheless, Brzozowski’s ideas concerning the 
nation, the mythical bond that forges a society, the emphasis he puts on the sol-
dier and the worker, his fascination with “strength,” “hardness,” “heroism,” and 
“energy” reveal obvious affinities with the later context of fascist and/or radical 
right movements in Europe.64 
It should be noted that Dontsov did not overtly adhere to or declare himself a 
proponent of fascist ideology65 even though he did express some sympathy for 
“fascism.”66 His essay Nationalism must of course be read against the back-
ground of the emergence of fascist movements in Europe during the 1920s.67 His 
refusal of universalist categories, the accent on biological categories in his con-
ception of the nation68 and on the “will” (vola) as the nation’s irrational “élan 
vital”69 are quite near to the late Brzozowski’s conceptualizations of nation and 
society. For both of them Georges Sorel was an important point of reference. 
However, Dontsov’s ideal of a “peasant and petty bourgeois republic”70 hardly 
                                                             
61  Dontsov, Natsionalizm, 159.  
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64  Cf.: ibid., 309–312. 
65  Stryjek, Ukraińska idea narodowa okresu międzywojennego, 149. 
66  Ibid., 149–156. Cf. also: Dontsov, Natsionalizm, 212. 
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Vistnyk cf.: Omel’chuk, Literaturni idealy ukraïns’koho vistnykivstva (1922–1939), 
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68  Cf. Stryjek, Ukraińska idea narodowa okresu międzywojennego, 138. 
69  Ibid, 142. 
70  “Отже, селянська дрібно-буржуазна республіка. Такий наш ідеал.” Dmytro Don-
tsov, Pidstavy nashoï polityky (Viden’: Vydavnytstvo Dontsovykh, 1921), 119. 
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fits with Brzozowski’s enthusiastic praise for the worker. Similar to Brzozowski, 
yet on a certainly less sophisticated level, Dontsov referred to writers and poets 
in order to support his views on the essence of the Ukrainian nation. Mostly, 
these were Ukrainian writers, such as Lesia Ukraïnka or, of course, Taras Shev-
chenko, but we encounter also Jack London and his “joy to kill.”71 In his pro-
grammatic brochure The Foundations of Our Politics, Dontsov gave an over-all 
analysis of Russian culture and society, referring above all to literature as an 
empirical basis for his observations,72 just as Brzozowski had done 12 years 
earlier in his essay on the “Crisis in Russian Literature” from Voices in the 
Night73—an essay Dontsov was familiar with, as we can conclude from the 
abovementioned quotation concerning Mikhail Artsybashev.  
Alexander J. Motyl has rightly pointed out that we should not overemphasize 
the role of “ideas themselves as the source of his [Dontsov’s] inspiration.”74 It is 
hardly possible to track down exactly whose books and articles Dontsov read, or 
whom he met and when. Even if we could approximately reconstruct his read-
ings and encounters, this still would not allow us to assess how he rethought and 
evaluated these manifold inspirations, not to mention the political events of the 
time which also played an important part here.75  
What we can do is point out some typological parallels between Dontsov and 
Brzozowski. When Dontsov declares his credo of “creative violence” and of 
“will and power,”76 then this reads in fact as a somewhat simplified or radical-
ized version of Brzozowski’s deliberations on the “search for and the creation of 
power”77 from The Legend of Modern Poland. It reminds us also of Brzozow-
ski’s understanding of the “nation” as a “great source of creation” with the ac-
cent falling on the “family” and the “military and state organizations” from 
Ideas.78 For the late Brzozowski, the “nation” was the unique source of self-
consciousness, “since there are no non-national, international organs of spiritual 
life.”79 This would be a quite fitting definition of what is discussed as “integral 
                                                             
71  Dontsov, Natsionalizm, 171. 
72  Dontsov, Pidstavy nashoï polityky. 
73  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Kryzys w literaturze rosyjskiej” [1909], in Głosy wśród nocy, 
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77  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 398. 
78  Brzozowski, Idee, 268, 264. 
79  Ibid., 269. 
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nationalism” in research on Dontsov. In the same context, Brzozowski stressed 
the role of “power,” a “power” that is inseparably linked to the nation and that 
alone allows a person to achieve real existential depth.80 In The Foundations of 
Our Politics, Dontsov wrote that only a “clearly defined national ideal” could 
transform a “national idea” into the “crystalized core for individual or collective 
wills inside the nation”; without this core, they would find “other centers of 
gravity.”81 The nation is seen as the catalyst for individual and collective aspira-
tions, it forges a community, vests it with a core and a direction. In this respect 
Brzozowski’s and Dontsov’s views coincide with only slight differences: Don-
tsov, who wrote his Foundations in the aftermath of World War I, was more 
concrete, more aggressive, and less philosophical than Brzozowski, since his 
political aims were more clearly defined. 
However, all common inspirations, references, key words notwithstanding—
this is hardly sufficient to speak of a “strong influence” exerted by Brzozowski’s 
writings on Dontsov. I pointed out above that Sosnovs’kyi’s story of their actual 
meeting is untenable. This still leaves us with the question why the editors of My 
put so much emphasis on the link between Brzozowski and Dontsov—when 
Brzozowski was hardly ever mentioned in the latter’s writings. Stepan Len-
kavs’kyi, the author of an early account of the philosophical foundations of 
Dontsov’s concept of “nationalism,” did not mention Brzozowski at all,82 which 
perhaps does not mean much, since for adherents of the radically anti-Russian 
and anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalist movement, the intellectual affinity with a 
Polish thinker, whose possible collaboration with the Tsarist Okhrana was not 
entirely clarified, could well have been something better left unmentioned. 
 
Brzozowski in the Polemical Context of Ukrainian (Galician) 
Interwar Criticism 
 
For now, we have to assume that the story of Dontsov’s “enthusiasm” for Brzo-
zowski, as told by Sroka and Sosnovs’kyi, and, more recently, Bahan and Er-
lacher, had its origin exclusively in the introductory remarks to Rudnytskyi’s 
piece on Brzozowski in My 1934.83 But for what reason should Ivan Dubyts’kyi 
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and Andrei Kryzhanivs’kyi have chosen the reference to Brzozowski in order to 
discredit Dontsov, and why did they do so in a commentary that was meant to 
introduce the readers to a partly critical, but overall sympathetic, and at times 
even enthusiastic article on Brzozowski? In my view, the only explanation that 
makes sense (given the current state of knowledge) would be contextual: My-
khailo Rudnyts’kyi, who signed the essay but not the commentary (although we 
cannot know if he wrote it together with Dubyts’kyi and Kryzhanivs’kyi), was 
one of Dontsov’s ideological adversaries within the Ukrainian intellectual com-
munity in interwar Poland—and one of the latter’s principal rivals in the field of 
Ukrainian-language journalism and literary criticism.84 In his articles Dontsov 
launched vivid attacks against proponents of nearly all ideological or political 
camps, most often denouncing them as “provençalist.” Among others, this con-
cerned Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi.85 The polemics between Dontsov and Rud-
nyts’kyi revolved around the role of the “worldview” for literature, Dontsov 
demanding of the writer a clear—if not political, at least philosophical—stance 
and a commitment to activity and struggle, whereas Rudnyts’kyi put the accent 
on aesthetic values.86 Dontsov attacked not only the critic but also the prose-
writer Rudnyts’kyi.87 The charges directed against him and his journal Nazu-
strich (Rendez-vous) were: lack of principle, careerism, cynicism, decadence.88 
Rudnyts’kyi, for his part, in an interview published in the leftist Polish journal 
Sygnały (Signals), overtly labelled the contributors of Dontsov’s Vistnyk as “na-
tionalists of fascist orientation.” He accused Dontsov of publishing works of a 
“certain specific tendency,” regardless of their artistic value.89 It must have been 
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especially provocative to Dontsov that this assessment was pronounced in a 
Polish journal and addressed to the Polish intellectual community.  
Why should Ukrainian intellectuals of the interwar period have an interest in 
Brzozowski? Reading Brzozowski’s novels Płomienie (Flames, 1908) or Sam 
wśród ludzi (Alone among People, 1911), and his critical essays we hardly ever 
encounter any Ukrainians. Although Michał Kaniowski’s (from Flames) and 
Roman Ołucki’s (from Alone among People) families live in Podolia, where the 
peasant population was ethnically Ukrainian, the Ukrainian element is practi-
cally absent in both novels. Andrzej Mencwel rightly noted that no works by 
Ukrainian authors are ever mentioned in Brzozowski’s essays.90 What then could 
attract Ukrainian intellectuals of the interwar period to this author? It is some-
what ironic that it is not Dontsov who can give us an answer to this question. His 
ideological and aesthetic adversary Rudnyts’kyi, who rejected any ideological, 
idea-centered approach to literature,91 did formulate some thoughts on the possi-
ble relevance of Brzozowski’s writings for Ukrainian readers of the 1930s. For 
Rudnyts’kyi, Brzozowski, in his messianic aspirations, was, above all, the “char-
acteristic type of Slav who wants to catch up with Europe” and, attempting to 
achieve this goal, “opted for the most inappropriate means: prophecy” (пропо-
відництво).92 Brzozowski had wanted to liberate his nation “through literature,” 
to “give her a national philosophy or religion.” It was, according to Rudnyts’kyi, 
this romanticist idea that inspired the Polish philosopher.93 It is quite characteris-
tic that he concentrates notably on the late Brzozowski’s ideas on identity and 
nationality. This allows him to draw a parallel between the fate of the Ukrainian 
nation in the 1930s and that of the Poles at the beginning of the century, but we 
also notice some reserve on his part when it comes to the applicability of Brzo-
zowski’s world-view: “As members of a stateless nation which is inspired by 
steely outcries about national strength we have the tendency to take the famous 
slogans of great demagogues for a worldview.”94 Unlike many Polish intellectu-
als of the interwar period, Rudnyts’kyi was clear about the lack of clarity in 
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Brzozowski’s writings. For him, there could be no straightforward reading of 
Brzozowski; there was no direct link even between the last chapters of The Leg-
end of Modern Poland and a concrete political platform that could lead to na-
tional liberation. Brzozowski’s thoughts were too complex, too manifold, and 
too vague and foggy to be used for political propaganda. These statements 
seemed to be directed against Dmytro Dontsov, although, let us stress this once 
again, Brzozowski’s allegedly crucial role for Dontsov was nothing but an as-
sumption issued implicitly by Rudnyts’kyi himself and explicitly by his editors. 
As a matter of fact, Rudnyts’kyi was quite skeptical about a possible impact of 
Brzozowski’s ideas and concepts on future readers. He asked, “how could one 
transfer the electric energy of Brzozowski’s works to the accumulator of a well-
constructed factory”?95 Brzozowski’s library reminded him of a chemistry 
laboratory with extracts and essences on every shelf. The question only was, 
“How to make use of this experiment?”96 Apparently, Rudnyts’kyi did not have 
an answer to this question. 
In all his meditations on criticism and literature, Rudnyts’kyi paid a great 
deal of attention to the role of minor literatures, namely Ukrainian literature, as 
confronted with the literature of urban elites, European, or even “Weltlitera-
tur.”97 He was very much concerned about the theoretical level of Ukrainian 
literary criticism—in Polish Galicia as well as in Soviet-ruled Ukraine—and 
deplored the divide between European discussions and the intellectual sphere in 
Galicia.98 The common thread of his 1932 book Mizh ideieiu i formoiu (Between 
Idea and Form) was the role of ideology in literature and the struggle against the 
attempts of the representatives of “national criticism” to claim national ideology 
as the superior criterion in discussions about literature.99 Rudnyts’kyi’s under-
standing of the critic’s role was very similar to Brzozowski’s. In Between Idea 
and Form, he wrote: 
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[…] literature is a battlefield of different currents and ships; the role of the critic is to 
recognize the direction of the wind and to distinguish armored cruisers from boats, but 
also to discover the new shores to which these are heading, unconscious of their aim.100 
 
This of course reminds us of Brzozowski’s depiction of the critic as “the poet of 
this new Odyssey across the sea of the human spirit and life” and as “a cartogra-
pher of strange journeys” in his essay “Kilka uwag o stanie ogólnym literatury 
europejskiej i o zadaniach krytyki literackiej I” (Some Remarks on the General 
State of European Literature I) from Voices in the Night.101  
Although Rudnyts’kyi only rarely mentioned Dontsov by name, it is never-
theless rather obvious that the views he expressed in the essays published in 
Mizh ideieiu i formoiu and Vid Mirnoho do Khvyl’ovoho (1936) were at least in 
part meant to counter Dontsov’s program of a nationalist literature. Given the 
wide range of key works of modern European literature and criticism quoted and 
discussed by Rudnyts’kyi, we can in fact conclude that for him Dontsov’s ideol-
ogy of literature was not “provençal,” but provincial in the plain sense of the 
word. For Rudnyts’kyi the way out of the ghetto of minority literature meant 
having to broaden perspectives, to spread European ideas and to develop an 
ethos of ‘world literature’. Young Ukrainian writers should not be content with 
compliments issued by domestic (i.e., Ukrainian-language) criticism. After all, 
criticism that did not refer to examples from world literature was nothing but 
“ordinary provincial propaganda.”102 For Rudnyts’kyi and, arguably less, for 
Dontsov, Brzozowski served as a model here: an intellectual of European stature 
who did not limit himself to his own, parochial world, who included in his med-
itations on culture and the nation nearly every new idea or philosophical current 
to appear on the European stage. At the same time, Rudnyts’kyi made use of 
Brzozowski’s name to discredit his adversary. Insinuating that Dontsov bor-
rowed his ideas and a good deal of his bibliographical references from Brzozow-
ski, Rudnyts’kyi tried to convince his Ukrainian readers of Dontsov’s profound 
provinciality: There was nothing original about the ideas of the author of Nation-
alism, which would be obvious for readers once they gained access to Brzo-
zowski’s texts. On the other hand, he implicitly used references to Dontsov to 
distinguish Brzozowski, the sophisticated critic and connoisseur of European 
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literature, from Brzozowski, the predecessor of nationalist (and by this: simpli-
fied) cultural criticism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The answer to the question I have posed in the title of this paper is negative. 
However, even if we have no evidence that Brzozowski inspired Ukrainian na-
tionalist thought, we can state that at a certain moment Brzozowski served as a 
point of reference in a discussion about the interconnections between aesthetic 
and political concepts in Ukrainian criticism of the 1930s. Brzozowski did in-
deed inspire Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi’s critical writings and his aesthetics. Rud-
nyts’kyi overtly acknowledged this indebtedness. Curiously enough, in doing so, 
he (or his editors) simultaneously ascribed an indebtedness to Brzozowski to his 
principal ideological adversary in the field of Ukrainian (Galician) literary criti-
cism of the time. The aim of this insinuation is clear: What can a nationalist 
program be worth that is entirely based on borrowings from a philosopher and 
critic who, in the Galician context, belongs to the hegemonic culture—the cul-
ture whose dominance a Ukrainian nationalist program has to tackle in the first 
place?   
We were able to see that the parallels between Brzozowski and Dontsov are 
merely typological; shared concepts, rhetoric devices, and biographical refer-
ences notwithstanding. However, the most astonishing outcome of this short 
overview is that the hypothesis of Brzozowski’s “strong impact” on Dontsov, 
which we could trace back to inner-Ukrainian (Galician) critical polemics of the 
1930s, has lived on and been reiterated in various sources right to the present. 
Furthermore, it is astonishing that those who postulated an impact of Brzo-
zowski’s writings on Dontsov also postulated a meeting between both authors—
in absence of any viable historical source and as if this were a prerequisite for 
‘influence’. Apparently, in intellectual history there still is a strong need for real 
persons and their actual “accelerated pulse,” as Brzozowski put it in his Diary.103   
 
 
                                                             
103  “[…] wszystkie kosmologie i metafizyki, to epizody biografii, to czyjś puls przy-
spieszony, czyjś błysk oczu – wszystko w człowieku” (“[…] all cosmologies and 
metaphysics are nothing else than episods of a biography, one’s accelerated pulse, 
the shine in one’s eyes—all is in the person). Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 164. 
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Brzozowski and Cioran: The Legend of Young 
Poland and The Transformation of Romania 
Andrzej Zawadzki  
 
 
An attempt to compare Stanisław Brzozowski’s and Emil Cioran’s philosophies 
may seem initially surprising and not very promising. They belong to different 
generations (Cioran was born the year of Brzozowski’s death in 1911) and, what 
is even more important, they dealt with different philosophical problems. For 
Polish readers, Cioran, as the author of Pe culmile disperārii (On the Heights of 
Despair), is first of all a historian of Western decadence and a perspicuous critic 
of the illusions inherent in the Western narrative of modernization. His works are 
full of extreme existential, cultural, and civilizational pessimism, atheism, and 
melancholy; he as well sees time and history as murky regions of decadence and 
corruption in which all hope is doomed to vanish. This philosophical stance 
seems to be in contradiction with Brzozowski’s line of thinking, which, in brief, 
can be characterized as an expression of humanism and vitalism, the belief in the 
highest value of history, man, and his projects, and the possibility of progress. 
These are all characteristic features of the early, heroic version of modernity 
which is still unconscious of its own dark side. 
The area in which I want to situate the comparison between Brzozowski and 
Cioran is the problem of modernity, or more precisely a modernity that has been 
deferred. The nations of East-Central Europe, which are situated spatially and 
temporarily on the margins of European modernity, have been experiencing this 
delay since the late nineteenth century and they have had to face the problems 
that arise from this. Cioran deals with such problems in his third book, Schim-
barea la faţā a Romaniei (Transformation of Romania), published in 1936. I 
want to concentrate my attention on this book because, as far as I know, it has 
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not been translated into Polish or English1 and it presents aspects of Cioran’s 
thought that are relatively unknown. Brzozowski’s ideas, which are much more 
popular and better known (at least in Poland), will serve here as a context. By 
comparing some parts of Brzozowski’s and Cioran’s philosophies, I also want to 
substantiate my thesis that the former defined a set of problems that successive 
Central European thinkers have had to solve or at least to deal with. 
Cioran frequently made critical and ironic observations about his compatriots 
in a number of works, but he most fully confronts Romanian identity in Trans-
formation of Romania. It should be noted that the character and ardour of this 
confrontation can be compared with Brzozowski’s clash with Polish identity in 
Legenda Młodej Polski (The Legend of Young Poland). When writing their 
crucial texts, both Brzozowski and Cioran were young men at the respective ages 
of thirty-one and twenty-six. The historical, civilizational, and cultural contexts 
of these two works were set as confrontations with their respective “backward” 
countries during the inevitable process of modernization. However, the conse-
quences of these clashes were the creation of modern nations and modern na-
tional cultures.  
Some of the similarities between Brzozowski and Cioran can be found in 
their concepts of culture, their styles in critically analyzing these cultural phe-
nomena, their visions of modernity, the way in which they treat history and the 
historical dimension of culture, and their rhetoric and the narrative roles that they 
assume as the speaking subjects of their works. 
Even without getting into a detailed discussion of the authors’ opinions con-
cerning Polish and Romanian societies, it is easy to notice that both thinkers 
were pessimistic about the state of their societies, and they consequently deliver 
a thorough and total critique of the cultural forms that are created by them. Due 
to their backwardness and their inability to develop culture, these forms are 
responsible for the deep inertia in the Polish and Romanian societies. Brzo-
zowski and Cioran seem to presume that culture is the expression of social con-
sciousness which can either assist or hinder a society’s needs and progress. They 
also share the conviction that Poland and Romania required a project that would 
be able to satisfy the needs of the modernizing societies in their times. Thus, 
both writers can be considered as representatives of Kulturkritik in a Central-
European form.  
The problem of history is crucial in Cioran’s remarks on the Romanian con-
dition, as having no history, or existing on its margins; it is the biggest issue for 
the Romanian people. Getting into history through the conscious creation of it 
                                                             
1  A French translation entitled Transfiguration de la Roumanie was published in 2008 
by L’Herne publishing house. 
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then should be the country’s greatest goal, or even an obsession. Cioran goes as 
far as to invent terms meant to accentuate Romania’s lack of history in his use 
of, for example, “sub-history,”2 “a-history” (63), “non-history” (78), and “histor-
ical dream” (63). He illustrates this lack by contrasting history to the other con-
cepts that replace it. First, he opposes history to time and the past, stating that 
“the past of Romania is time without history” (49) so that time is just simple 
duration, change, and flux. Along with this, Cioran contrasts history with geog-
raphy so that “Romania is geography, and not history” (57), which consequently 
places geography—the domination of a spatial dimension in its immutability, 
stability, and continuity being rooted in some defined place—over history. Fi-
nally, he sees the metaphysical, irrational idea of fate replacing history; he ar-
gues that “Romanians do not understand history, [instead] they substitute destiny 
for history” (94). Fate is opposed to history as a synonym of eternity, determin-
ism, and a passive acceptance of destiny, which received its full expression in 
the famous folk ballad “Mioriţa.” The idea of fate is also close to the “lyrical 
proximity of being” (74) in which it is possible to find the “ontologism” charac-
teristic of the Romanian culture. This can be identified with the primacy of idle 
being over change and, generally, with a static concept of the world, nature, and 
life as stable, given, and pre-formed structures, or, as Cioran himself puts it, “the 
worship of created reality, which causes inertia and stagnation” (102). 
There are at least four important features that are common to Cioran’s and 
Brzozowski’s philosophies of history. First, they are both convinced that history 
is the only realm in which the creative potential of humankind can be realized 
and, consequently, they claim that neither an individual nor a nation can exist 
outside of history. They also treat history in purely anthropological terms, and 
not in religious or providential ones (“Man can create only one condition that 
gives him a central position in history,” 104). Brzozowski and Cioran addition-
ally reject the idea of any given and pre-formed reality which they treat as an 
illusion and fiction, and thus they also reject the so-called “referential” concept 
of truth (i.e., truth seen as correspondence between cognitive structures and 
reality) treating it as a kind of illusion, based on the belief in the stable, un-
changed essence of reality. Instead, they accept an “existential” idea of truth the 
essence of which lies in the creation of ever-new conditions and circumstances 
that serve life by stimulating progress and development. And lastly, both think-
ers share the opinion that authentic history is the affirmation of coming into 
being and constant renewal. They also treat it as a domain of the will, an affir-
                                                             
2  Emil Cioran, Schimbarea la faţă a României [Transformation of Romania] (Bucureşti: 
Humanitas, 1993), 41, 47 (henceforth, quotes from this book will be referenced di-
rectly in the main text).  
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mation of a nation’s existence and force, a domain in which a nation is fighting 
for recognition, and a process in which it gradually becomes self-conscious.  
The problem of modernity is strictly connected with the problem of history. 
Cioran describes modernity on the two basic levels of civilization and philoso-
phy. Both Cioran and Brzozowski use suggestive and clear contrasts in order to 
accentuate aspects of modernity that differentiate it from pre-modernity. Violent 
industrialization and urbanization are two fundamental phenomena that deter-
mine the character of modern culture. The city is a fully historical phenomenon: 
both knowledge and novel cultural forms are produced there, while on the other 
hand, the rural is the “suspension of history” because it is satisfied with spiritu-
ality and, in its simplicity and homogeneity, it can be no more than a biological 
reserve of the nation (118–120). Peasants have always existed at the peripheries 
of life; yet, the worker is situated at the very center of it—he can independently 
create life because he is aware of his significance and value (124). Subsequently, 
it is the worker who represents a new kind of humanity that determines the mod-
ern world’s form, and mass culture created by the proletariat is a new kind of 
history (127). Peasants are reactionary, whereas the modern working masses are 
fighting for the self-consciousness they are deprived of. Their struggle takes 
form as a revolution which is then the crucial turning point of history that im-
poses its direction and substance on the simple and inert. According to Cioran, 
the evolution leading from the closed, integrated, and homogenous community 
to the shapeless mass that lacks any inner form and is based only on economic 
interest is degradation. Nevertheless, this process is historically necessary, it has 
an air of grandeur and fatalism which accentuates the tragic character of moder-
nity (128). 
Both Brzozowski and Cioran, as theorists of modernity, largely approve of 
urban civilization instead of traditional rural existence, which belongs to the past 
and is doomed to disappear. These traditional forms are represented by the 
Polish landed gentry in Brzozowski’s thought and, in Cioran’s opinion, their best 
incarnation is the Romanian peasantry. They unanimously see a new kind of 
humanity in the worker as creative and self-conscious (124). Modernity is, in 
their eyes, first of all a leap into history, life, and coming into being; it is also a 
creative impulse that liberates people from the passivity and inertia of the rural 
communities; and it is a chance to discover and develop the creative potential of 
humanity. But modernity is not only an opportunity, it is also a task that must be 
carried out by communities still deeply rooted in some form of pre-modernity. 
So, both thinkers seem to address their compatriots with an urgent and radical 
message: either we become modern or we perish. 
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The foregoing similarities of Brzozowski and Cioran can be explained by the 
influence of the philosophy of life on both writers. In Romania, the best known 
and most influential partisan of this philosophy was Nae Ionescu, an intellectual 
patron and mentor of the entire generation of the young Romanian intellectuals 
born at the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, both Polish and Ro-
manian thinkers can be recognized as disciples of Hegel. According to Brzo-
zowski, Hegel first of all holds that the subject, made and formed in and by 
history, must finally dominate and control history. Cioran understands that for 
Hegel history is a process in the development of self-consciousness: “Hegel 
taught us a truth which became a cliché, the deepest sense of historical life is the 
realization of consciousness and the development of history is the development 
of consciousness” (7). 
Although their styles differ, Brzozowski and Cioran adopt similar narrative 
roles and use many similar rhetorical devices. In his seminal essay on the dis-
course of the Legend of Young Poland, Michał Głowiński discerns three basic 
narrative roles of teacher, pamphleteer, and interpreter played by Brzozowski.3 
Similar roles can be discerned in Cioran’s Transformation of Romania. Both 
writers are sharp analysts and interpreters of contemporary culture and profound 
cultural critics. Moreover, they often serve as the educators of their societies, or 
even the prophets who uncover weaknesses, ruthlessly castigate vices, guide 
future development, and indicate the only means of salvation.  
Many similarities can also be noticed in the style of both treatises. They are 
impetuous, accusatory and visionary, and full of passion and pathos. In the case 
of Cioran’s book, even the title is a reference to the feast of the Transfiguration 
of Jesus (“Schimbarea la Faţa” in Romanian), which endows the entire discourse 
with a sublime and quasi-religious character. Both Brzozowski and Cioran use a 
very rich language, full of courageous generalities, effective formulas, and bril-
liant aphorisms—a mode of language which is very different from the reserved, 
transparent, and neutral style of a traditional philosophical paper. All of these 
features make these books philosophical essays, which was a very popular liter-
ary-philosophical genre at the turn of the twentieth century and during its first 
decades. Most important is the fact that all of these stylistic features and linguis-
tic devices are not accidental, nor are they just an ornament of speech, but they 
are strictly connected with the essential features of thinking, in which description 
and critical assessment, analysis of the contemporary world, and projections of 
                                                             
3  Michał Głowiński, Ekspresja i empatia [Expression and empathy] (Kraków: Wy-
dawnictwo Literackie, 1997), 290.    
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the future are tightly interconnected. The language used by Brzozowski and 
Cioran is then a performative language, focused on changing reality.4 
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Brzozowski and the Italians 
Joanna Orska 
 
 
Brzozowski’s preface to his Idee (Ideas) is a case unique in its kind, altogether 
contrary to the rationalist canon of modern science. He certainly was not the first 
thinker who recognized that a philosophical ‘opus’ is first of all a process as well 
as an active method of development and construction—the creation of the phi-
losopher’s own consciousness. However, it is here as well that the philosopher 
begins his life-long summa by way of personal confidences that take the form of 
an intellectual diary. Not only does Brzozowski not give an account of the 
chapters that make up his philosophical book, he likewise provides no alternative 
systematic overview of its contents. The author opens his text in a most peculiar 
way, compromising so to say the objectivity of his own research presented here 
as a journey through life: “an odyssey across the seas of the human spirit and life 
which in our time is the only possible epic” (odyseja po morzach ducha i życia 
ludzkiego, która jest jedynym możliwym eposem naszego czasu).1 For example: 
 
Krytyka moja była buntem nie posiadającym lub poszukującym dla siebie organów myśli, 
i w ich braku walczyła takimi, na których ciążyła jeszcze przynależność do bezhistorycz-
nego, abstrakcyjnego stanowiska myślowego, tego właśnie stanowiska, z którym podjąłem 
walkę.2 
 
My critique was a revolt neither possessing nor seeking to find organs of thinking, and in 
their absence it was a struggle against those afflicted by adherence to an ahistorical, ab-
stract form of thinking, the form precisely that I set out to oppose. 
                                                             
1  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Kilka uwag o stanie ogólnym literatury europejskiej i o 
zadaniach krytyki literackiej I” (Some remarks about the overall state of literature in 
Europe and the tasks of literary criticism, part I), Głosy wśród nocy, 97. 
2  Brzozowski, Idee, 71f. 
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And again: 
 
Stanisław Przybyszewski to oswobodził mnie z tej najniebezpieczniejszej dla zmysłu 
prawdy i życia jednolitego niewoli: – dzięki niemu przekonałem się, że można żyć na 
stanowiskach duchowych nakazanych nam przez poczucie wewnętrzne prawdy nawet 
wtedy, gdy nie mamy w myśli naszej żadnych środków utrzymania się na nich.3 
 
Stanislaw Przybyszewski freed me from that most pernicious captivity affecting the sense 
of truth and the integral life—thanks to him I came to the conviction that it is possible to 
live on a spiritual basis prescribed to us by our inner sense of truth even when in our 
thinking we lack any means to stand firm on it. 
 
Passages like these give the impression that we find ourselves at the heart of a 
nineteenth-century Bildungsroman or else in the face of an ironic, self-conscious 
statement by a character from Witkiewicz, or perhaps as well that we are pre-
sented with a fragment from Brzozowski’s novel Płomienie (Flames) or from his 
Książka o starej kobiecie (A Book about an Old Woman). It is not my point to 
suggest that Ideas starts out as a novel—including recourse to essayistic form, 
blending a variety of expressive styles, the interpenetration of literary, critical, 
and philosophical matter, which are rather common in texts grounded in the 
romantic tradition. Of greater interest would be the kind of strategy to which 
Brzozowski appeals: it consists in not separating the progressive construction of 
the creative subject—the critical subject taking shape through self-thematizing, 
the discovery of fundamental premises for philosophizing within biography—
from the philosophical matter itself. 
Brzozowski himself, taking account of his own experience of reading Sorel, 
and by the same token instructing his reader as to possible ways of reading, 
incites us to change our understanding of the tasks a philosophical text has to 
fulfill. He puts the accent not so much on the actual meaning contained in the 
text but on the cognitive activity it triggers. This is not about what the text means 
but how it acts. 
 
Narzędzie działa i żyje tylko w samym procesie; dlatego tak trudno jest czytać Sorela. 
Dojrzały czytelnik tych pism [...] przekona się, że pozornie są one tylko tak chaotyczne, że 
nie są to niespójne nagromadzenia uwag, ale nowo narodzone, nieznające jeszcze swej 
własnej natury organizmy myślowe.4 
 
                                                             
3  Ibid., 72. 
4  Ibid., 257. 
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A tool acts and lives only in the process itself; that is why it is so difficult to read Sorel. A 
mature reader of his writings [...] will come to see that only superficially are they chaotic, 
that they are not formless collections of remarks, but newly born thought organisms still 
ignorant of their own nature. 
 
According to Brzozowski, Sorel does not construct a philosophical conclusion 
on the basis of his considerations: he does not explicate ready-made meanings, 
rather he ‘creates meaning in us’: “Pisze on ściśle tylko tyle, ile tworzy; daje 
nam sam proces życiowy myśli” (He writes precisely only as much as he creates; 
he offers us the very course of life within thought).5 Brzozowski offers a similar 
reading of Bergson. What remains important for Brzozowski is the specific 
‘activism’ of philosophical thinking that shapes its meanings in a way resem-
bling the manner in which literature does by exploiting the metaphorical might 
of fiction, viz., performatively, in a progressive manner, often dramatizing the 
text by means of what only seem to be fragmentary statements colliding against 
one another and obliging the reader to second the struggle of ideas and apply 
himself to the intellectual outcome of their friction.6 
In the important chapter in Ideas devoted to Sorel and Bergson, the author 
writes of the “unsystematic” character of the former’s works. They do not permit 
of “abstract treatment” but constitute “multilateral and vital tools”—“this strange 
something, that needs to be created by one’s own effort in the soul, as an organ 
of thought, apt to think about life without injuring it [the organ]” (to dziwne coś, 
co zrodzić trzeba własnym wysiłkiem w duszy, jako organ myśli, zdolny myśleć 
o życiu, nie krzywdząc jego).7 The fluidity of meanings, extracting them in the 
course of the subject’s intellectual labor, in statu nascendi, is connected evi-
dently with, besides Bergson’s ideally realized perspective, an element previ-
ously referred to in the book and tied directly to Marxist philosophy. The refer-
ence is to Antonio Labriola’s philosophy of practice (filosofia della praxis) 
understood as the codependence of philosophy and practice, as “the emanci-
pation of life from the dominance of the concepts through which we conceive of 
it” (emancypacj[a] życia spod władzy form pojęciowych, za pomocą których je 
                                                             
5  Ibid., 258. 
6  See also: Joanna Orska, “Stanisław Brzozowski – poeta i filozof. Krytyka jako poezja 
progresywna w Głosach wśród nocy” (Stanislaw Brzozowski—poet and philosopher. 
Criticism as progressive poetry in Voices in the Night), Teksty drugie 5 (2011); eadem, 
“Ja – ‘arabeska’” [The self is an arabesque], in Stanisław Brzozowski (ko)repetycje, 
vol. 1, ed. Dorota Kozicka, Joanna Orska, and Krzysztof Uniłowski (Katowice: FA-
art, 2012). 
7  Brzozowski, Idee, 257.  
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ujmujemy).8 The Hegelian-Marxist conviction that humanity is its own more or 
less conscious product explains Brzozowski’s insistent and apodictic tone when, 
writing about Sorel’s philosophy, he insisted that agreement and intellectual 
concordance do not constitute the basis for truth: 
 
[...] prawda musi polegać na tym, że się nią jest, a nie zaś, że się ją poznaje. I że cały 
wielokształtny świat ludzki może pozostawać w głębokiej zgodzie z samym sobą, różniąc 
się umysłowo i duchowo nieskończenie i wiedząc, że ta różnica jest organem tej zgody.9 
 
[...] one is in the truth, one does not come to know it. And that the entire multifaceted 
human world can remain in profound agreement with itself while manifesting endless 
intellectual and spiritual diversity, aware at the same time that this diversity is the organ of 
agreement. 
 
In the present study, what interests me is the ‘poetic’, that is, literary aspect that 
a philosophical work acquires as it establishes the creation of an ‘interactive’, 
‘living’ text-work. Its task would be to represent, or rather to constitute in the 
reader, the sort of formula for ‘truth’ that one is to be in the course of action, 
through the ‘progressive autonomization’ of philosophical thought. Such ‘poetic’ 
experimentation in the context of a philosophical exposition is typical of Brzo-
zowski and can rarely be found elsewhere. The more typical nineteenth century 
post-romantic thinking, rife in the energy of Marxist or Nietzschean discourse, 
remains the straightforward discursive declaration of the inseparability of phi-
losophy and philology as tools of ‘autonomization’. From an ‘external’ perspec-
tive, this is accompanied by the conviction that they cannot be separated from 
biology, physics, history, economics, politics—every kind of science and art. 
This kind of tradition is equally important for German idealist philosophy as 
well as for the specific renaissance-like humanism of the Italian interpreters of 
Marxism at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These two tenden-
cies constituted the core of Brzozowski’s most essential and critical thinking. 
                                                             
8  Brzozowski, Idee, 82. Brzozowski first mentions Labriola when discussing the notion 
of historical materialism in the presently discussed chapter and in another entitled 
“Epigenetyczna teoria historii” (Epigenetic theory of history) in which Labriola is 
evoked in the context of a critique of orthodox “post-Engels” Marxism. Brzozowski 
refers to him as a writer important for both Bergson and Sorel as well as for the Italian 
thinkers Croce and Gentile, reference to whose writings recurs in Idee on several oc-
casions. Brzozowski also wrote a separate essay devoted to Labriola, which was first 
published in the collection Kultura i życie (1907). 
9  Brzozowski, Idee, 255. 
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In his introduction to Ideas, Andrzej Walicki underscores the specific alter-
native that thinkers—who stood apart from the politicized and evolutionistic 
readings of Marxism by the legislators of the II International (Plekhanov, 
Kautsky), based mostly on Capital and Engels’s version of Marxism—created to 
operate with Marxist categories (the world understood as the correlate of activ-
ity). Walicki also draws attention to the resemblance of Brzozowski’s views to 
those of the somewhat younger theoretician and critic of Marxism, Antonio 
Gramsci.10 Brzozowski and Gramsci both read Labriola, Croce, and Italian crit-
ics and aestheticians drawing similar interpretations from their works. The im-
manentist conception of reality as reduced to the activity of history, or as Gram-
sci put it, “pure humanism,” explains Kant’s subjective conception of reality as 
the “historical subjectivity of a social group.”11 Freed from all manner of tran-
scendental excesses, radical historicism, by renouncing an essentialist concep-
tion of human nature and asserting that all human knowledge is the product of 
human history, shows that—as Walicki demonstrates—Gramsci is closer to Brzo-
zowski than to Lukács.12 The simplest way of putting the point is to say that this 
specific understanding of Marxism (in contradiction to the II International) 
makes Brzozowski’s and Gramsci’s thinking kindred. However, Brzozowski, 
while citing Labriola as an unorthodox and independent Marx interpreter, turned 
as well on several occasions to yet another Italian source that was for him quite 
essential, providing a common thread of meaning for the pursuits of the positive 
heroes of his Idee, viz. Giambattisto Vico’s Scienzia Nuova.13  
In a recently published book devoted to contemporary Italian Marxist 
thought, Roberto Esposito assesses its history in relation to the category of phi-
                                                             
10  See also Walicki’s Stanisław Brzozowski and the Beginnings of ‘Western Marxism’ 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
11  Andrzej Walicki, “Filozofia dojrzałości dziejowej,” (The philosophy of historical 
maturity), introduction to: Brzozowski, Idee, 23. 
12  Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski and the Polish Beginnings of ‘Western Marxism’, 26. 
There are still other similarities between Brzozowski and Gramsci. Walicki supports 
his thesis by calling on Bronisław Baczko and Ewa Sowa (ibid., 2, 318) who contrib-
uted to the collection Wokół myśli Stanisława Brzozowskiego, edited by Walicki and 
Roman Zimand in 1974 .  
13  See Eliza Kącka, “‘Nieobciążony wpływem żadnej sekty…’ Giambattista Vico w 
myśleniu Stanisława Brzozowskiego.” In Brzozowski (ko)repetycje, ed. by Dorota 
Kozicka, Joanna Orska, and Krzysztof Uniłowski (Katowice: FA-art, 2012). The first 
to write about the ties of Brzozowski’s philosophy to Vico was Rena A. Syska-Lam-
parska, Stanisław Brzozowski: a Polish Vichian, preface by Wiktor Weintraub (Fi-
renze: Le Lettere, 1987). 
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losophy connected to the operaismo movement. Characterizing what he seeks to 
present as “the Italian difference,” he refers to categories that on his assumption 
proceed from the original and distinctive conception of Italian culture, the be-
ginnings of which would be associated with the Renaissance. The philosophical 
orientation that interests Esposito and that is supposed to constitute the specific-
ity of contemporary Italian Marxism, is most often simply equated with ‘Italian 
humanism’.14 At the beginning of his book Esposito cites Pico della Mirandola’s 
famous oration On the Dignity of Man as perhaps being the earliest European 
philosophical and political manifesto declaring a non-essentialist conception of 
man. According to Mirandola, man is a “work of indeterminate form” to whom 
God ascribed “no fixed seat, no form of thy own, no gift peculiarly thine.”15 It is 
this indeterminacy that constitutes the basis of human freedom and gives to the 
Christian doctrine of free will its real meaning. Man is a being who knows how 
to create himself and not a subject with predetermined conditions of existence. 
Esposito indicates not only that speculative categories are inseparable from 
practical and aesthetic categories (much as in early German romanticism), but 
also that profound philosophical thinking cannot be disconnected from local 
history, politics and everyday life. He is very much concerned to divorce ‘living 
Italian thinking’ from any connotations of both nationalism and Italian fascism.16 
Describing the “Italian difference” on more than one occasion in the catego-
ries of a philosophy of man as a social being, constantly going beyond himself, 
tied both to social life and to biology that submits to no norm, Esposito questions 
the primacy of language (presupposed by hermeneutics and analytic philosophy) 
                                                             
14  Roberto Esposito, Pensiero vivente. Origini e attualità della filosofia italiana (Torino: 
Einaudi, 2010). All references here are to the translation, Living Thought. The Origins 
and Actuality of Italian Philosophy, transl. by Zakiya Hanafi (California: Stanford 
University Press, 2012). 
15  As cited in Esposito, Living Thought, 41. 
16  Esposito treats “Italianateness” virtually as a philosophical a category seeing its 
sources in the Italian Renaissance. Given the originality together with the anachronis-
tic character of this concept that is central to his work, Esposito keeps clear of any 
romantic nationalist connotations. The philosophies of Machiavelli, Bruno, Campa-
nella, Galileo or Vico do not provide, according to Esposito, elements of a typically 
idealist historiography insofar as they emerged under conditions of political decen-
tralisation, in a fragmented world, in a world of clashing interests. For these reasons 
“Italianateness” has its beginnings in literature. Although this thesis is to some extent 
a historical simplification related to the wishful character of the ideological manifesto 
that Il pensiero vivente in fact is, it is hard to resist the attractiveness of “Italianate-
ness” so understood.  
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that became the basis of the anti-metaphysical turn in European philosophy. 
From the Italian perspective, the linguistic turn that considers language as a 
determinate philosophical value, analyzed in its own matter, creates overly ab-
stract speculations and cannot for that reason bring remedies to the ethical or 
social problems generated by modernism. “The Italian difference” upholds the 
romantic conviction in the importance as much of language as of literature in 
order to actualize their conflictual relation to life. It enables us to discern the 
difference between the intellectual conceptualization of the world from human 
life as such, and it conceives of this difference as the basic factor in the conflict 
between the present and tradition, and hence of the dynamics of history. Esposito 
follows Leopardi’s Zibaldone in affirming that the Enlightenment, in its feverish 
pursuit of truth, deprived humans of their material roots, thus leading Platonism 
and Christianity, for which the spirit is superior to matter, to extreme conse-
quences, including abstracting entirely from language. 
The attempt to reconstruct the meaning of literature with recourse to Vico’s 
historical myth, comprising the metaphorically written, historical heritage of 
man’s past efforts, penetrating the present down to its core, is the reason why 
Esposito’s text is not a scholarly work. The author of Living Thought creates his 
own history of the “Italian difference,” referring in equal measure to its cultural 
and philosophical origins (in the writings of Machiavelli, Bruno, and Vico), as 
well as to paintings by Leonardo da Vinci, Dante’s Divine Comedy, Cuoca’s 
historical writings, de Sanctis’s literary critique, and especially Leopardi’s po-
etry that he so admires. Attempting to reactivate the meaning of philosophy as 
inseparable from life, Esposito does not turn literature into an instrument for the 
proof of antecedently admitted philosophical theses, as is so often the case in 
contemporary German and French thought. Instead, he tries to glean, within 
diverse means of expression, ‘nuggets’ of thought that actively produce philo-
sophical meanings while excluding nothing from their historical nature or liter-
ary specificity. The inseparability, the historical immanence, and progressivism 
of the many individuals’ spiritual and intellectual lives for whom the most im-
portant complex that renders self-consciousness (autonomy) possible, remains 
the necessity of creating community—this is the ideological conglomerate that, 
according to Esposito, characterizes the “Italian difference”: It is a specific 
multi-linear, dynamic, restless, internally contradictory, and constantly changing 
‘whole’ of a pre-modernist bent that nevertheless does not prevent it from an-
choring itself, polemically, within modernity. What is decisive in this regard is 
the inclination of Italian thought toward what is not philosophical: to depart from 
philosophy in the direction of a broadly conceived externality out of which arises 
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its “civil commitment and its contamination from other styles of expression.”17 It 
is this inclination that is the cause of its separation from the specialized, self-
reflexive lexicon of philosophical concepts characteristic of modern philosophy.  
In the chapter of Ideas entitled “Pragmatism and historical materialism”—
that together with “The epigenetic theory of history,” “Nature and knowledge,” 
and the “Prolegomena to the philosophy of ‘labor’” constitutes the philosophical 
core of the volume—Vico is called on as a witness only sporadically but on each 
occasion his appearance is spectacular. One instance is the discussion of the 
empiriocriticist and pragmatist views of Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach. In 
Ideas, Brzozowski undertook a ‘personal’ struggle with 
 
[…] niemożność osiągnięcia jedną i głęboką, współczującą myślą wszystkiego, co było 
twórczym, pracowitym, pełnym dobrej wiary w ubiegłym stuleciu. Początkiem jakiegoś 
nowego barbarzyństwa jest stan, w którym pewne dziedziny duszy własnej są głucho-
nieme wobec siebie.18 
 
[…] the impossibility of grasping in a single profound and empathetic thought all that has 
been creative, painstaking, and full of good faith in the course of the last century. The 
beginning of a new barbarism is the state within which certain areas of the soul are deaf 
and dumb to themselves. 
 
In the “Pragmatism” chapter Brzozowski confronts philosophies that “still con-
tinue today to defend the specter of being, of a ready world” (dziś jeszcze usiłują 
bronić widma bytu, gotowego świata)19 and that he considers entirely anach-
ronistic. Criticizing Mach’s mechanist view of life, he cites The New Science, so 
resonant with his own style: 
 
W tej gęstej nocy, która zalega myśl od najdalszej, najpierwotniejszej starożytności, 
ukazuje się to nieprzemijające wieczne światło tej prawdy, która nigdy nie podlega za-
ciemnieniu i nie może być podana w wątpliwość, że ten świat społeczny został stworzony 
przez ludzi.20 
 
                                                             
17  Esposito, Living Thought, 11. 
18  Brzozowski, Idee, 253. 
19  Ibid., 209. 
20  Ibid., 208.  
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But in the thick night of darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from us, 
there shines the eternal and never-failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the 
world of civil society has certainly been made by men.21 
 
In his New Science Vico traces the entirety of knowledge, understood here as the 
social world (with its logic, morality, economy, politics, physics, astronomy, 
chronology in the sense of history and geography), back to poetic wisdom that 
he considers to be the wisdom of the ancients, the origins of which he attempts 
to winnow out of commonly known myths, as traces of a no longer decipherable 
past consciousness. For Vico, the social world is a world that we once succeeded 
in imagining and narrating; the poetic creation of the community precedes intel-
lectual conceptualization and makes possible the later functioning of social in-
stitutions. The idea of the collective construction of history, conceived as the 
effort of imagination, though without the possibility of attaining any kind of an 
enduring, however finite form, seems to pervade Brzozowski’s philosophy of 
labor in a most evident manner. In order to systematize the concepts Brzozowski 
brings to his account, we need to get clear about how he understands the cate-
gory of ‘creation’ that seems to be connected to a considerable degree with 
Vico’s ‘poetic wisdom’.  
Giorgio Agamben, one of the heroes of the last chapter of Esposito’s book, in 
a work entitled L’uomo senza contenuto (1970, The Man without Content), tries 
to recover the issues related to the ancients’ concepts of poiesis and praxis, the 
separation of which was decisive for the Cartesian model of epistemology in the 
European Enlightenment.22 Its direct consequence appears to have been the 
separation of mind and body, subject and object. Following Aristotle, Agamben 
restores the Greek meaning of poiesis as inventing rather than acting or ‘making’ 
something, as widely understood today, and identifies it with the creative process 
as such. For Aristotle, poiesis connotes pro-duction (bringing something into the 
world out of nothing) of new objects, material objects above all, a meaning as-
cribed in antiquity to every kind of technical creativity.23 Agamben critically 
presents the nineteenth century history of the identification of this concept with 
the practice that was supposed to have led to the nihilist interpretation of art as 
                                                             
21  Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas Goddard 
Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948), 85. 
22  Giorgio Agamben, L’uomo senza contenuto (Milano: Rizzoli, 1970); here and below I 
reference the translation: The Man without Content, trans. G. Albert (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999). 
23  Agamben refers of course to Aristotle’s distinction between poesis and praxis in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Agamben, The Man without Content, 68f. 
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an essentially self-sufficient, critically self-aware practice based on, as with 
Aristotle’s praxis, desire and the will. The history of this equation is tied to No-
valis who, following Leibniz, Fichte, and Schelling, inherited the conviction in 
the correlation of the concepts of practice and activity in the ‘poetic’ sense, as 
the outcomes of perception (that is, the cognition of the world) and the will (its 
creation). As is well known, in its culmination the will was absolutized as the 
originary principle of all things. As a spiritual-biological hybrid, man’s task 
would consist in transcending limitations carried by the intellectual, conceptual 
dichotomy inscribed in his activity:  
 
This idea of man as the redeemer and messiah of nature is developed by Novalis in the 
form of an interpretation of science, art, and in general all human activity as the “for-
mation” or “education” (Bildung) of nature, in a sense that appears to anticipate Marx’s 
thought and in some ways Nietzsche’s as well.24 
 
The creative potential of the thinking spirit, flowing the self-reflection, was to go 
beyond Fichtean idealism, since: “As Marx would fifty years later [...], Novalis 
located this going beyond in praxis, understood as the higher unity of thought 
and action.”25 Agamben points to the ensuing consequence of the philosophical 
equation of poiesis and praxis in the form of alienated activity reduced in mo-
dernity to the melancholy artistic act directed to the past conceived as a whole 
and deprived of any tangible social effects. The division of the world, of experi-
ence and language, is Agamben’s main philosophical thesis.26 In order for lan-
guage to be able once again to name, create the real world as well as to deter-
mine the community, Agamben conceives of the ‘voice’ as a paradoxical phe-
nomenon, one in which the corporeal and the lingual in man cross. The energy 
flowing from the division of language and the world, the creative potential of 
alienated, non-signifying language renders possible the replacement of devalued 
traditions by a community whose identity must remain a pure, constantly recre-
ated possibility. 
In his criticism of romantic ideas of art as the sole possible, uniquely true re-
alization of life, Agamben is reminiscent of Brzozowski with his negative, but 
fascinated orientation to the speculative worlds of the romantics, wholly lacking 
in real effects for the life of the collectivity and indeed rather standing in for its 
life. In The Man without Content Agamben rejects Novalis’ concept of ‘Poetry’ 
                                                             
24  Ibid., 46f. 
25  Ibid., 47. 
26  Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. K. E. Pinkus, 
M. Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). 
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as the fundamentally creative but autotelic will. On the other hand, however, he 
reserves for poiesis—within art and literature—in the Italianate manner, the im-
portant task of mediating the conflict between the old and the new, between the 
past and the present, and what in the future is to be consigned to the flames.27 
The ‘circular’ activity of the human mind, coming to know itself in the act of 
continuous self-development, turns out to be abstract rationality mired in philo-
sophico-aesthetic speculations. The result is that, from the Italian perspective, it 
comes to lack the fundamental component of experience, biological corporeality, 
the matter of life and its conditions, dictated by history and relations of domina-
tion rendered conflictual by the individual constantly struggling for his freedom. 
Doubtless, for Brzozowski as well, biology and the reality of social change con-
stitute the fundamental limits to philosophical speculation, for which reason 
perhaps he praises Vico. 
Vico’s concept of “poetic wisdom” appears to presage the nineteenth-century 
concept of poiesis as the “creative will.” Esposito’s Italian “living thought” is 
therefore dependent on not only the Renaissance but also the early romantic 
intellectual heritage. As Agamben shows, Marx’s thought, too, is marked by this 
characteristic. “Poetic wisdom” is characterized as social experience extracted 
creatively from the past as it was remembered or inscribed in the collective myth 
that requires actualization. On the one hand, given the premises pertaining to 
‘poeticalness’ understood as creating a new world, there follows, on the part of 
“Italian thought,” a characteristic relation to history, likewise in the manner of a 
‘fable’. On the other, an equally specific place is accorded to what is creative in 
literature. Brzozowski’s chapter on the “Epigenetic theory of history” corre-
sponds precisely to Vico’s categories of circularity. Vico’s tradition is visible as 
well in later chapters of Ideas, characterizing the concepts of historical material-
ism and the philosophy of labor, the discussion of which necessarily presup-
posed the theory of history. What is especially interesting, however, is the way 
in which Brzozowski draws the reader into the flow of his account, requiring of 
him a certain creative effort and obliging him to adopt a critical stance. We can 
see this in what is the most important chapter in Ideas, “The Prolegomena to the 
Philosophy of Labor.” Initially, Brzozowski attempts to provide a more precise 
account of labor as creativity that has a determinate aim and calls forth determi-
nate ‘creative gestures’. Resistance to labor that is to bring about real, funda-
mental change, in a social sense, comes on the one hand from nature and human 
biology and, on the other, from the entirety of encountered gestures and objects, 
the outcomes of earlier labor. As such, there is no matter which would condition 
the creation of a common world in a way not connected to human activity. In 
                                                             
27  Agamben, The Man without Content, 68f. 
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this way, all concepts are rendered present and intelligible only insofar as they 
are commensurate with labor. Brzozowski offers the following, only seemingly 
puzzling, definition of labor: “Jako gest wewnętrzny jest praca określonym przez 
nas przemijaniem życia”28 (In being an internal gesture labor is the passage of 
life as determined by us). According to “Prolegomena” it is difficult to speak of 
a reality as long as it is not created or of a subject that is not constructed in un-
ending confrontation with the limitations of our biology and common history. 
For Brzozowski, the truth about creativity as the sole truth renders the concept of 
truth as predetermined essence impossible. That is why he, in treating creation in 
the philosophy of labor precisely as “creation,” at once real and “poetic,” prom-
ulgates a ”new knowledge” attempting to ”activate” his own text by means of a 
play of statements put forth as well as by the continual reconstruction of his 
subjectivity. He is indefatigable in exercising or rather ‘training’ the reality 
created by the intellect, believing that when he writes he creates facts belonging 
to a common intellectual world and in this way reinforces the collective self-
consciousness. 
Where the arguments are concerned, the five parts of “Prolegomena” do not 
differ fundamentally from one another; the narrative is not sequential, from part 
to part, but rather involves a specific superposition of ever more developed con-
tents at ever higher and more complicated levels of understanding. As soon as 
we have the sense that we understand Brzozowski, the impression arises that he 
keeps saying the same thing round and round—an effect encountered as well 
while reading Scienza Nuova. He attempts to cope with recourse to means he 
particularly disliked, the pragmatist perspective, in that he submits to a test the 
different world views that interest him. In the fifth, summarizing subchapter of 
“Prolegomena,” Brzozowski begins with a characterization of the concept of 
‘life’ in order to throw down, in the last sentences, the project of freedom 
worked in accordance with local principles and traditions specific to the Polish 
nation. He then proceeds to a polemic against the objectivized, sociological lan-
guages of Simmel and Poincaré describing ‘life’ as a phenomenon “just as in-
comprehensible and external as a sunset, a mountain cascade” (równie niezro-
zumiałego i zewnętrznego jak zachód słońca, kaskada górska).29 
However, Brzozowski simply does not clarify the failings of what interests 
him, viz., the scientific view of the world. Instead, he mitigates by raising a 
simple question, “What is life?,” and then he gives himself an answer in a man-
ner that imitates the positive theses he put forward in the preceding chapters: 
“Wszystko jest dziełem życia, a samo życie nie może być przez nas myślane 
                                                             
28  Brzozowski, Idee, 223. 
29  Ibid., 241. 
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jako rzeczywistość, możemy myśleć o nim jedynie w kategoriach zacieśnia-
jących tę rzeczywistość”30 (Everything is the product of life, and life itself can-
not be conceived by us as reality, we are able to think about it only in categories 
that restrict this reality). He seeks first of all deceptive similarities of contempo-
raneous thoughts—the Marxist prerogative of a reality that is entirely in flux and 
dynamic as well as post-Cartesian scientific projects that, in keeping with the 
Enlightenment, exclude metaphysics from the sphere of description of shared 
reality that after all is a social fact here as well. The definition of ‘life’ to which 
the latter style of thinking leads us is compromised in an exceedingly subtle way 
by the subject of the critical text who as it were ‘identifies’ himself with a posi-
tion that is contrary to his own. By subjecting the myth of the worldview to 
hyperbole, in order to acquire a dramatic dimension with its accompanying deep 
irony, this subject tries to present to his readers the terrifying absurdity of Poin-
caré’s ‘non-human’ world: 
 
Są te zjawy i to jest wszystko; umysłowe życie człowieka i sam człowiek jako jeden z 
przedmiotów, jedna z jego zawartości, jest w gruncie rzeczy przygodą, wydarzającą się 
nie wiadomo komu – w głuchoniemej próżni. […] Pozornie tylko mówimy, wewnętrznie i 
zewnętrznie, właściwy świat jest niemy.31 
 
There are just these phenomena and that is all; man’s thinking life and man himself as one 
object among many, one of its contents, is at base pure chance happening to one knows 
not who—in a deaf and dumb void. […] Speech is an illusion, internally and externally, 
the world as such is dumb. 
 
At this point of the argument a rebound occurs—in the words of Paul de Man 
one would like to say, a parabasis of the allegory of tropes: 
 
Mnie, który jestem hipotezą, powiodła się inna hipoteza. Pozornie jest to stanowisko 
niezmiernie uwypuklające czynny, spontaniczny charakter życia, ale jest to pozór tylko. 
Tłem zasadniczym jest zawsze to: coś się tworzy, coś się myśli i w pewnej mierze trwa; 
nie wiemy, czym jest to coś, myśl nasza, ale trwałość jest oznaką skuteczności, szukajmy 
tego trwania.32    
 
I who am a hypothesis ceded successfully to another hypothesis. On the surface it is a 
perspective that puts great emphasis on the active, spontaneous character of life, but this is 
                                                             
30  Ibid., 240f. 
31  Ibid., 241. 
32  Ibid., 242. 
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only an illusion. The basic background is always the following: something is created, 
something is thought and to a certain degree persists; we know not what this something is, 
our thinking, but persistence is the sign of effectiveness, let us seek out this persistence. 
 
Brzozowski not only well understood the meaning of Marxian alienation of labor 
and commodity fetishism in opposition to the representatives of the determinist 
and scientific conception of the historical development of classes in their strug-
gle for emancipated existence. By means of a variety of devices of a ‘poetic’ 
character, sudden shifts of discourse, the construction of a kind of represented 
world of the critical text, Brzozowski tried hard to avoid an ‘objectifying’ defi-
nition of phenomena he considered to be dynamic, in flux and vital. As the crea-
tive subject who sets the scene, he neither presented nor systematized his 
worldview. Instead, he gave free reign to the dynamic clash of his own convic-
tions, their change, creating in the face of what is other, strange, absurd, even 
unreadable. 
Brzozowski describes the relations that tie labor and life—his fundamental 
concepts—in a way that could be characterized as autotelic story-telling, pre-
senting—or rather constantly working out—the autonomous creative process. 
According to Brzozowski, the only basis of our psyche’s authority over us is the 
entirety of human life, such as it is: 
 
Poza nim, poza tym życiem jest coś, o czym to tylko możemy powiedzieć, że jest współ-
mierne z naszą pracą; to jest że pomiędzy czasem w nas a czasem poza nami jest taka 
styczność, że możemy przez pewne zużycie naszego życia zapewnić pewne właściwości 
psychiczne nastąpić mającym przebiegom czasu.33 
 
Beyond it, beyond this life there is something about which we can only say that it is coe-
val with our labor; that is, between the time within us and the time outside us there is a 
contiguity of a sort that, by using up some degree of our life, we can ensure certain prop-
erties of the psyche supervening on the flow of time. 
 
In keeping with his auto-thematic style Brzozowski relates to the philosophical 
meaning of the foregoing thesis about life, developing not the sphere of exam-
ples and proofs, but instead directing the reader to its variable and ineffable 
nature that is meant to find its reflection in the author’s vital style: 
 
Jest rzeczą do najwyższego stopnia trudną dokonać całkowicie tego przetworzenia myśli, 
jakiego wymaga ujęcie tego stanowiska. Rozkłada ono wszystko, co wydaje nam się 
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stałym, cały świat fizyczny […] i roztapia we wrzącej i chropawej, zasadniczo niezupeł-
nej, spontanicznej nieprzewidzianości, irracjonalności życia.34 
 
It is exceedingly difficult to transform thinking in the way that this standpoint demands. It 
breaks up everything that seems to us constant, the entire physical world [...] and melts [it] 
in the roiling, coarse, fundamentally incomplete, spontaneously unpredictable irrationality 
of life.  
 
Brzozowski, without defining, systematizing, introducing any speculative char-
acteristic of phenomena in the course of a philosophical deduction, creates social 
concepts such as history in a way distant from the modern, post-Enlightenment 
project of ordering knowledge as truth. Proceeding philosophically beyond phi-
losophy he interprets history in the manner of Vico: 
 
Harmonia sfer trzyma się na krwawym słupie ludzkiego wysiłku, jest jedną z cech zbudo-
wanego przez nas ludzkiego życia, jedną z cech potoku życiowego, który przez wnętrze 
nasze przecieka; jest nami w momencie bierności, sam siebie pogłębia i dźwiga; tworzy 
swe wzniesienie, by utworzyć swój spadek i pięknem własnego przepływania utrzymuje 
się w wysiłku dźwigania. Żaden obraz nie wyczerpie tu wszystkich stron rzeczywistości, 
jaką jest ona.35 
 
The harmony of the spheres hangs on the bloody mast of human effort, is one of the traits 
of human life we have constructed, a property of the flow of life coursing through our 
innermost being; it is what we are in the instant of passivity, it deepens and bears itself; it 
raises itself in order to create its downfall and in the beauty of its own flowing it maintains 
the effort of bearing. Here no picture can exhaust all the aspects of the reality that it is.  
 
Thus, creative autonomy is worked out, the autonomy of the subject understood 
as the voice of the individual struggling to acquire the right to the creative dif-
ferentiation of jointly constructed social life—an individual whose essence is 
activity, development, change, labor, the transformation of what is encountered 
in order to attain the impossible perdurance of one’s achievements. This is not a 
process that remains a mere gesture and that can be associated with the modern-
ist concept of intellectual autonomy as the purely subjective autarchy of art. It is 
an ‘autonomy’ that carries above all the meaning associated with Mirandola’s 
Renaissance humanism. At the same time it proceeds from the absolute freedom 
and indeterminacy of man ceaselessly creating his forms out of matter on the 
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basis of his own decisions that give form to ‘humanity’. Autonomy thus con-
ceived, autonomy signifying the self-consciousness of society, remains as well 
the history of the collective. It should be understood not only ‘poetically’, but 
also in the Italian manner.  
As Esposito argues, Italian thought sets itself up in parallel to European 
modernism; when modernist processes occur in Europe it is in a sense ‘non-
actual’, though it stands ready, with its reserves of meaning, to run with the 
baton in case modernism does not manage with the issues it has brought to the 
table. Rather than cutting itself off from its sources, modernist and European, 
Italian thought always turns to its sources and seeks there the meaning of its 
actuality. The “Italian difference,” instead of creating its specific modernity 
starting from zero, by instituting a robust frontier between the rational and the 
feral, creates itself rather by returning to the sources prescribed in Machiavelli’s 
writings or understood as Vico’s ricorso. This is the return of a dark, unfathom-
able past recovered within the very heart of creation today, so necessary for new 
historical openness. Here the past is the source of energy, its reproduction does 
not consist in ‘reaction’, a real return to or restoration of the past, but rather in its 
evident ‘contiguity’ with the actuality of changing history which is immolated in 
what draws near. The necessary co-functioning of the contradiction constitutes in 
this way the present order of history, having nothing in common with the philo-
sophical systems of the Enlightenment. The history that comes to expression in 
the formula of the present clash of diverse perspectives cannot discard its source, 
for the shaky order of the collective is derived from and reproduces it. “At-
tualità” is thus shot through with incommensurable alternatives that demand 
decisions. Life, which acquires its expressive formula, especially when it be-
comes a stake in political conflicts, is understood as “[…] a set of impulses, 
desires, and needs that run through the body of individuals and populations in a 
form that is irreducible to the distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, 
reason and force, or proper and common.”36 
Creating life and the world in the historical process, which in Vico’s case 
takes place poetically, is connected frequently in Brzozowski’s case directly with 
literature or literary criticism. Literature turns out to be an important polygon, a 
coefficient in the ‘creation’ of social reality, though not in the categories of the 
modernist meaning of art’s autonomy—thrown back exclusively on itself. Nor 
does it relegate to the conviction belonging to philosophical speculation ground-
ing the concept of autonomy: the profound individualization, irreplaceability, as 
well as the reflexivity of the tools of creation. Life is creative, it works out an 
autonomy that is broad and socially significant, carrying in itself the possibil-
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ity—as Brzozowski would say—of the proletariat’s consciousness of self that is 
also a kind of utopia of Italian operatic thinking. The “Italian difference” not 
only does not eliminate the linguistic-literary aspect of philosophical reflection 
but in fact connects its own inception with Dante’s and Vico’s poetic humanism 
as well as with contemporary literature. As Esposito puts it: “[…] the most re-
cent Italian thought takes language as a given that is so constitutive of the human 
being that it can be identified as the point of suture between nature and mutation, 
invariance and difference, biology and history.”37 
It is natural that Esposito calls on Dante or Leopardi. Leopardi himself de-
scribed great poets such as Horace, Dante, and Shakespeare as thinkers, and in 
turn philosophers such as Plato as poets. The poetic imagination remained for 
him “an indispensable, internal structure of reason.”38 For Agamben, too, litera-
ture is a very important aspect of philosophizing. In Language and Death, the 
voice is the point of suture between the body and language to whose system the 
voice ascribes a bodily singularity. In his Categorie italiane. Studi di poetica 
(The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics), he deals with the source of what it 
means to be ‘Italian’: The Divine Comedy and the life of language.39 
From Bruno to Gentile Italian philosophy has gone down the path along 
which the individual subject is the constitutive locus of the community, never 
ultimately determined by the constitutive force of his innermost identity. On the 
other hand, it is deeply rooted in the productive rhythm of unending life. At the 
heart of Italian philosophy we find not individuality but a common world with its 
inexhaustible potential. Literature has not been the main focus of Italian Marxist 
thinkers. The chief theoreticians of operaismo, known also as Italian autonomi-
ans, such as Massimo Cacciari or Antonio Negri—much like Brzozowski ear-
lier—do not leave behind the subject consciously creating its own world and at 
the same time fulfilling a certain ‘communitarian’ mission. They do, however, 
reject the generalizing character of the purely philosophical concept of the de-
humanized authority producing its own essence, the individual nature of which 
consists in isolating itself from social phenomena. They attempt as well to recon-
struct the concept of autonomy by conjoining the singular and the universal. 
The similarities between Brzozowski’s poetic, activist “Epigenetic Theory of 
History” and Italian philosophy rooted in Marxism derive no doubt from their 
common literary sources of inspiration in the nineteenth century—Marx, Nietz-
sche, Bergson, and Sorel, but also still earlier thinkers. Vico, read by Nietzsche, 
is the intellectual core, as Esposito puts it, not only of Italian philosophy. On the 
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39  Giorgio Agamben, Categorie italiane: studi di poetica (Venezia: Marsilio, 1996).  
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other hand, Agamben finds currents common to Marxism and early romanticism 
in the writings of German precursors of modernity, such as Schelling, Novalis, 
and Hölderlin—important equally for Brzozowski—that lead in Nietzsche’s 
direction. Examining anew the operaismo philosophers, observing the course of 
their thinking in relation to new readings, new historical events, we can shed 
new light on Brzozowski’s thought by asking in what the current development of 
Italian humanism consists as well as by considering its closest ideological and 
intellectual affinities. Doubtless, the emancipatory conceptions of philosophy 
and art, directed against the Enlightenment project, will reveal a family resem-
blance. In this way, on the one hand, the joyful Kantian and Spinozist knowledge 
of the early romantics creating their pan-poetic philosophy at the margins of 
German classicism; on the other hand, Italian renaissance humanism in the bio-
logical and mythical interpretation drawing on Vico, laid the basis for many 
twentieth-century expressions of revolt against institutions of social knowledge 
and power, among which Brzozowski’s The Legend of Young Poland certainly 
figures. Speech and myth, voice and language or finally art, ‘poeticity’, consti-
tute from this perspective a creative factor invoked in philosophical as well as 
philological categories. It may well be that this is the most important remainder 
of the pre-modernist understanding of the place and function of poesis: to crea-
tively imagine man’s life in the dynamic paradoxical formula of poetic practice. 
 
Translated by Edward M. Świderski 
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Brzozowski and Rorty: 
Coping with the Contingent Self 
Edward M. Świderski 
 
 
Brzozowski, always our contemporary, in the light of whose thought we stand—
an assertion that inspired a research project within the scope of which the fol-
lowing remarks are couched. The assertion invites confirmation; it bids us to 
seek partners in dialogue with Brzozowski today. In the present instance, my 
interest focuses on Brzozowski the philosopher and I ask, does Brzozowski 
speak to the concerns of philosophers today, and if so, how?  
It is not immediately clear that this is the case, starting with the state of the 
dialogue in Brzozowski’s native Poland. His standing as a major representative 
figure of Polish modernism came in for renewed attention in the aftermath of the 
collapse of Polish communism that generated soul-searching by the Polish intel-
ligentsia. To the degree that his specifically philosophical views can be prised 
from his worldview as a whole and addressed on their own footing, they have 
drawn the attention of those who have been intent on reviewing the status of the 
so-called “Warsaw School of the History of Ideas,” in particular, the stand the 
members of the school adopted in regard to ‘orthodox Marxism’.1 At a critical 
                                                             
1  The locus classicus is the following book: Andrzej Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski and 
the Polish Beginnings of ‘Western Marxism’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). The 
most up-to-date treatments of the Warsaw School of the History of Ideas are two col-
lections: A. Kołakowski, ed., Wokół dorobku Warszawskiej Szkoły Historii Idei 
[Around the works of the Warsaw School of the history of ideas] (Warszawa: IFiS 
PAN, 2013), and Pawel Grad, ed., Warszawska Szkoła Historii Idei: tożsamość, 
tradycja, obecność [The Warsaw School of the History of Ideas: identity, tradition, 
presence] (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2014). A background question throughout many of 
the essays gathered in these volumes is whether the scholars most often cited in con-
nection with the ‘School’ shared a common identity.  
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juncture Brzozowski came to enjoy celebrity among the scholars with whom the 
school is identified as a forerunner of ‘Western Marxism’. Brzozowski’s ‘recov-
ery’, unbeknownst to him, in the initial decade of the twentieth century, of the 
spirit, and to a considerable degree the letter, of Marx’s early praxis philosophy 
appeared to augur well for his (potential) influence among those in Poland for 
whom a socialist worldview remained a viable option. However, when the politi-
cal authorities cracked down on, among others, the scholars associated with the 
Warsaw school following the events of March 1968, Brzozowski’s potential 
influence waned. In any case, it is doubtful that Brzozowski had anything to 
‘say’ to analytic philosophers, phenomenologists, and Catholic philosophers, the 
three salient non-Marxist currents in Polish philosophical life throughout the 
communist period. In addition, in the course of the two decades prior to the 
collapse of communism Marxist philosophers in Poland turned increasingly 
eclectic in their theoretical ambitions in order to preserve the little that remained 
of their relevance.2 The direction that eclecticism took was not fuelled by attach-
ment to Brzozowski’s philosophy.3  
Nor did the situation change in the aftermath of the transition to a democratic 
Poland. For example, in the mid-nineties, the Polish Academy of Sciences in-
vited Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Leszek Kołakowski, and Ernst Gellner to 
discuss the state of philosophy in the company of the associates of the Institute 
of Philosophy and Sociology in Warsaw.4 Brzozowski was nowhere ‘visible’ in 
this debate, his name appears nowhere on the roster of references to whom the 
                                                             
2  No better example of this eclecticism can be cited than the case of the ‘Poznan 
School’ whose chief architects, Leszek Nowak and Jerzy Kmita, construed an ‘an-
tipositivist naturalist’ account of scientific method eschewing a distinction between 
natural and human science by bringing central tenets of Marxian historical material-
ism in line with Popper’s philosophy of science, elements of Ajdukiewicz’s logical 
semantics, Znaniecki’s conception of the cultural sciences, and in due course a his-
torical epistemology drawing on the Quine-Duhem thesis. As regards the question of 
whether and how ‘orthodox’ Marxists in Poland dialogued with their opposite num-
bers, cf. Józef Tischner, Polski ksztalt dialogu [The Polish form of dialogue] (Kraków: 
Znak, 2002). 
3  Kołakowski’s role, both in a positive and negative sense, as regards Brzozowski’s 
‘Marxism’ was crucial. In 1977, when he published his three-volume Główne nurty 
marksizmu [Main currents of Marxism], Kołakowski put paid to his earlier belief that 
Brzozowski’s Marx-inspired ‘social subjectivism’ provided a sure footing for a philo-
sophical anthropology.  
4  Jozef Niżnik and John T. Sanders, eds., Debating the State of Philosophy. Habermas, 
Rorty, and Kołakowski (Westport: Praeger, 1996).  
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associates of the Institute appealed in the course of their discussions with the 
invited luminaries. This is significant given that it was surely no coincidence that 
a debate of this kind about the prospects for philosophy should have been orga-
nized at that time in Poland, still in the throes of the ‘transition’. Apparently, 
Brzozowski’s ‘absence’ signified that few if any believed that his philosophizing 
held out any prospects for the life of philosophy in Poland.  
It may be an irony, however, that there are voices outside Poland that do 
match the tone and style of Brzozowski’s reflections. One such voice, in my 
opinion, is that of Richard Rorty. I want to suggest below that the basis for a 
dialogue between Brzozowski and Rorty does exist and I shall try to bring 
Brzozowski ‘up to date’, so to speak, in order to determine if and how he 
measures up as a ‘contemporary’, taking Rorty as a pertinent foil. Readers fa-
miliar with the writings of both thinkers will surely acknowledge that there are 
parallels: both display an iconoclastic spirit with regard to age-old philosophical 
stereotypes; both mix discourses freely—philosophy, literary criticism, cultural 
commentary—with only passing concern for established academic boundaries; 
each is alive to the potential of metaphor to invigorate thinking; both are com-
mitted to a social ideal (‘achieving our country’ in Rorty’s phrase; reshaping the 
Polish national consciousness as Brzozowski hoped to do). To be sure, the dif-
ferences of context cannot be overlooked—Brzozowski’s as a (renegade) intel-
lectual in the culture of Young Poland steeped in nineteenth-century philosophy; 
Rorty the ‘American’ pragmatist who took distance from philosophy because he 
understood that ‘liberalism’ enjoins the search not for ‘objective truth’ but for 
‘communal solidarity’.  
How then do we reconcile the parallels with the differences in context? The 
first step is to show that Brzozowski and Rorty raised closely similar questions, 
differences of context notwithstanding. The second is to note commonalities—
and differences—in their ways of handling these questions. And the third is to 
hypothesize that, with respect to the differences, had Brzozowski at his disposal 
the kinds of ‘tools’ to which Rorty could appeal to construct his arguments, he 
might have come to conclusions very much like those Rorty defended. The 
‘tools’ I have in mind have to do with the ways and means of philosophizing, 
including philosophizing in a ‘deconstructive’ vein, something that was common 
to both. Because we want to test whether Brzozowski is our philosophical ‘con-
temporary’ we want to imagine him speaking the ‘language’ Rorty could assume 
on the part of his audience, a language honed from the dialectic of philosophical 
controversy throughout the twentieth century. Needless to say, Brzozowski knew 
nothing of that dialectic; nevertheless, the aim of my attempt to put words into 
Brzozowski’s mouth is to show that, in the course of thinking about the ques-
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tions he held dear, he stumbled over the lack of an adequate ‘vocabulary’ to 
express what I believe he was groping toward. I contend that the ‘vocabulary’ 
that might have kept him from stumbling over his words could well have been 
Rorty’s. The ‘might have been’ needs emphasizing: I will not contend that there 
is anything like a one-to-one correspondence between the two thinkers. 
Despite—or rather because of—Brzozowski’s critical reception of so many 
philosophies of his day, they conditioned the style of his own questioning. My 
idea is that, within a given discursive context, disagreement is dialectically pro-
portional to what can count as an intelligible alternative within that context. The 
philosophical context of Brzozowski’s questioning was such that, despite his 
critical stance in regard to many of the philosophies he examined, he remained 
committed to their tenor and purpose, viz., to seek true responses to substantive 
philosophical questions. In Rorty’s case, by contrast, his critique and ultimately 
abandonment of time-honoured philosophical assumptions rested on his version 
of the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ abetted by his pragmatist convictions. The up-
shot was that, in his view, substantive philosophical arguments should be recast 
as ways of speaking, first of all metaphorically, in order in this way to expose the 
myth that philosophers have something to discover about the way things really 
and truly are. I want to say that although Brzozowski remained stuck in the 
mould of substantive philosophizing his persistent questioning pointed beyond 
that mould and is consistent with the ‘vocabulary’ Rorty preferred.  
 
The ‘Truth within’ rather than the ‘Truth without’? 
First Glimmers 
 
What are the questions that Brzozowski and Rorty share? Each wants to become 
clear about the relation of the self to the world and in particular about the nature 
of the relation. Each believes that the relation is not discovered, it is made; and 
each seeks clarity about the nature of the making. For his part, Rorty came to the 
view that there is no centred self who would do the making by exercising powers 
grounded in some underlying human essence. One way in which he came to this 
conclusion concerns the idea that language is the medium through which the 
subject reaches the world. Rorty sought to undermine this idea and in so doing 
jettisoned two issues closely connected with it: representation and truth, includ-
ing truthful representation of the self. Freed from the onus of truth-telling, lan-
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guage reappears as a ‘poetic’ tool serving diverse needs and interests within the 
community.5 
By contrast, Brzozowski, I will say, struggled to reconcile nostalgia for a 
centred subject, on the one hand, and a socio-cultural historicism with regard to 
the ‘content’ of the subject, on the other. From stage to stage in his thinking the 
tension between these poles is palpable: who or what is the subject who makes 
the history that is all the content that the subject is (or has)?6 In this regard, how 
he sees language remains somewhat ambiguous, an ambiguity which is, I con-
tend, a symptom of the tension in his thinking. Whereas he would appear to 
agree with Rorty that as far as the ‘world’ is concerned language is not a trans-
parent medium of worldly representation, he remains in thrall to the truth of self-
representation, to the ‘truth within’. Despite insisting that we are only what we 
have made ourselves to be, Brzozowski, I will argue, never relinquished the 
conviction—the hope—that there is a fundamental truth about the ‘subject’, the 
‘truth’, namely, that the self is essentially self-constituting, that it belongs to its 
nature to be so. And here is where he ‘stumbles over his words’, as I put it 
above: how to pair the demand for truthful self-representation about what we are, 
essentially, on the one hand, with, on the other, the claim that we are but the 
products of our contingent, forever impermanent industry? 7 
Let me now go over this ground again, this time with an eye to detail. 
Consider the following sentence from Rorty. “At the heart of pragmatism is 
the refusal to accept the correspondence theory of truth and the idea that true 
beliefs are accurate representations of reality.”8 Brzozowski never tired of stating 
similar-sounding claims, initially in his Fichtean activist philosophy, subse-
                                                             
5  These are the master themes of Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), in particular the first part, “Contin-
gency.” 
6  Throughout, my reading of Brzozowski is directed to “Nasze ‘ja’ i historia” [Our 
“self” and history] (1909), the first chapter of Legenda Młodej Polski, 9–27. 
7  I leave out of account here the dialectic of the individual and the collective which 
played a key role in Brzozowski’s speculations, but which took more than one form. 
Initially, he placed the accent on the autonomous individual; then in the Marxist phase 
of the philosophy of labor attention to the individual receded in favour of collective, 
‘social subjective’, labor history; in his last period, Brzozowski returns to the individ-
ual self. More on this below in the section devoted to Brzozowski’s evolution.  
8  Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism and Romanticism,” in Philosophy as Cultural Politics. 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 105. 
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quently in his Marxian praxist phase, and right through to the end of his life.9 
There is the eventual complication that Brzozowski had qualms about the prag-
matism with which he was familiar, charging its proponents with not having 
sufficiently explained the concept of activity,10 the concept that provides the 
reference frame of the sentence I just quoted from Rorty. At the same time, 
however, a pragmatist strain in his thinking is rather evident, though of course 
Rorty’s pragmatism had come a long way from that of William James, with 
whom Brzozowski appeared to be familiar.11 
                                                             
9  One example: “In cognition, we come to know forms of goal-directed action and the 
creation of ever newer such forms. [...] Man does not come to know some ready en-
countered world, but rather, at first unawares, but at present consciously, he creates 
and grows aware of his different forms of activity. If cognition can still be explained 
as coming to know something given as ready, then this is possible only in the follow-
ing way: it turns out that what lies outside of us is such that now these, now those ac-
tions can be undertaken that lead to determinate results.” “Przyroda i poznanie” [Na-
ture and cognition], in Idee, 195.  
10  “What is an action?—I ask the pragmatists. And here we have the weakest point of 
their philosophy. Here they break down. They are incapable of distinguishing action 
from the feeling [poczucie] of action.” “Pragmatyzm i materializm dziejowy” [Prag-
matism and historical materialism], ibid., 211. I am not clear, however, about what 
Brzozowski means by „the feeling of action.” 
11  A Polish commentator selects the following passages from Brzozowski and argues 
that they show Brzozowski’s affinities with pragmatism (my translations): “The basis 
of the theoretical truth of some point of view is its practical value (in the widest sense 
of the expression).” “The soul of a world view, its veritable princeps movens is al-
ways the need to assume a certain active position in relation to life and the world. It is 
not so much our theoretical thinking that requires unification as our actions.” He as-
serts that “these theses are very similar to the pragmatist claims that resolving meta-
physical controversies may require ‘[…] to turn […] away from abstraction and insuf-
ficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, 
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins’ and to turn instead ‘towards con-
creteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power.’ It would 
seem that Brzozowski tended toward this kind of approach.” Pawel Bieławski, “Stani-
sława Brzozowskiego ‘Wstęp do filozofii – próba analizy’” [Stanisław Brzozowski’s 
“Introduction to philosophy”—an attempt of an analysis], http://www.racjonalista.pl/ 
kk.php/s,500/k,3. The first two quotations are from “Monistyczne pojmowanie dzie-
jów i filozofia krytyczna” [The monistic conception of history and critical philosophy] 
in Stanisław Brzozowski, Kultura i życie. 313, 279 respectively. The remaining is 
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Brzozowski’s reservations with regard to pragmatism have much to do with 
the influence his selected philosophical brethren exercised. These included Vico, 
German idealist philosophers from Kant onwards, but also their critics (Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard), bits of Bergson, Sorel, and Labriola, as well as the 
empiriocriticists Avenarius and Mach, for good measure. With this heady potion 
to stimulate him, Brzozowski required ‘activity’ to be something more than 
activity as James liked to think about it, as that to which we defer when we wish 
to know what it is useful to believe.  
Rorty shares some of these affinities—Hegel, Nietzsche, for instance—but 
blows the trumpet especially for philosophers and writers in the New World: 
Emerson, Peirce, James, Dewey in particular, as well as for those of his contem-
poraries in whose work he perceived pragmatist affinities—Davidson, Quine, 
Sellars, Putnam, and Brandom. While all the figures in Brzozowski’s and 
Rorty’s pantheons question representationalist epistemology, arguing the case 
instead for the constructive character of human cognition, the second group, 
unlike the first, does not ascribe a privileged ontic status to the agent or subject. 
Those in the first group vacillate with regard to whether the subject (agent) is 
centred or not, whereas those in the latter on the whole think that is not the case 
(a point to which I will return presently).  
To grasp the import of the difference, consider in addition the following pas-
sage from Rorty. 
 
[…] what we call “increased knowledge” should not be thought of as increased access to 
the Real, but as increased ability to do things—to take part in social practices that make 
possible richer and fuller human lives. This increased richness is not the effect of a mag-
netic attraction exerted on the human mind by the really real, nor by reason’s ability to 
penetrate the veil of appearance. It is a relation between the human present and the human 
past, not a relation between the human and the non-human.12 
 
On the one hand, Brzozowski would surely have warmed to Rorty’s practical 
interpretation of ‘knowledge’, his appeal to the primacy of human flourishing, as 
                                                             
from William James, Pragmatism, in Writings, 1902–1910, ed. Bruce Kuklick (New 
York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1987), 508f. 
12  Richard Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics, 108. Compare this with Brzozowski: 
“Thinking is a part of life, its forms, tools, and perspective: it can affirm its effective 
reach only through life. The significance of thinking consists in the effects it exerts on 
the creation of victorious forms of life. We don’t ask, what are you thinking?, but 
what are you doing—as the pragmatists say.” Brzozowski, “Pragmatyzm i materja-
lyzm dziejowy,” 209. 
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well as his recommendation to us to acknowledge the self-sufficiency of the 
human condition within the socio-cultural matrix that makes up the substance of 
history.13 Rorty’s remark about the relation between the human past and present 
sits well with Brzozowski’s contention that all that we are is our own history.  
On the other hand, however, when Brzozowski waxed lyrical about activity 
he had in view first of all the transformative power of labor, which extends so far 
as to underwrite the categories of cognition. For Rorty, our “increased ability to 
do things” is not a matter of ‘transformative powers’ mediating the self’s cogni-
tive relation to the world, but of the imagination. ‘Imagination’ is not the name 
of a cognitive faculty, as in Kant, for instance, who allies the imagination with 
the understanding in order to account for representation. Rorty’s imagination 
stimulates new ways of speaking, new descriptions that come with time to ani-
mate cultural practices. He fixes this imaginative capacity by the term ‘Romanti-
cism’. “At the heart of romanticism is the thesis of the priority of imagination 
over reason—the claim that reason can only follow paths that the imagination 
has broken.”14  
We know that the ‘mature’ Brzozowski didn’t hold much truck with Roman-
ticism, a major target of his criticisms being the neo-romanticism of Young 
Poland. Nevertheless, he appeared to have believed that romanticism did convey 
an urgent sense of the creative powers of the ego, however unfinished the crea-
tive potential of the ego—the individual ego—finally is.15 Allowing for Rorty’s 
slant on Romanticism, Brzozowski could well have penned the following Rorty-
like sentence: “I hold that “activity”—be it the deed [Tat / czyn], labor [praca], 
struggle, creation, terms omnipresent throughout his writings—is prior to reason; 
I claim that reason can only follow paths that ‘activity’ has broken.”  
                                                             
13  Something very much like this sentiment is expressed by Brzozowski as follows: 
“When we evaluate the cultural value of a given thought, a given current, we examine 
not its intellectual logical character, but its vital productivity [wydajność]: we ask not 
whether this current answers to our preferences, habits, presuppositions, but whether it 
will manage to maintain and develop itself in relation to the world, whether it will 
manage to survive in the face of life.” Brzozowski, “Nasze ‘ja’ i historia,” 25. The 
idea expressed can be parsed in pragmatist terms: the cultural value of a given thought 
is tantamount to the way in which it helps us with some task.  
14  Rorty, “Pragmatism and romanticism,” 105. 
15  Agata Bielik-Robson, “Syndrom romantyczny. Stanisław Brzozowski i rewizja ro-
mantyzmu” [The romantic syndrome. Stanisław Brzozowski and the revision of ro-
manticism], Słupskie Prace Filologiczne. Seria Filologia Polska 5 (2007). See as well 
Eliza Kącka’s article in this volume, 187ff. 
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Still, the difference between ‘labor’ and imagination, in the ‘activist’ setting 
Brzozowski and Rorty otherwise share, is significant. My claim is that the dif-
ference hinges on vestiges of a foundationalism in Brzozowski that Rorty ex-
plicitly disavows, vestiges due in large measure to the philosophical lineage with 
which Brzozowski associated. Citing Rorty again, for him pragmatism and ro-
manticism—a union tantamount to the utter rejection of the correspondence 
theory of truth and representational epistemologies—“are reactions against the 
idea that there is something non-human out there with which human beings need 
to get in touch.”16 Brzozowski, I would say, has not altogether given up the idea 
that there is something “with which humans need to get in touch.”17 However, in 
his case, the ‘out there’ is transposed to ‘in here’; he wants us ‘to get in touch 
with’ something fundamental about our human condition. He raises high the 
banner of human self-realization, understanding it as the affirmation of the hu-
man potential to create a world—a culture—in tune with something fundamental 
about human nature. Or at least this is how I read his paean to freedom, to take 
control of our destiny, in the essay “Our ‘Self’ and History.” There, in ringing 
tones, Brzozowski proclaims:  
 
Rysem znamiennym nowoczesnej europejskiej kultury jest to, że opiera się ona na tak 
pojętej indywidualności, że przyjmuje ona cały bezmiar tkwiący w samym pojęciu ja, że 
usiłuje to ja zrealizować. To wyznacza zasadniczy, podstawowy kierunek europejskiej 
historii. Ja tu jest nie złudzeniem, lecz czymś istotnym. Kultura europejska – to usiłowanie 
zmierzające ku utożsamieniu pojęcia jaźni i człowieka, to podniesienie człowieka do 
godności swobodnego, rzeczywistego sprawcy swoich losów.18 
 
The significant feature of modern European culture is that it is based on a conception of 
individuality, that it accepts the immeasurable proportions of that concept, and strives to 
                                                             
16  Rorty, “Pragmatism and romanticism,” 108. 
17  Of course, activity qua labor is ‘in touch with’ something ‘out there’, viz., the stuff—
nature, matter, that undergoes transformation in human hands for human purposes. 
But it is not a stuff that, on Brzozowski’s view, has to be adequately represented in 
order to ensure the success of ‘transformation’, an idea that attracted Brzozowski’s 
scorn. In this respect there is no disagreement between Brzozowski and Rorty: nothing 
‘out there’ is a ground of our ‘activity’. For example, “By his will, thinking, and labor 
man must reinforce himself in the face of nature; our enemy is all that is uncontrolled, 
that which in us or beyond us is left to itself; our enemy is any and every state of na-
ture: raw matter and the naked soul.” Brzozowski, “Polska zdziecinniała” [Poland 
gone puerile], in  Legenda Młodej Polski, 68. 
18  Brzozowski, “Nasze ‘ja’ i historia,” 19. 
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realize it. This is what determines the fundamental, basic orientation of European history. 
Here the Self is no illusion, but something essential. European culture strives to bring 
together, to unite the concept of the self and man, to raise man to the dignity of the free 
and really effective agent of his destiny.19 
 
Brzozowski deploys terms that evoke historical purpose, an inherent aim of 
cultural history: “striving to realize […], to unite under one concept […].” Nor 
does he shun the term ‘essential’ with reference to a Self to whom it belongs to 
be free and effective. Can this way of talking be understood in any other way 
than to say that, however much it may be that all we are is what we have made 
ourselves to be, the making, the power or capacity itself, is essential to the nature 
of the Self, the ground of the Self’s freedom?  
Rorty would desist; he would consider this kind of language, the language of 
truthful self-representation, as rooted in a ‘poetic’ tradition that has known a 
variety of forms. In his view, talk about self-realization is just that—it is talk that 
conveyed a culturally significant narrative rather than a report about something 
that had been waiting to be discovered. Self-talk is a language game among 
others, some of which are consistent with it, some not, that we owe to a succes-
sion of genial speakers (“strong poets”) who managed to get across the idea—
‘romantic imagination’⎯that self-talk is a better tool than other forms of talk 
humans have invented to decide what is good to believe. 
Brzozowski (under the spell in part of Kant20—the world conforms to con-
cepts, it is the world for the subject—but also of Avenarius and Mach—the raw 
material of psychic elements awaiting organization) makes much of the teeming 
vital energy of the psyche that in the course of labor rises to the status of a 
‘solid’ Self able to withstand nature’s destructive forces. On the strength of the 
passage from Brzozowski cited above, self-constitution is inscribed within the 
European cultural idea as its essential end—the realization of man as the auton-
omous Self. In my estimation, this is the way to understand the following pas-
sage by Brzozowski: “[…] we have to struggle to render permanent what we 
value in ourselves, which means that we need to work on how to ensure the 
duration of that which appears to us to be what is most valuable in us.”21 The 
idea seems to be that by our inherent resources, which belong to us essentially, 
we fix on that within the self which we discover to be the self’s fundamental 
value (or truth). Brzozowski concludes the essay in question with the sentence: 
                                                             
19  Italics mine (E. M. Ś.). 
20  For instance, the essay Brzozowski, “Kant w stulecie smierci” [Kant. On the cente-
nary of his death], in Kultura i życie, 249–258. 
21  Brzozowski, “Nasze ‘ja’ i historia,” 26. 
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“Our foundation and our construction take place only within us; they are not 
outside of us,” which I understand to be his call to “get in touch with something 
in here.”22 
Rorty could perhaps go along with that part of this evocation of the Self that 
is the expression of the ‘romantic ideal’, with the proviso, however, that we 
relinquish the myth of a Self that has powers of self-constitution.23 To be clear: 
by denying that there is a ‘substantial’ self which has such capacities Rorty does 
not mean this to be a point about ontology, that is, about “reducing” the subject 
to something of an entirely different nature. Quite to the contrary, the meaning of 
self-talk, i.e., its uses in our socio-cultural context, is not endangered by physi-
calist talk about the way things really are supposed to be ‘in here’ (no more or 
less than they would be by the way things are supposed to be ‘out there’).24 
Dropping futile worries about the status of self-talk in relation to some other 
supposedly privileged form of talk in no way abets or diminishes the role it has 
played in our culture; rather it testifies to the powers of the “imagination.”25 
                                                             
22  Ibid., 27 
23  Richard Rorty, “Non-reductive physicalism,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. 
Philosophical papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  
24  The reason this is so has to do with semantics, with synonymy. Reduction of self-talk 
would need to proceed by way of a ‘translation’, one-to-one, without remainder, to the 
preferred physicalist idiom—a translation which Rorty claimed was neither possible 
nor intelligible, i.e., useful. 
25  It may be that what kept Brzozowski from getting clear about the vestiges of the 
modern subject in his thinking was his abhorrence of ‘naturalism’, both in its evolu-
tionist form and in that of ‘scientific Marxism’, both of which struck him as ‘reduc-
tionist’. He quoted approvingly Marx’s first “Thesis on Feuerbach” in which Marx 
dismisses the naturalist (‘materialist’) project (as well as its ‘idealist’ counterpart). 
However, he offers the following gloss on Marx’s meaning: “Given that our funda-
mental reality is life, given that man is the giant ceaselessly struggling with nature 
[żywiolami], he has to become his own law-giver” (Brzozowksi, “Pragmatyzm i mate-
rializm dziejowy,” 210). Would Marx have subscribed to what appears to be a Kantian 
reading of his passage: as if in invoking the Kantian “autonomous” subject Brzozow-
ski sought to infuse Marxian Praxis with an inner purpose? Indeed, this impression 
can easily be reinforced by the lines that follow the passage just quoted: echoing his 
conviction about the creation of the self as the aim of history, Brzozowski writes 
about man’s “victory over the unknown” (ibid., 211), a victory consisting in appropri-
ating and maintaining his autonomy. The underlying question here seems to be 
whether ‘self-creation’ is ‘self-determination’ in the Kantian sense, as submission to 
the moral law? 
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So it appears that for Brzozowski the human condition is, on the one hand, 
sui generis and in process, and, on the other hand, it appears that self-constitu-
tion proceeds from a centre, a foundation within man’s activity that, in the end, 
is the whole point of activity—to assert and maintain its autonomy.  
 
Excursus: Brzozowski’s “Evolution” 
 
My sense of the tension in Brzozowski’s thinking is confirmed to a degree by 
discussions among scholars in Poland about the evolution of Brzozowski’s 
thinking. And part of that discussion has to do with the changes in Brzozowski’s 
approach to the Self. A brief pause to consider this discussion will provide addi-
tional stimulus for the Brzozowski-Rorty juxtaposition. Andrzej Walicki has 
looked carefully at stages of Brzozowski’s development both in his book-length 
study26 and in an article entitled “Leszek Kołakowski a Stanisław Brzozowski” 
(Leszek Kołakowski and Stanisław Brzozowski).27 Walicki’s references to his 
colleague include an article the latter wrote entitled “Miejsce filozofowania 
Stanisława Brzozowskiego” (The Place of Stanisław Brzozowski’s Philosophiz-
ing),28 which will figure in the background of my remarks.29   
Walicki contends that Brzozowski’s thinking is “remarkably organic” and 
“the general problematic of his thought remained basically unchanged.”30 
Notwithstanding the claim, Walicki’s own presentation could well produce the 
opposite impression—that Brzozowski was less than entirely clear as to what it 
                                                             
26  Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski and the Polish Beginnings of ‘Western Marxism’. 
27  Andrzej Walicki, “Leszek Kołakowski a Stanisław Brzozowski,” in Kołakowski i inni, 
ed. Jan Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 1995). 
28  Leszek Kołakowski, “Miejsce filozofowania Stanisława Brzozowskiego,” in Po-
chwała niekonsekwencji. Pisma rozproszone z lat 1955–1968, vol. 1 (Londyn: Puls, 
1989); originally published in Twórczość 6 (1966): 39–54. 
29  There are writers who question whether there is anything resembling an evolution in 
Brzozowski’s philosophical writings. With reference to the research on Brzozowski 
that began appearing in Poland as of the 1970s one writer is baffled by the seeming 
consensus that “we can discern something like an evolution in his thinking.” Try as he 
might, this author finds none, remarking only that “what we have here is an evolution 
devoid of anything that might be called its teleology […]; just a pure and abstract pro-
cess of evolving for its own sake.” He continues: “Each time I read Brzozowski and 
try to grasp the gist of his philosophy, it all bursts and implodes, as if there was no gist 
to it at all.” Jacek Gutorow, “Stanisław Brzozowski and the Ends of Thought,” Studia 
Culturae 16 (2013): 39f. http://iculture.spb.ru/index.php/stucult/article/view/469 
30  Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski and the Polish Beginnings of ‘Western Marxism’, 169.  
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was that he was searching for. On the one hand, Walicki identifies the philoso-
phy of labor as the linchpin joining the phases of Brzozowski’s thinking. On the 
other hand, there is reason to ask what the core of this idea is that remained 
intact from stage to stage. As Walicki characterizes these stages, we have, first, 
emphasis on labor in a narrow sense, that is, material production; second, ‘labor’ 
characterized by Walicki as ‘social praxis’, which he understands as the con-
struction of humanly meaningful reality; and finally ‘labor’ understood as the 
will to discipline the irrational, chaotic forces within both man and nature.31 
What do these several meanings have in common? Walicki offers no answer. 
More to the point, Walicki is entirely candid about the significance of 
Brzozowski’s last phase, the “movement from radical humanism to an attempt to 
ground human existence in the Absolute Being.”32 He writes in this regard of 
Brzozowski’s “radical reorientation” consisting in his giving up Promethean 
anthropocentrism in order instead to ground human existence in the divine being. 
If so, then talk of a radical reorientation hardly sits comfortably with affirma-
tions about the organic continuity of Brzozowski’s philosophy. Between radical 
anthropocentrism, that is, an immanent historicist perspective advancing the 
cause of the Gattungswesen, and the search (or longing) for a transcendent 
ground of personal existence there is more like an abyss than a continuous line. 
Perhaps a solution to this quandary might be to suggest a core in Brzozowski’s 
thinking other than the ‘philosophy of labor’. Walicki, so far as I can tell, does 
not propose any alternative. My sense in this regard is that the alternative might 
be Brzozowski’s search for the centred subject, be it the individual, the toiling 
collective, the working class, the nation—all of which Brzozowski at various 
times assigned the epithet ‘Man’ (człowiek).  
Interestingly, the issue I have been driving so far, the tension inherent in 
Brzozowski’s thinking, comes out explicitly in Walicki’s reading of what he sees 
as the virtual congruence of Brzozowski’s and Kołakowski’s “evolutions.” Fol-
lowing their closely similar anthropocentric phases, in large measure derived 
from—in Brzozowski’s case surmised from—the same source (the early Marx), 
each arrives at a critical ‘reorientation’, viz., each turns to transcendence and the 
search for certitude. Walicki pays attention to the difficulties of this quest given 
both thinkers suspicions of ‘representationalist’ epistemologies. Each denies that 
human knowledge can avail itself of standards by which to measure truth value 
that are independent of any and all circumstances in which the knowing subject 
finds herself and within which it constructs tools for survival. For Brzozowski-
Kołakowski, “no truth can be free of history, that is, of the situation in which it 
                                                             
31  Ibid., 174. 
32  Ibid. 
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was acquired. No human knowledge can pretend to be free of the inevitable 
relativity attached to the human species.”33 But then, how to recognize 
transcendence, how to aspire to what is not contingent? 
Each came to doubt, according to Walicki, the cogency of this relativist vi-
sion; each began to see that its consequences could become culturally fatal… the 
danger of universal relativism, creeping skepticism, and finally outright nihilism. 
Nevertheless, as Walicki recreates the logic of their respective situations, neither 
Brzozowski nor Kołakowski wished simply to give up the idea of the creative 
potential of the human deed and the tools it creates to satisfy its needs, but they 
came to understand that attempts to stave off the ravages of relativism by shift-
ing to a generic or social subjectivism are illusory. Brzozowski recognized, as 
Walicki puts it paraphrasing Kołakowski’s own account, that a radical anthropo-
centrism was at base “contradictory.”34 How could a radically contingent being, 
whether the individual or the species as a whole, hold itself up, over the course 
of its biological and cultural history, as a self-sufficient absolute? The upshot is 
to recognize that the search for unconditional truth assumes contact with 
“something” other than that to which labor or social praxis provide access—
neither of which can surpass what is contingent and relative to changing needs. 
Hence, either a leap of faith and personal commitment to transcendent values—
by Walicki’s lights the solution Brzozowski favoured—or the recognition that 
the search for certitude is the symptom of mythopoeic consciousness—the solu-
tion favoured by Kołakowski.  
As Walicki presents these parallels they take on the air of paradox. He 
writes, “For both Brzozowski and Kołakowski philosophy is first of all the 
search for meaning, not the meaning of words, but the meaning of life, the 
meaning of the world.”35 Walicki sees Kołakowski’s embrace of the ‘mythical 
option’ as a clue to what might have been Brzozowski’s own path had he had the 
time to probe to his nascent religious inclinations. Now, for Kolakowski, to 
recognize the presence of myth36 is to recognize that cultural forms are inher-
ently projective, that they supersede anything our experience in the world can 
possibly vouchsafe. Terms such as value (e.g., truth), abiding permanence, 
wholeness, contrast with our concrete experience of finitude, contingency, and 
fragmentation. Concerning the latter, there is all too much evidence; as to the 
former, it is as if the wish could make it so.  
                                                             
33  Walicki, “Leszek Kołakowski a Stanisław Brzozowski,” 19. 
34  Ibid., 20. 
35  Ibid., 21. 
36  Leszek Kolakowski, The Presence of Myth, trans. Adam Czerniawski (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1989). 
Brzozowski and Rorty | 173 
It seems to me, then, that with regard to the question of the “meaning of 
life,” as Walicki puts it, the position Kołakowski adopts, on the basis of his 
suspicion that myth permeates every cultural form, is akin to Anselm’s ‘credo 
quia absurdum’. We seem not to be able to get along without values which we 
‘create’ to assure ourselves of meaning; but despite this we want to believe (an 
excusable form of bad faith) that some values are not contingent and historically 
relative, that they abide somewhere outside our ordinary experience. Pace 
Walicki, this does seem to be about the meaning we ascribe to words, empty 
signifiers, however much we may wish to believe the contrary.  
In the end, therefore, once they gave up their ‘neo-Marxist’ convictions, 
Brzozowski and Kołakowski struggled with something redolent of the Hegelian 
‘unhappy consciousness’—the search to reconcile the temporal and the eternal, 
the inner world of the spirit and worldly finitude. I can summarize this part of 
my discussion by the following pairs of contrasting characteristics—unresolved 
aporias—which, on the basis of Walicki’s reflections—apply equally to Brzo-
zowski and Kołakowski in the last stages of their thinking: 
 
Immanence  Transcendence 
Making truth  Discovering truth 
Relativity/contingency/finitude  Permanence/structure/foundation 
Historied37 culture  Reality (Truth) 
 
where the characteristics in the right column are—certainly for Kołakowski and, 
I assume, for Brzozowski as well—projections (myths) by which we to seek to 
assure ourselves that we are bound to something beyond the pale of finitude—
represented by the characteristics in the left column.  
 
Brzozowski’s “Incomplete” Paradigm Shift? 
 
I have proposed that Brzozowski remained captive to the ‘modern philosophy of 
the subject’, though he sought a way to historicize, relativize the centred subject, 
believing that the autonomy of the self-creating subject would be preserved. That 
he remained captive is to say that he found it difficult to relinquish the idea that 
there is something essential, something substantive at the basis of self-creation. 
                                                             
37  The term ‘historied’ is taken from Joseph Margolis: “The grand theme that thought is 
historied, incapable of fixing the norms of reason beyond the horizon of its own con-
tingent vision.” Cf. Joseph Margolis, Historied Thought, Constructed World: A Con-
ceptual Primer for the Turn of the Millennium (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), 7. 
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I speculated at the outset of the paper that, given his questions, had Brzo-
zowski at his disposal the discursive, philosophical means that Rorty deployed to 
considerable effect, he might have managed to relinquish the idea and take a 
path similar to Rorty’s. While I can’t hope in the present paper to sufficiently 
justify this hypothesis, I want to illustrate what I mean by ‘had Brzozowski at his 
disposal the discursive, philosophical means’. It is a hypothesis about the dialec-
tic of philosophy, about paradigm changes in philosophy, about new ways of 
thinking, something to which Brzozowski was attuned.   
I will present two views of the history of (European) philosophy in terms of 
paradigm shifts, one by Habermas,38 the other by Rorty,39 and propose on that 
basis an interpretation of Brzozowski’s truncated shift.   
Habermas outlined the major shifts in the European philosophical conscious-
ness since the Ancients as successive passages from being to consciousness to 
language. These can be described, very roughly, as, first, fascination with es-
sence, whereby knowledge, itself an essential component of being, pays witness 
to essence in the form of Logos. The anomalies that came to afflict this paradigm 
prompted the questioning that culminated in the Kantian Copernican Revolution 
(things conform to concepts, not concepts to things), the shift to Bewusstseins-
philosophie, the ‘philosophy of the subject’. In its turn, this move brought in its 
train the vexed question of the relation of mind to world, that is, the issue of 
‘epistemology’, viz. does consciousness / mind reach beyond itself to the world 
in a way adequate to the world? This paradigm began losing its grip throughout 
the nineteenth century (perhaps with Nietzsche in one direction, with Frege in 
another, and with Peirce in yet another). Signs increased that Bewusstseinsphi-
losophie was ceding ground to symbolic practices—language—that not only 
carry meaning but are at the source of meaning.  
Habermas does not hold, however, that the succession from being to con-
sciousness to language involves radical discontinuity, such that it would be diffi-
cult to speak of the “history” of philosophy. We are, it is true, he holds, in a post-
metaphysical era of philosophizing (that is, beyond being and the recovery of 
being in the subject), but that is not because we deserve to be sceptical about the 
pertinence of the old questions. Instead, new ways of thinking are better adapted 
to integrating the many and increasingly diverse discursive formations that Mo-
dernity has introduced into the public sphere. ‘Paradigm changes’ in philosophy 
                                                             
38  Jürgen Habermas, “Metaphysik nach Kant,” in Theorie der Subjektivität, ed. H. F. 
Fulda, R-P. Horstmann and U. Pothast  (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1990). 
39  Rorty, “Non-reductive physicalism.” Habermas and Rorty confronted their respective 
visions of the history of philosophy during the debate about the state of philosophy in 
Warsaw in 1995. See the reference in note 4 above.  
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are therefore better understood as increased awareness of philosophy’s recon-
structive efforts, within its discursive sphere, in view of needs for renewed 
meaning elsewhere in the broader socio-cultural context in which it is practiced 
and is acknowledged as relevant (or irrelevant). Habermas offers as an example 
of philosophy’s reconstructive task the ways in which doubts about the discourse 
of mind and body in its Cartesian or transcendental formats were increasingly 
handled as the nineteenth century wore on. There are, Habermas believes, 
 
[…] good grounds to ascribe philosophical status […] to ‘tertiary’ [dritte] categories such 
as ‘language’, ‘action’, or ‘body’. These attempts to rethink transcendental consciousness 
by ‘incorporating it in language, action, and the body, and to ‘situate’ reason in society 
and history, have a not inconsiderable argumentative potential [Argumentationspotential] 
behind them. Starting with Humboldt, such arguments ran from Frege to Wittgenstein or 
from Dilthey to Gadamer, as well from Peirce to Mead, and from Feuerbach to Merleau-
Ponty via Plessner.40  
 
The issue I have raised about Brzozowski, in regard to the discursive means 
which he brought to the resolution of his questions about the relation of Self and 
world concerns precisely the ‘tertiary’ to which Habermas alludes. It is indisput-
able that Brzozowski was very much alive to the possibility that the Subject 
should be recast in terms of action as well as reason in society and history.41 He 
was of course far less alive to the possibility of recasting the subject through the 
prism of language, in part because the ‘linguistic turn’ had not yet crystalized in 
the first decade of the new century. To see how the effects of this ‘ignorance’ 
can plausibly be measured in his philosophy I turn to Rorty’s take on the para-
digm shifts within European philosophy. 
Rorty agrees broadly speaking with the ‘three stage’ view advanced by Ha-
bermas, but in his picture the succession does proceed in the form of radical 
breaks. Rorty thinks of the breaks as liberations from outmoded ways of talking, 
that is, from dead metaphors. He sides with Habermas as regards philosophy’s 
reconstructive task, though in his case the shift to new ground involves not re-
casting the old questions but inventing new ways of talking, even at the cost of 
philosophy. 
Although philosophers’ fascination with ‘Being’ came to be displaced by 
discovery of the Subject, modern philosophy bogged down in what Rorty de-
                                                             
40  Habermas, “Metaphysik nach Kant,” 435f. 
41  Recourse to italics, here and below, is meant to indicate that the reference of the 
expressions is to categories.  
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scribes as the “post-Kantian” model of the Subject (or Self) that had been para-
digmatic for some two centuries. He diagrams the model in this way: 
The second model, the one that Rorty bids us to recognize (on the basis of his 
favoured ‘pragmatist lineage’), is strikingly different.42 
The differences between the two models are all too evident, not least of all visu-
ally. The second diagram has but one arrow symbolizing the relation—that of 
causation—between the human self (the organism) and the world. The first, by 
contrast, sets up four relations and, in addition, presents a ‘picture’ of the inner 
make-up of the self that is incomparably more complex than that of the second. 
42  Both diagrams are from Rorty, “Non-reductive physicalism,” 119, 122. 
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Suffice it to say, and indeed Rorty wants to say, that in the former the self is 
characterized as a (transcendental or noumenal) centre to which various ‘func-
tions’ and resources accrue over which this centre exerts control. The latter mod-
el is devoid of any such centre: it represents a major philosophical shift away 
from the philosophy of the subject. The make-up of the ‘self’ in the second 
model consists of the same stuff that its environment consists of, that is, the 
perspective is naturalist all the way down, nothing remains left over which some-
thing else—the kind of self pictured in the first diagram—could claim as its 
specific mode of being. The two models do, however, share a vision of ‘external 
reality’—one which takes its cues from physical science. God, final causes, un-
seen spirits are absent in the physics of the post-Kantian model, all the more so 
in the physics of fields of energized particles.43 
Now, in light of these models as well as Habermas’ paradigm shifts, how far 
did Brzozowski come in deconstructing the post-Kantian Subject? He would boil 
down the post-Kantian self in a way that stands mid-way between Rorty’s two 
models. With Rorty, Brzozowski would strip away the relations of ‘making true’ 
and ‘representation’—the mainstays of the correspondence theory of truth. 
Again like Rorty he would retain the double arrow of causation, the relation of 
the organism and the environment. However, in contrast to Rorty, he would 
leave in place the arrow of constitution running from the human being to the 
world, though in his case post-Kantian constitution becomes (Marxian) ‘labor’. 
Rorty would see this as a vestige of the post-Kantian Bewusstseinsphilosophie. 
The question immediately arises whether or not Brzozowski believed that behind 
‘constitution’ qua ‘labor’ there stands some deeper Self, and the further question 
is whether his ‘model’ of the Self in relation to the world is finally coherent. 
Notice first, however, that Rorty believes that he can eat his cake and have it, 
too. He insists that his second, minimalist model is not to be interpreted as ban-
ishing talk of the subject (the self). This follows as soon as we acknowledge the 
futility of the epistemological enterprise—the obsession with objective repre-
sentation—and drop the idea that language is the medium of cognitive represen-
tation: the problem with the reference of self-talk vanishes accordingly. Self-talk 
does not hinge on objective representations of the way things really are ‘in here’. 
                                                             
43  Rorty buttresses his argument in favour of the second model by three theses (mostly 
taken over from Donald Davidson): (1) reasons for our actions must be their causes; 
(2) sentences are not made true by the world, and (3) the meanings we think inhabit 
our sentences are metaphors gone dead. The upshot is that there is no ‘space’, no cen-
tre from within which the Subject establishes a relation to the world. The difference 
that subject-talk makes in our lives does not require an epistemic warrant underwritten 
by ontological realism (or idealism for that matter).  
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In Rorty’s nominalist model, language games do not pick out bits in the world, 
nor bits within the subject; they have no place, therefore, within the single rela-
tion his minimalist model depicts. Within the scope of the causal nexus joining 
the organism and the environment all that there can be of language is acoustic 
blasts and physical marks, the rest being a matter of some of these blasts and 
physical marks becoming familiar to their users in accord with their needs.44  
Rorty would not know what to make of Brzozowski’s ‘labor’, all the more so 
as there is an open question as to how Brzozowski understood labor.45 Did he 
think that human labor manages to do more than rearrange pre-existing materials 
and brings into existence entities of a new ‘human’ kind, or did he hold instead 
that our artefacts remain relative to, and therefore dependent on, the way in 
which we ‘perceive’ arrangements of pre-existing materials as meaningful to—
and for—us? But Rorty, we saw, removes the sting from the issue by dint of his 
pragmatist ‘linguistic turn’: once you rid yourself of the idea that language is a 
medium in which to convey representations of the way things are, including the 
way ‘new things’ created by human ingenuity are, then nothing hangs on decid-
ing the issue one way or another. ‘Talk’ of a new human world that is significant 
to its users is a feather in the cap of the creative imagination in our culture, not a 
report about the state of a world ‘out there’.  
Now given Brzozowski’s appeal to the Self to be rid of the historical world it 
has created, it would appear that he does ascribe ontological weight to labor, for 
how else could the world compromise the autonomy of the Self? If so, then he is 
blocked from turning Rorty’s neat trick of neutralizing the issue. For if the his-
torical world is ‘real’, then ipso facto what we say about the things we bring into 
existence has to be constrained by what they are, objectively, in particular if we 
are to acquire the means to be better able to realize our intentions. But then, 
                                                             
44  Rorty’s ‘linguistic turn’ is that of a radical nominalist, not in an ontological sense 
since that would run counter to his anti-representationalism, but in a linguistic sense 
alone. For him, words, sentences, narratives, etc. are just so many tools serving what-
ever purposes appear important to us within our public spheres. In addition, he sub-
scribes to a Darwinian evolutionary account of the needs for which language is a tool. 
45  I took on this question in an earlier publication believing that Brzozowski could be 
characterized as a constructionalist nominalist in the manner of Nelson Goodman; 
Brzozowski’s labor might be likened to Goodman’s ‘ways of world making’. How-
ever, there are passages in Brzozowski in which he puts forward by far more realist-
sounding claims—‘labor brings out about’ substantial change, creates entities that are 
properly qualified as human. Cf. Edward M. Świderski, “Was Brzozowski a ‘con-
structionist’? A contemporary reading of Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’,” 
Studies in East European Thought 63 (2011). 
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however much Brzozowski would have liked to rid philosophy of the worry 
about how things really are out there, by clinging to a strong concept of labor 
can he consistently give up objective representation?  
Of course, Brzozowski would be struck dumb by the question “are there re-
ally tables?” As would Rorty, who explains, however: “[…] the best way to 
predict the behaviour of tables will probably remain to talk about them qua ta-
bles rather than as collections of particles or as fuzzy replicas of the Platonic 
archetypal Table. That is all one could possibly mean by saying ‘There really are 
tables.’”46 To ‘predict the behaviour of something’ is to make sense of it relative 
to our needs; we won’t advance the meaning of table-talk amongst ourselves, in 
our life-world, if we switch to talking about tables in terms of particles or ar-
chetypes. We don’t need independent confirmation of the existence of tables qua 
tables to fix the use of table talk. 
Brzozowski, on the contrary, both does and doesn’t need independent con-
firmation. He doesn’t insofar as it belongs to a strong ontological concept of 
labor that, when successful, labor runs its course to the finished product, with the 
laborer monitoring the process to the end. ‘I made the table, I can show you 
how—so of course it exists’. He does need independent confirmation, however, 
in the sense that the strong concept can stand its ground only in case there is an 
intentional subject of labor suitably equipped and able to set in train the process 
in the course of which the finished product comes into being.47  
In this last regard, we arrive once again at the tension at the heart of 
Brzozowski’s philosophy. Though the history of her industry is all that the Self 
is, nevertheless, in order to preserve its autonomy and creative potential the Self 
has to free itself of that content. Stating the same thing in terms of Rorty’s post-
Kantian model as modified by Brzozowski—there is a centred Self underlying 
the constitution of the meaningful experience of the world and intentional action. 
I have argued all along that this is what Brzozowski believed, but that at the 
same time he struggled to reconcile this belief in the autonomous Self with his 
equally persistent belief in the ‘human world’ created by the Self. On the one 
hand, he would have agreed with Habermas that relative to the human world it 
makes, the Self could well be recast in terms of the categories of action and his-
torical reason. On the other hand, because he thought that it belongs essentially 
                                                             
46  Rorty, “Non-reductive physicalism,” 115f. 
47  A transcendental argument could be imagined which concludes to the existence of 
such a subject from the undeniable fact that tables do exist and therefore had to be 
constructed by a subject. But this is a dubious strategy given that the intentional prop-
erties of tables obviously require reference to intentional subjects, without this alone 
entailing that the subjects produce real tables.  
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to the Self to make the human world, he shied away from relativizing that essen-
tial characteristic in terms of historical reason, since in that case the Self would 
be on a par with its products, as relative as they in relation to changing needs and 
new ways of categorizing. 
Habermas and Rorty, though in different ways, see that the dialectic of philo-
sophical argument moved past a perhaps still substantive notion of the human 
world as when language began taking over the reins of action and historical 
reason from whatever vestiges of consciousness that still remained. Language—
in the several connotations Habermas marks out in the passage quoted above—
displaces ‘consciousness’ and ‘experience’ as both the source and carrier of 
meaning, becoming thereby the primary locus of action and historical reason. 
The latter became coeval with language; they cannot be more meaningful than 
the meaning that language articulates. For the Self, the subject, the upshot seems 
to be unmistakable. Self-understanding is not independent of, it is constituted by, 
language as the articulate bearer, the ‘site’ of historical understandings. Rorty, 
however, takes the argument to the limit by dint of his nominalism: self-under-
standing is not to be glossed as discovering some fact of the matter about the 
nature of the self across the history of language, for instance, some fact about 
the essentially creative potential of the self. 
Seen in this light, Brzozowski’s hope to retrieve the Self from the historical 
world the Self creates, even as he concedes that the historical world is all the 
content that the Self has, is rife with paradox: by stepping back from the world 
the Self has created does it not relinquish the means it has put in place to give 
expression to its activity in that world? That is, does it not deprive itself of artic-
ulate self-representation? Brzozowski’s ‘argument’ is that the Self is forever 
more than it has in fact created, is never identical with its actual project, and 
therefore in principle is ahead of itself. The downside for him is that the histori-
cal world that the Self has created can compromise its autonomy to the extent 
that the Self deceives itself about the source and ‘substance’ of that world—as 
being the outcome of forces beyond the reach of labor—and succumbs as a result 
to the illusions of fetish. In response to this danger Brzozowski insists all the 
more on the urgent need for the Self to appropriate its autonomy over and 
against the world it has created. The questions that remain are: what is the nature 
of the autonomy that the Self is asked to recover in pure form, so to speak, and 
how, if at all, does the Self represent that autonomy to itself over and beyond its 
means of self-expression within the historical world it has left behind?48  
                                                             
48  In “Nasze ‘ja’ i historia” Brzozowski cites with approval Hegel’s Phenomenology: it 
is an example of how to overcome fetishized consciousness. It seems, however, that 
Brzozowski either misunderstands or overlooks Hegel’s Geist that comes to self-con-
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We can avail ourselves at this stage of Walicki’s account of Brzozowski’s 
‘evolution’. Recall that for Walicki, not only did Brzozowski grow wary of the 
historical world, a realm of contingency and relativity threatening the constancy 
of the Self, he came in time to the conclusion that the Self is not self-sufficient, it 
cannot pretend to the status of an/the Absolute. In other words, the ‘remaining 
questions’ above can have no answer so long as they assume the Self’s self-
sufficiency. Brzozowski could not go down the road to Language in the sense of 
Habermas and Rorty; the philosophical dialectic at the time had not come far 
enough to allow Brzozowski to envision such a possibility. Where Habermas and 
Rorty, each in their own way, relativize the ontology of the historical world to 
the manner in which way it is displayed in language, Brzozowski, despite his 
doubts about the self-sufficiency of the Self, needs the ‘strong’ concept of labor 
to reinforce the urgent need to recover the ‘truth’ about the Self—her autonomy 
over and against this historically created world. But as soon as autonomy as self-
sufficiency is perceived to be groundless, empty, where is refuge for the Self, a 
sense of foundation, to be sought?  
Walicki assures us that at this stage Brzozowski grasped at the straws of 
transcendence, he reached out to an/the ‘Absolute’. It is more to the point to 
observe, however, that if Walicki’s word is to be taken regarding Kołakowski’s 
and Brzozowski’s spiritual kinship, then Brzozowski’s turn to the Absolute was 
tantamount to coming to terms with myth in Kołakowski’s meaning. Semanti-
cally, myths are empty signifiers as far as ordinary experience is concerned, 
nothing corresponds to them, but they are infused with a meaning that comes 
from the need, the hope that there is something beyond experience to which 
these signifiers correspond. If we give up this hope, suppress the need, the noth-
ingness that ensues would be tantamount to the death of the Self (and for 
Kołakowski at least undermine the creative forces within culture).  
I wrote above that Rorty would have been nonplussed by Brzozowski’s 
strong concept of labor. He would doubtless have been impressed by the ‘ro-
mantic imagination’ to which Brzozowski gave expression in his passionate 
quest for some deeper meaning of the creative, autonomous Self. Still, he would 
have seen behind Brzozowski’s efforts the ever persistent influence of the phi-
losophy of the subject throughout the forms it acquired following Kant’s ‘Co-
pernican Revolution’. He wrote in this regard: 
 
Kant and Hegel went only halfway in their repudiation of the idea that truth is “out there.” 
They were willing to view the world of empirical science as a made world—to see matter 
                                                             
sciousness by reflexively appropriating and identifying with the totality of its histori-
cal objectivations. 
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as constructed by mind, or as consisting in mind insufficiently conscious of its own mental 
character. But they persisted in seeing mind, spirit, the depths of the human self, as having 
an intrinsic nature—one which could be known by a kind of non-empirical super science 
called philosophy. This meant that only half of truth—the bottom, scientific half—was 
made. Higher truth, the truth about mind, the province of philosophy, was still a matter of 
discovery rather than creation.49  
 
Indeed, the spirit, if not every detail, of this passage corresponds to Brzozow-
ski’s predicament: that mind—or labor—‘makes’ the world, a making expressive 
of its nature, the self-representation—the discovery of which requires a form of 
representation that transcends experience, whether or not this form goes under 
the name ‘philosophy’ (perhaps ‘religion’). Rorty would be happy, I am sure, to 
label this higher form of self-representation ‘myth’, though not in Kołakowski’s 
meaning, the point of which is to preserve the semblance of representation de-
spite the empty signifiers. For Rorty, it is myth because it is an idea that has 
outlived its time; if it was once culturally significant, an overstated invitation to 
think beyond reified ways of describing human relations, today we understand 
this need to seek new ways of being without claiming that successive ways are 
closer approximations to ‘truth’, Kołakowski/Brzozowski affirm that we can’t 
have one without the other, the new forms of being require a concomitant sense 
of continuity, certainty, historical wholeness, for as Brzozowski puts it, the entire 
point of European history is to show that “the Self is no illusion, but something 
essential.”50  
Taken to this stage, to the point where the Truth of the Self, over and beyond 
its created human world, is ‘myth’, there is no possibility of a rational solution to 
the question. Curiously, Rorty would certainly agree with the conclusion, though 
he would arrive at it from a diametrically opposed perspective. Language is the 
heart of the matter: Brzozowski’s move into Myth requires him to forsake lan-
guage for the sake of ‘what cannot be said’; Rorty detaches language from the 
obligation to say how anything is. Regarding the Self and its ‘truth’ the two 
positions come to the same: words in the absence of representations.  
 
 
                                                             
49  Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 4. 
50  “[…] the fundamental and basic direction of European history. The self is no illusion, 
but something essential. European culture has been the struggle to identify the con-
cepts of consciousness and man, to elevate man to the dignity of a free and real agent 
of his fate. Brzozowski, “Nasze ‘ja’ i historia,” 19. 
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BRZOZOWSKI’S PRESENCE IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERARY 
CRITICISM AND THEORY

Stanisław Brzozowski and Romantic Revision 
(Meyer Howard Abrams, Northrop Frye, Harold 
Bloom): Prolegomena 
Eliza Kącka 
 
 
The development of Stanisław Brzozowski’s writing owed much to his profound 
and complex relationship with Romanticism, not only in its Polish manifesta-
tions. This historical-literary assertion should be noted from the outset, since its 
potential for the study of Brzozowski’s oeuvre has not been fully realized.1 As a 
result, first, there are only few studies that take into account his output as a 
whole (from The Philosophy of Polish Romanticism to Voices in the Night), and 
second, the multiple aspects of the presence of Romanticism in Brzozowski’s 
work are underrated. It is not by coincidence that I refer to these two books: they 
are entirely different on account of their language and style and the difference is 
due to their subject matter and the purpose for which they were written. The 
sympathisers of English topics and the essayistic character of Voices in the Night 
will at times find it hard to stomach the prophetic and confessional tone of The 
Philosophy of Polish Romanticism. Nevertheless, it is only by studying both 
these texts (together with The Legend of Young Poland, The Diary, his corre-
spondence and, finally, Ideas) that we can appreciate not only the span of Brzo-
zowski’s diction and interests, but also the close relationship between his philo-
sophical-critical project and Romanticism. It is on account of the relationship 
between reading the Romantic writers and the shape of their own philosophy and 
                                                             
1  In fact, it has been clear since the late 1920s that Romanticism was one of the most 
important points of reference for Brzozowski, as was illustrated in Zdziechowska’s 
study: Stefania Zdziechowska, Stanisław Brzozowski jako krytyk literatury polskiej 
[Stanisław Brzozowski as a critic of Polish literature] (Kraków: Kasa im. Mianow-
skiego, 1927), 47–67.  
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critical work that Brzozowski can be studied on a par with such authors2 as 
Meyer Howard Abrams, Harold Bloom, Northrop Frye, Geoffrey Hartman. Even 
though their views were different, they all held Romanticism, which they 
thought through in a profound, multi-faceted, and intensive manner, as the foun-
dation of their criticism. All of them also enlarged the possibilities of literary 
criticism—as in this passage (about Lionel Trilling): 
 
Trilling was more than a critic […] though it is difficult to say what term better describes 
him. No doubt his work bears intermittent witness to the kind of concern we associate 
with intellectual history, or with literary journalism, or with sheer speculative commemo-
ration; but it is perhaps more appropriate to think of Trilling as having enlarged the possi-
bilities of literary criticism to accommodate almost any subject—provided only that it be 
framed to meet the terms of a focused and largely thematic enquiry.3 
 
Brzozowski’s connection with Polish and English Romanticism makes him 
intimately linked to the Anglo-Saxon critics not only on account of the im-
portance of Romantic texts in his work (they all referred to a shared set of au-
thors).4 The similarities are of far greater weight and more specific. Despite the 
differing time frames and cultural contexts (Brzozowski died in 1911, while 
Abrams started publishing in 1934),5 all these authors regarded Romanticism as 
                                                             
2  I shall be using the words ‘author’ and ‘critic’ interchangeably to refer to Brzozowski, 
Abrams, Bloom and Frye, despite the fact that I am aware of how problematic this can 
be. It is due to the nature of their critical work, which only rarely can be taken strictly 
as literary criticism, for even in the texts in which they reacted to contemporary liter-
ary events they seamlessly discussed philosophical or theoretical issues or engaged in 
essayistic or philological interpretation. Nevertheless ‘criticism’ in its broad under-
standing, as I will discuss below, can serve here as the common denominator—even 
though it is not entirely suitable, it is useful for a number of reasons. 
3  Robert Boyers, Lionel Trilling: Negative Capability and Wisdom of Avoidance (Co-
lumbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977), 2. 
4  Stanisław Brzozowski was familiar with the works of such authors as, among others, 
William Blake, William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Ralph Waldo Emer-
son, John Keats, Percy Bysshe Shelley and George Byron. Cf. Wanda Krajewska, 
“Związki twórczości Stanisława Brzozowskiego z literaturą angielską” [Stanisław 
Brzozowski’s contacts with English literature], in Wokół myśli Stanisława Brzozow-
skiego, ed. Andrzej Walicki et al. (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1974), 331. 
5  This is the date of publication of his first book (he was only twenty-two at that time) 
entitled The Milk of Paradise: The Effects of Opium Visions on the Works of De Quin-
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much more than an inspiring epoch in the history of literature and culture. For 
Brzozowski, as well as for Abrams and his disciples, Romanticism provided a 
frame of reference of reflection and a particular philosophy of the subject which 
was far from anachronistic. None of them aimed to reconstruct this philosophy in 
a systematic fashion; instead, they all constructed it in their own ways to suit 
their own research, philosophy of life, and vision of creative work. I use the 
word ‘construct’ on purpose, for it illustrates the specific nature of their interac-
tion with Romanticism, which they viewed as a formation that implicitly advo-
cated the need for creativity. It is just this specific view of Romanticism as a 
timeless and provoking challenge that allows drawing parallels between 
Brzozowski and the English critics. 
 
Against Abstraction 
 
The article “The Survival Eros of Poetry,” included in the volume Romanticism 
and Contemporary Criticism, ends with a questionnaire in which the following 
declaration is to be found: 
 
Question: Would it make sense to describe your critical theory as Romantic? 
Answer: Oh, it’s entirely Romantic, yes. I see the Romantic movement as the first great 
step in clarifying the role of criticism and bringing in a conception of creativity that could 
unify the mental elements in creative process.6 
 
The respondent (and the author of the article) was Northrop Frye, who wrote a 
pre-eminent study on William Blake (Fearful Symmetry)7 and an equally ac-
claimed work on “the scope, theory, principles, and techniques of literary criti-
cism.”8 Frye emphasised the role of Romanticism as the foundation of the mod-
ern critical paradigm and of the tendency to activate the full potential of an artist, 
                                                             
cey, Crabbe, Francis Thompson, and Coleridge. His most significant study, The Mir-
ror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition, appeared in 1953. 
6  Northrop Frye, “The Survival Eros in Poetry,” in Romanticism and Contemporary 
Criticism, ed. Eaves Morris and Michael Fischer (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1986), 15–45. 
7  Northrop Frye, Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970).  
8  Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957), 8.  
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not only in its intellectual sense. The fine scholar of Blake9 must have shared 
Stanisław Brzozowski’s view, namely that the passion of a Romantic writer was 
focused not on the abstract, but on the concrete, be it historical, anthropological, 
or human. In other words, one that does not gloss over the full scope of humanity 
in all its historical manifestations. As Brzozowski wrote in his Diary, “Only 
Blake with his [words]: ‘abstract thoughts belong to scoundrels!’” (Jedyny Blake 
ze swoim: “abstrakcyjne myśli należą do oszustów!”).10 
He advocated taking a firm stand rooted in reality, both in thoughts as well as 
in practice. A similar tendency was found in Harold Bloom’s thought (with 
reference to his fascination with Blake—“mental Traveller in the open world of 
poetry”)11 by Agata Bielik-Robson: 
 
If there is a slogan, which captures the force of Bloom’s theoretical efforts, from his 
earliest works on romanticism, through his engagement with deconstruction, to his latest 
inquiries into the aesthetics of genius, it ought to be drawn from the marginal notes of 
Blake: “To Generalize is to be an Idiot. To Particularize is the Alone Distinction of Merit. 
General Knowledges are those Knowledges that Idiots possess.”12  
 
This aphorism by Blake, so meaningful to Brzozowski13 and Bloom, could serve 
as an epigraph for an essay on the relations between Brzozowski’s philosophy of 
the subject and that of the other ‘Romantic critics’.14 They did not treat this 
philosophy autonomously nor did they give any systematic lectures on the sub-
ject. As a result, it can be only deduced from their most important works.15 It 
                                                             
9  Cf. Murray Krieger, “Northrop Frye and Contemporary Criticism: Ariel and the Spirit 
of Gravity,” in Northrop Frye in Modern Criticism. Selected Papers from the English 
Institute, ed. M. Krieger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). 
10  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 37. 
11  Harold Bloom, Blake’s Apocalypse: A Study in Poetic Argument (New York: Double-
day, 1963), 436. 
12  Agata Bielik-Robson, The Saving Lie: Harold Bloom and Deconstruction (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2011), 3. 
13  Maciej Urbanowski, who provided the footnotes to The Diary, pointed to this quote 
from Blake as the most probable source for the paraphrase by Brzozowski. Cf. Wil-
liam Blake, The Complete Prose and Poetry, ed. G. Keynes (London: Nonesuch Press, 
1989), 777.  
14  For the purposes of this article, I use this particular expression drawing on the term 
“Romantic critical theory” used by Frye, “The Survival Eros in Poetry,” 38. 
15  Among others, Adam Lipszyc undertook this task in his book on Bloom. Cf. Adam 
Lipszyc, Międzyludzie. Koncepcja podmiotowości w pismach Harolda Blooma z nieu-
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remains clear that Abrams (in The Mirror and the Lamp or in Natural Super-
naturalism), Bloom (in Agon or Poetry and Repression), Frye (in Fearful Sym-
metry) and Brzozowski were loath to see philosophy separated from poetry,16 
literature, and the experience of life. They advocated an all-encompassing view 
of the human being, a ‘living singularity’, as Bloom would have it, which radi-
cally changes the perspective of studying philosophy, history of literature, and 
theory. It entails rejection of the sort of knowledge of humanity which tends to 
generalize by disregarding the multitude of historical and social factors. In their 
interpretation, Romantics cultivated historical awareness sensitive to subtleties 
and were reluctant to admit abstraction, desiccated theories, and impersonal 
approaches. Bloom wrote in his The Breaking of the Vessels: 
 
Any mode of criticism, be it domestic or imported, that would defraud us of this true 
context of suffering must at last be dismissed with a kind of genial contempt. Perhaps 
there are texts without authors, articulated by blanks upon blanks, but the strong poet has 
the radical originality that restores our perspective to the agonistic image of the human 
which suffers, the human which thinks, the human which writes, the human which means, 
albeit all too humanly, in that agon the strong poet must wage, against otherness, against 
the self, against the presentness of the present, against anteriority, in some sense against 
the future.17  
 
In this passage, Bloom described, yet again, the figure of the powerful poet, 
which was so central to his critical conception. It is not for this reason that I use 
this quote, but rather on account of the emphasis it places on human potential 
and the character of creative activity, or any activity for that matter. Bloom’s 
remark is not a platitude, but a sort of a credo, especially if we see it against the 
background of other critical schools (e.g., the Yale deconstructionists) rather 
than the general knowledge. The weight of Bloom’s ‘human’ is similar to 
Brzozowski’s remarks concerning ‘the living thought’ as the only subject of 
interest for a thinker of such stature. Their remarks are equally general and ex-
pressed with similar power, but it is not only the rhetorical intensity that makes 
these two declarations so close. What they also have in common is the attempt to 
                                                             
stającym odniesieniem do podmiotoburstwa [Inter-human. The concept of subjectivity 
in the writings of Harold Bloom with constant reference to the deconstruction of the 
subject] (Kraków: Universitas, 2004), 7ff. 
16  I refer to poetry as independent of literature on account of its particular understanding 
in the nineteenth century and its privileged position in nineteenth-century literature.  
17  Harold Bloom, The Breaking of the Vessels (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982), 82. 
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pursue the critical work that by means of its propositions would make an impact 
on the reader. Another common feature is the need to find a psychological and 
spiritual struggle in literature—the need that binds the critical project very 
closely to Romanticism in the existential, philosophical, and historical-literary 
sense. Brzozowski wrote in his Voices in the Night: 
 
W ogóle chciałbym by czytelnik zrozumiał, że moje książki są zawsze systematem wy-
znań i podniet intelektualnych: że nie mają gotowej treści i na próżno by jej w nich szukał. 
Moją rzeczą jest czytelnika tak zaskoczyć, usytuować, by, jeżeli chce on zgody z sobą i 
życiem, musiał myśleć i znaleźć mniej więcej te myśli, o które mi chodzi. Jeżeli czytelnik 
z góry już nie chce dać nie książce, ale samemu sobie z jej powodu ani okrucha żywej i 
własnej energii, niech lepiej nie czyta tych rzeczy […].18 
 
In general, I would like the reader to understand that my books are always a system of 
confessions and intellectual stimuli: that they do not have a ready-made content and that it 
would be futile to search for it. It is my concern to surprise the reader so that if he wants to 
be in accord with himself and with life, he must think and find more or less the thoughts 
that I am concerned about. If the reader does not want to give, not to the book, but to 
himself on its occasion, a crumb of his own living energy, then he should rather not read 
these things [...]. 
 
This caveat to the reader reveals an important premise underlying their reason-
ing: Brzozowski, in a way similar to Abrams, talks about a sort of writing that 
applies an interpretative intuition (on the part of both the writer and the reader) 
rather than an easily identifiable method. They both emphasized (and it may well 
be that Bloom would subscribe to this narrative) the impression of truthfulness, 
the very power and energy of the text, and the importance of interaction with the 
reader. Abrams remarked:  
 
[Wayne C. Booth, in his critique of Abrams’s book Natural Supernaturalism] involves, 
explicitly or implicitly, a wide range of propositional truth-claims, of which only a frac-
tion assert literal causation. […] The basic mode of “proof” employed for this mixed bag 
of assertions is their incorporation into a story—more specifically, into a story made up of 
many stories, in which we can distinguish, within the overarching narrative, a number of 
middle-sized “novellas” and a great many “short stories”; and a book as a whole requires 
that the reader enter into its “narrative world” and be convinced that “all of this hap-
                                                             
18  Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy, 8. 
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pened—this story is true,” as a necessary condition for being persuaded of the soundness 
of the truth-claims and value-claims that the narrative implicates.19 
 
In the text quoted above (“Some remarks on the general status of European 
literature,” from in Voices in the Night) Brzozowski proposed to treat the critic 
as a “profound artist.”20 He wrote that “the critic can be recognized by the fact 
that he is never content with impressions, he immediately, at the slightest twitch 
of his sensitivity, searches for life […], recognizes it and strives to preserve it. 
He stands continuously as a watchful guard” (Krytyka poznaje się po tym, że nie 
poprzestaje on nigdy na wrażeniu, lecz natychmiast poza najlżejszym drgnie-
niem swej wrażliwości szuka życia […], rozpoznaje je, usiłuje zabezpieczyć. 
Jest on nieustannie czujną strażą).21 The figure of the “watchful guard” refers to 
the particular and the individual, which are in fact the most real. This is a recur-
rent motif in Brzozowski’s writing: he underlines the need to remain open to life 
and the concomitant readiness to individualize one’s approach each time. The 
basis for such individualization is the awareness of human involvement in his-
tory, an antidote to all abstractions. Certainly, this perspective is not a great 
accomplishment of speculative thought, but it has to be said that Brzozowski 
(following Vico, Newman, and Norwid) did not aspire to reach the heights of 
idle and lifeless speculation. He encouraged reflection that would restore the 
human being to the historical world and empower the concrete ‘I’. Regardless of 
the attitude adopted to this perspective, be it the Hegelian “feeling soul” (die 
fühlende Seele),22 as Agata Bielik-Robson would have it,23 or Vico’s vision of 
the historical man,24 there remains the common conviction that participation in 
                                                             
19  Meyer Howard Abrams, Doing Things with Texts: Essays in Criticism and Critical 
Theory, ed. Michael Fischer (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), 115f. 
20  Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy, 5. 
21  Ibidem. 
22  Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit / Hegels 
Philosophie des Subjektiven Geistes, ed. and trans. Michael John Petry (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 1978), §403.  
23  Agata Bielik-Robson, “Syndrom romantyczny. Stanisław Brzozowski i rewizja ro-
mantyzmu” [The romantic syndrom. Stanisław Brzozowski’s revision of romanti-
cism], in Romantyzm, niedokończony projekt. Eseje (Kraków: Universitas, 2008), 76f. 
24  For the importance of Vico in Brzozowski’s thought, cf: Rena A. Syska-Lamparska, 
Stanisław Brzozowski: A Polish Vichian. Pref. Wiktor Weintraub (Firenze: Le Lettere, 
1987); Andrzej Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi myśli [Stanisław Brzozow-
ski—paths of thought], ed. Andrzej Mencwel (Kraków: Universitas, 2011), 83f.; An-
drzej Mencwel, Stanisław Brzozowski. Postawa krytyczna. Wiek XX [Stanisław Brzo-
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the world is necessary for being a powerful and complete subject. Both Polish 
and British Romantic writers (from Mickiewicz to Norwid and, for the British, at 
least from the late eighteenth century up to the 1830s) were interested in the 
human being that, as Dilthey wrote, “wills, feels, and thinks” and cannot be 
reduced to “the mere contents of perception, representation, and thought.”25 
Abrams and Frye, as well as Brzozowski, applied the consequences that arose 
from the Romantic sense of the whole to their own critical practice. The readi-
ness of Abrams to place literature and criticism in larger cultural contexts (note 
the text by Michael Fischer devoted to his work)26 did not result from observa-
tion of the contemporary circles of criticism and methodology, but rather from 
his reading of the Romantic authors. Being rooted in culture and history not only 
helps to understand the complexity of a given phenomenon, but it also prom-
ises—which is of particular importance in this study—to bring concrete reality 
seen as a unique outcome of a number of simultaneous phenomena into a closer 
perspective. Such is the background for the following remark by Fischer: “While 
appreciating the formal complexity of literary works, Abrams emphasizes that 
they are by, for, and about human beings.”27 While addressed to Abrams, the 
remark could well be referred, in its core message, to any of the critics under 
consideration. Despite appearances, Bloom’s intricate theory of agon, reinforced 
and renewed a number of times, in the last analysis takes into consideration 
‘human beings’, the concrete subjects: 
 
What concerns me in a strong poem is neither self nor language but the utterance, within 
the tradition of uttering, of the image or lie of voice, where voice is neither self nor lan-
guage, but rather spark or pneuma as opposed to self, and act made one with word 
(davhar) rather than word referring only to another word (logos). A poem is spark and act, 
or else we need not read it a second time. Criticism is spark and act, or else we need not 
read it at all.28  
 
                                                             
zowski. The critical attitude. The twentieth century] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Kry-
tyki Politycznej, 2014), 25f.; Eliza Kącka, “‘Nie obciążony wpływem żadnej sekty...’ 
Giambattista Vico w myśleniu Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [Vico in Stanisław Brzo-
zowski’s thought], Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki 33 (2012). 
25  Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and 
Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 50.  
26  Michael Fischer, “Foreword,” in Abrams, Doing Things with Texts, ix (“A readiness 
to place both literature and criticism in their larger cultural context.”). 
27  Ibidem, x (emphasis mine, E. K.). 
28  Bloom, The Breaking of the Vessels, 4.  
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In this passage Bloom testifies to the focus on ‘voice’ instead of ‘language’, 
which in this case underlines the subjective, volitional character of writing (it is 
perhaps useful to disregard this gnostic vocabulary, which has been commented 
on also in Poland).29 Writers are, according to Bloom, entangled in tradition, in 
the textual agon, which does not mean that they are anonymous, extra-historical 
links in this agon. On the contrary: the ‘human being’ formula guarantees the 
historicity and the subjective character of an utterance. Geoffrey Hartman in his 
important work The Unmediated Vision expressed a view that might serve as a 
condensed characteristics of the approach taken by the ‘Romantic critics’, in the 
sense that I wish to emphasize in this article:  
 
Abstraction is never less than total. Great poetry, however, is written by men who have 
chosen to stay bound by experience, who would not—or could not—free themselves by an 
act of knowledge from the immediacy of good and evil.30  
 
To sum up: adopting an all-encompassing perspective which does not disregard 
reality is a fundamentally Romantic approach. Certainly, the readers of Bloom, 
Brzozowski, Abrams, and Frye are well aware of the fact that, while holding fast 
to the Romantic tradition, they dispelled several of its most ingrained illusions: 
the illusion of the full autonomy of poetic imagination and of the subjective self. 
This dispelling does not break their community with Romanticism. Quite the 
reverse: Romanticism itself, as they all perfectly knew, had a great potential for 
self-revision. It is no coincidence that Bloom, a reader of Shelley and the twen-
                                                             
29  In particular one should refer here to Agata Bielik-Robson and Adam Lipszyc, as well 
as Jan Potkański, who used Bloom’s theories for his own theoretical undertakings. 
Another author who referred to Bloom with respect to literary criticism was Kacper 
Bartczak. In Polish interpretations of Bloom’s gnostic vocabulary, Bielik-Robson and 
Lipszyc are particularly important, not unlike, on the European scale, Richard Rorty.  
Cf., e. g.: Bielik-Robson, Inna nowoczesność. Pytania o współczesną formułę ducho-
wości [A different modernity. Questions about the contemporary form of spirituality] 
(Krakow: Universitas, 2000), 87–122; Agata Bielik-Robson, “Sześć dni stworzenia. 
Harolda Blooma mitologia twórczości” [The six days of creation. Harold Bloom’s 
mythology of creativity], in Harold Bloom, Lęk przed wpływem: teoria poezji, trans. 
Agata Bielik-Robson et al. (Kraków: Universitas, 2002); Lipszyc, Międzyludzie, 47–
59; Kacper Bartczak, Świat nie scalony [The unassembled world] (Wrocław: Biuro 
Literackie, 2009), 12–30; Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 28–30. 
30  Geoffrey H. Hartman, The Unmediated Vision. An Interpretation of Wordsworth, 
Hopkins, Rilke, and Valéry (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1954), xi. 
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tieth-century canon, indicated that complete mastery of language is impossible 
and that we are indebted to tradition to a much greater extent than we believe, 
even though we cherish the originality of thought and independence.31 In a sense, 
Bloom’s protest against the naive claim of absolute originality as well as the 
assertion of breaking the continuity between us and history or tradition is analo-
gous to the protest of the author of The Legend of Young Poland against thinking 
that disregards its historical roots.32 
 
Romanticism(s) and History 
 
Brzozowski and the other authors use different metaphors and different sets of 
ideas, but they share, as I have argued already, the intention to question the 
model of subjectivity that ‘levitates’ somewhere above tradition and history, free 
of everything that preceded it in the course of events or utterances. So distinct is 
this intention that it becomes possible to draw parallels rooted in the creative and 
critical reading of Romanticism. This reading in its turn draws attention to the 
volatile nature of the historical context of creative work, not only in the strictly 
artistic sense, but more broadly in action, in human activities. In his text “Hu-
mour and law” included in The Legend of Young Poland, Brzozowski wrote: 
 
W Anglii świadomość kształtowała się pod wpływem nieustannego poczucia potężnej, 
zbiorowej mocy, która zdoła każdy indywidualny wysiłek wyzyskać, zużyć: rozstrzygało 
tu to zaufanie ku potężnej jak żywioł angielskiej ojczyźnie. Włoska świadomość ukształ-
towała się w ponadżyciowym zawieszeniu, kształtował ją opór stawiany przez kulturalną 
tradycję zniszczeniu; to tłumaczy nam najdobitniejsze różnice w tych dwóch stanowi-
skach. Ale ważnym dla nas jest ich rys wspólny: jedno i to samo poczucie, jeden i ten sam 
materialny fakt istnienia i jego najwyższe umysłowe szczyty. Jednostka może tu czuć i 
myśleć w rytmie wielkiej całości; myśl nie tworzy bolesnych przerw, niebezpiecznych 
osamotnień. […] Myśl nowoczesna, jaką ją znamy przeważnie u nas, powstała pod wpły-
wem izolujących lub zrywających naturalne łączności stanów dusz lub interesów.33  
 
In England, consciousness evolved under the influence of the constant feeling of a power-
ful collective force that is prone to exploit and to use every individual effort: this is a 
result of the trust in the English fatherland that is as powerful as a natural force. Italian 
                                                             
31  The role of the guardian of the canon results from this sort of awareness. Cf. Harold 
Bloom, The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1994). 
32   Cf. Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 15ff. 
33  Ibid., 313. 
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consciousness evolved in a supra-existential suspension, it was formed by the resistance 
put up by the cultural tradition against destruction; this explains to us the most striking 
differences between these two positions. But what is important for us is their common 
feature: one and the same feeling, one and the same material fact of existence and its 
highest mental peaks. The individual must feel and think in the rhythm of a great whole; 
the mind does not create painful breaks, dangerous solitudes. […] Modern thought as we 
predominantly know it in our country emerged under the influence of states of mind or 
interests that isolate or break up the natural bonds.  
 
This passage, so important for descriptions of Brzozowski’s views of England 
and Italy (together with his diagnosis of Poland’s historical discontinuity), per-
fectly illustrates the awareness of different rhythms of historical development. 
He realized that different national Romanticisms should not be mixed together, 
warning: 
 
Romantyzm polski nie jest odbiciem, czy echem jakiegoś zachodnio-europejskiego prądu 
kulturalno-literackiego. [...] Romantyzm polski był wypływem zmiany, ruchu, przeisto-
czenia, jakie zaszły w duszy polskiego społeczeństwa na początku ubiegłego stulecia. 
Zrozumieć romantyzm, to znaczy, zrozumieć tę zmianę, ten ruch, to przeistoczenie.34 
 
Polish Romanticism is not a reflection or echo of any Western European cultural-literary 
current. [...] Polish Romanticism was the outflow of change, of movement, and transfor-
mation that took place in the soul of Polish society at the beginning of the last century. To 
understand romanticism means to understand this change, this movement, this transfor-
mation. 
 
Brzozowski demonstrated the separate nature of the phenomenon that gave rise 
to his present, and I am thinking here not only of the modern formation, but also 
of modernity in its broader sense (and at the particular stage that he was able to 
observe it). In a sense, Brzozowski repeats, albeit with necessary corrections, the 
gesture of Mickiewicz’s Paris Lectures, which he knew well, for he read them 
passionately while working on his own lectures,35 later collected in that peculiar 
pamphlet entitled Filozofia romantyzmu polskiego (The Philosophy of Polish 
Romanticism). It is worth noting at this particular instance that, when situating 
Brzozowski on the map of European thought and philosophy, one should not 
disregard the focus on Polish Romanticism. This remark is meant to be directed 
                                                             
34  Brzozowski, Kultura i życie, 376f.  
35  In 1905 Brzozowski held his lectures on Romanticism in Kraków and at the Lwów 
Polytechnical School. 
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polemically against an approach that, in this context, favours Voices in the Night 
and marginalizes The Philosophy of Polish Romanticism. Agata Bielik-Robson, 
in her penetrating view of Brzozowski as a forerunner of the Romantic revi-
sion,36 asserts her claims on the basis of her reading of the ‘European’ or ‘Eng-
lish’ Brzozowski while altogether disregarding the Polish context. This context, 
however, should be brought into consideration; paradoxically, it can only cor-
roborate her diagnosis. Brzozowski’s discussion of Romanticism evinces the 
same awareness with which Abrams declared the following in his response to the 
reviews of Natural Supernaturalism: 
 
I didn’t intend, however, to posit eternal ideas or universal traits of human nature to ex-
plain the relations between the various themes and structures that I identify and trace 
trough time. I took care, in fact, to assert early on that the history I undertook to tell is 
strictly culture-bound.37 
 
Brzozowski, Abrams, Bloom, and Frye appreciated the perspicacity of the Ro-
mantics in diagnosing man’s involvement in the world and history. However, 
they also noticed the excessive passivity and perplexity with which many Ro-
mantics treated the very fact of this entanglement, their inability to use it in a 
positive way. Certainly, both Brzozowski and Bloom had a powerful will of 
emancipation from the burdensome elements of tradition. They advocated, as 
Bloom would have it, the ‘strong self’,38 but they did not think of this self out-
side the historical context, which is a context of dependence. Brzozowski strove 
to dispel the illusory view of language according to which its origins lie outside 
the contexts of life and society. His conviction in this regard is similar to that of 
Charles Taylor expressed in A Secular Age (even though the wording of the 
latter is markedly different): 
 
Even great innovative religious founders have to draw on a pre-existing vocabulary avail-
able in their society. This in the end shades into the obvious point about human language 
in general, that we all acquire it from the language-groups we grow up in, and can only 
transcend what we are given by leaning on it.39   
 
One of the important indicators of ‘Romantic’ critical practice is the suggestive 
tone of the argument, which despite being erudite remains non-scientistic. The 
                                                             
36  Bielik-Robson, “Syndrom romantyczny,” 75. 
37  Abrams, Doing Things with Texts, 120. 
38  Bloom, The Western Canon, 55.  
39  Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 148. 
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best known work by Meyer Howard Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, is not 
an anthropological manifesto, but rather a historical reconstruction as well as a 
paradigmatic construction. His proposition to view the conceptions of art, poetry, 
and criticism from the perspective of metaphorical transformations engages the 
reader’s erudition and imagination in a way that is markedly different from that 
of academic ‘non-situational’ treatises (in Brzozowski’s terms). It was to these 
‘non-situational’ thoughts, disregarding reality and intentionally disengaged, that 
Brzozowski referred to in his Diary, most notably in those parts devoted to his 
critical attitude to the philosophy of Kazimierz Twardowski and his circle. Cer-
tainly, he intended to criticize philosophizing understood as a prerequisite for 
‘being skilled in writing lectures’,40 for such an understanding of philosophizing 
takes no real responsibility for anything. In a broader sense, however, he referred 
the term ‘situationality’ to the focus on an external (social or existential) check 
concerning literature or theoretical constructions.  
A note of caution: in his Anatomy of Criticism Frye attempted to present a 
model of objectivist criticism in relation to ‘an impersonal corpus of received 
knowledge’.41 Brzozowski will have none of its impersonal tone and the declara-
tion of having a method. Following Vico42 (and not only him, even though the 
following passage refers to his polemic against Descartes), he perceived the 
violent character of method directed against life: “Już Vico prowadził nieustanną 
polemikę przeciwko wszelkim racjonalistycznym próbom zamknięcia treści tego 
życia w granicach jakiegoś pojęcia, wyrozumowanej i logicznej teorii” (Already 
Vico carried on a protracted polemic against rationalist attempts to enclose the 
content of life within a given concept, a ratiocinated and logical theory).43 
 
                                                             
40  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 29. 
41  Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 15. He would have termed Brzozowski’s criticism as 
‘journalistic’. Brzozowski’s mode of work is closer to that of Abrams, even though 
Frye can also be included in the context of the study of Brzozowski’s criticism (in 
fact, on many accounts: take for example his reading of Blake in Fearful Symmetry). 
42  The role of Vico in the writings of Abrams and his students merits a separate study. It 
is not only with reference to the figure or metaphor of the spiral form (applied to the 
broad understanding of Romanticism) that Vico appears in Abrams’s writing: “The 
book as a whole has a structure that is deliberately iconic of the spiral form which 
many Romantic thinkers considered the necessary shape of an intellection, and in 
which many Romantic writers ordered their philosophies, their histories, and their fic-
tional writings.” Abrams, Doing Things with Texts, 116. 
43  Brzozowski, Współczesna powieść i krytyka, 170.  
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Poetry 
 
Philosophy, criticism, and readings interlaced in Brzozowski’s mind to form a 
particular auto-paideia and autopoiesis in the effort to raise, form, and create 
oneself. This effort was to be connected to the proposition of activity (the Greek 
poiēsis) in a broader sense. Frederick C. Beiser in his book The Romantic Imper-
ative wrote: 
 
The primacy of the ethical and political in Frühromantik means that the romantics subor-
dinated the aesthetic and religious to ethical and political ends. They defined the highest 
good not as aesthetic contemplation but as human self-realization, the development of 
humanity. No less than Plato and Aristotle, they insisted that this ideal is realizable only 
within society and state. Thus ethical and poetical values played a decisive role in the 
romantic agenda: they are the ultimate purpose behind its aesthetics, its philosophy of 
history, and Naturphilosophie.44 
 
Brzozowski, for his part, wrote in his text entitled “Titania’s Spouse” published 
in July 1905 (against Józef Tretiak and his reading of Słowacki): 
 
Krytyk, który byłby tylko krytykiem, byłby bezwzględnym zaprzeczeniem twórczości. 
Człowiek jest to czynność nieustająca. Istnieje dla niego naprawdę to tylko, co przez jego 
czyn ogarnięte zostaje. […] Aby zrozumieć czyjeś ja, trzeba je odczuć, czyli właściwie 
stworzyć. Stworzyć je możemy zaś tylko z własnej naszej duszy, z własnej jaźni.45 
 
A critic who is solely a critic would be an absolute denial of creativity. Man is constant 
activity. Only that really exists for him, which is embraced by his action. [...] To under-
stand someone’s self, one must feel it, or actually create it. However, we can only create it 
from our own soul, from our own self. 
 
Certainly, one could deduce from this passage a sentence much like Schleierma-
cher’s hermeneutic formula on understanding authors better than they under-
stood themselves.46 The passage as a whole, however, has a different purport and 
                                                             
44  Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative. The Concept of Early German 
Romanticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), xi. 
45  Brzozowski, Wczesne prace krytyczne, 509. 
46  “It was Schleiermacher’s prime objective ‘to understand an author better than he 
understood himself.’ […] Privileging the author, however, does not mean fore-
grounding a personality but rather focusing on the author as the originator of the indi-
vidual and hence not immediately graspable meaning of a foreign strange speech.” 
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the affinity with Schleiermacher is not fundamental. What is placed in the fore-
ground is the motif of creativity, action and, consequently, the change in per-
ceiving the role of literary criticism. Even though it sounds somewhat general 
and esoteric, criticism in this view is seen as an activity that engages the human 
being as a whole and not just a particular intellectual disposition. Vico’s call to 
create truth, so dear to Brzozowski, led—when applied to criticism—to the 
praise of invention and responsibility for one’s creations. The indication that “we 
should not seek the truth, but create it,”47 which Brzozowski inferred from 
Vico’s polemic against Descartes, was an important impulse that led him to re-
evaluate the role of the critic. In “Titania’s Spouse,” Brzozowski wrote things 
that indicate his standing as a continuator of nineteenth-century thought on po-
etry, in its existential sense rather than the sense of poetic creativity. He can thus 
be seen as an author who conceives of poetry as another mode of reflection, 
different from systemic philosophy: For “how many critics withered because 
they lacked the poetry that would complement them!” ([…] ilu krytyków zmar-
niało przez brak uzupełniającej ich poezji!).48 On account of this, he can be seen 
as a representative of the same tradition which, on the one hand, is founded on 
the canonical texts of German Romanticism or, in Polish Romanticism, on Nor-
wid’s writings on Słowacki or on Mochnacki. On the other hand, this tradition is 
founded on such texts as On Heroes by Thomas Carlyle and the writings of 
Ralph W. Emerson and John Henry Newman. These authors studied the relations 
between poets and verse-writers (or: poetry as a means of participation and en-
gagement in the world and poetry as poetic creativity).49 It is no coincidence that 
Harold Bloom, a passionate reader of Emerson, wrote in his Poetry and Repres-
                                                             
Wolfgang Iser, The Range of Interpretation (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), 46. 
47  The translation of Verum esse ipsum factum is “The true is the thing made [or done] 
itself.” Or “The true is precisely what is made.” Cf. Giambattista Vico, On the Most 
Ancient Wisdom of the Italians: Unearthed from the Origins of the Latin Language, 
trans. L. M. Palmer (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 46. 
48  Brzozowski, Wczesne prace krytyczne, 511. 
49  Cf.: “There is an ambiguity in the word ‘poetry’, which is taken to signify both the 
gift itself, and the written composition which is the result of it. Thus, there is an ap-
parent, but no real contradiction, in saying a poem may be but partially poetical; in 
some passages more so than in others; and sometimes not poetical at all.” John Henry 
Newman, Essays Critical and Historical, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1907), 11.  
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sion that the poet is not a mere “verse-writer”50 and that the most powerful poets 
of the twentieth century were Freud and Nietzsche:51 
 
A poetic “text,” as I interpret it, is not a gathering of signs on a page, but is a psychic 
battlefield upon which authentic forces struggle for the only victory worth winning, the 
divinating triumph over oblivion […].52 
 
Metaphorical language is a key feature of poetical thinking. In his The Mirror 
and the Lamp and in Natural Supernaturalism Abrams wrote about metaphors, 
used metaphors in his critical discourse, and classified theories on the basis of 
their prominent metaphors. In the foreword to the former of those two books, he 
explained: 
 
I have attempted the experiment of taking these and various other metaphors no less 
seriously when they occur in criticism than when they occur in poetry; for in both prov-
inces the recourse to metaphor, although directed to different ends, is perhaps equally 
functional. Critical thinking, like that in all areas of human interest, has been in considera-
ble part thinking in parallels, and critical argument has to that extent been an argument 
from analogy.53 
 
Harold Bloom wrote in his Kabbalah and Criticism: 
 
I knowingly urge critical theory to stop treating itself as a branch of philosophical dis-
course, and to adopt instead the pragmatic dualism of the poets themselves, as I can see 
not the least relationship of what we have called poetics to the actual problematics of 
reading poetry. A theory of poetry must belong to poetry, must be poetry, before it can be 
of any use in interpreting poems.54 
 
                                                             
50  Harold Bloom, Poetry and Repression: Revisionism from Blake to Stevens (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press: 1976), 2. 
51  Cf. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 28. 
52  Bloom, Poetry and Repression, 2. 
53  Meyer Howard Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: romantic theory and critical 
tradition (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), iv.  
54  Harold Bloom, Kabbalah and Criticism (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 109. Peter 
de Bolla wrote: “For him [Bloom] a theory that is critical, and which deals with poetic 
texts, must be grounded within those texts: his argument is tied to extremely tradi-
tional accounts of the practice of reading literary texts in this respect.” Peter de Bolla, 
Harold Bloom: Towards Historical Rhetorics (London: Routledge, 1988), 18f. 
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This reluctance to include criticism in philosophy seems to collide with 
Brzozowski’s intention, for he was quite clear that his own theoretical undertak-
ings form part of a particular project of philosophizing. However, as soon as we 
counterbalance this assertion with a passage from The Diary: 
 
Każdy element obojętności istniejący w nas, mogący istnieć w chwili poetyckiego ujęcia, 
uszczupla głębokość poezji, jest połączony z jej uszczerbkiem. Poezja musi być pojmo-
wana jako twórcza autodefinicja człowieka.55 
 
Every element of indifference that exists in us, which can exist in the moment of poetic 
treatment, depletes the depth of poetry, is damaging it. Poetry must be understood as the 
creative self-definition of man. 
 
…then the perspective will change radically, for understanding poetry as a ‘cre-
ative self-definition of a human being’ overrides Bloom’s warning that one 
might engage in theoretical reflections that would disregard poetry and lead 
criticism into a scientific cul-de-sac.56 In the light of this chapter Brzozowski 
truly appears as a precursor of Romantic revision, which continually faced the 
challenge of reflecting on ratio in its specific Romantic understanding: 
 
Blake calls the sum of experiences common to normal minds the “ratio,” and whenever 
the word “reason” appears in an unfavorable context in Blake, it always means “ratiocina-
tion,” or reflection on the “ratio.”57 
 
Conclusion: Towards a New Shape of Criticism 
 
The term “Romantic critical theory” used by Frye58 leads me to acknowledge, 
despite all differences, the common foundation that unites the practices of 
Stanisław Brzozowski, Meyer Howard Abrams, Northrop Frye, and Harold 
Bloom (to this group one might add, with many qualifications, several other 
scholars).59 The common foundation and the mode of reflection is their reading 
of Romantic texts which transcends the boundaries of critical appraisal, scholarly 
                                                             
55  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 13 (emphasis mine, E. K.). Cf. Mencwel, Stanisław Brzozow-
ski. Postawa krytyczna, 648. 
56  Cf. David Fite, Harold Bloom: The Rhetoric of Romantic Vision (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1985), xii. 
57  Frye, Fearful Symmetry, 22. 
58  Cf. footnote 14. 
59  E.g. Wayne C. Booth, Jonathan Culler, Geoffrey Hartman, Lionel Trilling. 
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description or essayistic commentary. It is a practice which brings about a par-
ticular community to which the critics themselves subscribe as well. This com-
munity does not do away with scholarly, critical or philosophical standards. 
However, it would not come into being had it not been for the important compo-
nent inscribed in the text of Voices in the Night: 
 
Punktem wyjściowym romantyzmu jest założenie, że świat, w którym nie ma miejsca dla 
danej indywidualnej treści, nie jest światem skończonym i zamkniętym […] że ostatnie 
słowo należy zawsze do twórczej psychiki ludzkiej. […] sądzę, że jest to […] rys raczej 
bezwzględnie wartościowy w romantyzmie […].60 
 
The starting point of romanticism is the assumption that a world in which there is no room 
for a given piece of individual content is not a finite and closed world […] that the last 
word is always up to the creative human psyche. […] I think that this is […] a rather 
unconditionally valuable feature of Romanticism. 
 
In Voices in the Night affirmation blends with critical distance, a revisionist 
approach is paired with codification of the accomplishments of Romanticism, 
and this blend is not contradictory. Moreover, such an interrelation of ap-
proaches is inevitable in the case of the critics for whom Romanticism was a 
vibrant problem and a challenge. Dealing with Romanticism led to a sense of 
community, even though a degree of ambivalence remained. In a letter of Sep-
tember 1909, Brzozowski wrote: “I exchange secret greetings with Newman, 
Hegel, and Norwid” (wymieniam tajne pozdrowienia z Newmanem, Heglem, 
Norwidem).61 He referred in a similar way to William Blake, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, and John Keats, who were so important for Bloom, Abrams, Frye, 
and Hartman. 
None of the critics under consideration, nor Brzozowski himself, advocated a 
simple return to Romanticism. It is not by coincidence that I decided to use the 
term “Romantic revision” in the title. It entails not only a critical reading, but 
also an actualisation of meanings: their re-contextualization and creative re-
newal. Brzozowski, as well as Abrams, Frye and Bloom, did not advocate a 
return to a Romantic paradise lost, but attempted to establish criticism on the 
basis of reading Romantic authors and rethinking Romanticism as a productive 
and modern proposition. That they subscribed to the Romantic circles, which I 
have discussed here, is not to be understood too simple-mindedly. At any rate, it 
would be difficult to understand it in this way, given that these scholars were 
                                                             
60  Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy, 55. 
61  Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 2, 234. 
Brzozowski and Romantic Revision | 205 
fully aware of the complexity of Romantic texts, which they explored and publi-
cized so keenly.  
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Brzozowski as Precursor to Contemporary 
Studies on Cyprian Norwid’s Legacy 
Krzysztof Trybuś 
 
 
Norwid as a Commentator on Brzozowski 
 
Cyprian Norwid died when Brzozowski was five years old. I do not intend to compare 
them, as the scopes of their influence vary. Norwid’s poetic achievements determine, or 
will determine, the direction of modern Polish poetry. However, both of them have been 
perceived as “opaque,” some hold them up as saintly while others deem them monsters. 
And neither has received a full edition of their works in Poland.1 
 
The foregoing quotation is from Czesław Miłosz’s 1962 book Człowiek wśród 
skorpionów (Man among Scorpions). In addition to the lack of recognition that 
both writers experienced, Miłosz compares the histories of Brzozowski and 
Norwid and he recognizes that Brzozowski follows a parallel “line of fate”2 as 
the earlier Norwid in both his life and legacy. The two are not only similar inso-
far as they experienced rejection and faced near oblivion in the history of litera-
ture and Polish culture; Norwid, whose name appears eleven times in Miłosz’s 
reflections, is in fact ubiquitous to Miłosz’s reading of Brzozowski’s thought and 
intellectual development. He is also silently present in Miłosz’s poetry and it was 
                                                             
1  Czesław Miłosz, Człowiek wśród skorpionów. Studium o Stanisławie Brzozowskim 
[Man among scorpions: A study on Stanisław Brzozowski] (Kraków: Znak, 2000), 72. 
2  Czesław Miłosz, “A Controversial Polish Writer: Stanisław Brzozowski,” California 
Slavic Studies II (1963): 55. 
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him who prompted the relevant poetic tropes that allowed the three writers—
Norwid, Brzozowski, and Miłosz—to transcend the “damned formulas.”3  
Both Brzozowski and Norwid are mainly concerned with the role and mean-
ing of history in molding humanity, or in the shaping of “historical maturity”4—
this is why Norwid is constantly present in Brzozowski’s discussion of Giam-
battista Vico and John Henry Newman. This parallel is important in the lives and 
legacies of both writers as they both represent the vast stratum of destitute Polish 
nobility and by this the emergence of the post-noble intelligentsia. Earlier, such a 
sociological explanation of affiliation, or non-affiliation, would have seemed 
somewhat suspicious to me as it encourages us to find a cause and describe the 
unexplainable or illogical; the emergence of such genius does not need to be 
explained. To recall the category once described by Leszek Kołakowski, a great 
poet just like a “great philosopher”5 creates a new epoch or falls outside of it at 
the same time—they transcend their own epoch. Though both came from nobil-
ity, Norwid and Brzozowski contested the customs of their class for its excessive 
glorification of ritual over reason. Nevertheless, the source that allowed them to 
constantly confront their contemporaries and developments in contemporary 
Polish culture can be seen in their sense of mission, which can only be explained 
by their noble ethos. A comparable sublimation of the chivalrous sense of honor 
and duty occurs in the works of Joseph Conrad because the behavior of his char-
acters retains a shade of heroism and preserves a memory of obsolete customs.6 
                                                             
3  Cyprian Norwid, “Klaskaniem mając obrzękłe prawice…” [Their hands swollen with 
applause], in Pisma wszystkie, ed. Juliusz W. Gomulicki, vol. 2 (Warszawa: Państwo-
wy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1971), 16. 
4  See Eliza Kącka, “‘Ten, co od sumienia historii się oderwał, dziczeje na wyspie 
oddalonej’. Dojrzałość dziejowa w myśli Stanisława Brzozowskiego i Cypriana Ka-
mila Norwida” [“He who distracts himself from history is decivilized on a faraway is-
land”: historical maturity in Stanisław Brzozowski’s and Cyprian Kamil Norwid’s 
thought], in Konstelacje Stanisława Brzozowskiego, ed. Urszula Kowalczuk et al. 
(Warszawa: Narodowe Centrum Kultury, 2012); for the Brzozowski and Norwid pa-
rallel in a wider perspective, see, Eliza Kącka, Stanisław Brzozowski wobec Cypriana 
Norwida [Stanisław Brzozowski and Cyprian Norwid], (Warszawa: Nakł. Wydziału 
Polonistyki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2012).  
5  Leszek Kołakowski, “Wielki filozof jako kategoria historyczna” [The great philos-
opher as a historical category], in Pochwała niekonsekwencji [In praise of inconsequ-
ence] ed. Zbigniew Mentzel, vol. 1 (Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, 
1989). 
6  For Brzozowski’s remark on Lord Jim, see Pamiętnik [Diary], 179: “Znaczenie Lorda 
Jima. Zabija go utrata własnego szacunku, poczucia własnej godności. Od tej chwili 
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In the case of Norwid and Brzozowski, the old values of the knightly ethos re-
flect a model of personal endeavor and the productive effort of an individual 
striving to attain a sense of authentic humanity.7 
The chivalric ethos in this manner does not refer so much to the values that 
are beyond the individual, but to those that are continuously being created by a 
person so that it is a process that enables one’s continuous growth. In Norwid 
and Brzozowski, this leads to an engagement with history and the world as a 
whole, which, as related to the chivalric ethos, remains a crucial source of the 
sublime for both authors.8 Additionally, this legacy simultaneously reveals an 
                                                             
ginie dla niego cały olbrzymi świat, który materialnie go otacza, w którym bierze on 
udział. Problem przybiera tu postać bardziej skomplikowaną, nowoczesną, wskutek 
tego, że ten świat materialny azjatycko-tropikalny jest niewspółmierny z naszą etyką i 
wobec tego nasza etyka, nasze sumienie, bezwzględne nakazy stanowiące samą istotę 
naszej osobowości są tylko postulatem, czymś względnym, przypadkiem, który wal-
czy dopiero o swoje istnienie” (The importance of Lord Jim. He is oppressed by the 
loss of self-esteem and of the feeling of his own dignity. From this moment on, the 
whole world that physically surrounds him, in which he participates, is vanishing for 
him. Here the problem acquires a more complicated, a more modern character, since 
this physical, tropical, Asian world is incommensurable with our ethics, and therefore 
our ethics, our conscience, the reckless commands of which the core of our personal-
ity consists are only a postulate, something relative, accidental, only just fighting for 
its existence). 
7  See the comments on the role and meaning of Norwid’s chivalric ethos in reference to 
the observations of Maria Ossowska on knightly ethos in Zofia Dambek, Cyprian 
Norwid a tradycje szlacheckie [Cyprian Norwid and the traditions of the nobility] 
(Poznań: Wydawn. Naukowe im. Adama Mickiewicza, 2012), 152.  
8  See the reflections on “catastrophist discourse” in: Jens Herlth, “Epickość życia no-
woczesnego. Obrazowość estetyczna i wzorce postępowania katastrofizmu polskiego” 
[The epic strain in modern life: on the historical imaginary and models of conduct in 
Polish catastrophism], in Katastrofizm polski w XIX i XX wieku: idee, obrazy, konse-
kwencje, ed. Jerzy Fiećko, Jens Herlth, and Krzysztof Trybuś (Poznań: Wydawnictwo 
“Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne”, 2014), 267: “In Brzozowski’s heroic conception 
of history, idyllic silence is contrasted with the ‘epic’ character of modern life, where 
the constant threat of catastrophe may ensure the existence of values. Catastrophism is 
an answer to the comprehension of modernity as the grand epic of a lone man being 
put to the test. Facial contours in conditions of modernity are recognizable and re-
cordable only through struggle—this is the fundamental axiom of catastrophism. There-
fore, its tendency to decisionism and the exacerbation of conflict, […] its regular al-
lusions to the world of chivalric romance, and consequently its ‘swashbuckler’ spirit.” 
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emerging doubt in Romanticism concerning the possibility of continuing an old 
way of thinking, writing, and living. Hence, the continuous presence of this 
possibility is expressed in the contrast of the principles of chivalry and those of 
the landholding class as well as in the rejection of the ahistorical mentality of a 
rural idyll. The preference, then, for choosing such compositional forms enables 
an ongoing polemic that favors a foregrounded discourse associated with the 
expression of a subject, which then ensures the uncomplicated transition between 
different themes and how they are expressed. It can be assumed that Norwid’s 
“fragmentary means of expression”9 and the similar method of building a dis-
course of literary criticism in Brzozowski’s works, as characterized by Michał 
Głowiński as a “great parataxis,”10 leads to analogous results: 
 
1.  the characteristic pansemiotism—the searching for meaning that covers ev-
erything being said and everything has a meaning; 
2.  the person who is speaking is an interpreter of his own thoughts, life, and 
fate—he is commenting on the world that he is in order to fulfill his own 
ethos, which mainly leads to understanding and recognizing one’s own self 
in humanity; 
3.  the work of a hermeneut is always unfinished and unready—thought, word, 
and pen are in constant flux. 
 
Brzozowski and Norwid share a common heritage in identifying with the chival-
ric spirit, which demonstrates how Brzozowski is profoundly indebted to Norwid 
beyond mere literary criticism. Brzozowski identifies with Norwid through his 
own reflections concerning the writer’s as well as literature’s role in society and 
one’s own personal life. Therefore, Brzozowski could recognize himself and his 
own line of fate through Norwid’s works. 
Zenon Przesmycki worked on Norwid’s forgotten poems in the reading room 
of a Viennese library in 1897 and also brought Polish readers’ attention to Nor-
wid’s volume Poezje (Poems) from 1862. Apart from “Garstka piasku” (A 
Handful of Sand), which is the source of the motto for Brzozowski’s Idee 
(Ideas), the volume also includes “Malarz z konieczności” (A Painter by Neces-
sity), “John Brown,” “Do Emira Abdel-Kadera w Damaszku” (To Emir Abdel-
                                                             
9  Cyprian Norwid, “Letter to Maria Trębicka (January 2–3, 1846),” in Pisma wszystkie, 
ed. Juliusz W. Gomulicki, vol. 8 (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 
1971), 26. 
10  Michał Głowiński, “Wielka parataksa. O budowie dyskursu w Legendzie Młodej 
Polski Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [The great parataxis: on the construction of dis-
course in The Legend of Modern Poland], Pamiętnik Literacki 4 (1991). 
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Kader in Damascus), “Człowiek” (Man); the longer pieces Pięć zarysów (Five 
Drafts) and Rozmowa umarłych (Conversation of the Dead); the novellas “Bran-
soletka” (Bracelet) and “Cywilizacja” (Civilization); the tragedy Krakus; the 
poem Epimenides; and Norwid’s most extensive epic work, Quidam. Przesmycki 
recognized that Quidam was crucial for Norwid’s growth as it summarized his 
poetic works linked to the Romantic era and initiated the period when he wrote 
Vade mecum. Considered as a deconstruction of the romantic epic, Quidam 
recognizes an opportunity for the creation of post-chivalric heroism in literature. 
Quidam is the main character of the poem while he also serves as Norwid’s 
literary double. He is a philosopher of pre-Slavic origins who tries to prove that 
European civilization is rooted in “Israeli, Greek, and Roman knowledge.”11 
Quidam’s death at the age of thirty-three presents a martyrological dimension of 
heroism at the dawn of a new era to which his death is the most important testi-
mony. Simultaneously, Quidam’s death is like a theatrical curtain that unveils a 
blank space in Rome’s historical memory. His death does not save the memory 
of the hero who came from far away to the capital of European civilization. 
Quidam’s broken line of fate reads almost as if Brzozowski’s philosophical and 
critical works had been transformed into a poem and Brzozowski’s method of 
commenting on the works of other writers were used—with the language of the 
poem being a part of the language of the commentary. 
Quidam then discusses the possibility of bringing Christianity back into his-
tory, or of rediscovering it in “the middle of time,” while also conceiving history 
through Vico’s idea of its path as a spiral: 
 
Pomiędzy świtem a nocy zniknięciem 
Płomienne blaski różowe z mrokami 
Walczą, jak Cnota z świata – tego Księciem – 
Mgławe, lecz ufne, choć wciąż je coś mami. 
Pomiędzy świtem a nocą jest chwila, 
Gdy hoże łuny z czarnymi krepami 
Błądzą, aż bystry promień je przesila. 
Ostatnia gwiazda wtedy w niebo tonie, 
A słońce rude swe wynosi skronie – 
I periodyczna pamiątka stworzenia 
Wciąż o Pańskiego kreśli się skinienia.12 
 
                                                             
11  Cyprian Norwid, Quidam, in Pisma wszystkie, ed. Juliusz W. Gomulicki, vol. 3 (War-
szawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1971), 80. 
12  Ibid., 89.  
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Between dawn and night’s disappearance  
Pink flames gleam in the dark  
fighting like Virtue with the Prince of this world—  
Misty, but hopeful, yet constantly deluded.  
Between the light and the night there is a moment,  
When comely glows along with black crape,  
roving until a bright ray causes its climax.  
Then, the last star into the sky will sink,  
and the red sun will lift its brow—  
And this repeating memento of creation  
Is still being drawn by a nod of God’s head. 
 
The symbolism in Quidam refers to the creation myth in Genesis and foreshad-
ows the eternal conflict between good and evil and the world’s spiritual trans-
formation—one that is experienced individually through acts of spiritual labor. 
Conceived as a Christian epic that alludes to the Parable of the Mustard Seed, the 
poem is a discourse with Adam Mickiewicz’s messianic projects of rebuilding 
the world and Juliusz Słowacki’s revolutionary theory of progress.13 Quidam’s 
death takes place in an atmosphere of chaos, which recalls Kierkegaard’s split 
between the eternal and temporal.14 The irony of his death shows the fragments 
of a dispersed being belonging to an existing whole; and, conditioning the per-
ception of the status quo, it also gives the reader the point of view of a herme-
neut. Such a solution remains in accordance with the traditional allegorical 
exegesis of the Bible in which irony is derived from allegory; it allows us to 
translate the meaning of the words of Revelation, but unlike an allegory, it oper-
ates so that the truth “is exposed through the negation of the written word.”15 In 
                                                             
13  For a broader perspective see: Krzysztof Trybuś, Epopeja w twórczości Norwida [The 
epic in Norwid’s works] (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1993). 
14  Stefan Kołaczkowski writes about Kierkegaard’s thoughts on irony which were closer 
to Norwid than Schlegel (the dominating view in Romanticism) in the classic study 
“Ironia Norwida” [Norwid’s irony], Droga 11 (1933). He highlights the role of pro-
phetic characters—such as Sokrates in Kierkegaard’s On the Concept of Irony with 
Continual Reference to Socrates (1841)—who, on the threshold of a new era, refer to 
irony in their statements by denying the ideas of the old world.  
15  Włodzimierz Szturc, Ironia romantyczna: pojęcie, granice i poetyka [Romantic irony: 
concept, limits, and poetics] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1992), 58. 
By describing the role of allegory and irony in an allegorical reading of the Bible, 
Szturc pays attention to the rhetorical tradition of Quintilian, which for Isidore of Se-
ville, Julian of Toledo, and Saint Bede was the object of reference. 
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his poetry, Norwid demonstrates the limitations of being through irony, which 
constructs the world and shapes his characters; and, consequently, it explores the 
chivalric tradition of heroism through the concept of Christ the Logos.  
To read Quidam as a translation of Brzozowski’s worldview into poetic lan-
guage is obviously a stretch, however, the fact that we find the structures and 
contents of Brzozowski’s critical thoughts in Norwid does not conflict with a 
strict chronological view on literary history. This can be seen in Brzozowski’s 
study Filozofia romantyzmu polskiego (The Philosophy of Polish Romanticism). 
The view of history during the moment of the encounter between classical antiq-
uity and Christianity would seem familiar to anyone reading Quidam. This entire 
somewhat archaeological fragment of Brzozowski’s reflections on the theme 
concerning the formation of early Christianity could provide philosophical in-
sight into Norwid’s poem and the exegesis of the “Parable of the Mustard Seed”: 
 
Kościół jest niewzruszony, bo jest oparty na Słowie, ale dla człowieka Kościół ma się 
rozrastać, bo rozrastać się ma w człowieku samo Słowo, bo to jest żywot owego ziarna 
gorczycznego, które cieniem swym ma okryć ziemię.16 
 
The Church is imperturbable since it is based on the Word, and for man the Church has to 
grow since the Word itself has to grow in man, since it is the life of this mustard seed that 
has to cover the earth with its shadow. 
 
Brzozowski, just like Norwid, brings his own reflections on Christianity back to 
the origins of the Church’s community, to the time of its birth, and he rebuilds its 
foundations anew. 
 
Brzozowski as a Commentator on Norwid 
 
There has been little criticism linking Norwid and Brzozowski, Norwid is rarely 
mentioned in the reception of Brzozowski’s works, and he is not often cited as a 
source of inspiration for Brzozowski. What is more, Brzozowski’s observations 
concerning Norwid’s thoughts and style have not been recognized as a crucial 
reference for studies on Norwid. The comparative analysis of Norwid’s and 
Brzozowski’s works, initiated by Rafał Marceli Blüth, was later continued by 
Miłosz. That work has not been continued in more recent research, although an 
interpretation of Norwid through Brzozowski would be a significant contribution 
                                                             
16  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Filozofia romantyzmu polskiego” [The philosophy of Polish 
Romanticism], in Kultura i życie, 382. Traces of the reading of Quidam in the period 
of Young Poland may be found in the works of Cezary Jellenta and Tomasz Miciński.  
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to Norwid studies. One of the reasons for Brzozowski’s critical exclusion re-
mains his characteristic style of reading Norwid as being subordinate to Brzo-
zowski’s own philosophical thought—Maria Janion describes this as the “holy 
book of Romanticism’s style of exegesis.”17 
On the other hand, Norwid is regularly cited and usually appears in the philo-
sophical and cultural research frame of reference in studies on Brzozowski. 
Norwid has been used to clarify or more frequently illustrate the meaning of 
Brzozowski’s poetry, which is an advantage for our knowledge of Brzozowski, 
though it is less useful for understanding Norwid as a poet. In this context, it is 
worth mentioning Wiesław Rzońca’s important book Norwid a romantyzm pol-
ski (Norwid and Polish Romanticism) precisely because he does not mention 
Brzozowski,18 even though he undoubtedly deserves credit for returning Norwid 
to Romanticism—the main outline of Brzozowski’s dispute with Przesmycki 
touched on this particular issue. Brzozowski saw Norwid both as a rejuvenator of 
Romanticism and as its critic and successor. Long before the more recent debates 
over the poet’s placement in the history of literature, Brzozowski not only op-
posed himself to Young Poland’s usurpation of Norwid, but also pointed to the 
constant relevance and future significance of the latter’s poetry. 
What is astonishing even today is the completeness in Brzozowski’s recog-
nition of the ideological dimensions of Norwid’s works. He acknowledges the 
pivotal role of history and religion as he surveys Norwid’s poetry by going far 
beyond the discussion of poetic language. His hermeneutic approach to Norwid 
has its complement in a processual evaluation of Norwid’s epoch in Filozofia 
romantyzmu polskiego. Its importance is apparent in the following quote because 
of the order in which the poets are mentioned—Słowacki after Mickiewicz and, 
instead of Krasiński who is usually present in the history revealing the formation 
of the myth of the Three Bards of Polish Romanticism,19 Norwid: 
 
                                                             
17  Maria Janion, “Badania nad romantyzmem polskim” [Studies on Polish Romanticism] 
in Rozwój wiedzy o literaturze po 1918 roku, ed., introduction Janusz Maciejewski 
(Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1986), 119. 
18  Wiesław Rzońca, Norwid a romantyzm polski (Warszawa: Wydział Polonistyki Uniw. 
Warszawskiego, 2005). Rzońca seems to prefer Cezary Jellenta over Brzozowski, as 
far as the reception of Norwid in the period of Young Poland is concerned. Ibid., 203. 
19  See Henryk Markiewicz, “Rodowód i losy mitu trzech wieszczów” [On the genesis 
and the fate of the myth of the three bards], in Świadomość literatury. Rozprawy i 
szkice (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1985), 217f. The author notices 
that Brzozowski’s criticism of Krasiński is enhanced in Legenda Młodej Polski. 
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W Mickiewiczu, Słowackim, Norwidzie odsłania się właśnie treść romantyzmu polskiego 
i żyje ona bezpośrednio w duszy ich, i oni sami życiem swoim, całą nieprzymuszonością 
swego tworzenia dają świadectwo. W Cieszkowskim i Krasińskim znajdujemy bardziej 
zewnętrzną świadomość romantyzmu naszego i jego zdobyczy.20 
 
Through Mickiewicz, Słowacki, and Norwid, the essence of Polish Romanticism is re-
vealed and it unequivocally lives in their souls; they themselves testify through the story 
of their lives, through the unconstrainedness of their creation. In Cieszkowski and 
Krasiński we find a more external consciousness of our Romanticism and its achieve-
ments. 
 
Perceiving the period of Romanticism mainly as the domain of Mickiewicz, 
Słowacki, and Norwid, Brzozowski indicates that they create its substance, 
formed through time and crowned and enclosed in the works of Norwid: 
 
Norwid to otchłań światła, zbyt niezmącona, by już nawet wybuchem radości być miała; 
jest to jakieś zatopienie się światłości w sobie: niewzruszoność i cisza. 
I znowu Norwid jest wielką rękojmią. Bo romantyzm polski byłby czymś nieskończonym, 
jak gdyby nie zamkniętym i niedojrzałym, gdyby nie było w nim tej ciszy i tego spokoju.21  
 
Norwid contains an abundance of light, too undiluted as to be even an outbreak of joy; this 
is an immersion of lightness in and by itself: imperturbability and quietness. 
And then again Norwid is a great guarantee because Polish Romanticism would be incom-
plete, as if it were not concluded and not mature, were it not for his quietness and this 
tranquility. 
 
The dispute over Norwid’s status in the history of Polish literature seems to be 
never-ending. As in Brzozowski’s time, there are constant reevaluations of Nor-
wid’s poetry that not only stem from his ingenuity but also from the progression 
of literature generally, because, to aptly describe it, every age desires its own 
Norwid. Obviously, the ever-evolving status of Norwid in contemporary re-
search is also determined by literary history itself. Brzozowski’s interpretation of 
Norwid as a part of Romanticism is not the result of an excessively strict catego-
rization of the period, as making it so would ultimately cut off Norwid’s influ-
ence from Brzozowski and his contemporaries as well as later literature, thus 
changing the history of Polish poetry. Unquestionably, Brzozowski considers 
Norwid’s works a result of the buildup of contradictions and internal tensions in 
                                                             
20  Brzozowski, “Filozofia romantyzmu polskiego,” 397f.  
21  Ibid., 397. 
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nineteenth-century literature, although he also secures a special place for those 
works which cannot be described using traditional notions of literary history, just 
as Polish Romanticism cannot be described with them. Brzozowski states, 
 
Bo romantyzm nasz to nie szkoła literacka, nie kierunek artystyczny, nie coś przypadkowo 
powstałego i powierzchownego, lecz objawienie prawdy. Nie jest to konstrukcja umy-
słowa ani wizja poetycka – lecz prawda życia przez Słowo prześwietlonego.22 
 
Our Romanticism is not a literary school or an artistic direction and it has nothing superfi-
cial that occurs accidentally, but it is a revelation of truth. It is not a rational construction 
or a poetic vision, but the truth of a life that was illuminated by the Word. 
 
Regardless of the fact that Brzozowski’s opinions on literary history are explain-
able in the context of his ideological assumptions of an aesthetic utopia,23 they 
are also a result of treating literature and culture as a kind of totality beyond 
temporal considerations. From this perspective, the current examples that subor-
dinate Norwid to rigidly defined fields of literature may get muddled, yet the 
obligatory academic discourse has made us accustomed to finding commentary 
on Norwid in studies concerning either Romanticism or the literature of the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The need to organize aspects of Norwid’s 
poetry around the logic of an academic argument negates the inspiration emerg-
ing from Brzozowski’s thought. Yet, what if we attempt to move beyond the 
pattern of unequivocal assertions while staying within the realm of hypotheses 
that negotiate the status of the poet? I would like to make a reference to such an 
attempt by Janusz Maciejewski who shares Brzozowski’s point of view. 
Maciejewski claims that a crucial role in the formation of Norwid’s poetry is 
played by Romanticism and that which exceeds the boundaries of this period: 
 
Miejsce jego [Norwida] nie jest przed, ale obok pozytywizmu, między romantyzmem a 
modernizmem. Stanowił wariant literatury polskiej tej doby, nie boczny, ale centralny, 
bardziej może centralny niż sam pozytywizm, szybciej bowiem i dokładniej zbliżający się 
                                                             
22  Ibid., 401. 
23  See an elucidation of “idyllic topics” from Brzozowski’s considerations, accompanied 
by a summary of the studies on this subject, in an article by Maciej Gogler, “O myśle-
niu utopijnym Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [On Stanisław Brzozowski’s utopian 
thought], in Ostać się wobec chaosu. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Tomaszowi Le-
wandowskiemu, ed. Radosław Okulicz-Kozaryn and Mateusz Bourkane (Poznań: Wy-
dawn. Naukowe Uniw. im. Adama Mickiewicza, 2013), 135–151. 
Brzozowski and C. K. Norwid’s Legacy | 219 
do możliwości XX wieku: do symbolizmu, eksperymentów awangardowych, nowego 
klasycyzmu.24  
 
[Norwid’s] place is not prior to Positivism, but alongside it, between Romanticism and 
Modernism. He was a variant of the Polish literature of the times, though not in a second-
ary position, but a central one, maybe even more essential than Positivism itself since he 
approached the possibilities of the twentieth century more quickly and more neatly in 
regards to symbolism, avant-garde experiments, and new classicism. 
  
Therefore, the significance of Norwid appears here in the context of the im-
portant role of his poetry in the history of literature. Paradoxically, this is 
Przesmycki’s point of view, but in this particular case, the twentieth-century 
successors are the explorers of Norwid’s poetic originality. 
The importance of the studies on the relationship between Norwid and Ro-
manticism may be most fully illustrated through the influence of Zofia Stefa-
nowska’s seminal research. Her classic contributions “Norwid – pisarz wieku 
kupieckiego i przemysłowego” (Norwid: The Writer of a Mercantile and Indus-
trial Century) and “Norwidowski romantyzm” (Norwid’s Romanticism) are a 
general frame of reference for recent Norwid scholarship. They undoubtedly 
contributed to the broadening of our understanding of the period,25 but does the 
characteristic of Norwid’s poetical individuality as a nineteenth-century writer 
allow us to understand the universal meaning of his works? 
Certainly, these revisionary attempts remain a great opportunity for analyz-
ing Norwid based on Brzozowski’s interpretation; additionally, revisionists 
strive against periodization using Fernand Braudel’s concept of longue durée. 
Romanticism as a pivotal tradition of Polish literature, included in it as a compo-
nent of its contemporaneity, could participate in the co-creation of what modern 
                                                             
24  Janusz Maciejewski, Cyprian Norwid (Warszawa: PEN, 1992), 137. For more on this 
subject, see my article: Krzysztof Trybuś, “Jaki Norwid? (Między diagnozą a postu-
latem)” [Which Norwid? Between diagnostics and postulation], Poznańskie Studia 
Polonistyczne 4 (1997). 
25  Stefanowska’s essays remain in line with the tendency of Polish Romantic studies, 
emphasizing the significance of the great creative individual’s dialogue and the role of 
internal antinomies. See more on this issue in: Janion, “Badania nad romantyzmem 
polskim,” 133: “Polish Romanticism, which seemed to be speaking with a single 
voice, is returning today in shape of a polyphonic universe of the Great Dialogue. The 
restoration of the natural and internal dialogic character of Romanticism that reveals 
conversation as its fundamental structure became the highest ambition of Polish re-
search in this tendency.”  
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readings of Norwid as a poet of our times bring in accordance to Brzozowski’s 
claims.  
 
The Presence of the Absent 
 
Recalling Brzozowski’s absence in contemporary interpretations of Norwid, it is 
worth looking at “Testament Cypriana Norwida” (Cyprian Norwid’s Testament). 
Giving his own statement in the form of a “Testament,” Brzozowski centers Nor-
wid’s message in his works on three principal topics: (1) the notion of labor and 
its equivalence to creation, (2) attitudes towards Poland and (3) religiousness in 
Norwid’s poetry. As a consequence, most of the critical disputes over Norwid’s 
legacy were later concerned with how to interpret these three topics. They also 
constitute the common perspective that link the two poets and highlight the 
affiliation between their works. As Brzozowski states, 
 
Kulturą byłoby dla Norwida tylko to, co byłoby wynikiem własnej i swobodnej twórczości 
narodów. On, który pojmował jako krzywdę wyrządzoną polskiej sztuce krzywiznę i 
koszlawość każdej polskiej stodoły, patrzył na tę kwestię bardzo głęboko. 
Zresztą w Promethidionie wypowiada się on najzupełniej wyraźnie. Mówi on o tym, że 
jedną z największych klęsk życia kulturalnego jest całkowite odarcie pracy od twórczości 
[…]. Twórczość jest w stosunku do pracy momentem zwycięstwa, momentem narodzin 
godności osobistej.26  
 
Culture for Norwid would be only the result of the independent and free creativity of 
nations. He understood the crookedness and lopsidedness of every Polish barn as a harm 
done to Polish culture and looked at this issue very deeply. 
Besides, it is in Promethidion that he expresses himself most clearly. He says that one of 
the greatest disasters of cultural life is the complete separation of labor from creativity 
[…]. Relative to labor, creativity is a moment of victory, a moment of the birth of personal 
dignity. 
 
This comment reflects Brzozowski’s own opinions on the topic of labor—a key 
concept of his philosophy—and the organizing principle in his polemic against 
contemporary thought: “Niezrozumienie istoty pracy jest najbardziej chorym 
punktem myśli nowoczesnej”27 (The lack of understanding of the essence of labor 
is the most defective point in modern thought). 
                                                             
26  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Testament Cypriana Norwida,” in Kultura i życie, 220f. 
27  Brzozowski, Idee, 332. 
Brzozowski and C. K. Norwid’s Legacy | 221 
The context of Norwid in consideration of Brzozowski’s philosophy of labor 
became an important area of study in the history of ideas, as it situates Norwid’s 
thought within the context of the philosophy of Cieszkowski, Trentowski, and 
Libelt. This then undoubtedly connects Norwid with his own period and solidi-
fies the status of his works in history—maybe more in the history of philosophy 
and aesthetics than in that of literature. What is more, Norwid’s notion of labor 
became the cause of ideological simplification and even propagandic manipula-
tion. As a result, passages of Promethidion, which were intended to encourage 
labor, were stripped of their references to biblical tradition and ultimately ended 
up sounding like newspaper slogans. 
The strongest ideologization in the Norwid reception of the interwar and 
post-war periods covered such notions as the nation, the fatherland (ojczyzna), 
the relationship between Polish emigration and the homeland (kraj), and by 
extension the relationship between Europe and Poland. Brzozowski perceived all 
these accumulating layers of political influences by mentioning in “Testament 
Cypriana Norwida” the patriotism of the “all Poles”: 
 
Ale patriotyzm wszechpolaków nie ma nic wspólnego z patriotyzmem romantyków i 
emigrantów naszych – dla nich Polska była ideą, a więc krajem i narodem, który miał się 
stać wyrazem tego wszystkiego, co człowiek zdoła stworzyć, wydobyć z siebie pięknego i 
wzniosłego.28 
 
But the all Poles’ patriotism has nothing in common with the patriotism of our Romantics 
and emigrants, for them Poland was an idea, and, hence, a country and a nation that was 
supposed to become the expression of everything that a man could create and of every-
thing beautiful and sublime he could draw out of himself. 
 
This passage sounds relevant even today; in relation to the reflections on Nor-
wid’s works, it indicates the inevitability of the collision between its message 
and Polish nationalist thought.  
The most spectacular testimony to this collision could be Zygmunt Wasilew-
ski’s book on Norwid from 1935 in which he compiled his articles on the poet 
published over several years in the journal Myśl Narodowa (National Thought). 
One influential essay focuses on Norwid’s Masurian origin and how it deter-
mines the spiritual aspects of his poetry. Wasilewski states that, “the primitive-
ness of the Masurian spirit was a definite asset of Norwid’s poetry.”29 Kazimierz 
                                                             
28  Brzozowski, “Testament Cypriana Norwida,” 222. 
29  Zygmunt Wasilewski, Norwid (Warszawa: Skład Główny w Administracji Myśli 
Narodowej, 1935), 35.  
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Wyka, disputing Wasilewski’s theses in the magazine Droga (Path), points to the 
conceptual consequences of such assumptions by linking the poet’s works—
favorably characterized in an axiological manner—with national indigenous-
ness.30 According to Wasilewski, Norwid’s more than thirty-year Parisian period 
represents a time of the poet’s decline even though such works as Quidam, 
Vade-mecum, Aktor (Actor), Tyrtej (Tyrtaeus), Kleopatra i Cezar (Cleopatra and 
Caesar), and Pierścień Wielkiej Damy (The Ring of a Grand Lady) were written 
during this period. This was thus a time when Norwid became the Norwid who 
would turn out to be the precursor of contemporary European poetry. However, a 
reduction of Norwid’s universal significance solely to the Polish backwoods is 
not consistent with Norwid’s writings. In the poem “Moja ojczyzna” (My Fa-
therland), he wrote for instance: 
 
Naród mię żaden nie zbawił, nie stworzył; 
Wieczność pamiętam przed wiekiem, 
Klucz Dawidowy usta mi otworzył, 
 Rzym nazwał człekiem.31 
 
No nation fashioned or saved me; 
I recall eternity’s span; 
David’s key unlocked my lips, 
 Rome called me a man. 
 
The most revealing aspect of “Testament Cypriana Norwida” is the issue of 
religiousness: 
 
Ideał swobody, ideał czysto ludzkiej, swobodnej kultury opierał się u Norwida na całym 
systemacie teologicznym. 
Był on jednym z ostatnich chyba ojców kościoła. 
Teologia Norwidowska jest ciekawa i godna uwagi w nie mniejszym stopniu niż filozofia 
Platona np. albo Boehmego […]  
Osamotnienie dziejowe wytworzyło w Norwidzie, i nie tylko w Norwidzie, stan duszy, w 
którym ideał tak głęboko ludzki, jak powstanie kultury, będącej wyrazem swobody pracy, 
stwarzającej własne idee i podstawy, przerastającej w twórczość, ukazywał mu się jako 
                                                             
30  Kazimierz Wyka, Cyprian Norwid. Studia, artykuły, recenzje [Cyprian Norwid. Stu-
dies, articles, reviews] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989), 217–223; idem, 
“Zygmunt Wasilewski: Norwid,” Droga 2 (1935): 185f. 
31  Norwid, Pisma wszystkie [Complete works], vol. 1, 336. See translation by Adam 
Czerniawski in: Cyprian K. Norwid, Selected Poems (London: Anvil Press, 2004), 41.  
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wynik woli pozaludzkiej, w każdym razie ponadludzkiej mocy. Dla Norwida była wiara w 
tę nową, na swobodzie pracy opartą Polskę – cząstką wiary religijnej.32 
 
Norwid’s ideal of freedom, of a purely human and free culture, was based on a whole 
theological system.  
He was one of the last Church Fathers. 
Norwid’s theology is worth attention and it is no less interesting than the philosophy of 
Plato or let’s say Boehme […] 
The historical isolation created in Norwid—although not only in Norwid—a state of mind, 
in which an ideal so profoundly human, like the emergence of a culture, the expression of 
the freedom of labor, that would create its own ideas and foundation and that would 
evolve into creativity, seemed to him to be the result of a transhuman, or at least superhu-
man, force. For Norwid faith in this new Poland through labor was a part of his religious 
faith. 
 
Both writers have similar ideas when rooting the notion of labor in Christian 
tradition. Brzozowski perfectly recognizes this integral part of Norwid’s legacy 
in its religious foundations. Calling the poet “one of the last Church Fathers” 
entails a symbolic meaning, which is not necessarily clear and it does not match 
the doctrine of contemporary patristics. Unquestionably, just as in present times, 
the emphasis in such a metaphore is placed on the righteousness of the religious 
doctrine (doctrina orthodoxa), the common acknowledgement of its adherents 
(approbatio ecclesiae) grounded in the sanctity of their lives (sanctitas vitae), as 
well as on recollections of the authority of ancient times, which remains im-
portant in this case (antiquitas). From early Christianity just after the Apostolic 
Age up to the beginning of the Middle Ages, but before the schisms of Chris-
tianity, the Church Fathers proclaimed that the sources of their faith were rooted 
in tradition as the central pillar of religious doctrine. 
Norwid’s religious righteousness is emphasized by Brzozowski in his earlier 
Filozofia romantyzmu polskiego where he distinguishes religious ideas in Nor-
wid from the messianic reflections of other Romantics. Perhaps even today, this 
hypothesis remains crucial for the significance of Norwid’s teaching, as dis-
cussed by Stefanowska, 
 
[…] because the Norwid dilemma cannot be limited to the fact that the poet was religious, 
as some could claim, and thus, keen on reading the world and history in terms of a set of 
signs created by God. Many Polish Positivists were “privately” religious writers. Norwid 
is religious in a different way, because it is through Romanticism that he is so. Since 
                                                             
32  Brzozowski, “Testament Cypriana Norwida,” 224. 
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Romantic devoutness is expansive and possessive, it cannot be confined to the private 
sphere; it conquers every domain of reflection in the world—from politics to the railways, 
and from the arts to the faits divers column. The religiousness that is oriented towards a 
totally deified vision of the world probably represents the most characteristic feature of 
Norwid, but we should also add that the poet remains within the boundaries of orthodoxy, 
his religiousness is not subjected (or it is rarely subjected) to individual transformations. It 
is more static than the religiousness of the Romantics from the previous generation, which 
gravitated toward heterodoxy.33 
 
In many studies, the limits of Norwid’s orthodoxy were disputed since his reli-
giousness, just like his works, was always in flux—a fact that is not discussed in 
Stefanowska. Dealing with the evolution of Norwid’s faith, Zofia Trojanowi-
czowa emphasizes the evident presence of utopian and messianic topics in his 
works during the revolutionary period of 1848. She claims “such a statement 
may provoke objections, since the messianic perspective is often called into 
question by scholars of Norwid’s works who are keen on finding fragments that 
are critical of messianism in his writings.”34 
These arguments concerning Norwid’s faith, which were formulated many 
years ago without the slightest mention of Brzozowski (although they are often 
surprisingly consistent with his discoveries), are returning today in crucial publi-
cations on Norwid’s works. An example would be Perspektywiczność sacrum. 
Studia o Norwidowskim romantyzmie35 (The Sacred in Perspective: Studies on 
Norwid’s Romanticism) by Arent van Nieukerken, in which Brzozowski is not 
mentioned neither. Nevertheless, a reader of certain Norwid poems may make 
use of Brzozowski’s remarks on the poet’s religiousness, which often give a 
                                                             
33  Zofia Stefanowska, “Norwidowski romantyzm” [Norwid’s romanticism], in Strona 
romantyków. Studia o Norwidzie (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniw. 
Lubelskiego, 1993), 70. 
34  See Zofia Trojanowiczowa, “Cypriana Norwida mesjanizm sztuki, czyli o poszu-
kiwaniu wszechdoskonałości” [Cyprian Norwid’s messianism of art, or On the quest 
for perfection], in Studia Polonistyczne 14/15 (1986). Broader documentation of this 
approach may be found in Zofia Trojanowiczowa, Ostatni spór romantyczny. Cyprian 
Norwid – Julian Klaczko [The last romantic controversy. Cyprian Norwid—Julian 
Klaczko] (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1981). See a polemical re-
view of this book in: Grażyna Halkiewicz-Sojak, “Spór o mesjanizm Norwida” [The 
dispute on Norwid’s messianism], in Studia Norwidiana 2 (1984). 
35  Arent van Nieukerken, Perspektywiczność sacrum. Studia o Norwidowskim roman-
tyzmie (Warszawa: Instytut Badań Literackich PAN, 2007).  
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more accurate interpretation.36 Stanisław Barańczak once argued that Norwid 
was like an unseen presence for later Polish poetry—the less the patron’s pres-
ence is visible, the more it is determinative of his successors.37 Could it then be 
that the same goes for Brzozowski being a patron of later Norwid scholarship?  
Norwid’s religiousness in his poetry determined how he was received by 
Polish audiences. It is worth recalling some instances of this, such as the PRL’s 
use of Norwid in its propaganda, which proclaimed through academic banners 
that the Polish nation exists as our common obligation, as well as the emphatic 
reading of Norwid by Karol Wojtyła—the priest and the poet. The Institute for 
the Study of Cyprian Norwid’s Works at the John Paul II Catholic University of 
Lublin has constantly and patiently contributed to the recognition of Norwid’s 
poetry; and along with this, the Colloquia Norwidiana, a series of conferences 
organized by Professor Stefan Sawicki and his students, has been a framework 
for interdisciplinary research among literary scholars, linguists, art historians, 
philosophers, and religious studies scholars. 
The problem of Norwid’s religiousness, as described by Stefanowska, often 
appears in the form of two diametrically differing tendencies. In one, religious 
meaning is simply eliminated, which seems especially drastic regarding studies 
concerned with Norwid’s values.38 The other tendency is on the contrary a scien-
tific approach that confines Norwid to the illustrator of obvious truths in faith. A 
large number of articles on Norwid’s religiousness do not explain in what it 
                                                             
36  See an example of such a situation in an interesting fragment of parson Antoni Du-
najski’s reflections, which are somewhat an exception to the rule. They include 
Brzozowski’s classifications of the status of tragedy in the work of Norwid. Antoni 
Dunajski, Chrześcijańska interpretacja dziejów w pismach Cypriana Norwida [A 
Christian interpretation of history in Cyprian Norwid’s works] (Lublin: Redakcja Wy-
dawnictw Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1985), 114.   
37  Stanisław Barańczak, “Norwid: obecność nieobecnego” [Norwid: the presence of the 
absent], in Tablica z Macondo. Osiemnaście prób wytłumaczenia, po co i dlaczego się 
pisze (London: Aneks, 1990), 89–105. Cf. also id., “Norwid nie chce podpisać volks-
listy” [Norwid does not want to sign the volksliste], in Przed i po. Szkice o poezji 
krajowej przełomu lat siedemdziesiątych i osiemdziesiątych (London: Aneks, 1988). 
38  See the critical outline of Edward Kasperski’s book, Świat wartości Norwida [Nor-
wid’s world of values] (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1981), in 
Andrzej Tyszczyk, Studia Norwidiana 4 (1984): 98–104 (he states that, “in a work 
containing over 350 pages that are fully dedicated to the subject of the poet’s axiol-
ogy, there is almost nothing about the concept of the arts or the human being funda-
mental for that axiology, and nothing about the original idea of Christianity, which is 
elementary for the poet’s world view.”). 
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differs from the treatment of religion, e.g., in the writings of Henryk Sienkie-
wicz. 
More attention needs to be paid to the context of Catholic modernism, so 
present in Brzozowski’s reading of Norwid. Could there be someone with the 
courage to ask about such issues as faith and a Catholic worldview in order to 
return Norwidian literary criticism into the religious sphere of the poet’s values? 
Such audacity is characteristic of Brzozowski, though not for merely stating that 
religion is “a factor of cultural, historical, and social isolation,”39 but for being a 
religious thinker and author of the foreword to the works of Cardinal Newman. 
Have we already exhausted the topic of Norwid’s romantic religiousness as 
described by Stefanowska as his “totally deified vision of the world”? 
In fact, Norwid was not the only nineteenth-century writer whom Brzozow-
ski called “Church Father”:  
 
Taki np. Lamennais lub nawet Renan, w pierwszych wiekach chrześcijaństwa mogliby 
być obrońcami i ojcami kościoła. Dogmaty i legendy religijne mogą iść w zapomnienie, 
lecz dopóki pozostanie szczere i gorące uczucie religijne, dopóty i sama istota religii 
pozostanie nietknięta, gdyż religia jest “Bogiem odczutym przez serce” – jak mówi Pas-
cal, a Bóg ten odczuwany jest głęboko przez serca tęskniące za Nim w krwawej męce, 
jaką sprawia im pustka, szerzona naokół przez umysł badawczy i chłodny.40 
 
Thus, someone like Lamennais or even Renan could have been defenders and Church 
Fathers in the first few centuries in the history of Christianity. Religious dogmas and 
legends can fall into oblivion, but as long as an honest and ardent religious feeling re-
mains, the very essence of religion will remain unaffected because religion is “God felt by 
the heart,” as Pascal states, and this God is felt deeply by the hearts that long for Him in 
the bloody ordeal that was brought to them by the emptiness which the inquiring and cold 
mind sows. 
 
Along with Amiel, Towiański, Newman, as well as Blondel and Loisy, there is 
no doubt that Norwid, too, is an important guide for Brzozowski on his path to 
the discovery that “every man finds God within his own fate, and not in an ab-
stract, transcendent space in a vertical dimension.”41 Is there any chance in the 
                                                             
39  “[…] czynnikiem izolacji kulturalnej, dziejowej, społecznej […].” Legenda Młodej 
Polski, 90f. 
40  Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy, 149. 
41  Tomasz Lewandowski, “Młodopolski modernizm katolicki” [Young Poland’s Cath-
olic modernism], in Spotkania młodopolskie (Poznań: Wydawnictwo “Poznańskie 
Studia Polonistyczne”, 2005), 43. 
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studies on Brzozowski’s religiousness of a symbolic return to Café Greco—the 
one from the novel Ad leones!, and from Miłosz’s poem “Caffé Greco,” where 
Miłosz talks to Jerzy Turowicz about his juvenile reading of Maritain? Will we 
encounter there the “others,” the “[n]oble minded,” the “great[s],” “[t]hose who 
gave testimony to their faith,”42 and among many of them Brzozowski and Nor-
wid? 
The phenomenon of the presence of the absent described here appears espe-
cially in the studies of Norwid’s poetic language. Brzozowski, remarking on the 
poet’s style in the famous text “Cyprian Norwid. Próba” (Cyprian Norwid: An 
Essay), outlines the most significant areas of reflection on Norwid’s aesthetics—
an aesthetics of silence and the sublime, of fragments and the whole, of memory 
and oblivion. Initiating his reflection with the statement, “utwory Norwida są jak 
mowa ruin”43 (Norwid’s works are like ruins talking)—he not only indicates the 
most crucial image and topic of Norwid as a romantic poet, but also discovers 
the mystery of the Word in the poet:  
 
Thanks to the author of “Próba” and “Testament,” two highly important currents of read-
ing Norwid’s works in the period of Young Poland may be taken into account. One of 
them is founded on worship, the other on comprehension. […] The better understanding of 
Norwid’s works was to serve his own expressive style of understanding, popularizing the 
mythic style. In both of Brzozowski’s critical texts on Norwid, the highest regard and 
admiration for the forgotten author is plainly noticeable. It may be observed both on the 
surface of the works, directly explained, and in many parts of Testament or in the voice of 
a critic, expressing himself indirectly, when he talks about his intertextual attitude towards 
Norwid’s language—as in the critical poems from the fourth and the seventh chapter of 
“Próba.”44 
                                                             
42  Czesław Miłosz, New and Collected Poems, 1931–2001 (New York: Harper Collins, 
2003), 466. 
43  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Cyprian Norwid. Próba,” [Cyprian Norwid. An Essay], in 
Kultura i życie, 149. 
44  Piotr Wierzchosławski, “Norwid odczytywany przez Brzozowskiego: Cyprian Nor-
wid. Próba oraz Testament Cypriana Norwida” [Norwid read by Brzozowski], in 
Dwór mający w sobie osoby i mózgi rozmaite. Studia z dziejów literatury i kultury, ed. 
Barbara Sienkiewicz and Barbara Judkowiak (Poznań: Nakom, 1991), 190f. Wierz-
chosławski is referring to the critical opinion of Kazimierz Wyka who focuses on the 
classification of Norwid as a “poet of ruins” in Brzozowski’s “Próba.” In a contempo-
rary perspective it is obvious that the author of Quidam did not follow the style that 
was initiated in Les Ruines, ou méditations sur les révolutions des empires by Volney 
(Wyka accurately indicates the fallacy of this poetic clue), the topic and motif of ruins 
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It is necessary to add to Wierzchosławski’s accurate remarks that Brzozowski 
makes use of intertextuality in his discourse, and he then demonstrates it also as 
a fundamental feature of Norwid’s style as shown by later research.45 The spe-
cific phenomenology of ruins in “Próba” allows Wierzchosławski not only to 
address Norwid’s historicism—“the essence of the ruins is the presence of the 
ages. Who wakes the ruins, wakes the ages” (ruin istotą jest obecność wieków. 
Kto ruiny budzi, wieki budzi)46—but also to take into consideration the recol-
lections of old words, and hence a special style that places words into a historical 
setting. Brzozowski argues this when stating, “Słowo Norwida jest jak odpo-
wiedź wieków na pytanie trafunku. Jest jak wieki omszone, poważne i nieprze-
widziane”47 (Norwid’s word is like the ages’ answer to the question of coinci-
dence. Just like the ages, it is moss-covered, serious, and unforeseen.) More 
recent research has classified Norwid’s archaic poetics in three ways: (1) as a 
tool to render the most precise description of his poetic diction; (2) the omni-
present recognition of the theme of old age; (3) the special status of allegory. 
Each of these points may then be considered as a continuation of the hermeneu-
tic insights of “Próba” which still need to be further discussed in the criticism on 
Norwid.  
In a way, Brzozowski’s interpretation of Norwid is similar to Walter Benja-
min’s use of the ruin allegory in which he discusses the birth of modernity and 
the subsequent disintegration of cultural discourse. As with Benjamin, Norwid 
uses allegory as a means of referencing old quotes, creating something from the 
remains of a vanished culture, and recalling the past as boundless. Brzozowski 
was one of the first of Norwid’s readers to note what would later be termed by 
                                                             
in the works of Norwid are transformed originally and compose his own aesthetics of 
ruins (also appearing in art works by the poet); see more on that issue, among others, 
in a survey by Grażyna Królikiewicz, Terytorium ruin. Ruina jako obraz i temat ro-
mantyczny [The territory of ruins. The ruin as romantic image and topic] (Kraków: 
Universitas, 1993), 123–133. See also Michał Głowiński, “Intertekstualność w mło-
dopolskiej krytyce literackiej” [Intertextuality in the literary criticism of Young Po-
land], Pamiętnik Literacki 4 (1989).  
45  See references to the works of Norwid in the classic essay by Michał Głowiński, “O 
intertekstualności” [On intertextuality], Pamiętnik Literacki 4 (1980). See also, from 
more recent studies: Krzysztof Trybuś, “Po co Homer. O poematach dygresyjnych 
Cypriana Norwida” [Why Homer? On Norwid’s digressive poems], in Między tek-
stami. Intertekstualność jako problem poetyki historycznej, ed. Jerzy Ziomek, Janusz 
Sławiński, Michał Głowiński (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1992). 
46  Brzozowski, “Cyprian Norwid. Próba,” 149 
47  Ibid. 
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Hans-Georg Gadamer the “rehabilitation of allegory.”48 Norwid was aiming at a 
rehabilitation of existence in its ephemeral dimension. In his continuous tran-
scription of reality he evokes old images that acquire the status of cultural ar-
chetypes. By emphasizing the extent of antiquity, Brzozowski argues against 
Young Poland’s interpretation of Norwid; he emphasizes the distance between 
the writer and French symbolism as it contrasts with Norwid’s use of archaic 
modes of discourse, the primacy of the theme, and the idea of the historical 
nature of human existence.49 
At least two more of Brzozowski’s hermeneutic insights could contribute to 
finding new ground in Norwid studies, this goes especially for the interpretations 
concerned with the poet himself and his essence: “[…] zbyt lekkim określeniem 
jest powiedzieć, że był poetą albo myślicielem ruin, był on duszą ruin. Ruiną był 
sam we wnętrzu swoim” (It is a bit simplistic to say that he was a poet or thinker 
of ruins, he was the soul of ruins. He himself was a ruin within).50 
The other topic that still remains insufficiently developed in Norwid studies 
is the role and meaning of memory, which is often indicated in “Próba”: 
 
Bo ruiny porasta pleśń: niepamięć o samym sobie. Bo bierze je w posiadanie cisza, co 
nazbyt ciszą jest, by siebie znała. I by siebie sobie przypomnieć, trzeba coś zwalić; i to się 
tylko pozna, co się skruszy. 
Mową ruin jest tylko zniszczenie. Idąc w perzynę, dochodzą do głosu. I gdy się w nich 
ozwać coś chce, mówi: „byłem”.51 
 
Because mold grows on the ruins: an oblivion to itself. Because silence will take posses-
sion of it, a silence that is too silent to know itself. And to remember something, one must 
knock over something; and only that can be recognized that collapses. 
Ruins’ talk is only destruction. Crumbling to ashes, they obtain a voice. And when some-
thing wants to talk in them, it says: “I was.” 
 
And one more fragment: 
 
 
                                                             
48  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. 2nd edition (London, New York: Continu-
um, 2006), 69. 
49  Cf.: Arent van Nieukerken, “O niewczesności Norwida, dwóch modernizmach i 
Miłoszu” [On Norwid’s timelessness, two modernisms, and Miłosz], Teksty Drugie 6 
(1995).   
50  Brzozowski, “Cyprian Norwid. Próba,” 151. 
51  Ibid., 150. 
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Ruiny wspominają: 
Zniszczenie ożywia w nich pamięć. 
Każde słowo, każde stąpnięcie budzi echo 
Krok głupca odbija się w mądrości wieków. Czy nie jest to styl opowiadań czy nowel 
Norwida? 
Ruiny są ironiczne. 
Wszystko, co nie dla wieków jest ośmiesza się, kiedy w wieki wchodzi. 
Lecz jest ironia dziwna: szydzi spokojem. Jest zbyt mądra, by gniew miała w sobie. 
Można rzec, że jest w niej wyrzut: dlaczego przechodniem być chcesz tylko, dlaczego 
przechodniem? Gościnę mamy dla wieków, budowały ją wieki: dziecię wieków, czemu 
chcesz być tułaczem jednej godziny? 
Ironii Norwida połysk jest jakby mimowolny: tak szydzić musi zwierciadło, co bohaterów 
widziało, gdy się odbija w nim błazen.52 
 
Ruins remember:  
Destruction revives their memory. 
Every word, every step wakes an echo. 
The fool’s step resounds in the wisdom of the ages. Are they not the style of Norwid’s 
stories or novels? 
Ruins are ironic. 
Everything that is not predestined for the ages is laughed at when it enters the ages. 
But this is a strange irony—it mocks through silence. It is too wise to cherish anger. 
One can say that there is a blame in it: why do you only want to be a passerby, why a 
passerby? We have hospitality for ages, we prepared it for ages: child of the ages, why do 
you want to be one hour’s wanderer? 
The shine of Norwid’s irony is seemingly involuntary: thus a mirror is mocking when it is 
reflecting a jester although it saw heroes. 
 
Unlike the issue of Norwidian irony that has been extensively explored in cur-
rent research, the problem of memory described by Brzozowski as the most 
crucial feature of the poet’s style still awaits a monograph. The role of memory 
in Norwid’s works had been emphasized in Brzozowski’s time by Cezary 
Jellenta who wrote, “The mind of Norwid is like an acquisitive museum, aiming 
to own all the treasures of ruins and excavations.”53 
Referring to a distinction established Jan Assmann, we can state that Nor-
wid’s poetic imagination constantly moves between biographical memory, which 
                                                             
52  Ibid., 155. 
53  Cezary Jellenta, Cyprian Norwid. Szkic syntezy [Cyprian Norwid. A synthetic sketch] 
(Warszawa: E. Wende i Sp., 1909), 98. 
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records the experiences of its own fate, and collective memory54 as the basis of 
the Polish emigrant community. Figures of memory form this imagination and 
incorporate images of the past in the poet’s presence, which leads to a continu-
ous reconstruction of these images. Reading Norwid may become a reconstruc-
tion of different kinds of memory⎯one of creation referring to the very 
beginnings of history, another of Rome as a particular memory of place, a 
memory of allegory that implies the existence of a common range of meanings 
established in the past, and then a memory of death bringing up images of cessa-
tion and commemoration encouraging the self-examination of a waning life. 
Can Brzozowski’s Pamiętnik (Diary) be regarded as an attempt at self-ex-
amination in its retention and commemoration of fading thought? Writing about 
the light discovered by Newman underneath a layer of darkness (and his phrase 
“I know, I know”), did he remember the motto from Promethidion memorializing 
through the promise of a future encounter “on the route of white suns”55 the 
death of the poet’s friend? Brzozowski noticed that the light coming out of the 
bottom of our soul “pozostaje w łączności ze słońcem niegasnącym” (remains in 
communion with the undying sun). And the last words, linked with this fragment 
in Pamiętnik, refer to memory, “nie zapomnieć, nie utracać z oczu tego I know, I 
know”56 (One must not forget, not lose from sight this I know, I know). 
 
 
  
                                                             
54  On the distinction of biographical and foundational memory, see: Jan Assmann, 
Pamięć kulturowa. Pismo, zapamiętywanie i polityczna tożsamość w cywilizacjach 
starożytnych [Cultural memory: scripture, commemoration, and political identity in 
early high cultures], trans. Anna Kryczyńska-Pham, ed. Robert Traba (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2008), 67. Assmann’s reflections on the 
“culture of memory” (Erinnerungskultur), have inspired my reading of Norwid, in: 
Krzysztof Trybuś, Pamięć romantyzmu. Studia nie tylko z przeszłości [Romantic me-
mory. Studies not only on the past] (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2011), 
178–221. 
55  Cyprian Norwid, Promethidion, in Pisma wszystkie, ed. Juliusz W. Gomulicki, vol. 3, 
425. 
56  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 190. 
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Brzozowskianism: The Trouble with the 
“Great” Brzozowski and His Followers 
Dorota Kozicka 
 
 
References to Brzozowski as an author who had enough courage and critical 
power to tackle the reality of his times and rework dominant worldviews have 
appeared almost continually for more than a century, which has invariably trig-
gered heated debates on his actual ideological stances. This problem has been 
repeatedly debated, including in one of my own earlier texts which argues for the 
special place of Brzozowski within the landscape of Polish literary criticism.1 
The critics and intellectuals who have taken up Brzozowski’s thought and have 
treated his texts as a benchmark for their own intellectual work are usually re-
ferred to as brzozowczycy—“Brzozowskists”—and although today the term has a 
slightly outdated ring, it has preserved its positive meaning. A very different 
case is brzozowszczyzna, “Brzozowskianism,” a notion that I would like to ana-
lyze here more closely by looking at the elements of Brzozowski’s life and work 
                                                             
1  A bibliography of texts which analyse Brzozowski’s influence on Polish intelligentsia 
can be found in Krzysztof Fiołek’s article “Kłopotliwa obecność Stanisława Brzozow-
skiego w kilku przygodach ideologicznych inteligencji polskiej” [Stanisław Brzozow-
ski’s troublesome presence in several ideological adventures of the Polish intelligent-
sia], Ruch Literacki 4/5 (2005): 383–392. Cf. also Marian Stępień, “Spór o spuściznę 
po Stanisławie Brzozowskim w latach 1918–1939” [The controversy about Stanisław 
Brzozowski’s legacy in 1918–1939] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1976); Ma-
ciej Urbanowski, “Brzozowski i powojenna krytyka literacka. Uwagi wstępne” [Brzo-
zowski and post-war literary criticism: preliminary remarks], Dekada Literacka 4 
(2008); Dorota Kozicka, “Brzozowski – pobożne życzenie krytyki” [Brzozowski: cri-
ticisms’ wishful thinking], in Dorota Kozicka, Krytyczne (nie)porządki. Studia o 
współczesnej krytyce literackiej w Polsce [Critical (dis)ordering: Studies on contem-
porary literary criticism in Poland] (Kraków: Universitas, 2012). 
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which gave the term its connotations, and, above all, at its actual meaning. Has it 
changed throughout history, or does it rather, like żeromszczyzna (Żeromskian-
ism), contain a fixed set of characteristics understood relatively unambiguously 
by all? Seemingly obvious as it is (after all, we do feel intuitively what could be 
meant by this notion), the matter becomes more complicated once we take a 
closer look at the specific context in which the term of brzozowszczyzna is used. 
A literary critic testifies to its vague, nondescript character stating that when 
“[l]ooking for the acolytes of brzozowszczyzna, however understood, it is worth-
while to ask about critics from outside this circle, i.e., those not reading, not sus-
ceptible to, not in dialogue with, not fascinated by the heritage of the author of 
Legenda Młodej Polski.”2 
On the other hand, this notion can also be found in unambiguous contexts 
such as when used with a particular meaning in mind as argued by Maciej Ur-
banowski who states that “there was Brzozowski, and there was brzozow-
szczyzna,” which thus distinguishes the work of Brzozowski from its imitations, 
them being either inept or cynical.3 When later asked in an interview for Fronda 
(Fronde) “What would brzozowszczyzna look like today?”, Urbanowski replied 
as follows: 
 
Of course, it is hard to speak here of any normative formula. Of a correctly or incorrectly 
understood brzozowszczyzna. In any case, the very word brzozowszczyzna sounds pejo-
rative and condescending. Certainly, there will not be a new Brzozowski, a second or third 
                                                             
2  Anna Legeżyńska, “Fantazja lekturowa o nie-czytelniku Brzozowskiego” [A reader’s 
fantasy about a non-reader of Brzozowski], in “Ostać się wobec chaosu”. Prace ofiaro-
wane Profesorowi Tomaszowi Lewandowskiemu [“To survive in the face of chaos”: 
Studies to honor professor Tomasz Lewandowski] (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
UAM, 2013), 288. 
3  “Czy jest koniunktura na Brzozowskiego? Ze Sławomirem Sierakowskim i Maciejem 
Urbanowskim rozmawia Cezary Michalski” [Is Brzozowski fashionable? Sławomir 
Sierakowski and Maciej Urbanowski in conversation with Cezary Michalski], in: 
Brzozowski. Przewodnik krytyki politycznej (Warszawa: Krytyka Polityczna, 2011), 
61. The full context of this sentence is as follows: “The last such attempt of using him 
was, I think, Kornhauser’s and Zagajewski’s Świat nieprzedstawiony [The unrepre-
sented world], and then Andrzej Pawluczuk’s Rozbiory [Construals]. The latter was 
sharply criticised by Tomasz Burek, who called it a caricature of Brzozowski’s 
method. I do not know whether this critique was deserved, but certainly in our litera-
ture there were many rentiers who cashed up, conveniently and usually with impunity, 
on the thought of the author of Płomienie [Flames]. There was Brzozowski, and there 
was brzozowszczyzna […].” 
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Brzozowski. Surely, Czapliński to some extent refers to Brzozowski, but he puts his 
emphasis on the progressive, Promethean Brzozowski, the one who “exchanges” Poland 
for a different Poland, “liberated” from the burden of tradition, religion. What shall remain 
for us of this exchange? Not much, I am afraid. But there is also for example the already-
mentioned Tomasz Burek, who refers to the late Brzozowski, already clearly detached 
from that Polish progressivism, those sorry Youngbloods4 reading at breakfast American 
feminists and French philosophers. Thus, Burek is trying to find a trend in the Polish 
tradition, which, starting from 1905, has combined revolutionary and national, political 
and metaphysical tendencies. Perhaps this is our alternative to leftist brzozowszczyzna, this 
shows us how to read literature today and what kind of Polishness to think about.5 
 
In Urbanowski’s statements, the meaning of the term in question is clearly lim-
ited to such reading as the imitation of or fascination with Brzozowski’s works 
(to briefly recall Legeżyńska’s enumeration), which, according to the Kraków-
based scholar, is not in line with the thoughts or intentions of Brzozowski him-
self. Although it certainly seems open to question how this very “unorthodoxy” 
can be identified (a problem I will return to later in this essay), here it is worth 
noticing that Urbanowski’s emphasis on the pejorative meaning of brzozow-
szczyzna corresponds to the common understanding of such name derivatives in 
Polish. The dictionary Słownik poprawnej polszczyzny (Dictionary of Correct 
Polish) defines the meaning of the -izna and -yzna suffixes, which feature nouns 
derived from adjectives and nouns, with reference to three semantic categories. 
The first of these is in combination with the names of countries, 
 
[…] a language, or a set of features of a given country (i.e., fashion, mentality, manner of 
being), as in polszczyzna, francuszczyzna, niemczyzna [derivatives from the Polish names 
for Poland, France, and Germany respectively]. In the case of nouns derived from qualita-
tive adjectives, they [these suffixes] add to the lexical base a sense of gluttony or excess, 
i.e., jaskrawizna [from jaskrawy, gaudy (of a colour)], szarzyzna [from szary, grey (dull)], 
dłużyzna [from długi, long (in a temporal sense)]. In the case of derivatives from personal 
proper names, they create names of intellectual, artistic, or political formations repre-
                                                             
4  The Youngbloods (Polish “Młodziakowie”) were a fictional progressive Polish family 
of the interwar period, portrayed by Witold Gombrowicz in his novel Ferdydurke. 
Their name has since been used by critics to refer to the thoughtless following of new 
trends. 
5  “Religijny i metafizyczny socjalista. Tomasz Rowiński rozmawia z Maciejem Urba-
nowskim” [A religious and metaphysical socialist. Maciej Urbanowski in conver-
sation with Tomasz Rowiński], Fronda 65/4 (2012). http://www.pismofronda.pl/ 
religijny-i-metafizyczny-socjalista 
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sented by their authors, e.g., towiańszczyzna, wyspiańszczyzna, żeromszczyzna [from To-
wiański, Wyspiański, and Żeromski respectively], and they are often marked negatively.6 
 
What is worth considering in reference to this dictionary definition is whether 
the third category does not also contain the connotations of the previous two. It 
is in this sense that I would like to discuss brzozowszczyzna in this paper. 
 
Brzozowskianism vs. Brzozowski  
 
As soon as it was coined, the label brzozowszczyzna was used to refer to Brzo-
zowski’s works and/or his imitators and followers. In the case of Brzozowski’s 
supporters, these two usages are disjunctive, while for his adversaries, his influ-
ence on readers becomes an important argument for opposing him. In his famous 
text “Brzozowski jako wychowawca” (Brzozowski as an Educator), Ludwik 
Fryde concludes his analysis of the educational consequences of Legenda Młodej 
Polski and other writings by Brzozowski as follows: 
 
Brzozowszczyzna is a cultural ailment no less dangerous than żeromszczyzna. This ideol-
ogy does not lack consistency or even historical intuition—it is partial truth, yet based on 
a fundamental lie. For it is unwittingly assumed that one has the unquestionable right of 
leadership of the people. The intelligentsia believes that its irresponsible protests in the 
name of humanitarianism are permissible, and when it abandons all scruples, it thinks that 
it is allowed to seek power by all means, and retain it at any cost. And hence, brzozow-
szczyzna is a reflection of żeromszczyzna. It creates, despite the apparent power and con-
sistency of its ideological program, a school of political hysteria, a school of social merce-
narism.7  
 
Writing in Nowe Drogi (New Ways), an ideological organ of the Polish Work-
ers’ Party and the Polish United Workers’ Party, Paweł Hofman takes a different 
position than Fryde, stating, 
 
                                                             
6  Andrzej Markowski, ed., Słownik poprawnej polszczyzny PWN (Warszawa: PWN, 
2010), 153.  
7  Ludwik Fryde, “Brzozowski jako wychowawca (Z powodu wydania Legendy Młodej 
Polski)” [Brzozowski as an educator (Upon the occasion of the publication of Le-
genda Młodej Polski)], Ateneum 1 (1938). Quoted after the reprint in: Jest Bóg, żyje 
prawda. Inna twarz Stanisława Brzozowskiego, ed. Maciej Urbanowski (Kraków: 
Fronda, 2012), 205. 
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In many circles of the Polish intelligentsia, even in socialist circles, there still hangs the 
stench of Brzozowski’s views or ideology. There exists the legend created by Brzozowski 
and the legend created about Brzozowski. The dissipation of both of these legends, the 
liberation of Polish intellect from the taint of brzozowszczyzna, will facilitate a proper 
outlook on the last half-century of our history.8 
 
Brzozowski’s broadly-understood ideology is fundamental for both critics and 
no matter how they define it, it becomes the object of their criticism. As demon-
strated by Fryde, Brzozowski’s attitude can be considered even more dangerous 
as it is expressed in a manner that is appealing to the reader, producing a partic-
ular mode of reading and thinking. Pointing out Brzozowski’s style, the type of 
reader who would reach for Legenda Młodej Polski, and the way the book is 
received, Ludwik Fryde touches on issues that seem no less important for our 
reflections on brzozowszczyzna than on Brzozowski’s particular ideas and opin-
ions. It is therefore impossible to separate Brzozowski’s ideas from the manner 
he conveyed them and also from their reception, which includes the imitations 
that usually bring the features of the orginal into its sharpest relief. 
A different view on the influence of Brzozowski’s writings comes from Eu-
stachy Czekalski—the first person to use the word brzozowszczyzna, as far as I 
know. He mentions “the senile radicalism of the literary-critical Brzozowszczyz-
na persisting in a couple of already bald and grey skulls.” Using Suchodolski’s 
book on Brzozowski as his point of departure, the author tries to contrast the 
“true” value of Brzozowski with those of his imitators who maintained left-wing 
views. He claims that “it behooves and it is worthwhile” to read Brzozowski, 
“yet one should not take from him his positive assertions, but rather his melodies 
and tone, the intensity of his spirit.”9 Jan Emil Skiwski also refers to Brzo-
zowski’s followers and imitators in his 1928 essay on scientific and prophetic 
criticism. Deprecating the latter, Skiwski distinguishes between “the invariably 
deep, costly, and even painfully intense engorgement of contemporary philoso-
phy,” characteristic of Brzozowski himself, and the “improvisations à la Brzo-
zowski.” He forgives Brzozowski for his “immensely demoralizing” mannerisms 
(“artificial dramatization of language,” “jargon of philosophical emotions” in-
stead of direct statements, and suggestions instead of arguments) for the sake of 
“his talent” and originality. It was in this essay that Skiwski claimed that the 
unquestionable originality of Brzozowski’s thought was taken by his contempo-
                                                             
8  Paweł Hoffman, “Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [The legend of Stanisław 
Brzozowski], Nowe Drogi 2 (1947): 103.  
9  Eustachy Czekalski, “Brzozowszczyzna” [Brzozowskianism], Antena. Zjawisk życia-
sztuki-literatury 8 (1933): 2. 
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raries and “transformed into a little pocketsize codex” from which they drew 
ready-made formulas for depth, “vitality,” and “singularity.”10 Several decades 
later, Marek A. Cichocki repeated Skiwski’s argument, directing this description 
of brzozowszczyzna against his ideological opponents: 
 
When one follows the Polish dispute today, one can get the impression that brzozow-
szczyzna has entered into the circulation of public debate for good, giving it sometimes a 
downright, unbearable, self-accusatory tone. By brzozowszczyzna, I mean here a certain 
attitude characteristic of the Polish intelligentsia, and the whole ensuing set of arguments 
critical of Polishness (their congenial examples can be found in “Polska zdziecinniała” 
[Poland Gone Puerile]). It is a form of moral blackmail, readily employed by representa-
tives of our intelligentsia in regard to their less-enlightened fellow citizens who are 
shamed by their alleged non-modernity and lack of understanding of the modern world. 
This attitude involves many hidden, never-overcome complexes, and many unjustified 
simplifications. Describing the phenomenon of brzozowszczyzna in the interwar period, 
Jan Emil Skiwski noticed that the unquestionable originality of Brzozowski’s thought was 
taken by his contemporaries and “transformed into a little pocketsize codex,” from which 
they could draw ready-made formulas. Also today for example, the compound “Polish-
Catholic,” borrowed mainly from Brzozowski, is repeated like a Hindu mantra by all 
critics of traditional Polishness and defenders of a particularly understood modernity. It is 
not always, however, that brzozowszczyzna manifested in this way has anything to do with 
Brzozowski’s thought. Hence, sometimes it is worth distinguishing it from Brzozowski’s 
work, which is anything but a handy pocket-size codex.11 
 
In this sense—as imitation reducing the original model; as settling for a stereo-
typical, superficial repetition of somebody else’s views or ways of acting; as 
imitating a particular intellectual pose, yet understood as significantly distinct 
from Brzozowski’s actual writings—brzozowszczyzna acquires a character that is 
predominantly used by right-wing authors to refer to leftist-oriented intellectuals 
who evoke Brzozowski’s patronage (or in whose works any “common places” 
can be found, as is the case with Czapliński, as mentioned by Urbanowski). 
Thus, the main function of the term brzozowszczyzna is to discredit ideological 
                                                             
10  Jan E. Skiwski, “O krytyce naukowej i profetycznej” [On scientific and prophetic 
criticism], Myśl Narodowa 15 (1928); reprinted in: idem, Na przełaj oraz inne szkice 
o literaturze i kulturze, ed. Maciej Urbanowski (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 
1999), 36. 
11  Marek A. Cichocki, “Brzozowski – suwerenność w kulturze” [Brzozowski: sovereign-
ty in culture], Znak 2 (2001); reprinted in: „Jest Bóg żyje prawda”. Inna twarz Stani-
sława Brzozowskiego, 361f. 
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opponents, which makes it all the more interesting that most authors who use 
this term do seem to appreciate the diversity of Brzozowski’s views and to un-
derstand his influence on various attitudes and ways of thinking. Urbanowski 
himself, who has used brzozowszczyna most often, argues on many occasions 
that Brzozowski’s undeniable greatness is manifested in the fact that his writings 
have allowed many generations of Polish intelligentsia from multiple ideological 
“options” to define themselves, and that in this way the critic has become a cru-
cial role-model for different intellectual milieus and thinkers. In this case, how-
ever, the belief in the “eternal sources of creative capacities” contained in Brzo-
zowski’s works is combined with a firm idea of what can and what cannot be 
considered a proper use of these sources and it is motivated by the desire to 
defend Brzozowski against mediocre followers who simplify his thought. Used 
in this sense, the term brzozowszczyzna can be used above all in ideological 
disputes, but it also serves as a term in the struggle over Brzozowski’s true criti-
cal legacy.12 
 
                                                             
12  This way of thinking has been aptly demonstrated by Cichocki who writes that “one 
should combat brzozowszczyzna as an intellectual pose, but the thought of Brzozowski 
himself is worth being continuously engaged with.” He then goes on to explain that 
“on the other hand, it is difficult to pretend not to see that Brzozowski’s concept of 
modernity was always combined with an attitude of radical criticism—without it, it  
loses its actual meaning. This is not very distant from the conviction that a spiritual 
transformation of the Polish people can only take place if the old world is reduced 
completely to rubble. This argument was already used by many Polish intellectuals as 
an explanation of their enchantment with Stalinism in the early 1950s. The same lack 
of consideration with respect to tradition and intemperate criticism of one’s own na-
tional community that would lead to its destruction later became the main feature of 
brzozowszczyzna as a critical approach popular after 1989. However, this attitude as-
sumes a significant reduction of the themes of Brzozowski’s work, focusing as it does 
almost exclusively on his critique of Polish traditionalism in the form of nobility cul-
ture and Catholicism. What disappears when such a perspective is adopted are all the 
motifs of Brzozowski’s critique of bourgeois liberalism and its derivative forms of 
culture that could contribute to an unfavorable description of the Polish parvenu mid-
dle-class today. [...] One may get the impression that Brzozowski’s critical grandiosity 
often sets the same trap for Poles, namely the trap of Polish intellectual parochialism. 
So suggestive is Brzozowski’s critique of Polishness that anyone who dislikes some-
thing about the Poles can identify with it. His work is so rich that it can inspire both 
wise and stupid criticism of Polishness.” (Cichocki, “Brzozowski – suwerenność,” 
374f.). 
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The Power of Immaturity 
 
The two uses of brzozowszczyzna present somewhat different perspectives with 
the first referring to Brzozowski himself, centered not so much on his ideas as on 
his critical approach and his way of performing intellectual work. The second is 
used to assail Brzozowski’s imitators who do focus on Brzozowski’s views 
overall, although they concentrate somewhat on condemning his emotions and 
rhetoric.  
I would like to clarify this negative perspective by defining the notion of 
brzozwszczyzna following the example of żeromszczyzna13 by moving from a 
strictly evaluative formula to a more descriptive one, which would nevertheless 
take into account the pejorative character of this term. Without ignoring the 
obvious accusations put forth by different ideological camps against Brzozow-
ski’s particular views, I want to find in critical and polemical statements the 
caracteristics that are commonly ascribed to Brzozowski’s work. These can refer 
to his ideological stance, critical temperament, way of reading, and style of 
writing. After all, today it would be difficult to think of brzozowszczyzna without 
taking into account Brzozowski’s readers, critics, and followers; yet it would be 
equally difficult to forget that it was the characteristic performativity of his in-
fluential texts. 
The most salient element defining brzozowszczyzna is undoubtedly Brzo-
zowski’s changing views and beliefs and his temperament as a driven planner 
and mender of the world. Brzozowski’s style is unique because of the vividness 
and sharpness of his claims, his characteristic manner of arriving at particular 
views, and the changeability of his opinions and thought. From analyzing vari-
ous texts, one can distinguish some vivid descriptions of these negatively per-
ceived features. An example of this is the “‘critical’ St. Vitus dance,”14 which is 
                                                             
13  Cf. the entry “Żeromszczyzna,” in Słownik terminów literackich [Dictionary of liter-
ary terms], 3rd ed., ed. Janusz Sławiński (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossoliń-
skich, 1998), 640, and Stanisław Sierotwiński’s Słownik terminów literackich, 4th ed. 
(Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1986), 306. 
14  Stefan Żeromski wrote in 1918, “Fierce, phenomenally hasty, fitful reading, often not 
out of internal need but out of snobbism, which he himself admits, to impress the lit-
erary mob by the unheard of multi-directionality of reading, moved his mania of ado-
rations from Sorel as far as to the writings of Cardinal Newman. Every book he read 
smote him to such a degree that he cut veritable capers among multifarious authors. 
[…] This ‘critical’ St. Vitus dance practiced by Stanisław Brzozowski made a great 
impression and even still impresses certain writing spheres in Poland.” Stefan Żerom-
ski, Dzieła. Pisma różne [Works. Various writings], vol. 2: Pisma literackie i krytycz-
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a pejorative rendering of one of the most often underscored characteristics of 
Brzozowski’s critical work, i.e., the eclecticism, changeability, and superficiality 
of his reading; his unhealthy ambition to keep au courant with Western novel-
ties. Another feature of Brzozowski that is strongly connected with his reading is 
the “harvesting of thoughts from books.” Zygmunt Wasilewski referred to his 
reading as “literary emptiness”15 and accused Brzozowski of cherishing the 
beauty of ideas rather than truth. Fryde adopts a similar tone by describing Leg-
enda Młodej Polski as “sick and contagious intellectual hedonism” and accused 
Brzozowski of relishing in infinite intellectual associations.16 Similar views are 
expressed today in the indictments by the communist left against the over-intel-
lectualized elitism of the members of the Krytyka Polityczna circle who have 
been influenced by Brzozowski’s thought. Another such feature referring some-
what to the literary roots of Brzozowski’s thought and above all to the style of 
his texts is the phenomenon metaphorically described by Fryde as “the rushing 
of grand words and grand problems.”17 This phrase touches on Brzozowski’s 
bombastic style, the settling of intellectual problems at the level of existential 
resolutions, and his emotional tone. 
It seems that it is in Brzozowski’s way of shaping his critical discourse that 
we will find significant markers of the incriminated brzozowszczyzna; a style of 
writing capable of inspiring radical solutions. These texts are to some “a volcano 
of thoughts, feelings, and pursuits”18 while others describe it as “a raw, 
                                                             
ne [Literary and critical writings] (Warszawa 1963), 73. The accusations of literary 
snobbism and eclecticism already appeared during Brzozowski’s lifetime, for example 
in Jan Lemański’s rhymed pamphlet entitled Erudyta [The erudite] Widnokręgi 10,2 
(1910): 340f., reprinted in: “Chamuły”, “gnidy”, “przemilczacze”… Antologia dwu-
dziestowiecznego pamfletu polskiego [“Boors,” “lice,” “dissemblers”… An anthology 
of the twentieth-century Polish pamphlet], ed. Dorota Kozicka (Kraków: Universitas, 
2010).  
15  Zygmunt Wasilewski, “Idea pracy” [The idea of labor], in Dyskusje (Poznań: Księgar-
nia Św. Wojciecha, 1926); reprinted in: Jest Bóg, żyje prawda…, 113f. 
16  Fryde, “Brzozowski jako wychowawca,” 188.  
17  “The direct current of high emotional voltage, the rushing of grand words and grand 
problems, and the unclear yet very suggestive calls to action made us passionately 
delve into Legenda, with flushed cheeks even before we grasped its meaning.” Ibid., 
187. 
18  Silvester [s. Teresa Landy], “Stanisława Brzozowskiego drogi do Rzymu” [Stanisław 
Brzozowski’s Roads to Rome], Verbum III (1935), reprinted in: Jest Bóg, żyje 
prawda…, 145. 
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revolutionary element.”19 Still others stress the performative power of 
Brzozowski’s extremely passionate way of dealing with literature and criticism. 
Such features are evidently connected with the characteristics of Brzozowski’s 
thought which he best described when he wrote that he was always unready and 
immature.20 This description is very fitting in that it encompasses both 
Brzozowski’s tendency to record all of his thoughts, even while reading. He 
transcribes the thinking process rather than complete thoughts and to write in a 
youthful state of emotions by treating literature and philosophy as a “territory of 
quasi-life expansion.”21 As a consequence, the most “zealous inheritors”22 of the 
critic were young intellectuals. Characteristic among the numerous texts refer-
encing the youthful character of both Brzozowski’s writings and their reception 
is a review of Tomasz Burek’s second book of literary criticism in which the 
reviewer expresses his concern that unlike other critics who went through a 
Brzozowski phase, Burek never grew out of his.23 Another example would be 
Adam Zagajewski, who during the period of programmatic articles of the Polish 
New Wave, wrote pamphlet-like texts evoking Brzozowski, whereas a dozen or 
so years later in 1985, one of his means of grounding the radical change of his 
attitude was a wholesale deprecation of Brzozowski and his imitators: 
 
Those who put on the mask of Stanisław Brzozowski, whether for a moment or forever, 
[…] bring to life a phantom of literature, a poltergeist of art (it is easy to tell an artist from 
an educator⎯the former always speaks on his own behalf, the latter feels a generation, a 
nation, a social class, humanity, or a poetic group standing behind him). I can imagine 
where the charm of Brzozowski’s heritage stems from; it seems to promise a strict, con-
ceptual power over literature, a government of souls, and more—of chosen souls, those 
which govern other souls. Conceptual shortcuts, reductions, and postulates crisscross here 
like orders, like signals of a hunting horn.24  
 
It is the feverish emotionality—a combination of thoughts awakened and led on 
in multiple directions, of intellectual upsurges rather than finished, precisely-
                                                             
19  Krzysztof Fiołek, “Kłopotliwa obecność,” 387. 
20  Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 289. 
21  Fryde, Brzozowski jako wychowawca, 192. 
22  For Marta Wyka’s phrasing, cf.: “Głos Brzozowskiego. Rozmowa redakcyjna” [Brzo-
zowski’s Voice. Editors’ discussion panel], Dekada Literacka 230 (2008). http:// 
www.dekadaliteracka.pl/?id=4660 
23  Cf. Zbigniew Bieńkowski, “Klucze” [Keys], Twórczość 2 (1974): 95. 
24  Adam Zagajewski: Solidarność i samotność [Solidarity and solitude] (Warszawa: 
Fundacja Zeszytów Literackich, 2002), 76.  
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formulated mental constructions, a combination juxtaposed with the presence, 
constantly manifested in the texts, of Brzozowski fighting for his views and for a 
better reality that seems to constitute the special mixture comprising brzozow-
szczyzna. These features arguably prevented posterity from seeing an unques-
tionable greatness in Brzozowski and it contributed to the fact that he left a mark 
on Polish contemporary culture and broadly understood criticism not as an un-
challenged authority but rather as a catalyst for radically different views and 
ideological stances. Yet it is thanks to these same features, I believe, that 
Stanisław Brzozowski still remains inspiring, intriguing, not quite read to the 
full… 
 
Translated by Zofia Ziemann 
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“…actually speaking, this man converted me”: 
Jerzy Liebert, Brzozowski, and the Question of 
a Modern Religous Poetry 
Christian Zehnder 
 
 
Whatever one thinks of the last years and months of the life and work of Stani-
sław Brzozowski, one facet is perfectly clear: he did not consider his growing 
proximity to Catholicism a ‘conversion’. In a letter from 1909 he wrote, “Nie 
jest to żadne nawrócenie: sądzę, że nigdy nie zrywałem związku z Kościołem 
jako żywym zrzeszeniem duchów.”1 (This is not at all a conversion: I think that I 
never broke with the Church as a living association of spirits.) 
As Andrzej Walicki points out, Brzozowski had indeed used the term kościół 
as early as 1903, though denoting not so much the Catholic Church, but a kind of 
organic community to be built by mankind.2 It can be said without exaggeration 
that there had always been an “ecclesiastical” dimension in Brzozowski’s 
thought, even in his Marxist period (1904–1908). However, the argument against 
the idea of undergoing a conversion, the anxiety of becoming a genuine “con-
vert” takes another course in the Pamiętnik (Diary), the diary Brzozowski wrote 
from the end of 1910 until his death in April 1911. On December 10, he noted, 
“Staraj się żyć modlitwą, a nie polemiką i przeciwstawieniem. Siła ginie w tym 
tarciu i nie rodzi się pewne światło” (Try to live by prayer and not by polemics 
and opposition. The force dies in that struggle and light will not be born).3 And a 
few pages later: “Religia twoja nie powinna być nawróceniem. Strzeż się, strzeż 
się tego […] błędu” (Your religion must not be a conversion. Beware, beware of 
                                                             
1  Letter to Witold Klinger from April 27, 1909. Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 2, 134. 
2  Andrzej Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi myśli [Stanisław Brzozowski—paths 
of thought] (Kraków: Universitas, 2011), 281. 
3  Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 9. 
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this […] fault).4 That is to say, that to “live by polemics and opposition” would 
be as mistaken as to be religious in a converted way. Agata Bielik-Robson un-
derstands this careful avoiding of a rupture as “another conversion,” as an all-
integrating conversion without loss5 (of one’s own intellectual biography), which 
she calls a “highly creative and almost heretical misreading” of the Church’s 
teaching.6 
The arguments against conversion mentioned by Walicki and Bielik-Robson 
also imply a third one: Brzozowski cannot but have fundamental troubles with 
the transcendence or supernatural character of the Christian truth, because truth, 
according to Brzozowski, is always actually made by mankind, and never al-
ready given (revealed) and “known.”7 So, even if Brzozowski came to the 
conclusion that man needs transcendence, it remained for him, in Walicki’s 
words, a “postulate” in the Kantian sense of the word, and Catholicism as a 
whole a “possibility.”8 Interestingly, Walicki’s and Bielik-Robson’s arguments 
had been anticipated by Leszek Kołakowski, when he called Brzozowski’s 
Catholicism a “receptive container for cultural continuity”9 and when he con-
cluded that the philosopher’s “longing for a non-historical absolute” stands “on 
the threshold of hesitation not fully overcome.”10 
 
                                                             
4  Ibid., 12. 
5  Agata Bielik-Robson, “Another conversion. Stanisław Brzozowski’s ‘diary’ as an 
early instance of the post-secular turn to religion,” Studies in East European Thought 
63 (2011): 280 and passim. 
6  Ibid., 291. 
7  Walicki speaks of a “primacy of acting over knowledge” in Brzozowski. Walicki, 
Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi myśli, 317. On late Brzozowski’s critical remarks on 
Saint Thomas Aquinas’s intellectualism under the auspices of (Catholic) modernism 
(Maurice Blondel, Alfred Loisy, George Tyrrell as well as—in Brzozowski’s reading 
—Cardinal Newman) see Tomasz Lewandowski, “Młodopolskie spotkania z moder-
nizmem katolickim” [Young Polish encounters with catholic modernism], in Spot-
kania młodopolskie (Poznań: Wydawnictwo “Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne”, 
2005), 38f., 44. 
8  Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi myśli, 308, 317. 
9  Leszek Kołakowski, “Miejsce filozofowania Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [The place 
of Stanisław Brzozowski’s philosophizing], in Pochwala niekonsekwencji. Pisma roz-
proszone z lat 1955–1968 (London: Puls, 1989), 173. 
10  Ibid. 
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Brzozowski’s Conversional Energy According to Blüth, Liebert, 
and Wajngold/Gołębiowska 
 
Despite all these ambiguities and explicit reservations Brzozowski became a 
model of conversion to other intellectuals. The literary scholar Rafał Blüth 
(1891–1939), himself a convert from Judaism to Christianity, a co-founder of the 
Catholic journal Verbum (1934–1939), described the paradox of Brzozowski as a 
convert malgré lui in his article “Stanisław Brzozowski jako wychowawca” 
(“Stanisław Brzozowski as Educator,” 1938) as follows: 
 
What we, the readers of his [Brzozowski’s] writing and confessions, know can be summa-
rized by the affirmation that Brzozowski was fully aware of the path toward conversion 
that he had taken. However, intellectual sincerity does not allow us to consider 
Brzozowski as a Catholic writer with a completely formed worldview… A Catholic must 
be shocked to the very end by Brzozowski’s conception of truth by which he, as an ex-
treme anti-rationalist, excluded elements of intellect and knowledge. Hence Catholic 
intellectuals, those who had always confessed this worldview as well as those who had 
come to the Truth of Catholicism by different ways, and even those who were awakened 
and compelled to it by Brzozowski, are attached to him most deeply by the last moment of 
his life—and maybe by his death.11 
 
For Blüth, as later for Walicki, the criterion to measure Brzozowski’s (unreal-
ized) conversion is his “anti-intellectual” notion of truth. Yet Blüth introduces 
another criterion, which is a plausible explanation of the philosopher’s attrac-
tiveness to young intellectuals: his suffering arising from social isolation and 
illness in his last years, the “full awareness” of his turn to religion during this 
phase, and, most importantly, the receipt of the last rites in the hour of his 
death.12 That is to say that, regardless of the ambiguity of his own conversion, 
                                                             
11  Rafał M. Blüth, “Stanisław Brzozowski jako wychowawca” [Stanisław Brzozowski as 
educator] in Pisma literackie, ed. Piotr Nowaczyński (Kraków: Znak, 1984), 322 (em-
phasis in the orig.). 
12  Cf. Anna Brzozowska, “Wspomnienie o Stanisławie Brzozowskim” [Remembering 
Stanisław Brzozowski], Twórczość 216 (1963): 51, and recently Maciej Urbanowski, 
“Droga do Rzymu: Newman Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [The way to Rome: Stani-
sław Brzozowski’s Newman], in Konstelacje Stanisława Brzozowskiego, ed. Urszula 
Kowalczuk et al. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2012), 
367. For an account of Catholic—and particularly Rafał Blüth’s—views on Brzozow-
ski in the 1930s cf. Marian Stępień, Spór o spuściznę po Stanisławie Brzozowskim w 
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Brzozowski—“by the last moment of his life”—bears witness to the longing for 
salvation. Thereby he releases, as I would put it, an “energy” that galvanizes the 
conversion of others. 
Now when it comes to the case of the poet Jerzy Liebert (1904–1931), can 
we say, using Blüth’s words, that reading Brzozowski “awakened and com-
pelled” him to Catholicism? Liebert’s own answer to this question is an unam-
biguous yes. He expressed it in 1927 in a letter to Maria Leszczyńska, a married 
woman with whom he had a relationship following the decision of his friend 
Bronisława/Agnieszka/Miriam Wajngold, later known as Sister Maria Gołę-
biowska, to enter the convent.13 The letter to Leszczyńska has been quoted again 
and again and has become inevitably a commonplace of Liebert scholarship. 
Nevertheless, I will quote it here at length, given that it is the poet’s most de-
tailed account of his view of Brzozowski. Liebert starts by explaining his early 
fascination with Nietzsche, and then goes on: 
 
After Nietzsche at some point I took up Brzozowski. And actually speaking, this man con-
verted me. Thanks to him I for the first time became attentive to the essential importance 
of Catholicism, to its eternal, universal meaning. I was reading Brzozowski’s books from 
the period when he was still fighting with the Church. He did not lead me himself but 
drew my attention to Cardinal Newman, to the latter’s A Grammar of Assent. I read this 
book, there was a lot I did not understand, but I also understood a lot. Brzozowski had 
written an introduction to it, and thus Newman actually gave him a new birth. 
Later, after my conversion, I returned sometimes to Brzozowski, up to the present day he 
remains for me the most compelling read. How often I was driven up the wall when read-
ing his understanding of Catholicism. Only now, recently, his Diaries fell into my hands. I 
knew before that Brzozowski had expressly come closer to the Church, he already be-
lieved though without yet acknowledging it, but the Diaries, written in the most difficult 
period of his life, really showed me the great spirit of Brzozowski. I do not know whether 
anyone else could be found in Poland who has come to Catholicism in such a sincere and 
at the same time critical way.14 
                                                             
latach 1918–1939 [The controversy about Stanisław Brzozowski’s legacy in the years 
1918–1939] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1976), 82–86. 
13  On Sister Maria cf. Stefan Frankiewicz, Nie stracić wiary w Watykanie. Ze Stefanem 
Frankiewiczem rozmawia Cezary Gawrys [Not to lose faith in the Vatican: Stefan 
Frankiewicz in conversation with Cesarzy Gawrys] (Warszawa: Biblioteka “Więzi”, 
2014), 39f. 
14  Letter from September 4, 1927, in: Jerzy Liebert, Pisma zebrane [Collected works], 
ed. Stefan Frankiewicz, vol. 2 of Listy (Warszawa: Biblioteka “Więzi”, 1976), 425. 
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Let me take a closer look at this statement. Brzozowski, Liebert writes, “con-
verted” him by drawing his attention to the universality of the Church, even 
through his early writings (here, Liebert may have in mind the contradictory 
statements on Catholicism in Legenda Młodej Polski—The Legend of Modern 
Poland).15 As a reason for conversion, this seems to be a surprisingly superficial 
point. But the abundant use of expressions in the root of wróc- (turn) as “na-
wrócił,” “nawrócenie” as well as “po raz pierwszy zwróciłem uwagę” (I for the 
first time became attentive) and “[n]ie doprowadził mnie sam, ale zwrócił 
uwagę” (he has not lead me himself but drew my attention) show that the con-
versional “energy” of Brzozowski, for Liebert, is actually linked with the em-
phasis on the notion of Church. As a matter of fact, such emphasis also lies at the 
center of Brzozowski’s introduction to John Henry Newman. The Pamiętnik, this 
highly intimate document, was only belatedly to confirm the authenticity and 
rightness—if we take his letter as a factual account at all—of Brzozowski’s 
“awakening” him to the Church. 
Newman is mentioned numerous times in Liebert’s letters to Agnieszka 
Wajngold,16 but we know almost nothing about his Brzozowski readings and the 
existential role they played, according to the abovementioned letter to Maria 
Leszczyńska. And this uncertainty is all the more problematic since in his corre-
spondence Liebert is admittedly trying to convert Leszczyńska, a fairly decadent, 
disillusioned agnostic. Thus the way he speaks of Brzozowski might be at least 
partly an attempt to offer her an intellectually attractive model for her conver-
sion. Yet there is another account of the same event left by Sister Maria (the 
former Agnieszka Wajngold). In a text from 1976 addressed to her fellow sisters 
                                                             
Convert (see note 29). What attracted Brzozowski most in Newman was, as Walicki 
puts it, the “particular connection of a skeptical anti-intellectualism and historism with 
a personalist and anti-relativist tendency, which finds the source of certainty in the 
most individual depths of the personality.” Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi 
myśli, 309f. Crucial in this regard is Newman’s notion of the “illative sense,” devel-
oped in A Grammar of Assent (1870) to characterize the individual’s access to univer-
sal truth, whereas Brzozowski would see first of all the anti-intellectual potential of 
this “illative sense.” Ibid., 310. 
15  See Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi myśli, 290. 
16  Examples include: “Lately I haven’t read anything besides Newman, but I do read him 
in the evening and there is a growing closeness between us” (October 13, 1925). And: 
“I read little, but systematically. […] I’m starting to get Newman better and better.” 
(February 3, 1926) Jerzy Liebert, Listy do Agnieszki [Letters to Agnieszka], ed. Stefan 
Frankiewicz (Warszawa: Biblioteka “Więzi”, 2002), 185, 339. 
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she describes her reading of Brzozowski’s Newman essay with Jerzy Liebert in 
1924.17 She writes: 
 
[…] this was a book with the title A Grammar of Assent—a collection of writings of 
Cardinal Newman who converted from Protestantism to Catholicism and later became a 
cardinal of the Catholic Church. There was a foreword by Stanisław Brzozowski in which 
he is searching: searching for God, searching for Catholicism. We read that foreword and 
began to read the book. For me, this was probably the most important moment of my life. 
I suddenly understood that there is a supernatural world, that besides this world we see 
there is an invisible, inconceivable but living world, and that in this world there is Christ. 
And that Christ is something more than a man. Although I could not yet say that he was 
God, but [realized for myself] that He is someone more than a man. I remember this 
feeling, for me this was as if a curtain had been pulled back, as if before me there opened a 
completely other, new world. 
And besides that I came to know that there is the Church. I ask you, Sisters, to think about 
this: I had read so many books, the life of the Lord Jesus and several legends on Christ, 
but never could I put it all together for myself. I think this was a great grace the hugeness 
of which I could not embrace afterwards. When it comes to Jerzy Liebert he descended 
from a Catholic family, but Catholic in a superficial, traditional way; he was baptized, had 
had the First Holy Communion, went to confession from time to time at school—but all 
this was not vital at all. […] And suddenly all this awakened in him. Completely, as if it 
had been asleep… 
Thus we simultaneously found ourselves in another world.18 
 
Unfortunately, the problem of the singularity—and marginality—of Liebert’s 
letter to Leszczyńska is not solved by Sister Miriam’s account; on the contrary. 
What if it had been written only after she had read the 1927 letter (accessible to 
her through the editor of Liebert’s Collected Works, Stefan Frankiewicz, and 
published in the same year, 1976), and under its “influence”?19 Regardless of this 
uncertainty it is useful to compare the two statements. As we see, Sister Miriam 
chooses even stronger words when describing the Brzozowski experience: “For 
me, this was probably the most important moment of my life.” Thus the factor of 
                                                             
17  For details of their friendship and impossible love see Frankiewicz, Nie stracić wiary 
w Watykanie, 29f. 
18  Maria Gołębiowska, “Tak się zaczęło…” [This i show it started] in Ludzie Lasek, ed. 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Warszawa: Biblioteka “Więzi”, 1987), 499. 
19  In a personal letter (November 13, 2014) Stefan Frankiewicz confirmed to me that 
Sister Maria knew Liebert’s letters to Leszczyńska before Frankiewicz published the 
Collected Works in 1976. 
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being “awakened and compelled” (Blüth) is present here, too. The major differ-
ence in contrast to Liebert’s letter concerns the supernatural, and particularly the 
divine nature of Christ. Since we know that the supernatural is what Brzozowski 
develops the least in his Newman introduction, and that Christ is virtually absent 
in his Pamiętnik, Sister Maria’s emphasis on Brzozowski rather than on the 
former Anglican “Protestant” Newman may be surprising. And even more so if 
we take into consideration that a “confirming” encounter with the Pamiętnik 
seems to be lacking in her experience. However, what unifies the two texts is the 
central place in them accorded to the Church. Even the awakening of Liebert’s 
conventional Polish Catholicism, according to Sister Maria, is an effect of 
Brzozowski’s insistence on the necessity of a universal Church—very much as 
in Liebert’s own letter. 
 
Liebert’s “Christianity by decision” in View 
of Brzozowski’s Hesitation 
 
Thus, one can say that Brzozowski, a thinker who, as Bielik-Robson puts it, 
carefully avoided Pauline metanoia,20 became a model for the conversion of 
those two young intellectuals. One could denote Liebert’s and Wajngold’s reli-
gion with the German term Entscheidungschristentum, i.e., a stance of faith no 
longer rooted in traditions, but in the personal experience of and decision for 
grace. If we call such an emphasis on experience “mystical,” one could even 
apply Karl Rahner’s famous dictum to the case of Liebert and Wajngold, “the 
Christian of the future will be a mystic or he will not be [a Christian] at all.”21 
About this Christianity of experience, Liebert wrote to his—religiously less fer-
vent—friend Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, “if one knows what Divine grace in life is, 
if one receives it daily [i.e., the Eucharist], one starts believing in wonders. Intel-
lect, will, the heart are powerless as long as God does not illuminate them. Be-
lieve me, my dear, I experienced this for myself. Things most painful, heavy and 
horrible begin to settle down.”22 However, the paradigmatic text in this matter is 
Liebert’s best known poem, “Jeździec” (The Rider, 1926). It is a confession of 
an earthly “soldier” who tried to escape from his “heavenly Rider,” but then was 
captured by him irreversibly. I quote the poem in its entirety: 
 
                                                             
20  Bielik-Robson, “Another conversion,” 291. 
21  For different references of the sentence in Rahner’s works cf. Albert Raffelt and 
Hansjürgen Verweyen, Karl Rahner (München: C. H. Beck, 1997), 124. 
22  Letter from March 27, 1926. Liebert, Pisma zebrane, vol. 2, 398. 
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Uciekałem przed Tobą w popłochu, 
Chciałem zmylić, oszukać Ciebie – 
Lecz co dnia kolana uparte 
Zostawiały ślady na niebie. 
 
Dogoniłeś mnie, Jeźdźcze niebieski, 
Stratowałeś, stanąłeś na mnie. 
Ległem zbity, łaską podcięty, 
Jak dym, gdy wicher go nagnie. 
 
Nie mam słów, by spod Ciebie się podnieść, 
Coraz cięższa staje się mowa. 
Czyżby słowa utracić trzeba, 
By jak duszę odzyskać słowa? 
 
Czyli trzeba aż przejść przez siebie, 
Twoim słowom siebie zawierzyć – 
Jeśli trzeba, to tratuj do dna, 
Jestem tylko twoim żołnierzem. 
 
Jedno wiem, i innych objawień 
Nie potrzeba oczom i uszom – 
Uczyniwszy na wieki wybór, 
W każdej chwili wybierać muszę.23 
 
I ran away from You, panic-stricken, 
I wanted to mislead, to cheat You— 
But stubbornly my knees, day after day, 
Left traces on the sky. 
 
You caught me, heavenly Rider, 
You knocked me down, you trampled on me. 
I lay beaten, drunken from grace, 
Like smoke, scattered by a tempest. 
 
I have no words to rise from under your feet, 
Speaking becomes all the harder. 
Does one need to lose one’s words, 
In order to find them like a soul? 
                                                             
23  Liebert, Pisma zebrane, vol. 1, 157. 
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Or must one first go through oneself, 
Entrust oneself to Your words— 
If necessary, trample me to the ground, 
I am merely your soldier. 
 
One thing I know, and other revelations 
My eyes and ears do not need— 
Having made forever a choice, 
In each moment I must choose. 
 
“Jeździec” connects the all but gentle capture by the “Rider’s” grace with the 
soldier’s voluntary assent to it—a “choice” (wybór), which turns out to be a 
commitment to be constantly renewed, in each moment. Thus, on the one hand, 
grace is frightening and even violent in this allegorical poem; on the other hand, 
the soldier confesses that besides his choice (for grace) he needs no other “reve-
lations” (objawień). A conscious, personal choice as revelation—such a daring 
connection of a strong devotion and self-confidence is highly typical of John 
Henry Newman, especially in his Apologia pro vita sua (1864).24 However, it 
does not seem to have anything in common with Brzozowski’s hesitating relig-
iosity. The association by the young critic Jan Kott of Liebert’s “Jeździec” with 
Saint Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus25 is certainly justified and 
underlines a clear distance from the author of the Pamiętnik. For Brzozowski a 
Paulinian mortification of the past, as we have seen, would have been a “mis-
take” to be assiduously avoided. In this sense, Liebert’s (and Wajngold’s) con-
version is anything but an imitation of Brzozowski’s; rather one could call it a 
                                                             
24  Cf. for instance the following passage from a letter (1844), which Newman quotes in 
his Apologia: “Certainly, I have always contended that obedience even to an erring 
conscience was the way to gain light, and that it mattered not where a man began, so 
that he began on what came to hand, and in faith; and that anything might become a 
divine method of Truth; that to the pure all things are pure, and have a self-correcting 
virtue and a power of germinating. And though I have no right at all to assume that 
this mercy is granted to me, yet the fact that a person in my situation may have it 
granted to him, seems to me to remove the perplexity which my change of opinion 
may occasion.” John Henry Newman, Apologia pro vita sua, being a reply to a pam-
phlet entitled “What, then, does Dr. Newman mean?” (London: Longman, Green, 
Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1864), 333. 
25  Jan Kott, “Katolicyzm liryki Lieberta” [Catholicism in Liebert’s poetry], Przegląd 
Współczesny 155 (1935): 433. 
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completion of the philosopher’s “possible” Catholicism (Walicki) or “other 
conversion” to it (Bielik-Robson).26 
The attractiveness to Liebert of Brzozowski’s religious quest, then, would be 
precisely its obvious incompleteness which leaves space for his own decision. 
This outlook would be in perfect accordance with what Józef Czapski wrote in 
1928 about Brzozowski’s significance—not only in religious matters—for young 
intellectuals: “Each of his [Brzozowski’s] pages contains precious seeds. Our 
generation’s task is to bring these grains to fruit. We must continue the con-
struction undertaken by Brzozowski.”27 To carry Brzozowski’s conversion “to an 
end” is one way of fulfilling the task Czapski formulates here. 
 
The Word and the Church: Brzozowski’s Mediality 
and Liebert’s “Fulfillment” 
 
But is it all as clear as that? Is it not possible that Liebert is, at least partly, closer 
to Brzozowski than it would seem? In order to answer this question I propose to 
take a look at some aspects of Liebert’s writings through the prism of Brzozow-
ski’s introduction to Newman as well as the Pamiętnik and, finally, via the Rus-
sian religious philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev (for whom Liebert had a remarkable 
predilection). Let me first return to the very notion of the Church. In a letter to 
Wajngold from 1925 Liebert points out, “that Catholicism is not just another tiny 
idea, […] but the idea that this is life, our most simple life.”28 The view that the 
Church is not something abstract but “life itself” is one of the central concerns of 
Brzozowski’s Newman essay. There the philosopher writes: “nie jest on 
[Kościół] dziełem myśli, rozumu, dogodności: to wszystko – dzieła życia, a 
Kościół jest samym życiem, jako tworzeniem wiecznej prawdy i realności” (the 
Church is not a matter of thought, reason, convenience: all that is a matter of life 
and the Church is life in itself, as the creation of eternal truth and reality).29 
Similarly, in Pamiętnik he notes: “Newman uważał Kościół za sumę życia ludz-
kości, z niego brało źródło wszystko, co jest życiem, wszystko co jest czło-
wiekiem” (Newman considered the Church to be the sum of the life of humanity, 
                                                             
26  Bielik-Robson, “Another conversion,” 291. 
27  Józef Czapski, “O towarzystwo im. Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [On the Stanisław 
Brzozowski Association], Wiadomości Literackie 28 (1928): 1. 
28  Letter from July 26, 1925. Liebert, Listy do Agnieszki, 287 (emphasis mine, Ch. Z.). 
29  Stanisław Brzozowski, “John Henry Newman,” in John H. Newman, Przyświadczenia 
wiary, ed. Stanisław Brzozowski (Lwów: Księgarnia Polska B. Połonieckiego / War-
szawa: E. Wende i Ska, 1915), 23 (emphasis in the orig.). 
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it is the source of everything that is life, everything that is human).30 And a few 
months later, shortly before his death, Brzozowski wrote his famous words: 
“Katolicyzm jest nieuchronny. Nieuchronnym, w samej idei człowieka zakorze-
nionym faktem jest kościół. Człowiek jest niezrozumiałą zagadką bez kościoła. 
Życie ludzkie jest szyderstwem i igraszką, jeżeli kościoła nie ma” (Catholicism 
is inevitable. The Church is an inevitable fact that is rooted in the very idea of 
man. Without the Church, man is an unresolvable riddle. Human life is a scoff 
and a plaything if the Church does not exist).31 Besides the idea that the Church 
is the only real key to human life,32 obviously shared by Liebert, the young poet 
follows the philosopher in extending this very idea to language and particularly 
to literature. Brzozowski, lamenting the superficial approach to religion in Polish 
culture, intends to transform Catholicism, as he puts it, into a “medyum ekspre-
syi i wypowiedzenia” (medium of expression and utterance).33 I will come back 
to this aspect below. Let me first note that, implicitly, a similar concept underlies 
another famous poem by Liebert, “Kościół wojujący” (The Church Militant, 
1925). Here (in stanzas 3 and 4), the Church is addressed as a form-giving power 
to anything human. Before the interference of the Church not only is the sky 
“empty” (“puste,” second stanza), but also words are unable to clearly distin-
guish between different realities, and the human heart is distracted: 
 
Jeszcze słowa niespokojne 
Dzielą ziemi brud od piękna, 
Nam jak miecze się nie skruszą 
I w pacierzu nie uklękną. 
 
Jeszcze serce wykąpane 
W dreszczach słodkich firmamentu, 
Jest jak miasto pod gwiazdami 
Pełne gwaru i zamętu.34 
 
Still unquiet words  
Separate the earth’s dirt from beauty, 
                                                             
30  Entry of December 31, 1910. Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 71 (emphasis in the orig.). 
31  Entry of April 5, 1911, ibid., 190. 
32  Brzozowski also writes that outside the Church there are only “facts of description,” 
whereas within it they become “facts of experience.” Brzozowski, “John Henry New-
man,” 20. 
33  Ibid., 26. 
34  Liebert, Pisma zebrane, vol. 2, 212. 
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Like swords we can’t crush them 
And in prayer they don’t kneel. 
 
Still our heart is immersed 
In shivers of the sweet firmament, 
It is like a town under starlight 
Full of chattering and chaos. 
 
But then the restless chattering falls silent and the heart is transformed. It be-
comes somehow “ecclesiastical” or at least a kind of image of the Church (in its 
earthly state as “Ecclesia Militans”): 
 
Lecz już wznosi się wyniosłe 
Obnażone i milczące, 
I pokorne i żarliwe 
Niby kościół wojujący.35 
 
But then it rises up sublime 
Naked and silent, 
And humble and ardent 
As if [it were] the Church militant. 
 
Although Liebert implies in his letter to Maria Leszczyńska quoted above that he 
became acquainted with the Pamiętnik only in 1927 (two years after “Kościół 
wojujący”), one cannot fail to recall here Brzozowski’s remark about Newman’s 
writings as a hermeneutical key to poetry: “nie sądzę, aby dostępne dla mnie 
były ciche, głębokie, oceaniczne i międzygwiezdne regiony poezji. Wszystko to 
zawdzięczam Newmanowi” (I do not think that the calm, deep, oceanic and 
interstellar regions of poetry are accessible to me. I owe all this to Newman).36 
Brzozowski speaks also of a “pewne powinowactwo ze spokojem, tak całko-
wicie jej [duszy] dotąd obce”37 (a certain kinship with calm hitherto so alien to 
her [his soul]), that he owes to Newman. In the same entry Brzozowski confesses 
he believes “in a calm transformation at the bottom of the soul” (w cichą 
przemianę na dnie duszy).38 And the entry ends with the words: “Nic nie mogę 
napisać więcej – już przemaga znużenie i przesłania jasność. Teraz mogłyby już 
                                                             
35  Ibid. 
36  Entry of February 12, 1911. Brzozowski, Pamiętik, 167. 
37  Ibid., 166. 
38  Ibid., 169. 
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tu być tylko słowa” (I cannot write more—fatigue is overcoming me and ob-
scured the clarity. Now there could be only words here).39 Is this anxiety about 
the superficiality of “mere words” not the same as Liebert’s anxiety in the face 
of language reduced to its sound, language emptied? 
Brzozowski, as we see, hopes to attain a certain “kinship with calm” thanks 
to Newman—this modern ecclesiastical voice—as a literary/cultural “medium,” 
or “preparing.”40 That is why he presents Newman’s thought to the Polish public 
“jako wytwór jego organizacyi, indywidualności, nie troszcząc się o zasadność 
lub bezzasadność tych lub innych jego sposobów widzenia, traktując myśl i 
duszę jako kwestię stylu” (as the result of his organization, of his individuality, 
not caring about the foundation or the groundlessness of his specific ways of 
seeing things, treating his thoughts and his soul as matters of style).41 Liebert’s 
search for an ecclesiastical grounding of language seems to be quite different 
from Brzozowski’s project of a Newmanian “mediality” and “stylistics.” Liebert 
seeks less a medium for the (poetic) word than its fulfillment, and even salvation, 
by the Spirit. While Brzozowski constantly emphasizes the need for “creating” 
and “building” (wytwarzać and zbudować) the truth, which would be the 
Church,42 Liebert appeals to the Spirit to bless his poetic gift by grace. This is 
the theme of the poem “Veni Sancte Spiritus” (1930). In a letter to his friend 
Rafał Blüth, Liebert justifies his modern version of the hymn Veni Creator Spir-
itus to some critics (including Blüth himself, who had suspected Liebert of a 
poetic “heresy”): 
 
Not in the feeling of his own power, as some critics put it mistakenly, but in the feeling of 
complete lack the poet asks the Holy Spirit to send him a sign and grace, because without 
those the poet’s poetry and he himself will be like an empty cross on which Christ is 
absent, so that, transferred to the sphere of poetry, it will be sound, form—devoid of life, 
                                                             
39  Ibid. (emphasis mine, Ch. Z.). 
40  Cf. Brzozowski, “John Henry Newman,” 44: “Newman może stać się przygotowa-
niem do rozumienia bardzo bliskich nam i tak nadużywanych przez nas dzieł własnej 
naszej twórczości” (Newman can become a preparation for us to understand the works 
of our own creation). 
41  Ibid., 74 (emphasis mine, Ch. Z.). 
42  On the strong link between Brzozowski’s “philosophy of labor” and the notion of 
truth and action in Catholic modernism (Blondel, Loisy) cf. Lewandowski, “Młodo-
polskie spotkania z modernizmem katolickim,” 42–45; and Walicki, Stanisław Brzo-
zowski – drogi myśli, 291. 
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content, a mere conventional symbol, behind which could hide quietism, spiritual con-
sumerism, a mystical, so to say, ruse.43 
 
Liebert’s self-commentary is actually but a translation of the poem into prose. 
Here is the first stanza of Liebert’s “Veni Sancte Spiritus”: 
 
Nie – iżbym niemoc krył, czuł w sercu lęk, 
Gdy chcę, byś na mnie, gołąb – spadł. 
Lecz byś wypełnił sobą kształt, 
Gdy tu udziałem moim dźwięk.44 
 
It is not to hide weakness, what my heart was anxious about, 
When I ask, dove, that—you descend on me. 
But that you yourself fill shape, 
My part being only sound. 
 
In a very general way, the philosopher Charles Taylor has described the longing 
for fullness—and therefore the overcoming of a feeling of emptiness—as a cen-
tral concern of religiosity in the “secular age.”45 And I would say that such a 
longing, in this general way, is shared by Brzozowski and Liebert. However, 
Liebert’s concept of fulfilling (wypełnienie)46 is more specific. It is about breath-
ing life into religious poetry within modernity, a task seemingly unrealistic.47 I 
                                                             
43  Letter of July 20, 1930. Liebert, Pisma zebrane, vol. 2, 432f. (emphasis in the orig.). 
44  Liebert, Pisma zebrane, vol. 1, 213. 
45  Cf. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass./London: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 5: “We all see our lives, and/or the space wherein we 
live our lives, as having a certain moral/spiritual shape. Somewhere, in some activity, 
or condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that is, in that place (activity or condition), life 
is fuller, richer, deeper, more worthwhile, more admirable, more what it should be. 
This is perhaps a place of power: we often experience this as deeply moving, as in-
spiring. Perhaps this sense of fullness is something we just catch glimpses of from 
afar off; we have the powerful intuition of what fullness would be, were we to be in 
that condition, e.g., of peace or wholeness; or able to act on that level, of integrity or 
generosity or abandonment of self-forgetfulness. But sometimes there will be mo-
ments of experienced fullness, of joy and fulfillment, where we feel ourselves there.” 
46  Liebert, Pisma zebrane, vol. 2, 432. 
47  For a detailed account of Liebert’s place within the tradition of Polish religious poetry 
and his high ambitions of renewing it see Piotr Nowaczyński, “O miejscu Lieberta w 
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think that Jan Kott makes an essential point when writing about the “catholicity” 
of Liebert’s poetry, comparing it with religious features in the poems of the 
members of Skamander Julian Tuwim, Kazimierz Wierzyński, and Jan Lechoń 
(whose inspirations are easily recognizable in Liebert’s early poems). Kott 
writes, 
 
God [in Tuwim, Wierzyński, Lechoń] is just a symbol, a metaphor not defined by all-
embracing love or a metaphysical fear of life. 
Liebert is extraordinary by virtue of his Catholicism, in the sense of a theological ac-
cordance with dogmatics and even with Catholic mysticism, by his poetical experience of 
the inner struggle for the Kingdom of this and not of this world.48 
 
In a way, Kott gets Liebert better than the “tracker of subtle heresies”49 Blüth. 
The danger of Liebert’s poetry, as he himself understands it, is not that it runs 
the risk of not conforming to the Church’s teaching, but that it would remain a 
conditional symbol and the cross empty, i.e., a poetic religiosity of clichés. 
Whether Liebert had in mind the “metaphorical” God of the Skamander poets or 
his own—quite numerous—religious verses before the moment of his conversion 
is perhaps not so important. What is crucial is the basic model: that already as a 
high school student he found a poetic form and would now, following his con-
version, let it be “fulfilled.” Hence the poet’s prayer to the Holy Spirit to “send 
him a sign and grace.”50 A similar reconstruction of Liebert’s path seems to 
inform the Skamandrist Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz’s obituary notice for Liebert in 
1931: 
 
Liebert’s version of Christian faith is first of all Catholicism and as such it represents an 
absolutely particular stance within our highly uncatholic poetry. But this is not the most 
important point. What is striking is above all the atmosphere of this religiosity, which is 
                                                             
polskiej liryce religijnej” [On Liebert’s place in Polish religious poetry], Znak 208 
(1971). 
48  Kott, “Katolicyzm liryki Lieberta,” 430. 
49  From the above-quoted letter to Blüth: Liebert, Pisma zebrane, vol. 2, 432. 
50  In his short foreword to Liebert’s third collection of poems, Kołysanka jodłowa (Pine 
Forest Lullaby, 1932), Kazimierz Wierzyński writes: “He was filled by religiosity like 
a saint.” Liebert, Pisma zebrane, vol. 1, 183 (emphasis mine, Ch. Z.). This may be just 
a conventional formula, however, it goes well with Liebert’s fulfillment model of the 
poem “Veni Sancte Spiritus.” 
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highly individual, but at the same time it reflects currents and aspirations of a specific era 
and a specific group.51 
 
While Brzozowski wanted to turn (Newmanian) Catholicism into a universal 
cultural “medium,” Liebert seeks to transform himself, the poet and his poetic 
mastery, into a living, not “conventional” medium of Catholic content.52 
But a conversion also involves serious problems. Curiously, it intensifies the 
awareness of a potential multiplicity of persons within the convert. In a letter to 
Wajngold from 1925, shortly after both converted, Liebert writes how the “man” 
in him threatens the “poet”: “my heart is longing for universal (i.e., Catholic) 
poetry as if it were for bread. Lately, I have changed quite a lot, especially in 
regards to poetry: the man has overtaken the poet, and now, when I simply want 
to write, he is lacking the means. The poet, as it turned out, walked more 
freely.”53 The attempt to harmonize the different paces of the “man” and the 
“poet” becomes a salient motive in Liebert’s letters. In 1926 he describes how 
the poet prevents him from drawing near to Christ, “though, I am a poet and I 
have no intention to deny him. But today I grasp within me that I could not see 
the Lord Jesus a day earlier, that I am merely turning around Him, not getting 
closer even for one step.”54 Then, a little later, Liebert seems to overcome the 
                                                             
51  Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, “O postawie duchowej Jerzego Lieberta” [On Jerzy Liebert’s 
spiritual stance], Wiadomości Literackie 40 (1931): 3. However, by “tendencies of his 
time and aspirations of a certain group” Iwaszkiewicz may connote less the Ska-
mandrist’s poetics than Fr. Władysław Korniłowicz’s religious circle “Kółko” (Circle) 
and the Laski milieu. Iwaszkiewicz is not unambiguous here. 
52  Interestingly, Liebert could use here French Cardinal Henri Bremond’s (whose writ-
ings had also been a connecting item between Newman and Brzozowski) specific, 
mystically transformed notion of “pure poetry” as described in his La poésie pure 
(1926). See Stefan Frankiewicz, Introduction to Pisma zebrane, by Jerzy Liebert, vol. 
1, 45, and Nie stracić wiary w Watykanie, 27f. It is again Jan Kott who has well seen 
the possible impact of Bremond’s notion—be it on Liebert’s poetry itself or its recep-
tion: “His [Liebert’s] work could be one of the not numerous proofs of Fr. Bremond’s 
beautiful yet hardly verifiable thesis of the unity of the poetic and the mystical experi-
ence, of poetry-as-prayer and [the thesis] that ‘tout poème doit son caractère propre-
ment poétique à la présence, au rayonnement, à l’action transformante et unifiante 
d’une réalité mystérieuse que nous appelons: poésie pure’.” Kott, “Katolicyzm liryki 
Lieberta,” 435. 
53  Letter from July 22, 1925. Liebert, Listy do Agnieszki, 282 (emphasis mine, Ch. Z.). 
54  Letter from March 12, 1926. Ibid., 374 (emphasis mine, Ch. Z.). 
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problem of multiplication within the self. He proposes to re-center and unify the 
human person by an act of will. In a letter to Iwaszkiewicz he writes, 
 
[…] my dear friend, today we are all suffering from the, let’s say, “multitude” of selves. 
From behind every act, from behind every thought there are many Jarosławs or Jureks 
crawling out, but don’t tell me, for I wouldn’t believe that anymore, that it is impossible to 
get a man out of this game of hide and seek. And it is that man whom we have to put in 
the center.55 
 
But once man is “put” back into the center, what happens to the poet and his 
“steps”? Liebert does not speak about that. But one can assume that once the 
conversion of the poet has succeeded, the poet is now a part of the man. A month 
later Liebert specifies this solution in a letter to Wajngold, with recourse to the 
“step” imagery: “Now I know one thing—the Lord Jesus is going with me. And 
nobody, no force can change the rhythm of the pace I’m moving to.”56 The 
extension of the simple metaphor of “walking” to rhythm, I would argue, can be 
read here as an allusion to the rhythm of poetry. If this is so, it shows once again 
that, for Liebert, unlike for Brzozowski, Catholicism is not the “medium” of 
poetry. On the contrary, poetry, its rhythm, is to become a proper medium of 
Catholicism within a modernist context. 
So far, I have not discussed Liebert’s possible indebtedness, as a literary 
critic, to Brzozowski. However, Liebert’s activity as a critic in the second half of 
the 1920s, mainly for the journal Wiadomości Literackie (Literary News), is 
anything but marginal and should not be underestimated.57 For the topic of the 
“converted artist” it is all the more relevant that Liebert often integrates into his 
reviews reflections that concern himself as a poet. Thus he developed his con-
cept of the habitus poetycki, i.e., of the poet’s “strict responsibility […] for each 
written word,” in a review of a collection of poems.58 He probably owes the term 
                                                             
55  Letter from March 27, 1926. Liebert. Pisma zebrane, vol. 2, 398. 
56  Letter from April 23, 1926. Liebert, Listy do Agnieszki, 396. 
57  For an overview see Anna M. Szczepan-Wojnarska, “Z ogniem będziesz się żenił”. 
Doświadczenie transcendencji w życiu i twórczości Jerzego Lieberta [“You will marry 
fire.” The experience of transcendence in Jerzy Liebert’s life and works] (Kraków: 
Universitas, 2003), 83–93. 
58  Liebert, “Zakonspirowany romantyk [Stefan Napierski: Ziemia wolna, 1930]” [A 
conspirative romantic. Stefan Napierski: Free Land, 1930]. Pisma zebrane, vol. 1, 
593. Interestingly, “fullness” (pełnia) is a part of the concept, too: “The poetical hab-
itus! It decides if poetry will be a mere reflection of the lightly sketched contours of 
the idea or the thing; it decides of the acuteness and the fullness of visions which, re-
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“habitus” to Jacques Maritain’s Art et scolastique (1920).59 Moreover, respon-
sibility, in connection with consciousness, had been an essential category of 
Brzozowski’s essay on Newman. It is not surprising, then, that Frankiewicz 
refers to Brzozowski in order to characterize Liebert’s approach to literary criti-
cism.60 Whether Liebert ever attained the degree of radicality of the great critic 
of the 1900s could be, of course, questioned. What is clear is that Liebert’s 
proximity to Brzozowski is certainly not typical in a Skamandrit context. Jan 
Lechoń’s devastating statement with regard to Brzozowski is well known: “He 
[Brzozowski] was fantastically blind to what in literature is art, he was to it 
[literature] a Savonarola and Torquemada; he did not explain it to people, he did 
not teach it, but converted [nawracał] it to his permanently changing beliefs and 
heresies.”61 Interestingly enough, Lechoń accuses Brzozowski—who avoided his 
own conversion—of having converted literary texts according to his own needs 
instead of making them accessible to readers. Regardless of the polemical tone 
of Lechoń’s remark, it reflects very precisely Brzozowski’s idea of “medializ-
ing” Newman. On the other hand, in quite the opposite way, Liebert, in his criti-
cism (consisting mainly of poetry reviews), tries less to “convert” the volumes 
he discusses than to measure them according to the conversion he has already 
undergone. As much as faith can only increase “through a certain inner and spir-
                                                             
gardless of the time and tendencies witness most clearly the poet’s force.” Ibid. (the 
first emphasis in the orig., the second is mine—Ch. Z.). 
59  Jacques Maritain, Art et scolastique (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1965), 66–70, the 
section “Règles et habitus.” Cf. Frankiewicz, Introduction, 47f. 
60  Citing the following paradigmatic sentence from Współczesna krytyka literacka w 
Polsce [Contemporary literary criticism in Poland]: “Rozumie się i ocenia tylko to, co 
było etapem naszej własnej pracy” (One understands and appreciates only what has 
been a stage of one’s own work). Frankiewicz, Introduction, 52. 
61  Jan Lechoń, “Prawda poety a prawda krytyka” [The truth of the poet and the truth of 
the critic], Wiadomości Literackie 6 (1924): 1. For a quite different view, cf. Anna 
Iwaszkiewiczowa, Iwaszkiewicz’s wife, who joined the Laski milieu together with 
Jerzy Liebert. When reading Brzozowski’s Legenda Młodej Polski, she writes in her 
Notebook on September 1st, 1923: “Reading this pages, full of an almost phantastic 
enthusiasm, involuntarily I am comparing that all the time with our present psychol-
ogy and the idea that there are few, very few amidst us, the present Young Poland, 
people that could fall in Love with something, believe in something, hate something 
so passionately and despise something in such a way.” Anna Iwaszkiewiczowa, 
Dzienniki i wspomnienia [Diaries and memories], ed. Paweł Kądziela (Warszawa: 
Czytelnik, 2000), 55. 
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itual power of grace” (Liebert citing Newman in a letter to Wajngold),62 the 
poetic word has to be first of all an “external act”63 (Liebert’s expression in a 
review of Anatol Stern) susceptible of becoming an “inner” one—of being ful-
filled. For this reason Michał Sprusiński could speak of an “apostolic approach 
to art” in Liebert’s literary criticism,64 which he could not have done in the case 
of Brzozowski, simply because for Brzozowski the potential “conversions” of 
literature have no fixed end. They do not recognize a unique conversion as a 
point of reference. 
 
A New “Style” of Christianity? From Brzozowski to Berdiaev 
and back to Liebert 
 
If Liebert and Brzozowski, in their very closeness, remain always somehow 
opposed to each other, they seem to share, however, a crucial (anti-)modern 
topos: the topos of “another” light, an anti-rationalist enlightenment after the 
Enlightenment. Instead of a conclusion, I would like to sketch this ideologi-
cal/rhetorical aspect and then come back once again to the notion of the Church. 
The source I would like to use here is the small book The New Middle Ages by 
the Russian émigré religious philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev (1874–1948), con-
taining three essays: “The New Middle Ages,” “Thoughts on the Russian Revo-
lution,” and “Democracy, Socialism, and Theocracy,” published in 1924 in Ber-
lin.65 Liebert had lived and attended school in Moscow from 1915 to 191866 and 
knew Russian quite well. In 1926 he mentions in several letters to Wajngold that 
he has undertaken a translation of Berdiaev’s “very good book.”67 Although the 
translation went well, he would never finish it. When referring to the first of 
Berdiaev’s three essays and comparing some passages from it with Brzozowski’s 
                                                             
62  Letter of September 16, 1925. Liebert, Listy do Agnieszki, 152. 
63  Liebert, “Bieg do bieguna [Anatol Stern: Poezje, 1927]” [The run to the runner. Ana-
tol Stern: Poems, 1927], Pisma zebrane, vol. 1, 557. 
64  “Asking a lot from himself, he demanded maximalism also from others, a serious, 
nay, even apostolic attitude towars art.” Michał Sprusiński, “Jerzego Lieberta ‘siła 
fatalna’” [Jerzy Liebert’s ‘fatal force’], Twórczość 6 (1977): 109. 
65  Nikolai Berdiaev, Novoe srednevekov’e: Razmyshlenie o sud’be Rossii i Evropy (Ber-
lin: Obelisk, 1924). An English translation was published nine years later under a dif-
ferent title: Nicholas Berdyaev, The End of Our Time, trans. Donald Atwater (London: 
Sheed & Ward, 1933). 
66  Frankiewicz, Introduction, 9f. 
67  Cf. the letter from March 15, 1926. Liebert, Listy do Agnieszki, 376. 
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essay on Newman, my argument remains to a certain extent hypothetical (in as-
suming Liebert’s basic conformity with Berdyaev’s thought). However, regard-
ing Berdiaev and Brzozowski it may be recalled that the Russian thinker had 
been a Marxist in his early years.68 This fact is relevant when it comes to 
comparing their respective ideas on labor and their new notions of the Church. 
Newman’s life and work, according to Brzozowski, gives off a specific 
“light.” A light that not only enlightens but also brings an almost corporeal 
warmth.69 Berdiaev’s imagined upcoming era of a cosmic “dawn”—the “new 
middle age”—closing the era of “bright” individualism, though it has a com-
pletely different face, includes a specific atmospheric “warming” as well. Ber-
diaev writes: 
 
All these forms lose the sharpness of their outlines in the twilight of modern history: 
man’s atmosphere is now universal and cosmic, he meets the mystery of life and finds 
himself facing God. He was chained to individualism by forms which cut him off from 
other men and from the world at large. Now he moves towards generality, an epoch of 
universality and collectivity. He no longer believes that he was self-sufficient and could 
look after himself from the moment that he had rationalist thought, secular morality, Law, 
Liberalism, Democracy and Parliaments.70 
 
The strong aspect of “collectivism” in Berdiaev’s rather predictable cultural 
criticism is very clearly incommensurable with Newman’s individualistic ap-
proach to universality—and to his self-conscious “brightness.”71 However, as 
                                                             
68  Cf. Frederick C. Copleston, Philosophy in Russia: From Herzen to Lenin and Ber-
dyaev (Tunbridge Wells, Kent: Search Press Ltd/University of Notre Dame Press, 
1986), 372, 374. One should also mention that Brzozowski was familiar with the vol-
ume Problemy idealizma (Problems of Idealism, 1902), containing seminal Russian 
philosophers’ critical answers to (their own former) Marxism. Among the essays there 
was Berdiaev’s contribution: “Ėticheskaia problema v svete filosofskogo realizma,” in 
Problemy idealizma. Sbornik statei, ed. P. I. Novgorodtsev (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo 
Moskovskogo psikhologicheskogo obshchestva, 1902) (Trans.: “The Ethical Problem 
in the Light of Philosophical Idealism,” in Problems of Idealism. Essays in Russian 
Social Philosophy, trans., ed. and intr. R. A. Poole (New Haven/London: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2003). Cf. Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi myśli, 39. 
69  Brzozowski, “John Henry Newman,” 39. 
70  Nicholas Berdyaev, “The New Middle Ages,” in: Nicholas Berdyaev, The End of Our 
Time, 86f. 
71  See Newman’s famous words he said to his servant when, during a journey in Italy in 
1833, he got ill and supposedly was to die soon: “I shall not die, for I have not sinned 
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Brzozowski writes in Pamiętnik, “Newman jest egotystą, ale nie jest nigdy sam, 
nie chce być sam, każde jego zdanie ma korzenie, sięgające głęboko w myśl 
poprzedzającą go”72 (Newman is an egotist, but he is never alone, he does not 
want to be alone, every phrase he writes has its roots that go deep into the 
thoughts which preceded it). Brzozowski is very careful about pointing out how 
Newman manages to establish an “organic” contact between his “loneliness” and 
universalism (i.e., Catholicism). In his introduction Brzozowski writes: 
 
[…] wie on [Newman], jak ustala się związek z powszechnością poprzez samotność 
indywidualnej duszy, był on po tamtej stronie logiki i wyrażającego się w mowie rozumu, 
wie on, co dzieje się, gdy gaśnie to światło i wie, jak się je roznieca. Zna głębsze źródła 
światła i nie podaje nam nigdzie samej teoryi, lecz wyłącznie i jedynie wspomnienia i 
przykład własnej praktyki – daje nam on we wszystkiem, co mówi, pełną i konkretną 
prawdę rzeczy przeżytych, doskonale i spokojnie poznanych.73 
 
[Newman] knows how to establish a link with commonality through the loneliness of the 
individual soul; he was beyond the logic that is expressed in the language of reason; he 
knows what happens when the light goes out and how it is stirred up. He knows the deeper 
sources of light and never gives us any theory, but rather and exclusively memories and 
the example of his own practice—in everything that he says he gives us the full and defi-
nite truth of lived experience, a truth that was perfectly and calmly perceived. 
 
The “light” of Newman’s Christian knowledge, according to Brzozowski, is 
immune to rationalism inasmuch as he had already experienced its irrational, 
hidden side and its “deeper roots.” In this mixture of a bright and a peculiarly 
darkened light Brzozowski’s Newman is not that far removed from Berdiaev’s 
idea of a new ecclesiastical universality. In Brzozowski’s words, “Kościół nie 
jest instytucyą ludzką, ‘establishment’” (“The Church is not a human institution, 
not an ‘establishment’.”),74 but a force that would penetrate everything and ren-
der culture “cosmic.” It is exactly at this point that in Berdiaev’s dark neo-medi-
eval vision (not free of sympathies for Italian fascism75) a “transforming” light 
starts to shine. What makes such an unexpected “other” enlightenment possible 
                                                             
against light, I have not sinned against light.” Newman, Apologia pro vita sua, 99. 
Brzozowski refers to this passage in his essay (Brzozowski, “John Henry Newman,” 
52). 
72  Entry of January 15, 1911. Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, 125 (emphasis in the orig.). 
73  Brzozowski, “John Henry Newman,” 53 (emphasis in the orig.). 
74  Ibid., 22 (emphasis and English in the orig.). 
75  Cf. Berdyaev, “The New Middle Ages,” 89f. 
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is the new role of the “religious intelligentsia,” as the Russian philosopher puts 
it. He writes: 
 
The Church is cosmic by her nature and contains within herself the fullness of Being; she 
is the universe baptized. This ought to be a living and practical truth instead of just a 
theoretical and abstract doctrine; and the Church must pass from the period in which the 
sanctuary has predominated to a period of transfiguration of the cosmic fullness of life. 
Modern religion has become merely a department of culture, with a special place reserved 
for it—a very small one. It must again become all, the force which transfigures and irradi-
ates the whole of life from within; its spiritual energy must be set free to renew the face of 
the earth. 
Christianity has reached a stage in which the intelligentsia will play an increasingly im-
portant part […]. The “people” are being led away from faith by atheistic propaganda and 
by Socialism; but the “intellectuals” are coming back to it. And that is changing the style 
of Christianity.76 
 
Berdiaev doesn’t specify this new, elitist, not (yet) popular “style” of Christian-
ity. If it is, quite evidently, not the individual universalism of Newman, is it, 
then, something like the late Brzozowski’s all-integrating concept of Catholi-
cism? Or is it akin to what I have called Jerzy Liebert’s “Christianity by deci-
sion”? I am not able to answer this question here. But what is surely interesting 
is that Berdiaev links the new cosmic universality with “labor” and “creativity” 
(trud and tvorchestvo)77 just as Brzozowski does with regard to Catholicism and 
the cultural activity of zbudować and wytwarzać (“to build” and “to create”). 
Berdiaev imagines even a “particular sort of monastic life in the world.”78 
Such a secular monastic life is to a certain extent common to Newman, Brzo-
zowski,79 Berdiaev—and Liebert. The question is whether Liebert’s condition 
following his conversion (“drunken from grace”) has much to do with 
Brzozowski’s “to build” and “to create” or Berdiaev’s “labor” and “creativity.” 
As I have tried to show in this chapter, his Catholicism is clearly of another kind. 
I would phrase it as follows: Brzozowski (and possibly Berdiaev) showed Lie-
bert an “energetic” form of the Church. But as a converted poet he would him-
self fill this form. 
                                                             
76  Berdyaev, “The New Middle Ages,” 108f. (changed; emphasis mine, Ch. Z.). 
77  “The principle of work, spiritual and material, will be found at the root of future 
societies: not, as in Socialism, of work of which the goodness or badness does not 
matter, but of work considered qualitatively.” Berdyaev, “New Middle Ages,” 115. 
78  Berdyaev, “The New Middle Ages,” 116. 
79  See Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski, 446f. 
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Stanisław Brzozowski as Harbinger and 
Enabler of Modern Literary Theory in Poland 
and the West 
Michał Mrugalski 
 
 
Since the 1970s, a great deal of effort has been invested into making Stanisław 
Brzozowski a key figure in Polish “continental” philosophy, on a par with his 
analytical contemporaries from the Lvov-Warsaw School.1 This reassessment of 
the philosopher’s output entailed that Brzozowski, having ceased to be merely a 
speculative literary critic, gifted public speaker, and ideologist without a party, 
became a thinker in his own right and a patron saint2 of contemporary Polish 
left-wing intellectuals. After the rise and fall of the Soviet Union—which, 
though not directly Karl Marx’s fault, did, nevertheless, shake faith in his infalli-
bility—Brzozowski’s unfaithfulness to Marx, whom he abandoned after a four to 
                                                             
1  Andrzej Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski and the Polish Beginnings of ‘Western Marx-
ism’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Andrzej Mencwel, Stanisław Brzo-
zowski. Kształtowanie myśli krytycznej [Stanisław Brzozowski. The formation of criti-
cal thought] (Warszawa: Czytelnik 1976); Andrzej Mencwel, Stanisław Brzozowski. 
Postawa krytyczna. Wiek XX [Stanisław Brzozowski. The critical attitude. The twen-
tieth century] (Warszawa: Krytyka Polityczna, 2014). 
2  Czesław Miłosz, Człowiek wśród skorpionów. Studium o Stanisławie Brzozowskim [A 
man among scorpions: A study on Stanislaw Brzozowski] (Warszawa: Krytyka Poli-
tyczna, 2011), 212: “[…] prosty księżyna, wychodząc z pokoju, gdzie odbywała się 
spowiedź, był czemuś wzruszony, miał łzy w oczach i podobno powiedział do obec-
nych: Módlcie się, tu umiera święty” (the simple priest, when leaving the room where 
the confession took place, was somehow touched, had tears in his eyes and allegedly 
said to those present: “Pray, there is a saint dying here”). 
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five year period of fascination,3 stopped hindering the acknowledgement of his 
social and literary theory. His stylistic mannerisms also have become so alien to 
us that we no longer feel embarrassed for the author. Brzozowski’s dissidence 
and, alas!, susceptibility to ridicule have made it difficult to assess his impact on 
the Polish humanities. 
The measure of a philosopher in the eyes of the leftist intelligentsia ceased to 
be how far she goes along with the current interpretation of Marx. In pre-war 
Poland the Left either rejected Brzozowski altogether (Andrzej Stawar, Jerzy 
Borejsza, Ignacy Fik),4 or, as in the case of young Wiktor Erlich, redeemed 
veneration for Brzozowski’s literary criticism with condemnation of his unor-
thodox philosophy of culture.5 While the liberal weekly magazine Wiadomości 
Literackie (Literary News) paid lip service to Brzozowski as a stand-in for dem-
ocratic and modern Poland,6 without embracing his or any other specific critical 
program, Brzozowski became the main source of inspiration for personalist-
oriented critics such as Stanisław Adamczewski, Stefan Kołaczkowski, Kazi-
mierz Wyka, Ludwik Fryde, and Józef Spytkowski.7 With time, the personalist 
kind of literary criticism wore out, giving way to a less existentially engaged 
critical discourse shaped to a decisive degree by modern, text-and-structure-
oriented professional literary theory. But this does not in the slightest mean that 
Brzozowski’s legacy disappeared from literary criticism in the broad sense of the 
word, including also university-based literary studies, leaving him as the object 
of study exclusively by philosophers who came eventually to appreciate his 
intellectual self-government or, if you like, inconsequence. Brzozowski was and 
is still present in literary criticism, albeit mostly anonymously for reasons of a 
chiefly political nature (as well as those having to do with fashion and style). 
                                                             
3  Andrzej Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski – drogi myśli [Stanisław Brzozowski—paths 
of thought] (Kraków: Universitas, 2011), 142–151. 
4  Ignacy Fik, Rodowód społeczny literatury polskiej I [The social genesis of Polish 
literature I] (Kraków: Czytelnik, 1938), 133–135; Marian Stępień, Spór o spuściznę 
po Stanisławie Brzozowskim w latach 1918–1939 [The controversy about St. Brzo-
zowski’s legacy in the years 1918–1939] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie 1979), 
17–36. 
5  Wiktor Erlich, “Stanisław Brzozowski,” Myśl Socjalistyczna 11 (1937): quoted after 
http://lewicowo.pl/stanislaw-brzozowski/; Wiktor Erlich, “Brzozowski a socjalizm” 
[Brzozowski and socialism], Sygnały 65 (1939). 
6  Małgorzata Szpakowska, “Wiadomości Literackie” prawie dla wszystkich [“Literary 
news”: almost for everyone] (Warszawa: WAB, 2012), 262–265. 
7  Stępień, Spór o spuściznę po Stanisławie Brzozowskim, 110–172. 
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The thesis, which I propose to discuss below, is that Brzozowski had pre-
pared the ground for Polish literary studies in such a way that students of litera-
ture in the interwar period were able to adapt Russian Formalism and Czecho-
slovak Structuralism with less effort and more resourcefully. Moreover, owing to 
the ease and ingenuity of the reception, due in large measure to their knowledge 
of Brzozowski’s output, the Polish Formalist-Structural School contributed im-
portantly to modern literary theory, first and foremost by becoming a vital part 
of so-called Slavic Formalism which emerged in the 1930s. Thanks to Slavic 
Formalism vital elements of Brzozowski’s literary criticism and philosophy en-
tered into the global discourse of the postwar Humanities of which the center 
was the literary theoretical discourse (such that that the Humanities then and 
now are often called just “theory”). 
 
Brzozowski and Formalism: Marx avec Avenarius 
 
The extent to which Brzozowski enabled the new discourse demands careful 
reconstruction as his influence was systematically downplayed. He was regarded 
neither as a reliable Marxist, nor as someone who could be confined to the 
‘prison-house of language’ (as Formalism is still regarded by those who have 
little idea of its historical nature). This is why it is hard to believe that he could 
have exerted any influence whatsoever on the works of the Polish representatives 
of the formal movement in 1930s who were mostly Communists (Dawid 
Hopensztand was a member of the Polish Communist Party as of 1933, Stefan 
Żółkiewski joined the party during the war; Wiktor Weintraub relates how Fran-
ciszek Siedlecki defended the Moscow show trials while on a scholarship in 
Paris).8 Stanisław Brzozowski, a “Nationalist” and “Catholic,” was no hero 
during the time of the impending clash of totalitarian regimes. And yet, I argue 
that Brzozowski played a prominent role not only in the emergence of modern 
literary theory in Poland in the 1930s, but also, due to the significance of Polish 
scholars (notably Manfred Kridl and, to a much greater degree, Wiktor/Victor 
Erlich) in the transfer of Eastern and Central European theory to the West. 
That the importance of Brzozowski for the evolution of modern literary the-
ory remains largely unknown by contemporary students of intellectual history is 
a circumstance explained by a fatal misunderstanding. An instance of that is also 
to be found in the first monograph of the Polish Formalist School. In Andrzej 
                                                             
8  Wiktor Weintraub, “A Political Gloss to the History of the Polish Formalist Move-
ment,” in Russian Formalism: A Retrospective Glance. A Festschrift in Honor of 
Victor Erlich, ed. by Robert Louis Jackson, Stephen Rudy (New Haven: Yale Center 
for International and Area Studies, 1985), 7. 
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Karcz’s otherwise seminal work, Brzozowski is depicted not even as a literary 
critic, but as a “social thinker” focused on “the issues of ethics, patriotism, re-
building the nation and various other social problems.” His postulates “often, if 
not always, recalled the methods of positivist literary criticism.”9 Contrast this 
with Kazimierz Wyka’s crackdown, as early as 1933,10 on the persistent legend 
according to which Brzozowski was indifferent to aesthetic qualities of the liter-
ary work! Victor Erlich felt obliged, by the way, to dismiss a corresponding 
rumor on the part of Russian critics.11 
Even if one disregards this legend, the question remains: How can Brzo-
zowski, the ‘social thinker’, be regarded as an enabler of the Formalist-Structural 
approach, even if its champions stood up for social justice? The solution of the 
riddle lies perhaps in Wacław Borowy’s claim from the late 1930s, which at first 
seems to speak against my thesis.12 Borowy spoke for a considerable number of 
students of literature of his time when he claimed that the Russian Formalists 
had invented hardly any new tools or methods of literary studies; the elements of 
theory had been worked out earlier, mostly in German-speaking academia (Rus-
sian contemporaries of Borowy, Viktor Zhirmunskii, or Rozaliia Shor were 
equally decisive in declaring the dependence of Russian Formalism on German 
invention as was Manfred Kridl).13 What the Russians did invent, Borowy 
                                                             
9  Andrzej Karcz, The Polish Formalist School and Russian Formalism (Rochester: 
University of Rochester Press, 2002), 37. 
10  Kazimierz Wyka, “Brzozowskiego krytyka krytyki” [Brzozowski’s critique of criti-
cism], in “Kartografowie dziwnych podróży”: wypisy z polskiej krytyki literackiej XX 
wieku, ed. Marta Wyka (Kraków: Universitas 2004), 47: “Nie spodziewał się, że sam 
stanie się materiałem legend jeszcze liczniejszych niż Młoda Polska. Jedną z nich, 
najdokuczliwszą, jest legenda o niewrażliwości estetycznej Brzozowskiego jako kry-
tyka. Legenda, że nie miał on zupełnie zrozumienia dla sztuki samej w sobie, że ist-
niała ona dlań tylko jako materiał do naświetleń społecznych bądź filozoficznych” 
(He did not expect to become the object of yet even more legends than “Young Po-
land.” One of these legends, the most annoying one, is about Brzozowski lacking 
aesthetic sensitivity in his critical writings. A legend saying that he did not understand 
art at all, that it existed for him only as a material for social or philosophical insights). 
11  Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History—Doctrine (Hague: Mouton, 1965), 19f. 
12  Wacław Borowy, “Szkoła krytyków” [The school of critics], in Studia i szkice lite-
rackie, ed. Zofia Stefanowska and Andrzej Paluchowski (Warszawa, PIW, 1983).  
13  Viktor Zhirmunskii, “Vokrug ‘Poėtiki’ OPOIaZa ” [Around the “Poėtika” collections of 
OPOIaZ], Zhizn’ iskusstva 12 (1919). http://www.opojaz.ru/zhirmunsky/vokrug.html; 
Viktor Zhirmunskii, “K voprosu o formal’nom metode” [On the question of the for-
mal method], in Oskar Walzel, Problema formy v poėzii [The problem of form in po-
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claims, was, first, a specific arrangement of those methods; second, the For-
malists adopted a completely new attitude to literary studies that marked the 
direction and specific style of their investigations. In their works they prescind 
from evaluating literary phenomena according to extra-literary factors and at-
tempt to create value-free literary studies. This was truly a revolution, especially 
in Slavic countries where literature had been more often than not entangled in 
issues of social life by virtue of being a compensation for various deficits.14 It 
was also a seemingly deadly blow to a critic like the Fichtean Brzozowski who, 
having devoured the Russian raznochintsy and narodniki, made “morals” or 
“morality” the pillar and club of literary criticism. Nevertheless, in his writings 
there were a great number of elements of importance for modern scholars less 
openly but perhaps equally engaged in answering the social questions. 
Brzozowski was in no way the one who could instill such a value-free atti-
tude into the Polish Formalists. Yet his role in the emergence of modern Polish 
literary theory cannot be reduced to that of a purveyor of tools as in the case of 
the international (mostly German and Polish) forerunners of Russian Formalism. 
Not only are there intersections between the sets of properties associated with 
Brzozowski’s and Formalist-Structuralism’s poetics, but equally Brzozowski’s 
aesthetics, first and foremost his attempt to constitute a theory of the novel, 
promises a solution to the pivotal problem of the Polish Formalist movement, 
which was both politically engaged and focused on detecting the literariness of 
literary works. The Polish formalists adopted namely Brzozowski’s ideal of 
welding social interest and aesthesis as well as his program for carrying out the 
task by merging “Marx’s theory of the development of humanity” with Richard 
Avenarius’s “descriptive and formal” method of Empirio-criticism “that was 
                                                             
etry] (Leningrad: Academia, 1923), http://www.opojaz.ru/walzel/preface.html; Roza-
liia Shor, “‘Formal’nyi metod’ na zapade. Shkola Zeiferta i ‘ritoricheskoe’ napravle-
nie” [The formal method in the West], Ars Poetica 1 (1927), 127–143, 
http://www.sdvigpress.org/pub-100150; Manfred Kridl, “Poetyka Żirmunskiego” 
[Zhirmunskii’s Poetics], Wiadomości Literackie 19 (546) 1934: 4. 
14  Chernyshevskii relates the all-encompassing character of literature in Russia (of 
which the Kingdom of Poland was a part) to the backwardness of the Russian econ-
omy and the ensuing lack of the division of labor: Whereas a British writer can write 
fiction and only fiction, leaving politics and, say, sport to specialists in their respective 
fields, a Slavic novelist has to be a philosopher, an activist, etc. See Nikolai Cher-
nyshevskii, “Ocherki gogolevskogo perioda russkoi literatury” [Sketches on the Go-
golian period in Russian literature], in vol. 3 of Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Moskva: 
Goslitizdat, 1947), 303–306. 
278 | Michał Mrugalski 
developed in such a monumental way with regard to forms of cognition.”15 I will 
argue that Brzozowski’s “regulative idea” (regulatyw)16 of fusing Avenarius and 
Marx was in harmony with the assumed goal of interwar Formalist-Structuralist 
research. It is one of many paradoxes involving Brzozowski: the same features 
of Brzozowski’s philosophy that caused the Polish Formalists to leave unsaid the 
impulses they shared with or had obtained from him, made him indispensable to 
fulfill their ambitions to combine Marxism with an advanced aesthetic analysis. 
It is as if Brzozowski, by exceeding both Marxism and Formalism, had been all 
too successful in specifying the task for modern literary critics for which reason 
he had to be officially ignored by the Marxists and Formalists alike. 
 
The Morality of the Estrangement Device 
 
Brzozowski formulated the concepts that are most akin to Formalist premises in 
his 1905 study on Żeromski,17 who was committed, remarkably, to questions of 
morality and mores. Even had they been suppressed, with such forerunners as 
Brzozowski and Żeromski, value-free Formalism could not be that cynical, and 
seemed bound to look for ways of combining aesthetics with critical social phi-
losophy. The preoccupation with moral and social issues was passed on by 
Polish intermediaries to the West as an intrinsic quality of the Formalist-Struc-
tural school or at least as a signpost pointing in the direction in which post-For-
malist literary theory should develop. But the signpost pointed as well to the 
past. The Brzozowski-Żeromski complex of Slavic Formalism brings to light 
certain moral qualities characteristic of Russian Formalism—even in its earliest, 
militant and nihilist, phase. When Shklovskii introduced his famous technique of 
“estrangement” (defamiliarization), he used as an example Lev Tolstoy’s de-
scription of whipping as corporal punishment. Shklovskii comments on his own 
example: “Please excuse my somewhat ponderous example, but it is typical of 
how Tolstoy appeals to conscience. A plain whipping was estranged both by 
description and a proposal to change its form without changing its substance.”18 
The point of resorting to the device of estrangement is, then, to appeal to con-
science in a way analogous to Żeromski’s recourse to all possible poetical de-
vices in order to tear open the Polish wound so that it would not be scarred by a 
                                                             
15  Brzozowski, Współczesna powieść i krytyka, 64. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Stanisław Brzozowski, O Stefanie Żeromskim. Studyum [On Stefan Żeromski: a study] 
(Warszawa: Centnerszwer i Ska, 1905). 
18  Viktor Shklovskii, “Iskusstvo kak priem” [Art as device], in O teorii prozy (Мoscow: 
Federatsiia, 1929), 14. 
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layer of baseness.19 Consent to evil stems from becoming accustomed to evil, 
which therefore has to be estranged. Equating evil and routine found expression 
already in the most influential work in Polish literary history—Adam Mickie-
wicz’s Dziady III (Forefathers’ Eve III)—which begins with the hero’s gnostic20 
grieving over the slumber of indifference veiling humanity—“nie dziwi słońca 
dziwna, lecz codzienna głowa”21—and ends with a comparison: those among my 
Russian friends who object to my message of freedom resemble a dog so used to 
his collar that he bites the hand trying to set it free.22 Brzozowski’s fascination 
with Polish romanticism23 must have made him very sensitive to the sinister 
power of habit. Pitting poetry against habit, which overpowers the liveliness of 
life, was of course also a legacy of German and British romanticism. This ro-
mantic tradition—claim Omry Ronen and Ilona Svetlikova in unison—had a 
direct impact on Russian formalism in general and the concept of estrangement 
in particular. For example, in some of his formulations Shklovskii repeated 
entire phrases from Shelley’s “A Defence of Poetry,” which had been translated 
by Konstantin Bal’mont in 1911.24  
In his 1905 booklet O Stefanie Żeromskim. Studyum (On Stefan Żeromski: A 
Study) Brzozowski eloquently defended the principle of estrangement or de-
familiarisation as central to moral and aesthetic experience(s): “His mystery is 
                                                             
19  Stefan Żeromski, Sułkowski. Tragedia [Sułkowski: a tragedy] (Kraków: Książka), 
145. 
20  Stanisław Pieróg, “Mistyka i gnoza w myśli filozoficznej polskiego romantyzmu 
(Mickiewicz, Trentowski i Libelt)” [Mysticism and gnosticism in the philosophy of 
Polish romanticism (Mickiewicz, Trentowski, and Libelt)]. https://www.filozofiapolska. 
pl/spory/files/mistyka-i-gnoza.pdf  
21  Adam Mickiewicz, vol. 3 of Dzieła [Works], ed. Julian Krzyżanowski et al. (Warsza-
wa: Czytelnik, 1955), 129: “No one is struck by the sun’s strange, and yet daily head.” 
22  Mickiewicz, Dzieła, 308. Maria Janion claims that the recurring Polish uprisings 
(1830 and 1863 against Russia, 1846/48 against Prussia and Austria) aimed princi-
pally to wake the nation from its habituation to bondage. This aim was more important 
than victory, in which the leaders nevertheless believed. Maria Janion, “Vorwort” [Fo-
reword], in Polnische Romantik – Ein literarisches Lesebuch, ed. Hans Peter Hoel-
scher-Obermaier (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 10. 
23  Stanisław Brzozowski, “Filozofia romantyzmu polskiego” [The philosophy of Polish 
romanticism], Kultura i życie; Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy. 
24  Omri Ronen, Serebrianyi vek kak umysel i vymysel [The fallacy of the Silver Age] 
(Мoskva: OGI, 2000), 127f. Ilona Svetlikova, Istoki russkogo formalizma. Traditsii 
psikhologizma i formal’naia shkola [The origins of Russian formalism: the traditions 
of psychologism and the formal school] (Moskva: NLO, 2005), 75–77, 81f. 
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mysteriousness itself”—Brzozowski writes of Żeromski.25 This mysteriousness 
of Żeromski’s person and world is a function of form, because form means—
according to the study on the contemporary Polish novel published a year later—
finding a right perspective on the experience of the world: 
 
Świat ten [świat Zeromskiego] wydaje się nam głęboko znany, ale jakąś dziwną, niedo-
stępną świadomości i odmienną od niej wiedzą [...] gdy dostrzegamy jakąś dobrze nam 
znaną rzecz, drzewo, krajobraz ze strony całkowicie nam obcej, i gdy nagle zdajemy sobie 
sprawę, żeśmy rzeczy tej nigdy nie widzieli, że oto teraz dopiero ujawniła się nam jej treść 
istotna, którą pełni nienasytnego zdumienia chłoniemy jak gdyby innym, niecodziennym, 
głębszym, przenikliwszym wzrokiem.26 
 
This world [i.e., Żeromski’s] seems to us to be profoundly familiar, but familiar to some 
strange, inaccessible consciousness and to a knowledge distinct from this consciousness 
[…]. It is as if we notice a thing familiar to us—a tree, a landscape—from a perspective 
completely alien to us and realize that we have never seen the thing before, that only just 
now its essential content has been revealed to us, a content which we, full of insatiable 
amazement, absorb with a somewhat different, out of ordinary, keen sight. 
 
Much like Shklovskii quoting Tolstoy, who could not remember whether or not 
he had mindlessly dusted a sofa and in whose morality Shklovskii was more 
interested than the history of ideas has been willing to admit, Brzozowski claims 
eleven years earlier than Shklovskii that defamiliarization is the only adequate 
moral and artistic reaction to the life we live in forgetfulness and mechanically. 
Brzozowski’s description of estrangement may be perceived as an attempt to 
fuse the social dimension, so dear to him and his hero Żeromski, with Avena-
rius’s philosophy of experience. Shklovskii’s principle of estrangement is appar-
ently dependent on Avenarius’s philosophy in that it simply inverts the Empirio-
criticist or, more generally, post-Kantian,27 basic principle of austere economy in 
                                                             
25  Brzozowski, O Stefanie Żeromskim, 8: “… zagadką jego jest właśnie zagadkowość 
sama.” Cf. 29. 
26  Brzozowski, O Stefanie Żeromskim, 9. 
27  This was at least the way in which the Kantian aesthetical legacy was pеrceived at the 
time when Brzozowski’s ideas emerged: Cf. Witold Barewicz, “[Recenzja:] Les Pro-
blemes de l’Esthétique Contemporaine par M. Guyau. – Paris: F. Alcan, 1904” Pa-
miętnik Literacki 4 (1905): 110: “Dlatego zapatrywania ewolucjonistów, jak H. Spen-
cera, Grant Allena i Groosa, którzy wznowili teoryę Kanta i Schillera, że sztuka ni-
czym innym jest jak igraszką niezajętej energii wyższych władz umysłowych czło-
wieka, musiały w nim [Guyau] wywołać pewnego rodzaju oburzenie” (This is why 
Brzozowski and Modern Literary Theory | 281 
aesthetics. Whereas in Avenarius’s theory of apperception pleasure stems from 
economizing energy and displeasure from an experience of something new, 
strange, unusual,28 which forces the apparatus to exceptional activity, Shklovskii 
makes aesthetic appreciation proportional to the time needed to acquaint oneself 
with the estranged object, so that the quality of being new acquires the value of 
pleasure-giving. Whereas in Avenarius’s habit, Gewohnheit, steers everything—
the choice of the object, the construction of its ‘idea’, acts of will, move-
ments29—Shklovskii, following the Romantics, sets art against its worst enemy, 
habit. In retrospect, the passages from Avenarius’s Philosophie als Denken der 
Welt gemäss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses. Prolegomena zu einer 
Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (1876, Philosophy as Thinking of the World Ac-
cording to the Principle of the Smallest Expenditure of Effort: Prolegomena to a 
Critique of Pure Experience) appear to defy the Formalist-Futurist theory of art 
based on the principle of estrangement: 
 
Ich glaube kaum, dass Jemand die Vorstellung “Ungewohntes” denkt, ohne einen wenn 
auch noch so leisen Anklang von Unlust in sich zu fühlen; jedenfalls fühlte er diese Un-
lust, wenn er Ungewohntes wirklich denken soll. Einfach, weil Ungewohntes denken ein 
ungewohntes Denken, d. h. ein das Gewohnheitsmass überschreitendes Denken ist. Eine 
jede Vorstellung, welche nicht in dem System unserer bereits erworbenen, unter sich fest 
verbundenen Vorstellungen enthalten ist […] lässt uns deutlich die Scheu oder Abneigung 
der Seele vor dem Ungewohnten empfinden, vor dem Zwang, neben dem Alten ein Neues 
zu denken. Ein solches Denken, eine solche Vorstellung ist uns “unbequem” und wir 
reagieren darauf mit Unlust.30 
 
I do not believe that anyone is capable of thinking of the idea of “unusual” without feeling 
the slightest touch of reluctance; as a matter of fact, he would feel this reluctance if he 
would actually think the uncommon. This is simply because thinking the uncommon is 
uncommon thinking, i.e., thinking that exceeds the limits of the usual. Every representa-
tion, which is not yet a part of our already acquired representations […] lets us clearly feel 
our soul’s awe or dislike with reference to the uncommon, with reference to the constraint 
                                                             
the approach of the evolutionists—like H. Spencer, Grant Allen, and Groos, who 
revived Kant’s and Schiller’s theory that art is but a play of free energy pertaining to 
the higher mental faculties of man—must have incensed Guyau to a degree). 
28  Richard Avenarius, Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Princip des klein-
sten Kraftmasses. Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (Leipzig: Fues, 
1876), § 7. 
29  Avenarius, Philosophie als Denken, § 714. 
30  Ibid., § 18, 8f.  
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to think something new apart from the old. This kind of thinking, this kind of representa-
tion, is disagreeable to us and we react to it with reluctance. 
 
Empirio-criticism, as the latest vogue of Positivism that presented itself as an 
heir to Kantianism (“Kritik der reinen Erfahrung...”), was the proper other (one 
of the most proper others, taking into consideration the complexity of the intel-
lectual field at the time), against which Formalism could define its stance—not 
only with regard to defamiliarization but also literary history. By literary history 
I mean both the autonomous development of literary devices as well as its inter-
play with the institutional framework. On the basis of Aleksandr Bogdanov’s 
philosophy of “living experience” (живой опыт), which combined Avenarius’s 
pure experience with an anti-determinist understanding of Marxism,31 a version 
of literary history could have been developed that would have been strikingly 
similar to the concept of literary criticism Brzozowski upheld at the time he was 
a Marxian philosopher of life and experience and wrote his books on Żeromski, 
the Polish novel, and literary criticism in Poland. 
 
Brzozowski’s Ideas between East and West 
 
It is an already established opinion that the social and in particular historical 
approach to literature was at the center of Russian Formalism, which, even be-
fore Shklovskii undertook what Jakobson called “defeatist attempts at a compro-
mise with vulgar sociologism,”32 produced such classical studies as Tynianov’s 
“Literary Fact,” “Literary Evolution,” “Archaists and Innovators,” Tynianov’s 
and Jakobson’s “Problems of the Study of Literature and Language,” Ėikhen-
baum’s “Literature and Literary Environment,” “My Diary,” and Shklovskii’s 
                                                             
31  Aleksandr Bogdanov, Filosofiia zhivogo opyta. Populiarnye ocherki. Materializm, 
ėmpiriokrititsizm, dialekticheskii materializm, ėmpiriomonizm, nauka budushchego 
[The Philosophy of living experience. Popular sketches. Materialism, empirio-criti-
cism, the science of future] (Sankt-Peterburg: Pechatnyi trud, 1912).  
32  Quoted in: Aleksandr Galushkin, “I tak, stavshi na kostiakh, budem trubit’ sbor… K 
istorii nesostoiavshegosia vozrozhdeniia Opoiaza v 1928–1930 gg.” [Stepping on 
bones, we will call the roll… On the history of the failed revival of Opoiaz in 1928–
1930], NLO 44 (2000), http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2000/44/galush.html; Jakobson 
refers to Shkovskii’s works Material i stil’ v romane L’va Tolstogo “Voina i mir” 
[Material and style in Lev Tolstoy’s novel “War and Peace”], Matvei Komarov, zhitel’ 
goroda Moskvy [Matvei Komarov, inhabitant of Moscow]. 
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“In Defense of the Sociological Method.”33 Many Formalists got involved politi-
cally, Shklovskii and Brik being central figures of “Levyi Front Iskusstv” (Left 
Front of the Arts) where they met the leading critics who adhered to Aleksandr 
Bogdanov’s “Proletkul’t” that was rooted in the idea of fusing Marxism with 
Empiro-criticism. On the other hand, Jakobson and Nikolai Trubetzkoy enthused 
over the Eurasian Ideology, which was also a kind of political commitment.34 
In Russia, the founder of “Proletkul’t,” Aleksandr Bogdanov and his fellow 
traveler Anatolii Lunacharskii, the first Soviet People’s Commissar of Educa-
tion, campaigned for combining Marxism with Empirio-criticism. (While read-
ing Lunacharskii’s 1924 pamphlet on Formalism in which he criticized Formal-
ism’s sterile analyses in the name of emotional intensity charging them with the 
bourgeois mentality of a spectator,35 one can imagine how Brzozowski’s protest 
against the one-sidedness of early Formalism would have looked, had he been 
alive at the time of the Formalist surge. It was usual for Brzozowski to lay the 
charge of the spectator mentality.)36 Andrzej Walicki has described in detail 
Bogdanov’s and Lunacharskii’s personal acquaintance and intellectual ex-
                                                             
33  English titles after William Mills Todd, III, “Literature as an Institution. Fragments of 
a Formalist Theory,” in Russian Formalism: A Retrospective Glance, 16. Cf. also Liah 
Greenfeld, “Russian Formalist Sociology of Literature: A Sociologist’s Perspective,” 
Slavic Review 46 (1987). 
34  Nikolaj Trubetzkoy, Russland, Europa, Eurasien. Ausgewählte Schriften zur Kultur-
wissenschaft [Russia, Europe, Eurasia: selected writings on cultural studies], ed. 
Heinz Miklas (Wien: ÖAW, 2005), Roman Jakobson, Formalistická škola a dnešní 
literární věda ruská [The Formal School and contemporary Russian literary criticism], 
ed. Tomáš Glanc (Brno: Academia, 2005), 122f. and passim; Tomáš Glanc, “Structur-
alism Forever / Jakobson 1935,” in Prague Structuralism. Methodological Funda-
ments, ed. Marek Nekula (Heidelberg: Winter, 2003). Roman Jakobson and Petr Sa-
vitskii, Evraziia v svete iazykoznaniia [Eurasia in the light of linguistics] (Praha: Iz-
danie Evraziitsev, 1931). 
35  I am using a German translation of “Formalizm v nauke o iskusstve” (Formalism in 
art criticism): Anatolii Lunačarskij, “Der Formalismus in der Kunstwissenschaft” 
[Formalism in art history], in Marxismus und Formalismus. Dokumente einer litera-
turtheoretischen Kontroverse, ed. Hans Günther and Karla Hielscher (München: Han-
ser, 1973). 
36  Cf. Michał Mrugalski, “Vers une stylistique de l’acte. La querelle de Karol Irzy-
kowski et Stanisław Brzozowski à propos du Trésor de Leopold Staff dans le contexte 
des philosophies polonaise et allemande,” trans. Katia Vandenborre, Slavistica 
Bruxellensia 11 (2015). http://slavica.revues.org/1715 
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changes with Stanisław Brzozowski, whom they met in Florence.37 Contrary to 
Lenin, who argued in his famous book that materialism and Empirio-criticism 
are incompatible, a consideration of the role of Empirio-criticism for the For-
malist aesthesis demonstrates not the incompatibility of Marxism and Empirio-
criticism, but of Formalism and Phenomenology. Roman Jakobson hoped to 
merge the two mismatched traditions in what was later called “phenomenologi-
cal Structuralism.”38 In his last letter to Jakobson, written in 1941, the Polish 
Formalist-Structuralist Franciszek Siedlecki, terminally ill and stranded in occu-
pied Warsaw, warns Jakobson against Phenomenology and envisions a salvation 
of the OPOIAZ legacy by means of establishing a new union of “materialism“ 
and “Empirio-criticism.”39 Uniting Marxism and Empirio-criticism, i.e., Mate-
rialism with a positivist, anti-metaphysical philosophy of experience, was ex-
actly the program Brzozowski laid down in 1906 to study the succession of 
artistic forms without falling into the soulless “mechanicism” characteristic of 
Ferdinand Brunetière’s notion of literary evolution. 
Siedlecki’s message did not reach Western academia, as his letter was pub-
lished only in Polish in 1966. But two Polish literary critics managed to escape 
Poland and settle in the USA, Manfred Kridl and Victor Erlich. Although the age 
difference between them was thirty-two years, they were both under the compar-
                                                             
37  Andrzej Walicki, “Stanisław Brzozowski i rosyjscy ‘neomarkisści’ początku XX 
wieku” [Stanisław Brzozowski and the Russian “neo-Marxists” at the beginning of the 
twentieth century], Wokół myśli Stanisława Brzozowskiego, ed. Andrzej Walicki, Ro-
man Zimand (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie 1974), Walicki, Stanisław Brzozow-
ski. Drogi myśli, 101–108. 
38  Cf. Elmar Holenstein, Roman Jakobsons phänomenologischer Strukturalismus [Ro-
man Jakobson’s phenomenological structuralism] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1975); the most important contribution to the topic, in my opinion, is Dieter Münch, 
“Roman Jakobson und die Tradition der neuaristotelischen Phänomenologie” [Roman 
Jakobson and the tradition of neo-aristotelian phenomenology], Prague Structuralism. 
Methodological Fundaments, ed. Marek Nekula (Heidelberg: Winter, 2003). 
39  Roman Jakobson, “List badacza polskiego” [A letter from a Polish researcher], in Li-
teratura, komparatystyka, folklor. Księga poświęcona Julianowi Krzyżanowskiemu, 
ed. Maria Bokszczanin, Stanisław Frybes, Edmund Jankowski (Warszawa: PIW, 
1968), 664–674 (first publication in Kultura i społeczeństwo, 9, 1, 1965, 13–21). The 
passage from the letter is so intricate that it may mean the opposite of what I said. 
Siedlecki may have meant that Phenomenology was in his day what Empiro-criticism 
had been in Lenin’s day: an unacceptable idealistic stance. Either way, the relation-
ship between Marxism and Empirio-criticsm was still an urgent problem for the Polish 
scholar in the 1940s. 
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atively strong influence of Brzozowski’s philosophy of culture and literary criti-
cism. Their reception of Slavic Formalism, in its Russian and Czech varieties, 
had been preceded and most likely prepared by their intensive preoccupation 
with Brzozowski, in advance of becoming propagators of modern Eastern and 
Central European literary theory in the USA and Western Europe. 
The position and age of Manfred Kridl, professor of Polish Literature in Vil-
nius,40 predestined him to become a central figure of the Polish Formalist move-
ment, in that he gathered a group of gifted youths from Vilnius, Warsaw (the 
aforementioned Siedlecki, Hopensztand, Żółkiewski, Budzyk), and Poznań 
around him. Kridl assimilated a large part of Russian Formalism’s output into his 
“integral method” that consisted in combining, in nuce, a phenomenological 
theory of fictionality as a hallmark of literariness with the Formalist dynamic 
approach to aesthesis.41 The “integral” method also took into consideration the 
social aspects of literature, although these were to be dealt with from a specifi-
cally literary perspective. As far as I know, Kridl was the first writer to inform 
American audiences in 1944 of the main features of Russian Formalism.42 Nev-
ertheless, Kridl’s interest in the Russian formalist approach dates back no earlier 
than the mid-1930s, whereas, already a decade and a half earlier, he had written 
about Brzozowski in a spirit presaging the theses of his “integral method.” First 
of all, he did not fall prey to the “legend” of Brzozowski’s hostility toward aes-
thetic values. No horror litterarum in the author of Współczesna powieść w Pol-
sce. On the contrary, Brzozowski strived, driven by “the love of art,” to “sub-
stantiate art’s value, to interlock art with the totality of life, to make it a self-
                                                             
40  Teresa Dalecka, Dzieje polonistyki wileńskiej 1919–1939 [The history of Polish stud-
ies in Vilnius] (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2003), 75–101; Tradycje polskiej nauki o 
literaturze: Warszawskie Koło Polonistów po 70 latach [The traditions of Polish liter-
ary studies: The Warsaw circle of Polonists 70 years later], ed. Marcin Adamiak and 
Danuta Ulicka (Warszawa: Wydział Polonistyki UW, 2008); Adam Kola, “Zwrot do-
konany niedopełniony. Z dziejów nowoczesnego literaturoznawstwa polskiego okresu 
międzywojennego” [The turn accomplished not-fullfilled: The history of modern Po-
lish literary studies in the interwar Period], in “Zwroty” badawcze w humanistyce. 
Konteksty poznawcze, kulturowe i społeczno-instytucjonalne, ed. Jacek Kowalewski, 
Wojciech Piasek (Olsztyn: Colloquia Humaniorum, 2010). 
41  Manfred Kridl, Wstęp do badań nad dziełem literackim [Introduction to the study of 
the literary work] (Wilno: Dom Książki Polskiej, 1936), 44–46, 57–63, 151–152, 
181–186. 
42  Manfred Kridl, “Russian Formalism,” The American Bookman. A Quarterly of Criti-
cism and Theory of the Public Arts 1 (1944). 
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aware organ of life.”43 These words may be read as a lofty pre-formulation of the 
“integral method”: To avoid the restrictions the early Russian Formalists 
imposed on themselves to concentrate solely on the relationships between forms 
and devices, on the one hand, and the aesthesis, on the other. The scope of liter-
ary studies needs to be expanded without forgetting, however, that the aesthetic 
lies at the core of the discipline. Kridl therefore adhered to the program Brzo-
zowski set down in his book on the Polish novel and in return became something 
of a Brzozowski expert in the eyes of the liberal intelligentsia. I have already 
mentioned that the weekly Wiadomości Literackie—a liberal magazine attracting 
the attention of the younger generation of literary scholars equally drawn to 
Kridl44—often referred to Brzozowski’s legacy in order to legitimize its pro-
gressive stance. When Bogdan Suchodolski’s45 seminal work, Stanisław Brzo-
zowski. Rozwój ideologii (Stanisław Brzozowski: The development of an ideol-
ogy), appeared in 1933, Wiadomości Literackie asked none other than Manfred 
Kridl to write a review.46 
By enlarging Formalism so that it became (a crucial part of) the integral 
method, Kridl followed the example of the critic who, according to Stanisław 
                                                             
43  Manfred Kridl, Krytyka i krytycy [Criticism and critics] (Warszawa: Gebethner i 
Wolff, 1923), 81: “Z tego ukochania [sztuki, M. M.] właśnie płynęła [Brzozowskiego, 
M. M.] dążność do uzasadnienia jej wartości, do związania jej z całokształtem życia, 
uczynienia świadomym siebie organem życia.”  
44  Only 5 out of altogether 27 works that the leading figure of Polish Structuralism 
Franciszek Siedlecki published during his lifetime and that were eventually repub-
lished in Pisma zebrane (Warszawa: PIW, 1989) were not published in Wiadomości 
Literackie or Skamander, two press organs of the Skamander Group. 
45  Another platform where the young Warsaw literary scholars could immerse them-
selves in Stanisław Brzozowski’s methodological thought was the interdisciplinary 
Circle of Science Studies (Koło Naukoznawcze), which met in Warsaw as of 1928. 
Although the leading thinkers of the Circle of Science Studies were connected to the 
so-called Lvov-Warsaw School (Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Ossowski, Maria Os-
sowska, marginally Tadeusz Kotarbiński), Suchodolski held a lecture on the role of 
the notion of science in Stanisław Brzozowski’s development as a thinker; a summary 
of the lecture and the subsequent discussions were published in a magazine closely 
connected to the Circle, cf. Bogdan Suchodolski, “Rola pojęcia nauki w rozwoju 
myśli Stanisława Brzozowskiego (streszczenie referatu)” [The role of the notion of 
science in the development of Stanisław Brzozowski’s thought (abstract of a paper)], 
Nauka Polska. Jej Potrzeby, Organizacja i Rozwój 19 (1934). 
46  Manfred Kridl, “Książka o Brzozowskim” [A book on Brzozowski], Wiadomości 
Literackie 8 (1934). 
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Baczyński, “attacked the narrow-mindedness that ensued from the art for the 
art’s sake ideology, because he saw in it a separation from the most important 
issues of the time and the artist’s most exciting experiences.”47 In this spirit Kridl 
worked on a model in which art acquired the substantiality of the social, while, 
as fictional, the autonomous area of Dichtung conversely became a laboratory 
where social forms were only scrutinized and modeled as forms. The art for art’s 
sake ideology, at least in its Polish variety, did not strive for the autonomy of art, 
but for its subjugation to a vague Platonism; Brzozowski waged his anti-Miriam 
campaign against subsuming art under something as unchangeable as the Pla-
tonic Idea. Instead, art has to have a substantive basis in the dynamic realm of 
social activity.48 
In contrast to the somewhat obscure Manfred Kridl, who, although named to 
a professorship at Columbia University, never achieved the standing that he had 
enjoyed in pre-war Poland, Victor Erlich is, next to Roman Jakobson and René 
Wellek, the most important figure in the transition of Slavic Formalism for the 
West. Erlich’s biography is contained in his memoirs.49 He was born in 1914 in 
Petrograd to a Jewish family with strong intellectual traditions: his grandfather 
was the legendary Jewish historian Simon Dubnov; his mother wrote Russian 
poetry which was praised, among others, by the Russian poet Kornei Chu-
kovskii; and his father was a leader of the Jewish “Bund,” first in Russia and 
then in Poland where the family moved to soon after the outbreak of the October 
Revolution. At the start of World War Two, Victor escaped the Germans through 
Lithuania, Russia, Japan, and Canada, and landed in the U.S. Army fighting in 
Germany. After the war, he wrote a dissertation at Columbia on Russian For-
malism which was inspired by, and mostly devoted to Roman Jakobson. It be-
                                                             
47  I quote after Stępień, Spór o spuściznę po Stanisławie Brzozowskim, 51: “Brzozowski 
atakował ciasność horyzontów, wynikającą z hasła ‘sztuki czystej,’ widząc w niej od-
separowanie się od najważniejszych zagadnień czasu i najbardziej emocjonujących 
artystę przeżyć.” The narrow-mindedness of the art for art’s sake approach will be 
further criticized by Jakobson.  
48  Czepiel [Stanisław Brzozowski], “Scherz, Ironie und tiefere Bedeutung [fragmenty]” 
[Comedy, irony, and deeper meaning (fragments)], “W odpowiedzi na protest” [Re-
sponding to a protest], “Miriam – zagadnienie kultury [fragmenty]” [Miriam—the 
problem of culture (fragments)], in Programy i dyskusje literackie okresu Młodej Pol-
ski, 3rd ed., ed. Maria Podraza-Kwiatkowska (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2000). This is 
supposed to be a more brutal version of the press campaign in comparison to the one 
republished later with alterations in Brzozowski’s Kultura i życie. 
49  Victor Erlich, Child of a Turbulent Century (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 
2006). 
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came the first and probably the most influential monograph of the movement. 
All subsequent major contributions had to take into account Erlich’s work: Peter 
Steiner, who wrote his Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics in Yale where Erlich 
taught, Krystyna Pomorska, and Aage A. Hansen-Löve, all had to take a stance 
on Erlich’s Russian Formalism: History—Doctrine.50 
Despite the fact that Erlich did not hold Kridl in high esteem as a person (he 
once recounted how, during the defense of his dissertation on Formalism, Lionel 
Trilling “took a brief nap while Manfred Kridl, professor of Polish literature, 
spoke at inordinate length”),51 he made Kridl’s “integral method” pivotal for the 
acceptance of Russian Formalism in the West. Not only did Kridl become the 
main hero of the chapter of Russian Formalism devoted to the redefinition of 
Formalism in Poland, Erlich also included his ideas (along with those of other 
members of the Vilnius-Warsaw School) in his systematic reconstruction of the 
Formalist output. Needless to say, Erlich described the reformulations of Russian 
Formalism in Czechoslovakia and Poland as having transformed the initial Rus-
sian impulse into the most mature approach to the literary to date. 
Erlich follows Kridl when he speaks about the inadequacy of the Formalist’s 
initial premises and expresses dissatisfaction with their “last-minute attempt to 
combine rigorous formal analysis with some hasty sociologizing.”52 The Warsaw 
Formalists, it will be remembered, promised that they would find a blueprint for 
a more rigorous and revealing combination of aesthetic analysis with sociology 
in accordance with Brzozowski’s idea of uniting Marxism, as a theory of collec-
tive creativity, with Empirio-criticism’s theory of experience. In numerous pas-
sages of his Russian Formalism Erlich shows his aversion to Viktor Shklovskii’s 
extravagances. Thus he does not accept Shklovskii’s claim that a new form 
appears not in order to express a new content, but in order to replace an earlier, 
worn-out form. This aversion was instilled into Erlich not exclusively by Roman 
Jakobson,53 but also by his own early preoccupation with Brzozowski’s attempt 
at substantiating the value of artistic forms. Granting that Erlich, the author of 
Russian Formalism was under the nearly hypnotic influence of Jakobson and 
                                                             
50  Krystyna Pomorska, Russian Formalist Theory and Its Poetic Ambience (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1968), 39. Aage A. Hansen-Löve, Der russische Formalismus. Methodologi-
sche Rekonstruktion seiner Entwicklung aus dem Prinzip der Verfremdung [Russian 
Formalism: A methodological reconstruction of its development out of the principle of 
estrangement] (Wien, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978); 
Peter Steiner, Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics (Lausanne: sdvig, 2014), 25–29. 
51  Erlich, Child of a Turbulent Century, 135. 
52  Erlich, Russian Formalism, 130. 
53  Erlich, Child of a Turbulent Century, 133 
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took for granted some of Jakobson’s most controversial appraisals (above all 
regarding the indigenous character of Russian Formalism and the formative role 
of Husserl’s Phenomenology on structural linguistics),54 one gets the impression 
that Brzozowski’s aesthetic philosophy of collective and creative work, about 
which Erlich enthused in his Polish years, found its prolongation not only in 
Erlich’s sympathy toward the integrity of Western Slavic Formalism, but also in 
his later development. In the years after Russian Formalism, he began to shift or 
expand55 his interests in the direction which he himself described with Stanisław 
Barańczak’s phrase “Poetics and Ethics.”56 Barańczak, for his part, was a bril-
liant representative of Polish Structuralism, before he moved to Harvard. It had 
been Brzozowski’s program for literary criticism to make morality and form two 
focal points of the great ellipse. Thanks to Erlich’s early preoccupation with 
Brzozowski, he was susceptible to Jakobson’s notion of Slavic Structuralism and 
he came to treat structures ever more in ethical and sociological terms. 
 
Brzozowski’s Social Kantianism and Slavic Structuralism 
 
Victor Erlich left Poland as an ardent follower of Brzozowski’s literary criti-
cism—as ardent as his Marxist creed allowed him to be. He devoted his Master’s 
thesis defended in 1937 at the Wolna Wszechnica Polska in Warsaw to 
Brzozowski, the more liberal of the two universities in Warsaw at the time. In 
two magazine articles concerned with Brzozowski, the second of which marked 
symbolically the end of an era as it appeared in Spring 1939 in the Lvov based 
Sygnały (Signals) magazine,57 Erlich struggled to defend the substance of Brzo-
zowski’s literary criticism while at the same time condemning his ‘nationalist’ 
political positions and mysticism that obscured his general philosophy of culture. 
(In Russian Formalism Erlich mentions neither Brzozowski nor his own Polish 
publications.) One may say that he had the same problem with Brzozowski as 
the Warsaw Formalists who could not simply set aside Brzozowski’s program 
for literary criticism, but were not willing to follow him in his unorthodox 
Marxism and his later turn to Catholicism. This struggle was formative for Er-
lich, impacting his vision of Formalism, because while he was still in Warsaw, 
                                                             
54  Erlich, Russian Formalism, 58, 62. 
55  Which is discernable already in the “Foreword to the Second Edition,” in Erlich, 
Russian Formalism, 7: “still more critical than I was a decade ago of the excesses of 
‘pure’ Formalism.” 
56  Erlich, Child of a Turbulent Century, 161. 
57  Wiktor Erlich, “Stanisław Brzozowski,” Myśl Socjalistyczna 11 (1937); Erlich, “Brzo-
zowski a socjalizm.” 
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he made contact with Russian Formalism. The pages in Russian Formalism 
devoted to the Polish Formal School that consisted of Manfred Kridl’s Vilnius 
Group and the Warsaw Circle are concise and scholarly. At the beginning of the 
monograph, Erlich mentions en passant his original idea for a book describing 
the entire spectrum of Slavic Formalism (Structuralism) and subsequently the 
need to narrow the scope of the material so that only those aspects of Prague and 
Polish Structuralism are covered which had a direct correspondence with the 
Russian School.58 Erlich’s memoirs give, alternatively, a livelier picture of the 
Warsaw group: 
 
Already back in Warsaw I began to move away from the Marxian approach to literature in 
search of what a New Critic would call a more “intrinsic” perspective on imaginative 
literature.  
 
Note that it was a period when he dealt predominantly with Brzozowski: 
 
[…] sometime in 1937 I attended a couple of meetings of the vital Polish Literary Club at 
the University of Warsaw, which was demonstratively drawn to structural analysis of 
verse and of artistic prose. I was especially impressed by the brilliant young scholar of 
versification Franciszek Siedlecki, author of the innovative Studies in Polish Metrics, as 
well as the sophisticated if somewhat Talmudic David [sic!] Hopensztand and his discus-
sion of point of view in the prose of an influential contemporary Polish writer [Juliusz 
Kaden-Bandrowski, M. M.59]. Siedlecki and Hopensztand were to perish during the war. 
The only surviving key member of the circle whom I met again in Warsaw in 1960 was 
the articulate Stefan Zólkiewski [sic!], who was to play a visible role in postwar Poland’s 
cultural life as a cross between an influential—and relatively open-minded—“official” 
literary critic and an establishment bon vivant. 
The political ambience in the circle was decidedly leftist. Yet its dominant methodology 
was not Marxist. Both Siedlecki and Hopensztand were taking their cues from a remarka-
ble school of Russian literary scholarship which originated in the second decade of the 
twentieth century, a school of which Roman Jakobson was one of the architects and which 
became the subject of my dissertation and my first book, so-called Russian Formalism.60 
 
                                                             
58  Erlich, Russian Formalism, 12. 
59  Dawid Hopensztand, “Mowa pozornie zależna w kontekście Czarnych skrzydeł” [Free 
indirect speech in the context of Black Wings], in Prace ofiarowane Kazimierzowi 
Wóycickiemu (Wilno: Dom Książki Polskiej, 1937). 
60  Erlich, Child of a Turbulent Century, 127f. 
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Before becoming a spokesman for Roman Jakobson, whose version of the For-
malists’ history he tried to recount, Wiktor Erlich received his cues from the 
Warsaw Circle and Manfred Kridl, a group whose members were prepared, to 
various degrees by Brzozowski, for their reaction to Russian Formalism. They 
undoubtedly influenced the reception of what Erlich had learned from Jakobson 
and from written sources in New York libraries after the war. Here is how they 
did it: According to Erlich’s Russian Formalism, in order to remain prolific, 
Formalism had to cease to be just Formalism and become instead an integral 
method. The Polish scholars agreed with Jakobson and his colleagues from 
Czechoslovakia as to the integrity and the scope of the method, but whereas 
Jakobson looked rather to Phenomenology as the vehicle of expansion, Polish 
Structuralists, although not totally deaf to the siren song of Phenomenology, held 
rather to Empirism and Positivism which they wanted to marry with Marxism. 
(In Brzozowski’s time Emprio-ciriticism was the most advanced Empiricist 
stance, whereas in the 1930s the position was occupied by the Vienna Circle, 
whose output Żółkiewski tried to implement in literary studies). In this respect, 
the Warsaw group seems to have been more decided then Kridl’s Vilnius circle. 
Prague Structuralism and the Polish Integral Method, Erlich claimed, man-
aged to “reopen the problem of ‘literariness’ and place it in a proper perspec-
tive.”61 This is the perspective of aesthesis involved in life, ‘mores’, or ‘environ-
ment’, as the Russian Formalist notion ‘byt’ is translated. It may serve as an 
indication of the influence of Brzozowski’s moralist world-view on Erlich that 
he chose the ethically loaded notion of ‘mores’ to render ‘byt’, which is probably 
a pendant to Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, and not, say, ‘environment’. Once the one-
sidedness of Russian Formalism has been corrected in the Western Slavic coun-
try’s world-views and morality, even if entangled in multidimensional mores, are 
seen as a part of art. Ethos is no longer “a camouflage element of the esthetic 
structure,”62 its presence in the work is not an effect of a projection on the part of 
the critic.63 Erlich, in the chapter devoted to the relationships of literature and 
life, sounds almost like Brzozowski. And it is not only the presence of sublated 
elements of social life in the artwork or that the literary partakes in social experi-
ence which exhaust the presence of life in literature and its theory. Theory, just 
as Brzozowski postulated, has to resemble life, it needs to be organic in its 
structure; this crucial principle guides endeavors to weld the social and the aes-
thetic. This is why the trickster of Russian Formalism Viktor Shklovskii failed in 
his attempt to combine the social and the formal analyses of Tolstoy’s War and 
                                                             
61  Erlich, Russian Formalism, 198. 
62  Ibid., 199. 
63  Ibid., 197f. 
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Peace. Shklovskii’s “categories [were] mechanically superimposed on each 
other rather than integrated,”64 Erlich writes, thus amplifying the topos referred 
to even by present-day Russian critics: “The enclosure of the Prague theses and 
‘formal-sociological’ premises in the Marxist framework (even if Marxism were 
purely ornamental here) was made too superficially, and even in a mechanical 
fashion.”65 It was a strange accusation, by the way, directed at the critic who was 
a professional driver and borrowed his metaphors from the mechanical rather 
than the organic.66 
Erlich’s critique of the mechanical character of Shklovskii’s version of Rus-
sian Formalism is isomorphic with Brzozowski’s put-down of Brunetière’s liter-
ary evolution, which he described in his work on the contemporary Polish novel 
as a mechanical succession of abstract forms paralleling a soulless, because 
deterministic, development of societies.67 Already at the stage marked by Kul-
tura i życie (Culture and Life, 1907), a book which testifies to his initially hesi-
tant turn to Marxism, Brzozowski tried to combine art criticism with a radical 
anti-determinism resembling the Kantian teleology of art. The social and the 
aesthetic were to meet in teleological anti-determinism so that the sphere of art 
appeared as a Kantian utopia of disinterestedness freed from economic needs.68 
Brzozowski, it seems, pleaded during the later stages of his career for the libera-
tion of, rather than the liberation from, labor so that labor, like creation and 
aesthetic play, could be unconditionally free. Brzozowski’s pathos kindled Er-
lich’s double-edged attack on both the anti-social attitude of early Formalism 
and “vulgar sociologism,” to which Shklovskii turned in his later Formalist 
works. But what repelled Erlich in Shklovskii’s book on War and Peace was 
also the determinism of form, exactly like that severely criticized by Brzozowski 
in his rejection of Brunetière’s literary evolution. The history, recounted by 
Shklovskii in his book on Tolstoy’s War and Peace, is a model treatise in the 
style of the Marxist ‘despitists’ (voprekisty), as opposed to the camp of “thank-
ists” (blagodaristy).69 This was an allegedly more dialectical stance than the 
                                                             
64  Ibid., 124 
65  Galushkin, “I tak, stavshi na kostiakh, budem trubit’ sbor…” (emphasis mine, M. M.). 
66  An example: Shklovskii writes in an open letter to Jakobson “You and I were like two 
pistons in the same cylinder. That’s a fact in the life of steamships. You have been un-
screwed and kept in Prague as an implement.” Viktor Shklovskii, Third Factory, 
trans. Richard Sheldon (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1977), 39. 
67  Brzozowski, Współczesna powieść i krytyka, 62–64. 
68  Brzozowski, Kultura i życie. 
69  Cf. Katerina Clark and Galin Tihanov “Soviet Literary Theory in the 1930s: Battles 
over Genre and the Boundaries of Modernity,” in A History of Russian Russian Liter-
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vulgar determinism of the ‘thankists’ who reduced the message of a work to its 
author’s class origin that prompted her to write in a way corresponding to her 
class origin. The supporters of ‘despitism’ invoked Engels’s opinion on Balzac, 
who, in accordance with his social origin and world-view, wanted to write reac-
tionary novels, but his qualities as a writer made him do otherwise.70 Literary 
form as such is progressive and changes itself because it cannot stay the same. 
The history of Balzac repeated itself in the case of Shklovskii’s Tolstoy who had 
planned to write an apologia of the nobility, but the form he chose carried him 
into modern polyphony. The determinism of Tolstoy’s class world-view was 
derailed by the history of literature, i.e., the history of literary forms working of 
its own accord. Shklovskii’s approach seems to be dialectical and modern, and 
yet Erlich deems this procedure mechanical. This assessment can be understood 
in the light of Brzozowski’s radically anti-determinist theory: the formal causal-
ity postulated by Shklovskii is still a causality which cannot be brought in corre-
spondence with the freedom of creation. Brzozowski was probably the most 
resolute anti-determinist philosopher of his time. According to his ardent reader, 
Erlich, not until Western Slavic Structuralism adopted teleology in lieu of de-
terminism was it able to rid itself of the obsolete and extravagant elements in 
Russian Formalism. As every other reader of Brzozowski may easily foresee, the 
new anti-determinist and multidimensional stance on literariness boiled down to 
(social) Kantianism. 
 
Just because art is not primarily a call for action or a source of information, but a disinter-
ested contemplation of the medium, “purposiveness without purpose” (Kant), can it bring 
within its orbit so many, often discordant, elements and become involved with so many 
interests and endeavors.71 
 
Brzozowski along with Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz and Edward Abramowski 
worked on an anti-metaphysical “social Kantianism,” based in part on an anti-
determinist reading of Marx’s doctrine of embodied praxis.72 The social Kanti-
ans of the beginning of the twentieth century perceived social reality as the do-
main of free creation; even determinist processes both in the base and super-
                                                             
ary Theory and Criticism. The Soviet Age and Beyond, ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and 
Galin Tihanov (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), 117. 
70  This opinion was expressed in a letter to Margaret Harkness in early April 1888. Karl 
Marx, Friedrich Engels, Werke [Works] (Berlin: Dietz, 1967), vol. 37, 42–44. 
71  Erlich, Russian Formalism, 210. 
72  Andrzej Walicki, Polska, Rosja, Marksizm [Poland, Russia, Marxism] (Kraków: 
Universitas, 2011), 286–292. 
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structure were rooted in the spontaneity of the subject.73 Kantianism adopted in 
West Slavic Structuralism and Integral Method—its main aspects were the the-
ological approach to human reality and bracketing purpose in the teleology of 
the aesthetic function—salvaged “the healthy core” of Russian Formalism. It 
literally brought Formalism to life without having it renounce the aesthetic core: 
“Structuralism, the final result of Formalist theorizing, points the way toward a 
conception of literature that would do full justice to both the uniqueness and the 
relevance of literary art.”74 
The social Kantianism professed by the Polish Marxists (Brzozowski, Kel-
les-Krauz, Abramowski) that, according to Jakobson and Erlich, became the 
mature form of the Formalist project, which started in Russia and came to reali-
zation in West Slavic cultures, is quite conspicuous, for example, in the notion of 
the dominant. I would like to close this paper with a short analysis of the notion. 
It aims to demonstrate that Brzozowski’s program of introducing Avenarius’s 
description of aesthesis to literary criticism, which would be integral and social 
and pay justice to both uniqueness and the relevance of literary art, was perfectly 
in accord with the later developments of structuralism.   
 
The Case of Dominant 
 
Dominante was a term that Richard Avenarius used in his Kritik der reinen 
Erfahrung to designate that among many the “Vitalreihen” (life series) compet-
ing with one another in the framework of the central nerve system (the system C) 
which subsumes other series and thus determines the general direction of an 
individual’s behaviour. Excitations that do not fall in the scope of dominant are 
repressed, their energy absorbed and transferred to the dominant series.75 The 
functioning of the “dominant” described by Avenarius tallies with Broder Chris-
tiansen and Aleksei Ukhtomskii’s76 usages of exactly the same term, which 
                                                             
73  Edward Abramowski, “Zagadnienia socjalizmu” [Questions of socialism], in Zagad-
nienia socjalizmu. Wybór pism, ed. Krzysztof Mazur (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Poli-
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74  Erlich, Russian Formalism, 211. 
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76  Broder Christiansen, Philosophie der Kunst [Philosophy of Art] (Hanau: Clauss & 
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exerted a direct influence on Formalisms in Eastern and Central Europe (begin-
ning with Eikhenbaum and Shklovskii77). The transfer of energy between the 
dominant and the subjugated elements of the system foreshadows the function-
alistic structuralism of the mature Roman Jakobson.78 
The role of the dominant consists namely in securing the dynamic character 
of an achieved balance amounting to the system’s ability to develop.79 The sys-
tem must remain in the state of a dynamic equilibrium of contradicting forces in 
order to be able to adapt to the ever-changing environment, but, at the same time 
a hierarchy of elements has to be assured for the system to remain organised. 
According to Mukařovsky, the inner contradiction sets structure apart from a 
mere aggregate of elements.80 In order for inner tension to dynamize but not 
blow up the whole, one of the system’s aspects has to come to the fore and be-
come its dominant. In Averarius, the dominant subsumes other series, absorbs 
their energies and gives a general direction to the system. The system may thus 
become dynamic and historical, as already Roman Jakobson stressed in his 1935 
Czech essay on the dominant (in which he does not mention Avenarius nor refer 
to Christiansen or any other champion of the term). The dominant is for Jakob-
son not only historically changeable (his definition of the dominant is ostensive 
as it consists in an enumeration of different dominants of Czech poetry).81 The 
                                                             
Communist Autobiographies on Trial (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2003), 
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77  Boris Eikhenbaum, Melodika russkogo liricheskogo stikha [Melodics of Russian 
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stein, Roman Jakobsons phänomenologischer Strukturalismus, 42. 
80  Jan Mukařovský, “Über Strukturalismus” [On structuralism], in Formalismus, Struk-
turalismus und Geschichte, ed. Aleksandar Flaker and Viktor Žmegač (Kronberg/Tau-
nus: Scriptor, 1974), 86f. 
81  Jakobson, “Dominant,” 751f. 
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dominant is the notion through which—according to Jakobson who was already 
exchanging with his Polish colleagues in 1935—the aesthetic may and should be 
connected to the social: 
 
[…] the definition of an artistic work as compared to other sets of cultural values substan-
tially changes, as soon as the concept of the dominant becomes our point of departure. For 
example, the relationship between a poetic work and other verbal messages acquires a 
more exact determination. Equating a poetic work with an aesthetic, or more precisely 
with a poetic, function, as far as we deal with verbal material, is characteristic of those 
epochs which proclaim self-sufficient, pure art, l’art pour l’art. In the early steps of the 
Formalist school, it was still possible to observe distinct traces of such an equation. How-
ever, this equation is unquestionably erroneous: a poetic work is not confined to aesthetic 
function alone, but has in addition many other functions. Actually, the intentions of a 
poetic work are often closely related to philosophy, social didactics, etc.82 
 
In a manner which does not surprise at this stage of the present exposition, Ja-
kobson’s positing of the dominant harmonizes with Brzozowski’s aversion to 
mechanicism as well to the narrow-minded ideology l’art pour l’art, in opposi-
tion to which he proposed the program of welding Marxism together with Em-
pirio-criticism, from where the notion of the dominant began its expansion in 
sciences and the humanities. Needless to say, Erlich expressed the same aver-
sion, given his adherence to Brzozowski and Jakobson at different stages of his 
life. Jakobson pointed out that the dominant connects the aesthetic to the social 
and stands in opposition to the mechanical character of pure sociologism as well 
the monistic stance of aestheticism: 
 
In direct opposition to the straight monistic point of view is the mechanistic standpoint, 
which recognizes the multiplicity of functions of a poetic work and judges that work, 
either knowingly or unintentionally, as a mechanical agglomeration of functions. Because 
a poetic work also has a referential function, it is sometimes considered by adherents of 
the latter point of view as a straightforward document of cultural history, social relations 
or biography. In contrast to one-sided monism and one-sided pluralism, there exists a 
point of view which combines an awareness of the multiple functions of a poetic work 
with a comprehension of its integrity, that is to say, that function which unites and deter-
mines the poetic work. […] a poetic work is defined as a verbal message whose aesthetic 
function is its dominant.83 
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The echo of Jakobson’s “integral method”—reinforced by Brzozowski’s fervent 
anti-determinism—was clearly discernable in Erlich’s condemnation of Shklov-
skii’s “vulgar sociologism” and his praise of the social Kantianism of West 
Slavic structuralisms. 
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The Stalinist Reception of Stanisław 
Brzozowski’s Philosophy: 
The Case of Paweł Hoffman 
Paweł Rams 
 
 
The Stalinization of Polish artistic, cultural, and academic life began around 
1947, even though the breaking point for Polish literature was the Writers’ Con-
gress held in Szczecin in January 1949. As Zbigniew Jarosiński, the author of a 
book on Polish Socialist Realism notes, “at the very beginning, socialist realism 
was manifested in a few vague slogans based on the solid conviction that Polish 
art should be socialist, which meant both realist and faithful to the Party.”1 These 
initially vague visions grew into a firm doctrine that restricted all kinds of art-
ists.2 Polish cultural history ran its course, as did the cultural history of the So-
viet Union, which moved towards socialist realism over a decade earlier by 
Maxim Gorky and his follower, Andrei Zhdanov.  
The organized destruction of intellectual life in Poland3 was preceded by 
philosophical debates grounded in Lenin’s thesis that “philosophical theories are 
not neutral in the class struggle but are instruments of it. Every philosophy is in 
                                                             
1  Zbigniew Jarosiński, Nadwiślański socrealizm [Socialist realism along the Vistula] 
(Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IBL PAN, 1999), 15. 
2  Ibid. 
3  In this regard, as Michał Głowiński demonstrates, Stalinism was inconsistent: “On the 
one hand, it ruined Polish culture and tradition, but, on the other, it was in favor of 
ideas that lead to the growth of science and culture, especially those in which Com-
munists could serve the function of patrons, protectors, or founders.” Cf.: Michał 
Głowiński, “Pani Mayenowa – próba portretu” [Mrs. Mayenowa: a portrayal], in 
Rozmaitości interpretacyjne. Trzydzieści szkiców (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IBL 
PAN, 2014), 229.  
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the service of some class-interest, and in a society torn by the class struggle this 
cannot be otherwise.”4 The proliferation of philosophical views on class struggle 
can be shown as the manifestation of a prior conflict at the level of production 
and ownership. However, it cannot be so in a classless society, which requires a 
unified philosophical approach that signifies working-class self-awareness. This 
approach came into being through the Soviet Union’s implementation of Marxist 
materialism as interpreted by Lenin and systemized by Stalin.  
After the Bolshevik Revolution, social and political life in the Soviet Union 
was controlled by Vserossiiskaia chrezvychainaia komissiia (The All-Russian 
Extraordinary Commission) who had the responsibility to suppress political 
opposition. In intellectual life, such roles were assigned to institutions such as 
the People’s Commissariat of Education, the Red Professors’ Institute, and the 
Communist Academy in Moscow,5 which were formed by Lenin to replace 
university philosophy departments. The latter two functioned under the patron-
age of Nikolai Bukharin who considered Marxism as a scientific approach to 
both social and natural phenomena of life.  
How does the debate within such a defined Marxist framework of Lenin’s 
era differ from those of Stalin’s? In short, if it was at least somewhat possible 
under Lenin,6 the word “debate” practically disappeared from the register under 
Stalin. A late example of a debate would be between the “mechanists” and “dia-
lecticians.” The mechanists perceived Marxism as a theory explaining the facts 
of social life but not as a philosophy, and hence, they disregarded the Marxist 
thinkers of their times as well as philosophers in general because they were 
products of bourgeois culture. The dialecticians, on the other hand, claimed that 
philosophy was necessary for the elaboration of exact science and its results in 
the spirit of dialectical materialism. In doing so, they wanted to explain the shift 
from quantitative to qualitative phenomena—the idea rejected by mechanists.7 
Followers of dialectical materialism led by Abram Deborin were also interested 
                                                             
4  Leszek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, trans. Paul S. Falla (New York: 
Norton and Company, 2008), 717.  
5  Ibid., 827. 
6  “Until the mid-1920s philosophical debates went on rather undisturbed. Undisturbed 
in this sense that the opponents were at least allowed to respond to each other.” Leo-
nid Stołowicz, Historia filozofii rosyjskiej. Podręcznik [The history of Russian philos-
ophy: a textbook.], trans. and afterword by Bogusław Żyłko (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz 
terytoria, 2008), 589. 
7  Further analysis of the dispute between the “dialecticians” and “mechanists,” and its 
philosophical ground can be found in Nikolay Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy 
(New York: International Universities Press, 1951), 347–356.  
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in the history of philosophy, however, they used it mostly to consolidate their 
stance. Owing to the influence of academic publishers and references to Engels 
and Lenin in their writings,8 dialecticians led the official criticism of ideological 
opposition in April 1929; it was not a long-lasting victory. At the beginning of 
1931, an act condemning Deborin’s followers was decreed which led to the 
editors of the journal Pod znamenem marksizma (Under the Banner of Marxism) 
to be forced to self-criticism. According to Leszek Kołakowski, since that mo-
ment in time, “the history of Soviet philosophy under Stalin [was] largely a 
history of Party ukases.”9 This and the fourth chapter of Stalin’s History of the 
All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course significantly changed 
the way that students wrote philosophy because they were obliged to paraphrase 
the text with the proper application of the four elements of the Marxist dialecti-
cal method and three features of philosophical materialism in their research. No 
changes to the original were allowed until 1953.10  
Stalinization in Poland was based on an already existing model that had been 
developed in the Soviet countries during the 1920s and 1930s; the process af-
fected all spheres of life including politics, administration, culture, and the arts. 
Polish journals and magazines published after the war until 1948 show the 
changes in public debate especially on history, culture, and politics during which 
there was a more open discourse,11 but after 1948 Stalinism became the domi-
                                                             
8  Ibid. 
9  Kołakowski, Main Currents, 847. Cf. Stołowicz, Historia filozofii rosyjskiej, 589–
591. 
10  Historia Wszechzwiązkowej Komunistycznej Partii (bolszewików): krótki kurs, pod 
red. Komisji KC WKP(b) zaaprobowany przez KC WKPB(b) 1938 (Warszawa: Spół-
dzielnia Wydawnicza “Książka,” 1948), 120–134. 
11  In March 1945 “Tygodnik Powszechny” (Universal Weekly), an independent (from 
both the state and the Church) Catholic newspaper was established. From May 20–25, 
1945, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party 
took place, during which Władysław Gomułka criticized the fragmenting of the Party, 
excessive activity of security forces including the activity of the People’s Commis-
sariat for Internal Affairs (NKWD) on Polish territories. He also cautioned against 
identifying the Polish Workers’ Party with the Soviet forces in Poland. In such jour-
nals as Kuźnica (The Forge), Odrodzenie (Revival), and in Tygodnik Powszechny, the 
debate over the shape of Polish culture after the war was still ongoing. Among the 
people involved in it were Zofia Nałkowska, Stefan Kisielewski, Jan Parandowski, 
and Juliusz Kleiner. In July 1945, the Polish People’s Party was formed, with Stefan 
Mikołajczyk as its first head (the party kept its autonomy until 1947) and another 
journal, Tygodnik Warszawski (The Warsaw Weekly), was established. A managerial 
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nant approach in literature in both style and content marking the beginning of 
cultural dependence in Poland.  
Stalinization affected philosophy even more than literature because of the 
fact that there were so many responses to Marxism in Poland before 1945 and 
they differed so significantly from Stalin’s Historia WKP(b). Such distinguished 
thinkers as Ludwik Krzywicki, Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, or Edward Abramowski 
were controversial and could have led to revisionism. In order to hamper these 
free interpretations of the Marxist doctrine, it was necessary to combat the reac-
tionaries on the Polish Left in order to control academic discussions on Marxism. 
This peculiar act of deciding what was true or not preoccupied the minds of 
philosophers affiliated with the Polish Worker’s Party until the mid-1950s.  
“Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego” (The Legend of Stanisław Brzozow-
ski) by Paweł Hoffman and published in Nowe Drogi (New Ways) in 1947 was 
the first paradigmatic text for the philosophy of the era. Hoffman’s life was no 
different from many other members of the Polish Worker’s Party; he was born in 
Lviv in 1903 and began his activity in socialist movements when he was eight-
een. He studied at the Department of Law and Philosophy at the University of 
Lviv and then moved to Krakow. In 1927 he became a member of the Com-
munist Party of Poland and he started working for such socialist journals as 
Czerwony Sztandar (The Red Banner) and Lewar (Jack) before the war. In 1937 
                                                             
congress of the Union of Independent Socialist Youth took place in 1946 during 
which Jan Strzelecki’s speech titled “Humanizm socjalistyczny” (Socialist Human-
ism) prompted a vivid discussion joined by Józef Chałasiński, Maria and Stanisław 
Ossowski, and Adam Schaff, among others; the first issue of a Catholic periodical 
Znak (Sign) was released in Krakow the same year. Based on Marta Fik, Kultura pol-
ska po Jałcie. Kronika lat 1944–1989 [Polish culture after Yalta: the chronicle of the 
years 1944–1989] (London: Polonia, 1989). Here, I refer to the following issues: 1945 
(36, 71, 94, 111, 170); 1946 (43, 61). These are only a few selected events that show 
the heterogeneity of the official discourse in Poland after the war. It seems important 
to mention that Stanisław Brzozowki’s Płomienie (Flames) was also reissued in 1946. 
Joanna Kulczyk-Saloni (“O Płomieniach St. Brzozowskiego. Nowa recenzja bardzo 
starej powieści” [On Flames by Stanisław Brzozowski: a new review of a very old 
novel], Kuźnica 32 [1948]) and Kazimierz Koźniewski (“Płomienie Brzozowskiego” 
[Stanisław Brzozowski’s Flames], Twórczość 4 [1948]) were skeptical in their re-
views of the work. However, they acknowledged the value of the novel and Brzo-
zowski’s impact on the leftist intelligentsia before the war. Numerous references to 
Brzozowski can be found in other writers’ texts. There were some positive references 
as well (e.g., Józef Chałasiński, “Inteligencja polska w świetle swojej genealogii 
społecznej” [The Polish intelligentsia and its social genealogy], Kuźnica 4 [1946]). 
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Hoffman was arrested for his political activity and spent two months in prison, 
and then after the outbreak of the War, he worked as a teacher in Soviet-occu-
pied territories until he joined the Red Army in 1941. In May 1943 he was as-
signed the position of Officer in Education and Welfare in the Polish First Ta-
deusz Kościuszko Infantry Division. In June 1944 Hoffman had become a mem-
ber of the Polish Worker’s Party and after 1945 he worked as an editor of nu-
merous periodicals, such as Rzeczpospolita (The Republic), Kuźnica, and Nowa 
Kultura (The New Culture). For a short period Hoffman worked also as the head 
of the cultural department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Work-
ers’ Party. It also seems important to mention that Hoffman got Adam Ważyk’s 
“Poemat dla dorosłych” (Poem for Adults), which symbolically marks the be-
ginning of the Polish October in 1956, published in Nowa Kultura. After that, 
Hoffman worked as a translator, editor, and the deputy chief editor of Polskie 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe (Polish Scientific Publishers). In 1975 he decided to 
maintain his formal membership while keeping his distance from the party until 
he died in 1978.12 
“Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego” is significant for a number of reasons; 
first and foremost because Hoffman choses one of the most interesting yet most 
controversial philosophers of the twentieth century for the text’s (anti-)hero. He 
subjects Stanisław Brzozowski to a critical analysis that was considered an act 
directed at the Polish non-Stalinist Left. Although initially considered a socialist 
authority, Brzozowski is depicted as a bourgeois reactionary in order to portray 
Marxism-Leninism as the only true way of thinking in accordance with Sta-
linism. Secondly, “Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego” also exemplifies the 
way in which Soviet philosophical discourse was transplanted onto Polish soil.  
I will first provide a summary of Hoffman’s three key arguments which are 
archetypal for a Stalin-era text that confronts bourgeois thought. The first part of 
the overview highlights the philosophical tradition that Hoffman uses, discusses 
the undertones implicated in his text, and analyzes the way in which empirical 
categories are used and transformed into shallow, vulgar, and ideologized con-
cepts. Next, I will explore Brzozowski’s life and work within the context of 
Polish history and more specifically in the political, artistic, and intellectual 
movements in Poland at the turn of the twentieth century. Finally, I will address 
the language and structure of the article because these two elements are insepa-
rable.  
                                                             
12  Słownik biograficzny działaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego [Biographical dictionary 
of the activists of the Polish Workers’ Movement], vol. 2, ed. Feliks Tych (Warszawa: 
“Książka i Wiedza”, 1987), 535f. 
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At this point, some additional information regarding methodology needs to 
be provided. Hoffman does not enter into a discussion of Brzozowski’s thought, 
nor does he encourage anyone to do so, therefore, the following analysis does 
not intend to show which interpretations of Brzozowski’s writings are inaccurate 
or simply false because all of the arguments presented by Hoffman are self-evi-
dent and questioning them seems pointless and irrational. The only way to pin-
point the ideological discourse of the text is to deconstruct and discuss the 
structure of its dogmas through an exploration of the text’s foundation.  
The most characteristic feature of texts like “Legenda Stanisława Brzozow-
skiego” is its schematic blueprint that functions as a template in which themes 
can be changed or added. However, this formula has a major flaw in that it 
prevents the author from writing more complicated narrative structures for ideas 
and rhetoric. In the case of “Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego” whose tar-
geted readers were neither experts in philosophy, nor connoisseurs of Brzozow-
ski’s writings, this flaw appears to be the text’s greatest advantage in that it 
provides arguments that are difficult to falsify but not difficult to believe.  
In “Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego,” an ideological opponent becomes a 
coherent and rational subject with a clear set of ideas while the reader is assigned 
the role of both the observer and witness who sees the judgment for the crimes of 
the accused. Hoffman uses virtual or reverse induction which consists of two 
major elements: an extra-narrative knowledge of the author and the reader’s 
unawareness. Although the author’s position is fixed from the very beginning, he 
does not reveal all of his knowledge at once; instead, he gradually reveals it 
through various literary techniques. As a result, the text is not only a discovery 
for the reader but it is also an account of the author’s rising awareness. In this 
configuration the reader serves as a passive textual subject with limited 
knowledge, but he or she knows enough to follow the argumentation. This tex-
tual structure though can be easily unmasked because the reader must be com-
pletely under the control of the author, or otherwise he ruins the author’s mean-
ing. Therefore, the text does not allow room for argument because it is assumed 
that the targeted reader of an ideological text must not be distrustful. The reader 
is then forced into an arrangement with the author—either he or she will accept 
the text, or become the author’s antagonist. What merely appears to be a rejec-
tion of an ideological position had significant intellectual, psychological, and 
physical consequences in reality.13 
                                                             
13  Andrzej Walicki discusses this problem when analyzing “Zniewolony umysł” (The 
Captive Mind) by Czesław Miłosz. Andrzej Walicki, “Zniewolony umysł” po latach 
[“The Captive Mind” revisited], in Prace wybrane, vol. 4: Polska, Rosja, marksizm 
(Kraków: Universitas, 2011).  
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Brzozowski and the Theory of Marxism 
 
Marxism is a guideline to act. In a capitalist state, it is a guideline for the working class 
struggling for power. In a people’s state, it is a guideline for the working class which leads 
to the creation of a new material and cultural reality. The Marxist philosophy of life—the 
recognition of reality in the process of transformation in order to transform it again—is a 
theoretical tool that any conscious creator of a new society—a socialist—cannot do with-
out if he truly wants to become a conscious creator, i.e., one consciously and effectively 
using his sociological knowledge in social practice. Hence the demand to address issues 
transgressing the frames of strict practicality; hence, for instance, the necessity to analyze 
our cultural past; the necessity motivated by certain reactionary, radically anti-democratic, 
ideological attitudes seem to have a progressive form or even, as some may believe, a 
socialist one.14 
 
This fragment from “Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego” conveys important 
lessons as a Communist primer, a credo of Marxist-Leninist belief. These lines 
present the author’s, and the Party’s position that became the foundation of the 
criticism of Polish leftist thought, and, most specifically the faction represented 
by Brzozowski.  
The opening sentence had to set a basis that resonates throughout the text so 
that Hoffman’s voice is infallible and draws a line in the sand for the reader. 
Although the Second World War had ended two years earlier, the war over the 
direction of humanity had just begun. The Stalinist text thus needed to evoke 
fear so that an individual would be willing to go into life-threatening situations 
and fight for Stalinism. In the case of “Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego,” 
Hoffman’s short, succinct, and most of all, logical phrasing of communist argu-
ments displays the values of the Polish People’s Party15 to the reader in their 
conventional interpretation. Therefore, the text argues that Hoffman’s standpoint 
is the only legitimate and possible one that can serve as a point of departure for 
future philosophical debate.  
The first sentence of the article is a reference to a political message of com-
munism. And for the readers of the time, it was clear that the main idea behind 
Marxism, as advocated by Lenin and Stalin, was to fight in order to give power 
                                                             
14  Paweł Hoffman, “Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego” [The legend of Stanisław 
Brzozowski], Nowe Drogi 2 (1947): 103. From this point on I will refer to the text 
using the abbreviated title “LSB” and the number of the page.  
15  The “Polish United People’s Party” after 1948. 
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to the parties representing the working class.16 Thus, to create a political agenda 
out of working-class struggle was not only an expression of Lenin’s genius, but 
it was also the decisive factor behind the Russian Revolution. Owing to Lenin’s 
constant efforts, Marxism developed from a philosophical and economic theory 
to a political doctrine with clearly defined and practical guidelines explaining 
how to create a communist state.17 Therefore, to use the formula of a classical 
definition (A means B) in the opening line is meant not only to legitimize his 
rationale but also to prove that Marxism-Leninism is superior to Brzozowski’s 
Marxist philosophy whose line of reasoning is by far illogical and unclear.18 
The following two lines add historical elements and constitute an elaboration 
on the initial definition of Marxism. Interpretations of the political message 
written into the original statement vary and depend on circumstances, as for 
example, in a capitalist state, the message becomes a fight for power given to the 
working class; while in a people’s state, it is imperative to act for the creation of 
a new material and cultural reality. At this point, the reference to the history of 
the Soviet Union is quite clear. Marxism enables the working class to reclaim 
power from capitalists; however, that does not mean that the war was over, be-
cause the second sentence reveals Hoffman’s doctrinal orthodoxy. Like Lenin, 
Hoffman claims that the state should not be understood as an autonomous entity 
but rather as a stage in the process of creating a model community, which then 
justified violence and brutal imposition of the new order. Even Marx wrote about 
the need to get past that stage19 because he viewed it as temporal and certainly 
                                                             
16  A similar argument is presented in What Is to Be Done? (1902) by Lenin, in which he 
criticizes the parties who opposed a Social-Democratic revolution. Hence, Hoffman 
had an excellent model to follow in confrontations with other ideologies.  
17  Setting goals and pursuing them, but also the necessity to act on both political and 
theoretical grounds are emphasized by Lenin in his reference to Engels’s The Peasant 
War in Germany. In this way, he opposes certain social-democratic ideas, seeking 
possibilities for a change in immediate action and the worker’s union. Vladimir I. 
Lenin, What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement (New York: Inter-
national Publishers, 1969), 27. 
18  On the one hand, Marxists referred to commonsensical formal logic. However, in their 
references to dialectical materialism, they also made use of the dialectical logic of 
Hegel that was adopted by Marx and Engels, and in consequence, also by Lenin. To 
refer to the rules of formal logic and use them as an argument against ideological en-
emies could have been seen as a double-edged sword. Cf.: Lossky, History of Russian 
Philosophy, 345–347. 
19  Cf. Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 296. This interpretation of Marx, espe-
cially in his early works, was criticized by Andrzej Walicki, who writes: “Marx was 
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less destructive. Followers of Soviet policy could have argued that the state, 
despite its oppressiveness, was indispensable in the fight against reactionaries 
because, owing to its structure, it was possible to eliminate a counter-revolution-
ary element. To make such a statement in Poland in 1947 equates the necessity 
to fight for the state against those who do not want to give power to the people. 
This struggle takes place not only in the realm of politics, but also—as Hoff-
man’s text illustrates—in the realm of ideas, and the author explains which atti-
tudes are acceptable and which are not.  
The fourth sentence then sets a more philosophical and sociological context 
by clarifying Marxist philosophy. First of all, Hoffman argues that it should be 
treated as a philosophy of life that provides specific instructions regarding eve-
ryday life. Secondly, as a method of philosophical analysis whose nature is ra-
ther peculiar, it refers to reality in the process of transformation.20 According to 
                                                             
well aware that the consequence of people’s liberation from materialized objective 
relations must be a substantial increase of personal dependency; that elimination of 
the market’s ‘invisible hand’ would lead to consolidation of the power of an organized 
collective over individuals. Contrary to liberal axiology, Marx viewed this as a posi-
tive change. As he claimed, ‘true liberty relies on the degree of subordination to the 
authority’.” (Andrzej Walicki. Marksizm i nieudany „skok do królestwa wolności” 
[Marxism and the unsuccessful “leap into the Kingdom of freedom”], in Prace wy-
brane, vol. 4: Polska, Rosja, marksizm [Kraków: Universitas, 2011], 407). According 
to Marx, the structure of a model community should resemble that of a factory. He 
also wrote about the ambiguous role of the state, which only proves Walicki’s point. 
Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in Karl 
Marx, Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart: 
1975), 3–129. 
20  This idea is derived from dialectical materialism. According to Lenin, it is “a develop-
ment that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in 
a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so 
to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catas-
trophes, and revolutions; ‘breaks in continuity’; the transformation of quantity into 
quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and con-
flict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given 
phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indis-
soluble connection between all aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly re-
vealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process 
of motion, one that follows definite laws—these are some of the features of dialectics 
as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional one.” Vladimir I. 
Lenin, Lenin’s Collected Works, vol. 21 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 454f. 
312 | Paweł Rams 
Lenin, philosophy cannot exist by itself; it is a consequence of various produc-
tive forces, therefore, a philosophical method should not be treated as an aca-
demic tool but as social practice. The next line carries another dogma of Marx-
ism-Leninism, viz., that the communist movement is a union of theory and prac-
tice separated from capitalism. Hence, the author argues that two academic dis-
ciplines—philosophy and sociology—merge in the working class movement, 
ultimately resulting in social engineering. This Marxist concept is important 
because it constitutes the foundation of Brzozowski’s literary and philosophical 
work. In effect, Hoffman explains the dogma of communism and prepares the 
grounds for the criticism of Brzozowski. 
According to Hoffman, the problem of reactionary tendencies is of high im-
portance—to deal with it is not an act of escapism, but of utmost concern. Hoff-
man’s article was crucial at the time because of the fight for political leadership 
in the newly-established Polish People’s Republic, even though it was not in-
tended to deal with the irrelevant texts produced by the working class’s enemies. 
It was rather a defensive action to protect the proletariat from the anti-demo-
cratic slogans of the old capitalist era; slogans which also found followers in the 
new people’s reality.  
Hoffman’s demonization of opponents was not only based on revealing 
Brzozowski’s “deceitful” modes of thought; Brzozowski was also accused of 
trying to destroy the commonsensical laws governing history. Reactionaries 
contradicted rational cognition of reality and nullified its objective nature by 
claiming that the world depends on individuals. This ideal vision highlights 
fideism and the belief in an intuitive power of cognition while disregarding the 
legacy of empirio-criticism and the philosophy of Henri Bergson, which are the 
themes that Hoffman focuses on the most in his criticism of Brzozowski. Re-
vealing inaccuracies within Machism was equivalent to questioning the work of 
the Polish philosopher in general, the philosopher who openly displayed his 
fascination with both of these tendencies in modern philosophy. When analyzed 
from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, both make the same mistake—they de-
scribe themselves as anti-metaphysical but, on the other hand, resort to anti-
materialist argumentation. Anti-metaphysical currents are materialist and anti-
materialists are idealists. Therefore, Brzozowski’s choice was unacceptable for 
Hoffman because of its attempt to join together mutually exclusive currents.  
Hoffman is well aware that entering into an argument with an ideological 
opponent may easily go off on the wrong track, hence, he constructs a concep-
tual pattern of interpretation in his article. First of all, he picks out concepts from 
the Marxist-Leninist register that are already legitimized in communist dis-
course. Next, he shows how these concepts function as reactionary weapons 
The Stalinist Reception of Brzozowski’s Philosophy | 313 
against the proletariat, and then he “uncovers” the presence of these concepts in 
Brzozowski’s writings, to arrive finally at the conclusion that Brzozowski was 
an advocate for bourgeois philosophy and had to be removed from the collective 
memory of the leftist movement. This argument is slightly invalid, though. 
Brzozowski indeed refers to the same legacy as the Communist movement and 
his interpretation of this legacy differs from that of Lenin and Stalin; but it 
would still have to be shown that he was an ally of imperialism. In this sense, 
Hoffman’s polemics are only quasi-argumentative and intended to depreciate his 
opponent’s standing. In this way, the author only proves that his perspective is 
relative.  
One of Brzozowski’s crimes was, as Hoffman writes, “a shift from empirio-
criticism (which he initially believed in) and pragmatism to Bergsonism. It is an 
evolution from an already reactionary philosophy to an even more reactionary 
one.”21 Hoffman also notes, “Bergson says nothing about reality or about cogni-
tion in general. Epistemological matters essential for empirio-criticism were 
solved in an overly simplified way—ontological and epistemological matters do 
not exist; everything is metaphysical and the only concreteness lies inside of 
us.”22 The most fundamental theoretical abuse is to assume that intuitionism is 
an anti-epistemological current if interpreted as “a stance exposing the role of 
intuition (moral, intellectual, metaphysical) within cognition.”23 In that case, 
why does Hoffman contradict the most fundamental Bergsonian thesis? There 
are two possible answers, one being that Hoffman refers to Lenin’s Materialism 
and Empirio-criticism: Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy in which 
the latter introduces the theory of reflection, as summed up by Leszek Kołakowski: 
“Sensations, abstract ideas, and all other aspects of human cognition are the 
reflection in our minds of actual qualities of the material world, which exists 
whether or not it is perceived by anyone.”24  
The way that Hoffman presents his opponent’s philosophy is not meant to 
prove Brzozowski wrong but rather to ridicule his work as reactionary philoso-
phy. Bearing in mind the premises of Marxism-Leninism, any worker or member 
of the intelligentsia with no education (there were such in the Polish United 
Workers’ Party) would find Hoffman’s choice of Brzozowski’s arguments ridic-
ulous, which was precisely the result that Hoffman wanted. The devaluation of 
Brzozowski’s work is achieved through textual manipulation, terminological 
                                                             
21  Hoffman, “LSB,” 106 
22  Ibid., 105 
23  Jan Hartmann, “Intuicjonizm” [Intuitionism], in Słownik filozofii (Kraków: Krakow-
skie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2009), 108. 
24  Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 719.  
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ambiguity and finally, through ridicule and the devaluation of the philosopher’s 
work. As Hoffman claims, “there are no original thoughts” in Brzozowski’s writ-
ings; “everything is borrowed from the most reactionary Western-European 
thinkers.”25 Hence, Brzozowski not only follows the most outrageous epistemo-
logical theories, he also does not build upon them with any original thought of 
his own. 
 
Brzozowski and Polish History from a Marxist Point of View 
 
In the section “Klasowość jako podstawa antydemokratycznego solidaryzmu” 
(Social Class as the Foundation of Anti-Democratic Solidarity), the focus 
changes from philosophical matters to more social and political issues, which, 
according to Hoffman, are inseparable from Brzozowski’s writings and the au-
thor himself. The tone changes as Brzozowski is presented not only as an au-
thoritative Polish intellectual at the turn of the twentieth century but also as a 
political proponent. This way of writing about him diverges from the initial 
style, although this shift is unclear and can easily be challenged. If Hoffman 
considered Brzozowski as an advocate of a certain philosophical theory, then, in 
the context of social and political analysis, he becomes a conscious and active 
subject who affects the flow of events through his publications instead of direct 
action. This hypothesis is justified in the philosopher’s attempt to reconcile two 
of the most important political currents that shaped prewar Poland society as 
emblematized by Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski.  
The second section of the text seems to be of more importance for Hoffman. 
He devotes more space to socio-political discussion and there is also a difference 
in his reasoning. As in the first section, Hoffman resorts to terminological den-
sity, numerous shortcuts, and arguments based on association; but then the sec-
ond section is also characterized by a slower pace in order to analyze Brzozow-
ski’s philosophy more closely and systematically. These different sections are 
connected by one central thesis which claims that Brzozowski was not actually a 
socialist, but rather a proto-fascist. In doing so, Hoffman argues from what he 
conceives as a set of governing laws that make of communism the pinnacle of 
human development.  
In the chapter on syndicalism, which is devoted to its advocate, Georges So-
rel, Hoffman states that “[Sorel] proclaimed the Bergsonian mystique the succes-
sor to dialectical materialism [and] the most adequate philosophy for the work-
ing-class movement. He contested the value and aim of political struggle, and 
                                                             
25  Hoffman, “LSB,” 108. 
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the idea of the proletariat coming to power.”26 Hoffman argues that the relation 
between Bergson and Sorel was based on mutual inspiration, and thus, the for-
mer as an intuitionist was considered a syndicalist while the latter was influ-
enced by Bergsonian intuitionism as an advocate of syndicalism. There is one 
more reason why Sorel can be qualified as an enemy of communism: He chal-
lenged the idea of a workers’ utopia with the “myth” of workers’ syndicates. In 
his letter to Daniel Halévy, Sorel wrote: 
 
The revolutionary myths that exist at the present time are almost free from any such mix-
ture; by means of them it is possible to understand the activity, the feelings and the ideas 
of the masses preparing themselves to enter on a decisive struggle; the myths are not 
descriptions of things, but expressions of a determination to act. A utopia is, on the con-
trary, an intellectual product; it is the work of theorists who, after observing and discuss-
ing the known facts, seek to establish a model to which they can compare existing society 
in order to estimate the amount of good and evil it contains. […] Whilst contemporary 
myths lead men to prepare themselves for combat which will destroy the existing state of 
things, the effect of utopia has always been to direct men’s minds towards reforms which 
can be brought about by patching up the existing system.27 
 
Associating Brzozowski’s ideas with Sorel’s critique of the workers’ movement 
and replacing utopia with myth allows Hoffman to deny his opponent’s individ-
uality and originality. For him Brzozowski is just another reactionary since he 
does not offer anything new. Using Sorel’s myth in a simplified way, Hoffman 
demonstrates how familiar slogans work as a cover for dangerous ideologies as 
he disqualifies what most people would consider the greatest intellectual 
achievement of Brzozowski—his philosophy of work—and presents it as an 
attempt to hide the truth about capitalist exploitation. Furthermore, it is presented 
as highly mystical and thus inaccessible to analysis with materialist or Marxist 
categories. What Hoffman wants to prove is that Brzozowski’s language is only 
superficially socialist, because his use of Marxist vocabulary only refers to reac-
tionary concepts. By supporting the bourgeoisie, the greatest Polish author and 
philosopher becomes the ‘greatest fraud’. 
The major goal of the article was to prove Brzozowski’s connection to Polish 
nationalism, although this could not be done directly. In his own writings, 
                                                             
26  Ibid., 115 
27  Georges Sorel, “Introduction: Letter to Daniel Halevy,” in Reflections on Violence, 
(New York: Dover Publications, 2004), 28f. The quote shows the exactly opposite un-
derstanding of utopia and the role of the workers’ movement than presented by Lenin 
in What Is To Be Done?. 
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Brzozowski openly criticized the nationalist tendencies of the National-Demo-
cratic Party, and it is possible that many readers of Nowe Drogi were still famil-
iar with these texts.28 Hoffman argues that although there was no apparent 
connection to nationalism on the surface, a closer analysis would reveal Brzo-
zowski’s kinship with Dmowski’s movement. At this point, his adaption of 
content to form is obvious, and he emphasizes Brzozowski’s anti-revolutionary 
and anti-romantic attitudes. Hoffman presents himself as a defender of the na-
tional tradition, as a rightful heir of revolt, and most of all, as the only heir of 
romantic moral values,29 while Brzozowski as well as the National-Democratic 
Party are portrayed as the nation’s true enemies. He then argues that the only 
rightful heirs of Polish imponderabilia were the Polish United Workers’ Party, 
and that “Brzozowski warns against any grassroots revolutionary action, against 
the people’s mass movement, against any attempt of going to war with the in-
vaders’ governance.”30 He describes both the November Uprising and the Janu-
ary Uprising as anti-capitalist and connects them to the Bolshevik Revolution by 
presenting them as a fight for people’s rights and the end to oppression. With 
these rhetorical tricks Hoffman deems Brzozowski as anti-Polish.  
The final section of the text, entitled “Longing for Imperialism,” is a major 
accusation against Brzozowski. Hoffman’s aim was to discredit indisputably 
Brzozowski’s tradition, especially since imperialism was a substantial topic for 
Marxism-Leninism. Supposedly, Brzozowski’s most important project was to 
combine two conflicting ideological currents which apparently had a common 
feature in that they were both epiphenomena of a Polish capitalism rife with 
deeply rooted tensions and inconsistent ambitions. On the one hand, there was a 
desire for independence from foreign powers, while on the other, a need for a 
pragmatic agreement. Trying to solve this problem, Hoffman claims that Brzo-
zowski had to act on behalf of the invaders, which is proven by his friendly 
                                                             
28  Cf.: S. Brzozowski, “Trąd wszechpolski” [The all-Polish leprosy]; “Oto wszechpol-
skie są junaki!” [Here are the all-Polish braves!]; “W przededniu [o taktyce narodowej 
demokracji]” [The day before: on the tactics of National Democratic Party] in Pisma 
polityczne. Wybór, ed. Michał Sutowski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycz-
nej, 2011). 
29  “Shortly after the war, the authorities were mostly preoccupied with the rising social 
awareness of the romantic tradition to prove that it is not in contradiction with the new 
state.” Wojciech Tomasik, Inżynieria dusz. Literatura realizmu socjalistycznego w pla-
nie „propagandy monumentalnej” [The engineering of souls: the literature of socialist 
realism in “monumental propaganda”] (Wrocław: Monografie Fundacji na Rzecz Nauki 
Polskiej, 1999), 74. 
30  Hoffman, “LSB,” 124 
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sentiments to both the Soviet Union and Western powers. What is crucial and 
unusual in this way of argumentation? First of all, Brzozowski was manipulated 
into a purely political game, which was close to the heart of the Polish people at 
the time. The problem was not only related to the near future, but also to matters 
of liberty and independence, because collaboration with invaders, even to be 
suspected of such activity, was met with condemnation. Although not mentioned 
in the text, the reference to the so-called “Brzozowski affair” and his apparent 
collaboration with the tsarist Okhrana is apparent. Secondly, the process of re-
writing history relied on prevailing post-war sentiments in Poland. Hence, 
Piłsudski and Dmowski were drawn together, called traitors,31 and described as 
politicians not able to predict the Russian Revolution of 1917.32 To put them in 
the same category ended many perilous discussions and was suitable for Hoff-
man’s dichotomous vision of the world as presented in “Legenda Stanisława 
Brzozowskiego.” Finally, according to Hoffman’s argument, the close relations 
between the philosopher and National Democracy as well as his actions against 
Poland could be proven.  
In his conclusion, Hoffman states that “his ideology, the political ideas that 
Brzozowski was the father of in Legenda Młodej Polski, were put into practice 
only after May 1926, when the Polish bourgeoisie was ready—under favorable 
circumstances—to follow the imperialist bourgeoisie of other nations, as sug-
gested, among others, by Brzozowski.”33 This quote makes Brzozowski 
responsible not only for future events that he could not have predicted, but also 
presents him as a major ideological thinker of Sanacja. Pretending to be a so-
cialist, he made statements to which Piłsudski and his followers referred during 
the coup of May 1926. According to Hoffman, this approach not only solves the 
problem of Brzozowski’s philosophy and its pseudo-socialist and proto-fascist 
origins, it is also a warning for those who would think of departing from the 
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. In this way Hoffman creates a link between history 
and the ongoing political, social, and cultural events.  
                                                             
31  Piłsudski’s rejection of Socialism was frequently reported on in newspapers long 
before the beginning of the First World War. Their aim was to deconstruct the myth 
regarding the history of Piłsudski’s leftist military activities. Cf. Władysław Bieńkow-
ski, “Nad grobem legendy” [Above the grave of the legend], Odrodzenie 25 (1947); 
Henryk Jabłoński, “Raz jeszcze o legendzie piłsudczyzny” [A few more notes on 
Piłsudski’s legend], Odrodzenie 29 (1947). 
32  “Neither Dmowski nor Piłsudski expected this happening: that Russian Revolution 
will end with victory, that tsardom will be overthrown, and that Russian imperialism 
will collapse” (“LSB,” 128).  
33  Ibid., 131f. 
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This analysis of Hoffman’s “Legenda Stanisława Brzozowskiego” is sup-
posed to establish the structure and the purpose of the Stalinist text of reconcili-
ation and demonstrate how important it was to eliminate any discourses that 
opposed Marxism. The case of Brzozowski and Hoffman is a perfect example of 
this since the text has been frequently referred to in, for instance, Adam Schaff’s 
Narodziny i rozwój filozofii marksistowskiej (The Birth and Development of 
Marxist Philosophy)34 in which are present the same figures and ideological 
calques. The same method was applied to other controversial Polish thinkers of 
the turn of the twentieth century, including Edward Abramowski and Kazimierz 
Kelles-Krauz. However, after 1956, the foundations of philosophical criticism in 
the spirit of Marxism-Leninism would be destabilized.  
 
Translated by Karolina Mistrzak 
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Brzozowski and the Question of Engagement: 
On a Different Concept of the Autonomy of Art 
Przemysław Czapliński  
 
 
In the history of Polish literature, Brzozowski has been commonly regarded as 
the first critic to draw an opposition between pure and socially engaged art. In a 
series of polemics—against Henryk Sienkiewicz, Zenon Przesmycki “Miriam,” 
and finally the poets of Young Poland—the author of Legenda Młodej Polski 
(The Legend of Young Poland) is said to have pointed to the consequences of 
aestheticism and made a case for ethical writing. 
This was how Brzozowski was regarded throughout the twentieth century, 
especially on those occasions when due to a change in the political situation, 
artists felt obliged to make a clear declaration and alter their writing accordingly. 
The first decade of the interwar period was marked by interest in form; in the 
second decade, artists moved “from Formism to moralism.”1 Following the 
Second World War, the period of engaged art continued despite the increasing 
censure of Brzozowski’s work, but it was interrupted in 1955, with artists once 
again declaring their allegiance to pure ethics. Yet this phase also soon ended: In 
the mid-1970s—with the increasingly severe censorship, the rise of independent 
channels of communication, and the first organised political opposition—a shift 
occurred, and, as Stanisław Barańczak put it, ethics took precedence over poet-
ics.2 And in the mid-1980s, when fulfilling ethical obligations yielded in litera-
                                                             
1  Cf. Konstanty Troczyński, Od formizmu do moralizmu. Szkice literackie [From for-
mism to moralism: literary sketches] (Poznań: Jan Jachowski Księgarnia Uniwersy-
tecka, 1935). 
2  Cf. Stanisław Barańczak, Etyka i poetyka [Ethics and poetics] (Paris: Instytut Lite-
racki, 1979). The eponymous pair introduced by Barańczak immediately entered Pol-
ish literary criticism, and survived until the early 1990s. The categories of “ethics” 
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ture merely noble forgone conclusions, artists heard again that they should 
choose “solitude” over “solidarity.”3  
The foregoing summary of the history of engagement and aestheticism in 
twentieth-century Poland is far too schematic. Seen in these simplified terms, 
history is marked by an alternating radicalisation of attitudes and artists’ biog-
raphies are governed by the neurotic repetitiveness of the same dilemma, which 
can only be addressed with a zero-one response. On the other hand, it can hardly 
be denied that the history of modernity bears some resemblance to compulsive 
neurosis, to obsessive repetition of the same predicament and the endless need to 
decide either to defend art as a value irreducible to economic calculation or 
social benefit or to subordinate artistic matters to a particular idea that consti-
tutes the quintessence of the artwork and the social justification of art. In other 
words: either self-concerned art or art in the service of important goals of collec-
tive life. 
Those who think that the obtrusiveness of this antinomy disappeared at the 
end of the twentieth century, when the lesson of deconstructionism taught us to 
know better than to trust in dichotomies, should take a closer look at present-day 
evocations of Brzozowski in disputes about art. It will turn out that today the 
literary-critical consciousness is still determined by the belief in the opposition 
between autonomy and engagement in art and the conviction that the patron saint 
of this distinction is none other than the author of Idee (Ideas). To give an exam-
ple, in an interview tellingly entitled “Wróg Polski zdziecinniałej” (The Enemy 
of a Poland Gone Puerile), Sławomir Sierakowski claims: 
 
[…] we embrace the idea of engaged art developed by Brzozowski in his campaign 
against Zenon Przesmycki (Miriam) and the ‘art for art’s sake’ of Young Poland. We 
share his view that it is impossible to abstract art from social life.4 
                                                             
and “poetics” were used both to describe the positioning of art vis-à-vis society and to 
create a certain code of values, helpful in evaluating particular works. 
3  I am referring here to Adam Zagajewski’s much-discussed book Solidarność i samot-
ność [Solidarity and solitude] (Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza MARGINES, 1986), in 
which the author writes that following the birth of the Solidarity movement, the cul-
tural struggle against the totalitarian regime became “something childishly easy, […] 
rather anachronistic, almost unnecessary, even exaggerated.” He expressed the hope 
that “thus, perhaps the more difficult works of the spirit will regain their timeless sig-
nificance” (62).  
4  “Wróg Polski zdziecinniałej.” Interview with Sławomir Sierakowski by Tomasz Diat-
łowicki, Focus Historia, June 25, 2011. http://www.focus.pl/artykul/wrog-polski-
zdziecinnialej 
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Igor Stokfiszewski, also from the circle of Krytyka Polityczna (Political Critique), 
wrote in his book Zwrot polityczny (The Political Turn): 
 
Stanisław Brzozowski […] believed that the category of real literature should be reserved 
for texts which, regardless of genre, influence society’s perception of reality, change the 
course of our intellectual choices, readjust the world and life.5  
 
Both critics—young, active, influential—refer to Brzozowski when they want to 
say that “real” art has an impact on social life, whereas its opposite, i.e., litera-
ture of lesser importance, is art for art’s sake. With such a clear-cut division it is 
possible to oversee the entire realm of artistic creation, enjoying the right to 
select and evaluate. Thus, with recourse to articulate slogans, critics can situate, 
on one side, the Demirski/Strzępka team, Masłowska, the author of Paw kró-
lowej (The Queen’s Peacock/Spew), and, on the other side, Stefan Chwin or 
Jacek Dehnel. However, it behoves us to ask whether it is indeed Brzozowski to 
whom we owe the division between pure and engaged art. 
 
Double Negation 
 
What the young critics did not develop was the idea that by criticising the aes-
thetics of the Chimera art magazine and Przesmycki’s achievements Brzozowski 
took a stance against autonomous art and in behalf of engaged art. The idea was 
born much earlier. In Main Currents of Marxism, Leszek Kołakowski wrote:  
 
Brzozowski was, it is true, the most active exponent in Poland of modernist or ‘neo-Ro-
mantic’ thought, but he would have nothing to do with that aspect of it which he regarded 
as a continuation of the ‘bad side’ of Romanticism, i.e. the view that art should be com-
pletely free [from real life, P. Cz.] and unfettered by any consciousness of its social func-
tions.6 
                                                             
5  Igor Stokfiszewski, Zwrot polityczny (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 
2009), 156.  
6  Leszek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. 
Vol. 2: The Golden Age, trans. Paul S. Falla (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 217. It 
is to this side that Sławomir Sierakowski refers when he claims: “For Brzozowski 
l’art pour l’art will be the recognition of inactivity and the incapacity to act as the 
symbol and symptom of spiritual superiority / elevation.” Powrót zbawionego herety-
ka [The return of a saved heretic]. In: Brzozowski. Przewodnik Krytyki Politycznej 
[Brzozowski: Krytyka Polityczna guidebook], ed. Krytyka Polityczna editorial team, 
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It is not difficult to find in Brzozowski’s works interpretations originating in this 
approach or relevant firm statements, such as this oft-quoted sentence: “Sztuka i 
twórczość jest zjawiskiem społecznym, jest zawsze wynikiem społecznego dow-
artościowywania przeżywanych wzruszeń”7 (Art and creativity are a social phe-
nomenon, are always the result of the appreciation of deeply felt emotions). The 
problem, however, lies in the fact that Brzozowski’s concept of art as a “social 
phenomenon” does not entail acceptance for social art. In other words, in negat-
ing aestheticism by no means does the author of Idee turn to engaged art. After 
all, it is noteworthy that in Main Currents of Marxism Kołakowski framed his 
interpretation of Brzozowski’s attitude towards the two opposing poles of art 
with the following comment:  
 
He was equally opposed to the positivist, utilitarian approach and to the doctrine of ‘art for 
art’s sake’. He wished to preserve a place for artistic creation which was not determined 
by the laws of ‘progress’ and did not owe its significance to other than human powers, yet 
at the same time did not represent a breach of historical continuity or claim to be exempt 
from social responsibility.8 
 
Kołakowski’s remark is noteworthy, because it reveals a double negation. If 
Brzozowski questioned both modernist aestheticism and utilitarian art, he must 
have formulated his judgement from a different perspective—from a third space. 
This space did not overlap with either the pole of pure art or the pole of engaged 
art. It would be very convenient to make a hasty discovery and locate this space 
outside the dichotomy in question. Yet the problem with Brzozowski is that his 
concept of the relation of art to itself and to society, albeit based on the negation 
of both extremes, does not in fact go beyond them at all. 
 
“There is no entitative being” 
 
In order to shed light on this problem, we must place Brzozowski’s concept of 
art in the framework of his philosophy. 
In a nutshell, his philosophical program can be extrapolated from three pairs 
of assertions: 
 
                                                             
Katarzyna Szroeder-Dowjat (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2011), 
16. 
7  Stanisław Brzozowski, Mitologia estetyczna – Miriam [Aesthetic mythology: Miriam] 
in Współczesna powieść i krytyka, 262. 
8  Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 217. 
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1. There is no entitative being—there is only being.  
2. Being is unfinished—the essence of being is free creativity.  
3. Creative freedom in is not a value in itself—its aim is mutual freedom.  
 
The assertion that there is no entitative being means that there is no idea that 
determines human life. Stated in an existentialist idiom, no essence precedes 
human existence. In Brzozowski’s understanding, entitative being—physical or 
metaphysical—determines the forms of human existence, leaving no space for 
free self-creation. If there is entitative being, the human being does not exist. 
This follows from classical ontology, which, according to Brzozowski, revealed 
the impossibility of entitative being; it defined the conditions human beings must 
recognize in order to understand what their life is. Thus, the anthropological task 
of the philosophy of entitative being is to make us aware of the conditions to 
which the human being is subject. The simplest of these is at the same time the 
strongest: we were born, so we must die; we have bodies, so we must accept the 
decay of matter; we partake in the exchange of goods, so we are governed by the 
laws of economy. In light of the philosophy of entitative being, the only thing a 
human being can do is to understand that there is nothing s/he can do. This is 
why, as Hegel put it, freedom is the recognition of necessity. 
But if the human being does exist, then there is no entitative being. Human 
beings exist, i.e., they undergo changes throughout historical ages and introduce 
these changes into social reality. Since change is possible, entitative being as the 
broadest possible framework determining the human being does not exist. There 
is no entitative being, there is only being. “There is no entitative being,” because 
“the essence of the world is free creativity. Deed and creation are not an illusion, 
but the highest truth.”9 If Heidegger argued that philosophy after Socrates forgot 
being, Brzozowski—alongside Nietzsche—would be among the first who 
brought being back to mind and pointed to others who did so as well. 
Once being is brought back to mind—i.e., the absence of destiny, fate, and a 
framework of determination—the human being regains self-creating potency, yet 
at the same time is left lonely with respect to being. For there is no plan of crea-
tion which could be realised in existence, nor any foundation with respect to 
which a given stage of human activity could be evaluated: “[…] człowie-
czeństwo nie ma żadnego ‘gruntu’, na którym by stało […] jest samo dla siebie 
                                                             
9  Stanisław Brzozowski, “‘Miriam’ – zagadnienie kultury” [“Miriam”: the question of 
culture; 1904], in Programy i dyskusje literackie okresu Młodej Polski [Literary pro-
grams and discussions of Young Poland], 3rd ed., ed. Maria Podraza-Kwiatkowska 
(Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2000), 547. 
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wsparciem ostatecznym”10 (humanity has no “ground,” on which to stand […] it 
is its own ultimate support). Brzozowski holds that the human being—even 
when lacking plans or aims—nevertheless preserves a value relating to every 
deed. This value is “freedom,” i.e., the quality of being free from previous limi-
tations and constraints. Once we regard value as something that transcends and 
justifies any given end, “freedom” can be understood as the gauge of human 
achievement. 
It would seem that by negating entitative being and defining freedom as 
freeing oneself from constraints, Brzozowski is close to existentialism. The 
difference comes, however, with the following point, i.e., the problem of human 
self-creation. The author of Idee argues that being makes the human being meta-
physically but not ontically lonely. This is because endowing being with value 
does not manifest itself in individual emancipation, in individual self-liberation 
from frameworks previously regarded as unchangeable. Attributing value to 
being is possible only by binding together that which has been freed. Brzozowski 
formulates this idea in an oxymoronic-sounding postulate: “Uczynić swobod-
nymi względem samych siebie i wzajemnie wszystkie uczucia, wzruszenia, po-
pędy etc. istniejące – oto jest zadanie kultury”11 (The task of culture is to render 
each and every sentiment, emotion, drive, etc. free in itself and in relation to all 
the others). I say oxymoronic, because normally one can either “render” some-
thing “free in itself” or “in relation to all the others.” The former consists in 
loosening ties, the latter in creating them; to free things is to make them inde-
pendent of one another, whereas to “free mutually” is to bind the freeing of one 
thing with the winning of freedom by another. In this sense, freedom can only be 
attained by creating ties. 
The non-existence of entitative being, the indeterminacy of being, and mu-
tual freedom—these are the three fundamental paradoxes of Brzozowski’s phi-
losophy. Could they find expression within the framework of any existing philo-
sophical system? Brzozowski answered this question in the negative: “nowa 
filozofia […] nie istnieje”12 (There is no […] new philosophy). It does not exist, 
because it is not a philosophy in the established sense of the word; however, it is 
a practice. There is no system, no ontological affirmations—but what does exist 
is the critical mode of investigation. Lacking foundations practice draws the 
justification of its groundlessness from the concept of being devoid of founda-
tions. According to this approach, philosophy is worked out, not practiced. It 
is—just like any other human activity—processual, incomplete, unfinished, 
                                                             
10  Brzozowski, Głosy wśród nocy, 247.  
11  Brzozowski, “Miriam,” 551 (emphasis mine, P. Cz.). 
12  Ibid., 545. 
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inconclusive. It must be continuously produced, despite the awareness that it will 
never be definitively created. When Brzozowski writes that “scientific ‘notions’ 
and ‘methods’ need to be recognized as a means of artistic expression” (trzeba 
uznać “pojęcia” i “metody” naukowe za jeden z środków ekspresji artystycz-
nej),13 he expresses the belief that scientific discourse uses language in the same 
way art does—for the sake of being, and not entitative being. That is: not in 
order to name that which is because it must be, but rather that which is coming 
about, because it can become. 
Hence, there is no difference between philosophy and art, because both are 
forms rather than domains of activity. Culture is the process of producing reality, 
and this production does not have a ready-made program. This is the first reason 
why Brzozowski cannot be deemed a supporter of social art: socially engaged art 
would have to fulfil the postulates of some other, superordinate domain, e.g., that 
of the social sciences or the laws of production. Were he to acknowledge the 
existence of some such superior domain, the artist would have to admit that 
objective truth also exists. However, in that case truth of an economic or social 
nature would not only dictate to the artist the content of his work, but also con-
tradict the previously stated view that truth about reality is truth produced. Ac-
knowledging socially useful art that advocates a specific program would mean 
that there is entitative being; and were such to exist then there could be no hu-
man being, i.e., the being who constitutes and decides about itself. And if the 
abode of humans is being—not entitative being—art is situated on the same level 
of indeterminacy as science or production. 
Second, social art is not possible due to the subjectivity Brzozowski ascribed 
to it. If the philosopher had come to the conclusion that art serves society, he 
would have situated it on a level lower than, say, practical needs. The existence 
of a higher level would arrest the searching movement: the human being would 
know that certain spheres of human activity are privileged and other subordinate. 
As a result, the artist would be deprived of creative freedom, i.e., the very aspect 
which Brzozowski regarded as the prerequisite of a creative act. Consequently, 
the artist would need to reconcile, in some specific way, freedom and oppres-
sion, much like a factory laborer who dances merrily alongside a machine pro-
ducing hundreds of identical screws. 
Thus, to sum up concisely, socially engaged art understood as the simple op-
posite of pure art would have been the Trojan horse of Brzozowski’s conception. 
Adopting this idea would have meant that there exist objective truths and stand-
ards of value external to art, and that it would be necessary to subordinate the 
artist to these truths, making him serve the freedom of others. 
                                                             
13  Brzozowski, Idee, 391. 
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A Different Autonomy  
 
In order to resolve this dilemma, we can refer to Brzozowski’s polemics with 
Sienkiewicz and Miriam. Breaking with the prevalent critical tradition of consid-
ering the two disputes separately, Andrzej Mencwel has argued that in both cases 
Brzozowski resorted to pairs of the same categories, albeit in each case inter-
preted differently: 
 
The logic of two-sided polemic forced […] Brzozowski to reinterpret his understanding of 
the whole relation of expression and communication. With respect to Miriam, it assumed a 
concept of expression other than that of passive contemplation, and with respect to Sien-
kiewicz—a concept of communication other than one that is particularly restricted. […] 
expression had to be “active,” and communication “universal,” while both were supposed 
to be inseparably linked together. This way of thinking was decisive for the anti-Modern-
ist orientation of Brzozowski’s aesthetics.14 
 
According to Mencwel, in the second half of the nineteenth century “expression” 
was synonymous with poetry, i.e., the true outpouring of an artist, who comes to 
expression in the work of art; “communication,” in turn, was understood from 
the point of view of true poetry as “production of literature,” i.e., writing not 
“from oneself,” in one’s own name, but for a rather nondescript collective 
reader. “Expression” projected a passive, contemplative attitude of the reader 
that Brzozowski found in the poetry of Young Poland, and with which he con-
trasted the necessity of inciting an active attitude. “Writing for the many,” in 
turn, even if it was “active” and activating, remained particular as in Sienkie-
wicz, i.e., oriented to a selected area of culture: the family, the history of the 
Polish ‘republic of nobility’, religion. Hence, particularism should be understood 
as isolation of specific aspects of being; for now let us define the opposite of 
such an attitude as universalism. Thus, a consistent reading of Andrzej Menc-
wel’s proposition reveals four varieties of art: passive expression (Miriam) and 
active expression (e.g., Leopold Staff in the period when his poetry aimed to 
overcome impotence), as well as communication of a particular (Sienkiewicz) 
and universal kind. 
It is universal art activating the recipient that can be deemed the essence of 
Brzozowski’s explorations. We will see this once we translate the categories 
suggested by Mencwel into notions related to engagement. Let us not forget that 
Brzozowski’s polemic with Miriam is regarded—even in university teaching—
                                                             
14  Andrzej Mencwel, Stanisław Brzozowski – kształtowanie myśli krytycznej [Stanisław 
Brzozowski: the formation of critical thought] (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1976), 235. 
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as foundational for the opposition between aestheticizing and engaged art. We 
already know, however, that in challenging “art for art’s sake” Brzozowski did 
not deny the autonomy of art. He was looking for such an art that would be 
autonomous and engaged at the same time. He resolved this contradiction by 
proposing a different understanding of both these features. In the already quoted 
text “‘Miriam’ – zagadnienie kultury”, he wrote: “[…] dziś pracujemy dla kul-
tury integralnej, dla wielkiego wyzwolenia wszechżycia. Stąd i swoboda nasza 
nie jest już przywilejem, lecz czymś głębszym nawet niż prawo – istotą naszą”15 
(today we are working for an integral culture, for the great liberation of the enti-
rety of life. That is why our liberty is no longer a privilege, but something even 
deeper than law—it is our very essence).  
Instead of contrasting autonomy with engagement, Brzozowski contrasted 
integration with alienation. The true aim of art is to create an integral culture. An 
obstacle for the development of this culture is not autonomous art, but rather art 
for the sake of its own or another’s liberation, but never for the sake of linking 
its own freedom with the freedom of others. Art can be egoistically focused on 
its own freedom or altruistically devoted to the freedom of others—and in this 
sense both pure and engaged art can be threatened by alienation. Integrating art, 
in turn, by freeing a given aspect of human life, includes that which is freed in 
the entire culture.16 Under this approach, the value of art, its aim and its form-
producing power is the capacity to overcome alienation. To integrate the eman-
cipated areas means to make their free existence mutually bound: a new word 
discovered by a poet, unblocked feelings and drives, the idea of a new institu-
tion, or a plot about changed social relations will acquire an integrative value 
only if they do not reproduce conditions of alienation. Thus, in Brzozowski’s 
philosophy the real name of “engagement” is “art integrating being.” This can-
not, however, be conventional art, which neglects its own form. Socially useful 
conventional art is a case of voluntary self-alienation: acting for the sake of 
liberating others, it remains dependent in artistic terms, which, as Brzozowski 
has it, means that the creator of this kind of art has neither diagnosed the prob-
lem correctly nor formulated his/her own answer to it, has not run it through 
himself. The artist must produce form only under the influence of the problem he 
has noticed, only when faced with alien reality, so the more engaged he wants to 
be, the greater should be his defence of the autonomy of art. If the real aim of art 
                                                             
15  Brzozowski, “Miriam,” 551 (emphasis mine, P. Cz.). 
16  Brzozowski strove to achieve a state in which “personal life uses the whole of history 
as an instrument and creates its own organism in it” (życie osobiste posługuje się całą 
historią jako swoim organem i tworzy w niej swój organizm); Pamiętnik, 9.  
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is to reveal alienated aspects of being and continuously integrate culture, then the 
autonomy of art is a precondition of, not an obstacle to, integration. 
Brzozowski criticised “art for art’s sake” not for its autonomy, but for its 
isolation from reality. Romanticism invented the idea of art in opposition to the 
world, and early Modernism turned this into a programmatic tenet. The author of 
Idee did not want to deprive art of autonomy; what he did want, though, was that 
this autonomy be marked by solidarity. The measure of the value of a work is 
not the sum of freedoms gained by the author, but rather the sum of “mutual 
freedoms” secured for the human world. This means that the philosopher was not 
searching for an opposite of autonomy; he was searching rather for a different 
mode of its realisation. In this way, he came to the opposition between isolating 
and integrating autonomy. 
This can be illustrated as follows: 
 
activity… …that is alienating …that is integrating 
autonomous art self-oriented autono-
mous art, isolating 
itself from the rest of 
reality (e.g., art for art’s 
sake) 
autonomous art integrat-
ing all emancipated as-
pects of life 
socially useful art conventional art ori-
ented towards the liber-
ation of one social 
group: the proletariat, 
women, peasants, etc. 
conventional art aiming 
to integrate all of exist-
ence (e.g., present-day 
variants of eco-art) 
 
Thus, Brzozowski should not be regarded as the patron of the opposition “pure 
art versus engaged art.” In his conception, they are not opposites, but rather two 
varieties of autonomous art. The difference between them lies in the scope of 
emancipation: the “pure” artist is interested in exploring the language of art, 
liberating his or her domain from entanglements in and dependencies on any 
other languages, whereas the “integrating” artist states his case in such a way as 
to include others in the emancipation and connect the emancipated parts within a 
new whole. Put differently, the “pure” artist, obtaining independence for his/her 
own domain, alienates its language from the sphere of social communication, 
using it as a tool for individual emancipation, whereas the integrating artist trig-
gers the process of de-alienation, which does, admittedly, begin in the work of 
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art, but then expands in the form of connections ranging over the entire spectrum 
of social life. Thus understood, engaged art is still autonomous; in contrast to 
“art for art’s sake,” which seeks autonomy for itself, “engaged” art acts for the 
sake of solidary autonomy. What matters here is not the extent to which a work 
of art becomes autonomous with respect to social life, but rather how many 
freedoms revealed by this work in social being will be bound together in an 
integrated culture. 
 
The Troublesome Relevance of Modernity 
 
The reading of Brzozowski’s philosophy proposed above and the ensuing neces-
sity of reinterpreting the opposition between pure and engaged art seem to create 
an opportunity for a different approach to Polish art of the modern period. 
Throughout the twentieth century, artists faced a changing reality and an un-
changing list of problems. Political events forced them to take a stance with 
respect to the dilemma “ethics or aesthetics”; due to the development of mass 
culture, every dozen or so years they had to describe themselves in terms of the 
“mass or elite” extremes; blurring borders among genres and the surge of non-
fictional forms renewed the problem “truth or fabrication.” 
The basic strategy adopted by artists of the interwar period manifested itself 
in the logic of alternating radical choices: members of the Skamander literary 
group began with a demonstrative turn against engaged art, glad to be able to 
praise spring rather than Poland, but in the 1930s some of them, like Tuwim, 
abandoned the path of “non-engagement” for the sake of ethical art. Several 
Futurists took the opposite path: Wat, Młodożeniec, or Czyżewski entered public 
life by manifestly rejecting traditional versions of aestheticism and seeking out 
forms of social communication with a strong and immediate impact. Yet by the 
1930s they stood at the opposite end of the scale, exploring folk language, 
searching for simple forms, creating poetry that was not translatable into ideo-
logical slogans and programs. A similar course was taken by Czesław Miłosz: 
from the path of engagement during his time with the journal Żagary (Brush-
wood) and his debut collection Poemat o czasie zastygłym (A Poem on Frozen 
Time) to the ethical orientation adapted following his much-publicized breakup 
with the left. But is the Miłosz of post-engagement phase a representative of 
pure art? 
By posing this question, we reveal the problem of any dichotomous classifi-
cation. If great artists fail to fit it, the division must be inadequate. By way of 
example—was Tadeusz Peiper, with his references to Brzozowski, an engaged 
artist? For sure. Did he pursue autonomy in art? Definitely. 
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The case of Peiper indicates that the division into pure and engaged art is 
both necessary for understanding the dilemmas of modern art and insufficient for 
explaining the most advanced artistic solutions. It is true that modernity was 
dominated by the dynamics of alternating extremisms; however, the most inter-
esting artistic results appeared when artists followed Brzozowski’s course. Here, 
the aim of artistic explorations was to maintain the inner tension between the 
pairs of opposites while at the same time preserving the key values of each. On 
the basis of the lesson Brzozowski taught us we know that in order to find a 
solution it was not a matter of choosing between autonomy and its negation, but 
rather between two different scopes of autonomy. But how was this really ac-
complished? 
Tadeusz Peiper seems to have been the first to see the necessity of a different 
resolution of the dilemma awaiting artists in modernity. This is indicated by his 
double-edged polemics: he criticised engaged as well as pure art. In Peiper’s 
well thought-out conception, correlated with the problems of modernization, the 
autonomy of poetry is manifested in the right to violate syntactic and phraseo-
logical linguistic rules. Destroying stock patterns of poetic creation stems from 
the conviction that language and the social perception of reality are linked; ac-
cording to Peiper, we see the world in the way language allows, and what we see 
determines how we take part in reality and how we transform it. In other words, 
we can only change what we are able to name in a changed way. Consequently, 
social changes are not possible without the renewal of language. But Peiper takes 
his thinking even further, as it were in the footprints of Brzozowski: He argues 
that the rationale of poetry is to integrate the unintegrated, i.e., to bind together 
separate elements of the world. Poetry teaches its readers relational thinking and 
acting. Yet it teaches them not by means of direct instruction, as revolutionary 
poetry does, but by training their sense of functionality. Poems turn the mass into 
a society. 
Following Peiper, the history of integrating autonomy was carried forward 
by very different representatives of Polish modernity. I would include here 
Miron Białoszewski, the post-war Miłosz, the poets of the late phase of the New 
Wave,17 as well as Zbigniew Herbert who in his poetry prior to the mid-1970s 
                                                             
17  My inspiration here is Jacek Gutorow’s opinion, expressed in his interpretation of the 
poetry of Julian Kornhauser: “The lesson of Kornhauser shows that he is not only af-
ter poetics or rhetoric in the narrow sense of the word. He is also, or perhaps above 
all, after a certain vision of being—being understood as remaining open to all lan-
guages, the higher and lower, those fully conscious and those outside consciousness, 
resulting from an impulse coming from elsewhere. Nothing is given. One has to de-
cide, choose, get engaged—but blindly, not owning even oneself, taking everything 
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(i.e., before the collection Pan Cogito [Mr Cogito]) and his essays gradually 
broadens the scope of human sensitivity, and binds ethics with aesthetics, mak-
ing aesthetic taste a prerequisite for the individual’s moral sovereignty. 
Does this idea continue to have significance? Is it justified to extend moder-
nity beyond 1989? One could risk the following answer: modernity lasts as long 
as the human being produces alienation or is unable to overcome it. As long as 
alienation remains a result of human activity, whether its main or side effect, the 
idea of integrating is still relevant. 
Uncertain about further names, I would mention—hesitantly—Magdalena 
Tulli (as the author of the novels: Sny i kamienie [Dreams and Stones], W czer-
wieni [In Red], Tryby [Moving Stones], Skaza [Flaw]), Zbigniew Kruszyński 
(Schwedenkräuter, Szkice historyczne [Historical Sketches]), Jacek Dukaj (as the 
author of Czarne oceany [Black Oceans], Perfekcyjna niedoskonałość [Perfect 
Imperfection]), and Marek Bieńczyk (as the author of Terminal and Tworki, as 
well as the essays Melancholia and Przezroczystość [Translucence]). Even if I 
am wrong in my choice of names and achievements, it is clear that I am selecting 
those who pursue solidary, integrating autonomy. Hence, it is not about those 
who point to the necessity of returning freedom to particular collective subjects: 
women, sexual minorities, children, Jews or animals. Artists active in the sphere 
of solidary autonomy look for the broadest possible basis of coexistence, finding 
it in communication (and not in human language itself), in improvised network 
connections (and not only in stable networks). Thus, their efforts are directed 
against the mechanics of exclusion, rather than against the exclusion of a partic-
ular social group or natural species. In their art, the represented autonomy, 
played out in the plot, is linked with the autonomy of the means of expression, 
i.e., language, of form or composition. At the same time, the emancipation 
awarded to particular beings is reintegrated, in hypothetical mode, with a broader 
sphere of reality. Here, the question is not, “How and in what name to liberate a 
given subject?” but rather, “How to make sure that emancipation does not lead to 
isolation?” 
The foregoing sketch of an idea, which as yet does not even deserve the 
name of a précis of Polish modernist literature, seems worth considering insofar 
as the opposition between the autonomy and heteronomy of art persists. Gone or 
at least lessened are the oppositions between mass and elite culture or truth and 
fiction. Yet the dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy has maintained its 
status, dramatic fervour, and relevance. 
                                                             
that comes our way.” Języki Kornhausera [Kornhauser’s languages] in: Niepodległość 
głosu. Szkice o poezji polskiej po 1968 roku (Kraków: Znak, 2003), 56f. 
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Today, even the very reflection about the shrinking autonomy of culture has 
itself become a non-autonomous form, contributing to a certain ritual of frustra-
tion. Revealing the subordinate character of literature serves cynical reason and 
leads to a bitter conclusion: Since writers cannot be independent of the market, 
let them live off their own dependence. On the other hand, the market, an area 
heteronomous to art, accepts and rewards tales about the integration of humans 
with nature, objects, or even machines. Ideas of a harmonious life in communion 
with nature, especially in a lakeside cottage, like that depicted in a popular TV 
series, of active concern for the climate, pro-environmental thinking, recycling—
all of this is in line with the expansion of capitalism. Thus, the present changed 
position of Brzozowski’s idea is conditioned by the fact that although modernity 
at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has recourse to the ideology 
of integration, it thereby conceals vast areas of exclusion, both economic and 
ecological. This poses a double challenge for art. The first task is to reveal the 
dangers of coercion hidden in integration. The second, opposite task is to focus 
attention on everything from which people of late modernity isolate themselves 
with full awareness and for the sake of survival. Viruses are the literal and meta-
phorical example of phenomena from which people take distance, and epidemi-
ology provides models of isolation procedures. In response to this challenge, art 
would have to raise the question about the limits of integration laid down by 
human beings in the name of self-defence. Put differently, today the greatest 
problem of solidary autonomy is the question whether at the end of the day it is 
only humans who should benefit. 
With the above-stated problem, I would like to return to present-day claims 
to Brzozowski’s legacy. Even though contemporary literary criticism practiced 
under the patronage of the author of Idee can be interesting, it does bypass the 
crucial challenges formulated by him. I would single out three most important 
issues. 
First of all, the main categories of Brzozowski’s philosophy—labor, culture, 
nation, church—are too often separated. In their interpretations, leftist critics 
employ the notions of “labor” and “culture,” while right-wing critics reach for 
“nation” and “church”; the left avoids the undesirable motif of community ties 
rooted in tradition, the right refuses to admit that in Brzozowski’s view man 
creates himself. Secondly, taking as its point of departure the dichotomy “pure 
art versus engaged art,” present-day criticism reverses the necessary action, 
assuming that forms of engagement are given, whereas Brzozowski regarded 
artistic form as a result of coming to know reality and as an individual expres-
sion of solving a particular problem. He wrote: 
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Każda treść w dziele sztuki ujawniona jest wywalczona, zdobyta, przeżyta, zawiera więc 
w sobie ciężar własny i powagę własną rzeczy głęboko istniejących. […] Nie jest wytwo-
rem myśli, jest realnością kanciastą […]. Walka z nią, z jej określonością, usiłowanie 
oddania jej niezawisłego, indywidualnego kształtu, tworzy rdzeń wysiłków formalnych w 
sztuce. Ona to – ta walka z określonością własnych czynów i sił, które tym czynom 
się przeciwstawiają – rozsadza zawsze wszelki sztywniejący szablon w sztuce, manierę. 
Styl własny, forma własna – nie wynajdują się i nie wymyślają. Jedna jest tylko droga do 
nich prowadząca – życie własne.18 
 
Each content brought forth in a work of art has involved struggle, achievement, deep 
experience, and hence bears its own weight and the authority of things that exist deeply. 
[…] It is not a product of thought; it is an angular reality […]. The struggle with it, its 
determinate contours, the attempt to provide it with an independent, individual shape, 
constitutes the core of formal efforts in art. This struggle against the fixed determinacy of 
one’s own deeds and the forces opposing them rips apart every congealed template, man-
ner, in art. A personal style, a personal form, these are not discovered nor conjured up by 
thought. Only one road leads to them—one’s own life.   
 
In other words: form emerges when individual thought meets the resistance of 
reality; it is neither superimposed on the world by the mind nor borrowed from 
literary tradition. Finding a solution to an artistic problem, the artist at the same 
time finds the solution of a specific general and his own individual problem. The 
form suggested by the artist combines individual biography and shared culture. 
Thanks to that, Brzozowski could postulate an engagement that is inseparable 
from the freedom of artistic exploration. 
Third, Brzozowski’s conception is—exclusively and expansively—anthropo-
centric, and this anthropocentrism is complemented by the image of nature as a 
foreign continent, which must be conquered and subdued. This image is dan-
gerously consonant with the colonising approach to nature in modernity. If in 
Brzozowski’s philosophy only the human is to be the subject of integration of 
being, this means that his conception legitimates cruel forms of alienation—con-
cerning animals, plants, bodies of water, but also human bodies. If, on the other 
hand, integration could encompass not only human beings, but also everything 
that coexists with them and often threatens them, we would need to ask where in 
Brzozowski’s thought is the passage that would allow the transition from the 
human to the post-human world. 
It seems that these three problems—the problem of community, artistic form, 
and anthropocentrism—today pose a challenge to anyone who wants to comment 
                                                             
18  Brzozowski, “Miriam,” 556. 
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on the development of engaged art by referring to Brzozowski. In his view, 
autonomy is the precondition of engagement, while integration is the aim of 
autonomous actions. Thus, art of value cannot exist without community or au-
tonomy. This seems to open up a new perspective on Polish modern culture as a 
whole—one aimed not at works which confirm the opposition of pure and en-
gaged art, but rather at finding a poetics that would act for the sake of overcom-
ing this dichotomy. Perhaps this perspective could encompass the art of late 
modernity of the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The ideal of 
“mutual freedom” suggested by Brzozowski does, after all, seem to constitute a 
link missing from present-day social life and contemporary art. As postulated by 
art today, emancipation is rarely accompanied by thinking about mutuality, 
while mutuality more often than not appears among those who have already 
gained freedom. Brzozowski’s idea enjoins us to remember that the freedoms 
which we enjoy acquire value only when they free others. This concerns also the 
autonomy of art. 
 
Translated by Zofia Ziemann 
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Brzozowski or Plots of the Future 
Marta Wyka 
 
 
Brzozowski was the author of five novels: among them the debut Pod ciężarem 
Boga (Under the Weight of God), and Płomienie (Flames), a novel written in 
difficult times during which he was fighting allegations of his supposed collabo-
ration with the tsarist secret police; furthermore the project of European and 
world scale, as his contemporaries (but also Brzozowski himself) called it, 
Dębina (Oakwood). And yet, despite these achievements, it appears that Sien-
kiewicz rather than Brzozowski remains the chief diagnostician of Polishness. 
All of Brzozowski’s novels, previously difficult to come by, were published in 
two volumes in 2011 and 2012 by the Cracow-based publishing house Wy-
dawnictwo Literackie.1 It is worth mentioning this fact, because this reedition 
has failed to inspire Brzozowski scholars—especially those of the younger gen-
eration—to undertake new readings of these novels. This is surprising indeed, 
insofar as the author attached considerable significance to his novels, regarding 
them as a breakthrough. Their later fate, however, did not confirm his sentiment. 
For it is around Henryk Sienkiewicz that lively discussions still revolve to-
day, even though he did not attempt to offer, in his works, prognoses for culture. 
Brzozowski believed that his European contemporaries should by all means get 
to know the works of Stefan Żeromski, because otherwise the Polish mentality 
will remain a puzzle. As we know, this puzzle still awaits a solution, although 
Europe is not even aware of its existence. Żeromski remained an unknown. 
Already these brief signals announce the first assumption governing my present 
argument: as a novelist, Brzozowski had a particular aim in mind, namely to give 
in his plots an account of places which had shaped him and which he considered 
formative for his worldview to the extent that they were translatable from indi-
                                                             
1  Brzozowski, Dębina. Część pierwsza. Sam wśród ludzi. Książka o starej kobiecie; 
Brzozowski, Pod ciężarem Boga. Wiry. Płomienie. 
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vidual into collective experience. My preliminary suggestion is that Brzozow-
ski’s novels were determined by his biography, and the degree to which he 
deformed his biography manifests at the same time the artistic style that he 
wished to create, regarding these particular works (and especially Dębina) as a 
bold experiment. Are we today in keeping with the self-definition of Brzozowski 
the novelist? Are we willing to admit—as readers and scholars—that in writing 
Dębina he made a breakthrough, forgotten but nonetheless significant, in Euro-
pean and Polish fiction? 
Critics deemed Dębina an unfinished masterpiece. Originally, the entire 
work was to be entitled Mesjasz (Messiah); in the end, only the first part of the 
planned trilogy was completed, namely Sam wśród ludzi (Alone among People). 
Let me recall here two lines of fascination with the novel: the authorial dimen-
sion and that of the reader. The readers always belonged to the intellectual elite; 
the novel never won mass popularity, which, as we know, is often the fate of 
works oriented towards breakthrough, change, and experiment. The passage of 
time did not help Brzozowski’s novels, however; they remain scholarly fare, 
though in fact within academia they do not enjoy a privileged position.  
Czesław Miłosz considered Sam wśród ludzi as the most important Polish 
novel. And yet its plot, and the narrative that carries it, turned out not to be suffi-
ciently appealing to ensure that the novel has a place in Polish history to which 
readers would want to return. It was Sienkiewicz’s Trylogia (Trilogy) that 
achieved this status despite the criticism directed to it. Brzozowski’s fiction 
demanded overcoming stereotypes and penetrating the “dark current” of Polish 
nineteenth-century history. Sienkiewicz, going further back in time, better satis-
fied the expectations of those who sought a positive model in the past. Under-
taking a far riskier challenge, Brzozowski nurtured the conviction that he was 
writing about a “historical type” his contemporaries could not fathom, a type 
(and thus a fictional character) placed in the borderland between fantasy and 
realism. Strange as this borderland is, this indeed is the space in which historio-
sophical and personal visions of novelistic characters can be situated. 
As always with Brzozowski, the steadily expanding literary project, exten-
sively described in his letters to friends, was not completed. Here are examples 
of how the author saw it: 
 
[…] jest absolutnie pewne, że sama zasada kompozycyjna powieści zrozumiana nie bę-
dzie, ale jestem już tu tak na stronie od młodopolskich wartości i norm, że na razie jest 
nieporozumienie i lekceważenie mojej pracy nieuchronne […].2  
 
                                                             
2  Brzozowski, Listy, vol. 2, 554f. 
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[…] it is absolutely certain that the principle guiding the composition of the novel will not 
be understood, however, I am already so far removed from the values and norms of Young 
Poland that for the time being incomprehension and neglect of my work is inevitable […]. 
 
Moja nowa książka będzie dla ludzi w Galicji – dla różnych „niepospolitych” i „orygi-
nalnych” umysłów, które, licho wie dlaczego, uważają, że mam z nimi coś wspólnego, 
ostatecznym kamieniem obrazy. Natomiast jestem przekonany, że robię rzecz dobrą, która 
jeśli nie dziś przyniesie pożytek trwały i głęboki, później będzie w każdym razie czymś 
spoza granic dzisiejszej polskiej umysłowości.3 
 
My new book will be, for people from Galicia—for those “uncommon,” “original” minds 
who, for some reason, believe that I share something in common with them, the ultimate 
stone of offense. On the other hand, I am convinced that I am doing something good that, 
even though it may not bring lasting and profound benefits today, will in due course be 
something beyond the limits of the current Polish mentality. 
 
Księga III jest właściwie beletrystyczną krytyką polskiego romantyzmu.4  
 
All things considered Book III is a belletristic critique of Polish Romanticism. 
 
These three quotations and three points establish the function and message of 
Brzozowski’s fiction: a new compositional style, a critical field of reference (Ro-
manticism), and fixing the limits of Polish mentality. Brzozowski turned his 
back on the status quo in each of these domains, i.e., he pursued his project with-
out regard for its thematic tradition. How else could he proceed, if the theme 
itself was considered intellectually frivolous and anachronistic (“Poland gone 
puerile,” “Poland of pet pupils”—these and similar epithets from Legenda Mło-
dej Polski (The Legend of Young Poland) characterised his critical discourse)? 
Brzozowski’s contemporaries did not deserve an intellectual, let alone creative 
partnership. This is very evident in his satirical collection Widma moich 
współczesnych (The Spectres of my Contemporaries), which can be read as an 
announcement of his principal belles-lettres campaigns (I am using this expres-
sion in Brzozowski’s sense, to mean novelistic writing). 
The author was certainly right when, having completed the first part of Dę-
bina, he wrote to Walentyna and Edmund Szalit: “[…] mam wrażenie, że w 
całości jest to najdziwniejsza rzecz, jaką od wielu lat, może od czasu pierwszych 
                                                             
3  Ibid., 546f. 
4  Ibid., 377. 
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powieści Przybyszewskiego, – w polskiej literaturze ktokolwiek napisał.”5 (I 
have the impression that as a whole this is the strangest thing that has been writ-
ten in Polish literature for many years, perhaps since Przybyszewski’s earliest 
novels.) We must not forget, however, that “the whole” never saw the light of 
day. 
Brzozowski’s enemy number one was the “Galician mentality.” What did he 
mean by this? Certainly not just the well-rooted “territorial” conflict between the 
Austrian- and Russian-governed parts of former Poland. Brought up in the East-
ern Borderlands, educated in the Russian-controlled Kingdom of Poland, 
Brzozowski suffered the greatest personal defeat in Galicia: it was in Cracow 
that he was brought to court on a charge of espionage. On the other hand, many 
of his close friends as well as his wife’s family lived here. In any case, 
Brzozowski’s mental map points to Galicia as the place of oppression, one where 
the most respected figures of city life can be exposed as individuals unable to 
transcend their own limitations. No “uncommon minds” are to be found here. 
But then again, it was in Galicia that, at the beginning of his career, Brzozowski 
enjoyed spectacular success as a speaker and lecturer: in Lvov and also in Za-
kopane. Cracow was the home of Wilhelm Feldman, editor of the journal Kry-
tyka (Critique) and Brzozowski’s long-time intellectual ally, who published his 
texts. 
The writer’s conflict with “the city of funerals” (this is how he saw the Cra-
cow of the turn of the century, as shown in his column piece “Król-Duch w Kra-
kowie” [King-Spirit in Cracow] from Widma moich współczesnych) was much 
more complex than that: he objected to a certain type of mental constitution 
prevalent in Galicia. However, it was in Cracow that Stanisław Przybyszewski’s 
artistic milieu took form, setting a model for the modern novel. Even though 
Brzozowski did not belong to the bohemian circle headed by the author of Sa-
tans Kinder (Satan’s Children) nor traverse its trails in Cracow, his reception of 
Przybyszewski’s novels was uncritical: He placed them in the leading position as 
far as new themes and new expression were concerned. 
In present-day readings of Brzozowski’s novelistic endeavour, the Galician 
conflict, once so sharply accentuated by the author himself, is treated as almost 
irrelevant or is only rarely mentioned. It is true that characters created in the first 
part of the novel were to develop psychologically with time, and the reader’s 
initial contact with them was only meant to provide an introductory overview 
presaging further progress. Such was the principle of composition in Dębina, 
similar to that of the great European cycles which came twenty years later, alt-
hough in the former the content of the “family framework” was already radically 
                                                             
5  Ibid., 525f. 
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different; we could say that, from the perspective of a European of Brzozowski’s 
time his compositional style appeared as fantastic and exotic. Yet as regards the 
artistic effects of “cyclicality,” so important for the fiction of high modernism 
(Mann, Musil, Proust), Brzozowski did anticipate them, just as he anticipated the 
diversity of novelistic discourses. 
The “historical type” in Brzozowski’s fiction is highly complex and his expe-
rience quite inaccessible, hermetic. The author was aware that this type needed 
“civilising,” i.e., it needed to be fitted with features—related to the places he 
came to know—which would bring him closer to some cultural community. This 
seems to be why Brzozowski regretted not having managed to describe mid-
nineteenth-century Paris, with all its artistic and human diversity (in this context 
Balzac plays a central role as a model). The culture of Florence, too distant from 
the nature of Polish disputes, could not inspire him the way French culture did. 
No matter that Georg Simmel considered the Italian city as especially conducive 
to culture, or, on a different level, that Brzozowski responded deeply to the story 
of Robert and Elisabeth Browning, who lived in Florence. Emotionally dedicated 
to his wife, he compared the British couple to his own marriage. We can surmise 
that the writer’s disposition needed the kind of stimulation that moved Zola, 
Flaubert, or Balzac rather than the harmonious palimpsest of culture that Flor-
ence arguably was. Today, venues of writing are of particular interest to scholars 
of the novel, hence my reason for referring to them; writing in Italy, Brzozowski 
stigmatised both the city and state as a space of exile and undeserved suffering. 
He tried to escape to other cultures, with different degrees of artistic success. 
The French inspiration of Brzozowski the novelist, superseded by the domi-
nant influence of British authors, is underestimated. We can hardly speak of an 
evolution here; what happened was rather a revolution of sentiments, which 
changed radically over the course of several years. In Brzozowski’s case, the 
idea of an evolution of sentiments and models generally does not seem very 
useful. It is better to replace it with the notion of “change” (with all its implica-
tions), or perhaps to express it in performative terms. 
In the rather rarely cited Chapter Ten of Legenda Młodej Polski (“Natural-
izm, dekadentyzm, symbolizm” / Naturalism, Decadence, Symbolism) Brzozow-
ski points to the works of Gustave Flaubert and to the French author himself, 
seeing in him the progenitor of changes of the second half of the nineteenth 
century. There is no Zola without Flaubert, nor Anatole France or Jules La-
forgue. Without getting into comparatistic detail, we can say that Flaubert’s Édu-
cation sentimentale (Sentimental Education) was a matrix which the modern 
writers could fill in accordance with their own social and historical experience, 
with the proviso that they always and above all follow two principles: that the 
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novel should be seen in its social context, and that the emotional life of the char-
acters must be filtered through the author’s own personality, i.e., his biography. 
Brzozowski wrote about the social background of Dębina as set against the 
European context, about the transformations of the international activist, who as 
a type was the psychological descendant of Polish Romanticism; he also wrote 
about people who for different reasons found themselves uprooted. Refuges and 
exiles, incomers from foreign cultures, were to determine the shape of Europe—
but how? Does this special visionary quality bring Brzozowski’s fiction closer to 
modernity? 
From his high esteem for Wacław Berent’s Próchno (Rotten Wood)—a Eu-
ropean novel about European artists whom Europe does not want to admit to its 
circle (the story takes place in Munich), we can infer, among other things, that 
Brzozowski not only could relate to the technical fabric of Berent’s experiment 
(“action pushed out into inter-chapters” or a certain “plotlessness”), but also 
sensed a deep analogy between his own uprootedness and the situation of the 
protagonists of Próchno, who in their monologues manifested alienation (which 
occupied Brzozowski’s attention in other contexts as well) and separation from 
the social world. There was one difference: the son of Brzozowski’s protagonist 
was supposed to return to this world, albeit not as an artist but as a socialist 
agitator. Or as the Messiah, which would be the next prophetic figure following 
Romanticism, and now fulfilling modern tasks. 
As we know, in the end neither version was put to paper, although politics 
and socialist agitation appeared as a theme in Książka o starej kobiecie (A Book 
about an Old Woman), written simultaneously with Dębina. This barely 
sketched novel announces Brzozowski’s novelistic potential: the narrator moves 
to the margin, he is “nameless,” so that it is left to the reader to judge the char-
acters. The opening scene of Książka… takes place in a courthouse—does this 
mean that Brzozowski aimed to abandon the “grand” narrative of Dębina for the 
sake of performance? 
The foreground story of Dębina is hard to grasp for a European reader: 
Polish Podolia in the time of the Napoleonic Wars (and later the November 
Uprising of 1830–1831), complicated relations between the forebears of the 
Ogieński family and the Petersburg court, dark scheming and patriotic escapes 
(the figure of emissary Trawka)—a reader without knowledge of Polish history 
will untie—if at all—the whole plot tangle in a way entirely different from that 
of a Polish reader (if at all). The former will certainly be taken aback by the 
contrast between the European age of Enlightenment and its feeble Polish muta-
tion. He or she will also be moved—I believe—by the tragic loneliness of the 
inhabitants of a far-off periphery of the enlightened world. Yet despite these 
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historiosophical merits, the nineteenth-century culture of Polish gentry and its 
heritage (we may also call it the Romantic heritage), unknown in this exotic 
dimension in Europe, did not find a place among the themes of great European 
literature. 
Learning about Europe in Poland also meant education in the field of style, 
natural for the reader familiar with Goethe’s rules: this style is created by travel 
accounts, reports on the progress of schooling received from tutors (even those 
ridiculed, like Truth-Hegel in Brzozowski’s novel), exploring cities (Berlin, 
Paris), getting involved in conspiracies. But how, under what conditions could a 
Romanticism as versatile as Polish Romanticism be read, a Romanticism so 
subtly transposed by Brzozowski into family stories, conflicts in small commu-
nities, the social and individual quirks of people “thrown off the saddle,” the 
complex character of Polish-Russian contacts (both intellectual and erotic…), 
revolts, escapes, the return of young men so different from their fellow Europe-
ans? 
In the Polish cultural context, the philosophy of a declining house and the 
dissolution of family structure was certainly a breakthrough, as Brzozowski 
meant it to be, but it was completely divergent from, say, the image of Lübeck as 
created by Thomas Mann. Although Brzozowski admired him, and sensed pre-
cisely the functions of the novelistic autobiographical style developed by the 
German author, it would have been very difficult for him to cross the border 
separating two worlds: the German bourgeoisie and Polish landowners. 
Abandoning Flaubert (even though he saw in the French author the father of 
new fiction), Brzozowski discovered the British route. This is a rather well-re-
searched aspect of his reading interests—from Kipling’s “imperialism” through 
Conrad’s “colonialism” to the fiction of Herbert George Wells, which attracted 
Brzozowski’s attention.  
As can be seen, the nineteenth century was the natural soil of Brzozowski’s 
mind, and could not have been absent from his greatest novel. Its psychologism 
seems to owe much to the already common, widely read, predominant model. 
Where then, in which spots, did Brzozowski project his “plots of the future”? 
Why did he regard his novel as an experiment which no other author could 
measure up to and no reader fully understand? An important role in the design of 
Dębina was to be played by the long timeline: the history of three generations, 
hence—time. At the time Proust’s cycle, whose first volume will be published in 
1914, was well under way. Without getting carried away by easy comparisons, 
let us note, however, that confrontation with time is a structural component of 
the text, and signals that the anticipation of fundamental changes in the modern 
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novel was already deeply ingrained in the awareness of prose writers who ad-
dressed the nineteenth-century stereotype. 
Three factors shape Brzozowski’s protagonist: the family, the distant prov-
ince of Europe, the city. It was in a modern city that the author wanted to place 
his protagonist: the Messiah or a labor leader. Scholars of modernity like to 
translate this into Marshall Berman’s vision of the city,6 although in this case 
Brzozowski himself was probably inspired by Sorel, and not by Marx, as Ber-
man was. This signalled messianic motif is not unique in the twentieth century: 
several years after Brzozowski it will fascinate Walter Benjamin, likewise a 
reader of Sorel. Bruno Schulz is said to have written a novel about the Messiah, 
and efforts to find it continue, as though its appearance could strengthen 
Schulz’s vision of Drohobych, a town brought out from provincial darkness into 
the world of great fiction. 
Brzozowski’s last unfinished essay is the kernel of his planned larger exege-
sis of Conrad. Of course we will not find Conradian motifs in Dębina, but while 
writing the novel, Brzozowski was already thinking about the relationship be-
tween culture and imperialism, just as Edward Said did in his seminal work 
eighty years later.7 
It seems that the family story in Dębina is the most personal story of the au-
thor himself. Of course it is not about faithfulness to detail, which would in any 
case be difficult to measure, since we know so little about his early life. That a 
family can descend into self-destruction was something that Brzozowski, the 
critical reader, also saw in Mann’s Buddenbrooks, of which he provided an accu-
rate description. To what extent he treated Mann’s work as the context of his 
own fiction cannot be resolved in this brief discussion. Brzozowski provokes his 
interpreters to create very broad contexts for his writing—which is both reward-
ing as an intellectual exercise and dangerous, as it ascribes to him the creation or 
rather emanation of analogies which are often difficult to test. 
But could the heritage of the Polish gentry, as a culture and not only as plot 
material, enter Europe? Because this gentry is, in the end, the protagonist of 
Dębina; not the picturesque Sienkiewicz variety, but this impoverished yet proud 
gentry, having faith in its visions of civilisation based on the family, even though 
its ties are increasingly weaker. It was the gentry that gave rise to the Polish 
intelligentsia, of a kind unknown in Europe. Brzozowski had first-hand experi-
ence of the heritage of being “thrown off the saddle” and tried to liberate himself 
from it. 
                                                             
6  I am referring here to Marshall Berman’s book All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The 
Experience of Modernity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 
7  Cf. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). 
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Certainly, this type of culture did stand a chance of an alliance with Eu-
rope—and yet it did not come to pass. Here, we touch on a variety of issues and 
problems. Writing a history of the nation—whether like that of Żeromski’s 
Popioły (Ashes) or Brzozowski’s Sam wśród ludzi—entails a fictional presenta-
tion of a particular national idea. As these novels were never translated the 
Polish Romantic idea remained confined within its own circle. Brzozowski went 
further than Żeromski; he decided that his plots will be “inlayed” with essayistic 
discourse, as was later the case with Musil or Hesse. 
Today, unlike in the time of Brzozowski’s contemporaries, incompleteness is 
interpreted as guaranteeing the relevance of a text. Certain thematic motifs, such 
as Brzozowski’s interest in Judaism or Marxism, are read as clear signals of 
communication with modernity. And the plots? They could be used as compo-
nents of the presented world on the border of fantasy and mimesis. 
The fantastic aspect of Sam wśród ludzi has been noticed by Andrzej 
Mencwel in his biography of Brzozowski. Mencwel quotes a passage describing 
the vision of the “mad child” Oleś, a character appearing in Dębina. He places it 
in the introductory chapter, in which he discusses Mark Twain’s novel A Con-
necticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court as an illustration of one of the funda-
mental conflicts of early modernity, namely that which plays out between (Ro-
mantic) nature and the emerging civilisation: between the world of feeling and 
technology, between the past and modernization arising from technological 
progress.8 
Brzozowski’s novel was supposed to be grand and modern. Of course its 
author could not have been aware of new tendencies in the development of fic-
tion writing, which were already ripening, albeit as yet concealed. The sugges-
tion of “grandness” brings to mind epic literature. The approach that Lukács 
presented in his essay “on the forms of great epic literature” is quite relevant for 
understanding Brzozowski’s fiction. According to the Hungarian critic, the fun-
damentals of epic literature as projected by Cervantes are “melancholy” and 
“irony.”9 
The plot and narration of Dębina undoubtedly meet these criteria. Added to 
these are the essayistic discourse and the epistolary solution. “Essayism” offers 
commentary and philosophical reflection, while letters open and conclude the 
                                                             
8  Andrzej Mencwel, Stanisław Brzozowski. Postawa krytyczna. Wiek XX [Stanisław 
Brzozowski. The critical attitude. The twentieth century] (Warszawa: Krytyka Poli-
tyczna, 2014), 30f. 
9  Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the 
Forms of Great Epic Literature, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, 
1971), 104. 
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novel. The letter of the representative of the old world, Castellan Ogieński (of 
the Kopajgród castle), is a farewell to the world of Enlightenment; the letter of 
his grandson, in turn, creates an image of despair and melancholia shaping the 
Romanticism of Poland’s Eastern Borderlands, abandoned and tragically unfit 
for life. These plots can be quite accurately illustrated with passages from Leg-
enda Młodej Polski—or the other way round, Legenda… receives additional cor-
roboration from the novels. 
The foregoing discussion aimed to demonstrate that Brzozowski’s connec-
tion with the nineteenth century is stronger than we used to think. It could also 
follow that the writer’s every contact with Polish problems was secretly deter-
mined by his biography. To conclude: the modern surprises that Brzozowski 
prepares for scholars result largely from the incomplete and thus unpredictable 
character of his novelistic projects, as well as from the combination of writing 
techniques whose coexistence within one text was only admitted within late 
modernist fiction: the employment of essay and letter, i.e., genres belonging to 
different textual spaces. 
Emotions controlled by irony, the melancholia and neurasthenia of the inher-
itors of history, which Europe should by all means get to know, the pride of the 
artist who confronts them—none of these dominant elements in his writing 
helped Brzozowski secure a place among masters. Perhaps this was meant to be 
the fate of those “born late.” Here, i.e., in the communal experience of a genera-
tion, another possible perspective on reading Brzozowski’s novelistic plots 
comes into view, again reaching out into the future (and not back to the past). 
But there also exists another solution: I propose to call it “abandoning plots.” 
According to this approach, the scholar of Brzozowski’s fiction refrains from 
deciphering Brzozowski’s psychological historicism or adopting it to the Euro-
pean norm. What he or she does instead is look into Brzozowski’s essayistic 
reflection in order to see how it functions, cognitively and artistically, in his 
fiction. Adopting a research strategy of this kind, the scholar moves beyond the 
plots, thus modifying their function from narratives in the foreground to fictional 
additions to visions of the nineteenth-century world, governed not only by its 
own laws but also by the principles by which the philosophical mind learns 
about reality. 
With this choice, Brzozowski’s fiction becomes universalised, always rele-
vant for any “world of thought.” Whether this proposition can be defended I am 
in no position to judge. But a polyphonic “concert of ideas,” whose coexistence 
is possible in an extra-historical universe, indeed distinguishes Brzozowski’s 
fiction. Writing about polyphony, Bakhtin used Dostoevsky to illustrate his 
thesis. Brzozowski admired the author of Crime and Punishment as an insightful 
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spokesman of “the Russian soul.” Again, the nineteenth century and its great 
prose support Brzozowski’s novelistic design. “This is our beginning”10—these 
words from the first chapter of Czesław Miłosz’s “Traktat poetycki” (Treatise on 
Poetry), referring to the role of fin-de-siècle for the emerging new era, could be 
shared by Brzozowski—even though he was such a harsh critic of the “Galician 
heritage.” The heritage of the Eastern Borderlands operated according to similar 
principles. And the writer made both those currents accountable, believing that 
he alone possessed the artistic authority to pass judgment on them. 
 
Translated by Edward M. Świderski 
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Epilogue 
Andrzej Mencwel 
 
 
According to dictionaries of literary terms, an epilogue to a given text is sup-
posed to inform us of the subsequent history of the tale recounted in the com-
pleted work. But these dictionaries remain silent about when, following the 
completion of the work, the epilogue comes to be, for which reason I will as-
sume that the time frame remains indeterminate: it can be written shortly after 
the tale has been told but also well after the event, from a more distant temporal 
perspective. As I write, more than a year has passed since the end of the interna-
tional scholarly conference, entitled “Always Our Contemporary: Stanisław 
Brzozowski and the Intellectual Field in Twentieth Century Poland and Be-
yond,” organized at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, October 23–24, 
2014. It might be thought therefore that I am making life too easy for myself by 
resorting to this, so to say, artistic stylization. However, the point is not merely 
that the conference took place under the sign of a risky designation (“always our 
contemporary”) and gathered scholars from several countries, especially from 
Poland, with a program the thematic scope of which was equal to the repertoire 
of issues that exercised Brzozowski. The point is rather that the conference was 
expertly organized, the best of its kind in my decades-long experience of confer-
ences throughout the world. To be sure, I have in mind as well the fabled Swiss 
penchant for exactness, esteemed everywhere, including Poland: everything took 
place according to plan, punctually and exactly, in a cordial and friendly setting. 
Even the Alps, clearly visible through the windows of the conference room, 
seemed to extend their greeting to us. None of this, however, exceptional though 
it was, would justify recourse to the artistic stylization suggested by the title of 
the conference were it not for the fact that the conference was pervaded by a 
distinctive sense of drama, a scenic character, so to speak, to which all the par-
ticipants seemed alive. It is still fresh in my mind and is the reason why I am 
adding this epilogue.  
352 | Andrzej Mencwel 
How did this dramaturgy come about? First of all, the invited speakers were 
requested to submit the texts of their presentations in advance of the conference 
in order to prepare an online as well as a complete print version distributed to all 
participants at the start of the conference. Everyone knows that generally this 
fails to happen, and that conferences tend to consist of talks not infrequently 
constructed in the course of the presentations. The monotony of the ensuing 
monologues works to the disadvantage of, indeed it tends to stymy, free ex-
change and dialogue. I have been witness to sessions during which no time re-
mained for discussion. I would have said that the farther one penetrates into 
Eastern Europe the more frequently do such cases occur, a regularity deriving 
from Soviet party conferences, were it not for the circumstance that the French, 
among whom rhetoric tends to supersede argument, likewise favor this style.  
From the start the organizers of the conference in Fribourg enjoyed a double 
organizational success: not only did they distribute the texts of the presentations, 
they managed to convince all the speakers to restrict themselves to short sum-
maries of the main theses of their papers. I keep racking my brain, trying to 
understand how the organizers managed to achieve this consensus, since I can 
recall countless occasions of presentations exceeding all measure⎯recently, I 
won’t say where, a presentation in bad English dragged on more than an 
hour⎯with the speakers stoically ignoring reminders from the chairpersons. 
Worse still are the cases when speakers acknowledge the time constraints, 
promise to close anon, and go on incessantly. There would be little point of 
rehearsing these unfortunate examples were it not for the fact that, seen against 
this background, the Fribourg conference dedicated to Brzozowski became a 
model of its kind. It took on the character of a virtually ceaseless debate, a two-
day dialectical symposium, with discussions running on even during the prandial 
interludes. It is evident that the best means alone could not by themselves 
achieve this level of intellectual drama without the skills and qualities of the 
conference organizers⎯Jens Herlth, Dorota Kozicka and Edward Świderski. 
Personally, in the company of such protagonists, on such a stage, I felt like a fish 
in water.  
The significance of this kind of symposium does not come down to the 
presentations prepared in advance⎯though some of these were excellent⎯with 
which the reader can at present become familiar in the revised versions follow-
ing the discussions during the symposium. Rather the two-day, virtually inces-
sant debate constituted the proper sense of the conference, a sense ‘superim-
posed’, to quote the Structuralists, on the texts prepared in advance that were so 
many answers to the implicit question raised in the title of the conference. Does 
Brzozowski forever remain our contemporary, and if so, in what does his con-
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temporaneousness consist? What is it that today continues to lend vitality to his 
thinking and creativity? In seeking to answer these questions, I should first note 
that at no time during the meeting was the so-called ‘Brzozowski affair’ even 
mentioned, never mind discussed. It is well-known that in 1908 Brzozowski was 
accused of collaboration with the tsarist political police, an accusation that 
doubtless shortened his life and exerted a catastrophic effect on the reception of 
his work over the course of the ensuing century. It became a kind of ‘moralizing’ 
ritual to offer answers to the pseudo-question, whether, namely, in case Brzo-
zowski was a ‘spy’, his works retain an autonomous value and remain important 
or whether they are without value in this sense and should be excommunicated, 
together with their author? Nothing of the sort made the rounds in the course of 
the conference in Fribourg, which fact leads me to conclude that, for the partici-
pants, this question had been resolved: not only was Brzozowski not guilty of the 
collaboration for which he was accused, but the very accusation was a falsehood 
and thus deserves no further attention. Though this is the majority opinion today, 
it is not exclusive: on the occasion of another conference I attended someone 
opined that, had it not been for all the tumult surrounding the so-called ‘affair’ 
and the periodic revivals of the controversy, Brzozowski would have long since 
been forgotten. However, the organizers of the Fribourg symposium recognized 
in advance, so to say, that the actual significance of the author of Idee (Ideas) has 
all to do with the message he conveyed, a message so rich in content that it 
would more than meet the aims of the conference. Moreover, it is a message that 
seems to speak to a key contemporary issue, as represented by Richard Rorty, an 
issue that Edward Swiderski took up in his paper. 
I will return to this paper, since the discussion it called forth amounted, in 
my opinion, to the intellectual highpoint of the conference. At present, I want to 
return to the ‘Brzozowski affair’, approaching it, however, from another angle, 
not as a problem, but as a symptom. That it became a problem is a matter in 
regard to which I took a firm stance in my first book, published in 1976, a stance 
I confirmed in my most recent book of 2014.1 However, this does not alter the 
conviction, stated long ago already, that the so-called ‘Brzozowski affair’ merits 
a separate investigation in that it is an example of the way in which the media 
within our mass societies exacerbate contemporary political mechanisms. Or 
stated in simpler terms: instead of addressing the question become stand-
                                                             
1  Cf. “Nota V. Czy istnieje sprawa Brzozowskiego” [Note V. Does the Brzozowski 
affair exist] in Andrzej Mencwel, Stanisław Brzozowski. Kształtowanie myśli krytycz-
nej (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1976), 362–386, as well as my Stanisław Brzozowski. Po-
stawa krytyczna. Wiek XX [Stanisław Brzozowski. The critical attitude. The twentieth 
century] (Warszawa: Krytyka Polityczna, 2014), especially 600–612. 
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ard⎯was Brzozowski guilty? ⎯I suggest turning to the question, how was the 
Brzozowski affair concocted? The wide-ranging and fruitful discussions in Fri-
bourg rekindled this question in my mind, turning it in fact into a broader issue: 
Has the intellectuals’ fate in Eastern and Central Europe in the first half of the 
twentieth century been more specific and dramatic than that of their counterparts 
in Europe’s heartland, that is, in the West? Did the same dilemmas⎯for instance 
the conflict between the ‘patriots’ and the ‘internationalists’ (as word had it in 
Warsaw at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries)⎯which in the 
heart of Europe ran their course in orderly, ‘normal’ ways, acquire extreme, 
radical, and explosive forms at Europe’s peripheries? And is it not the case that, 
at the peripheries, modernism was often qualified as a “worthless” (obezwar-
tościowy) relativism, as Brzozowski would have put it, and that the forms of 
escape from this relativism have often been extreme—in the direction of anar-
chism, nationalism, socialism, even fascism and communism? Conversions to 
Christianity, on the contrary, often evince a personalist tinge.  
To a question as broad and fundamental as this I have no concise, desultory 
answer. I do admit, however, that the presentations and discussions during the 
Fribourg conference stimulated my thinking about these matters, which deserve 
to become a theme for research. During the conference Brzozowski appeared not 
only in the light of the by now classical juxtaposition with Lukács, but also with 
Emile Cioran; as a possible source of inspiration for Ukrainian nationalism as 
well as the Israeli Kibbutz movements; in the context of the Italian Marxists, 
Labriola and Gramsci and their contemporary followers. As I listened to Jens 
Herlth’s presentation, whose protagonist was the coryphe of Ukrainian national-
ism, Dmytro Dontsov, I recalled Ivan Franko’s intellectual biography that in 
many ways is closely analogous to Brzozowski’s. To this analogy I would add 
the Czech, Zdeněk Nejedlý, who transformed himself from a modernist into a 
Stalinist, as well as the Lithuanian, Mikalojus Čiurlonis, a musician and painter 
rather than a theoretician, but whose fate was no less dramatic than that of Brzo-
zowski. What do I have in mind in suggesting these analogies? Just this: writers, 
thinkers, and artists from the European peripheries experienced the intellectual 
dilemmas and conflicts of their day with particular intensity. Close attention 
needs to be paid to their intellectual milieus, as signaled in the subtitle of the 
conference. The clash of modernity and tradition often took an acute, dramatic 
form at the peripheries and came to expression as well in the cultural modes of 
being. Outstanding local artists and intellectuals still continue to aspire to 
‘govern souls’ so soon as they are directed to become ‘engineers of souls’; they 
stylize themselves as the ‘conscience of the nation’, although advancing nations 
have not a conscience but interests; they seek to be the legislators for their 
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societies, whereas the latter need experts. That is why anyone who fails to 
understand this fundamental historical transformation has somehow or other to 
be depraved and/or liquidated. In my opinion, the staging of the ‘Brzozowski 
affair’ is a salient example of the personal consequences of this kind of historical 
clash. 
If, however, the claim that opened the conference—“always our contempo-
rary”—is to stand, that is to say, to be confirmed in relation to Brzozowski, he 
needs to be more than a historical accident, he needs to be genuinely our con-
temporary. This was the issue Edward Świderski addressed in his attempt to 
juxtapose Brzozowski with Rorty. It was a felicitous choice, since Rorty, more 
than any other philosopher who has recently enjoyed international renown 
(among others, Habermas, Derrida, Bauman), is the iconic thinker of the intel-
lectual milieu at the turn of the twenty-first century. Moreover, he enjoys con-
siderable prestige in Poland, having several devoted commentators, and as testi-
fied by the controversial debate that took place in Warsaw in which he was the 
chief adversary.2 In his presentation, Edward Świderski first emphasized the 
analogous roles of the two thinkers, notwithstanding the century that separates 
their respective activities as well as the different cultural contexts. Brzozowski 
and Rorty are not arm-chair philosophers but rather conscious actors on a broad 
cultural stage; both attacked effete idols and dead metaphors; each sought to 
carry out a fundamental reconstruction of philosophy as a whole in the name of a 
new vision of truth; both engaged in radical cultural criticism in order to trans-
form the state of mind of their respective societies; and each upheld literature as 
the exemplary model of human creativity.  
The most evident difference between them is the century-long temporal di-
vide, visible as well in their writerly forms⎯Brzozowski, though attaining liter-
ally in the last months of his life a crystal clarity in his essays theretofore un-
known in Polish, remains a fundamentally modernist writer, and hence somehow 
dated; Rorty’s style sparkles with all the effects of contemporary philosophical 
rhetoric honed within and directed to the university seminar. Moreover, the 
author of The Legend of Young Poland could count on no more than the local 
Polish public, whereas the author of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity stepped 
onto the broad American cultural scene that today more than ever before is syn-
onymous with global visibility. However, this disproportion in style and exer-
cised effect need not necessarily work to Brzozowski’s disadvantage, especially 
if we keep in mind his pursuit of truth rather than success. In this last regard, 
                                                             
2  Józef Niżnik, John T. Sanders (eds.). Debating the State of Philosophy Today: Haber-
mas, Rorty, and Kołakowski. Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1996. 
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Brzozowski does occupy one of the lowest places in world rankings, although 
the Fribourg symposium does doubtlessly improve his standing.  
I encourage anyone interested in the parallel between Brzozowski and Rorty 
to attend directly to Świderski’s text.3 I want only to call attention to the way in 
which the discussion that ensued focused on what I consider to have been the 
salient point of the Fribourg conference and that is at the same time a core com-
ponent of the cultural consciousness. To this end, let me set out briefly, and 
hopefully without excessive simplification, the essence of Brzozowski’s thinking 
as manifest in key biographical nodes. The first node is the youthful ‘Darwinian 
crisis’, as it was then called, that brought on the loss of religious faith, substitut-
ing for the latter the, at the time virtually sacred, “scientific worldview.” In 
Brzozowski’s intellectual biography this was the first step to rejecting the ‘Pla-
tonism’ of European thought, as Richard Rorty was to dub any faith in a prede-
termined world of ideas a century later. But Brzozowski was soon to discover 
that the ‘scientific worldview’ depended on a different version of ‘Platonism’, 
viz., on the claim that there exists a predetermined ‘readymade being’ that, like a 
book inscribed by the hand of God, has only to be deciphered by science. Brzo-
zowski’s extensive criticisms of then contemporary versions of the scientific 
worldview presented in “Monistyczne pojmowanie dziejów i filozofia krytycz-
na” (The Monist Conception of History and Critical Philosophy, 1904)4 retains 
its significance to this day. Fully aware of what he was doing, Brzozowski 
passed from a philosophy of cognition to a philosophy of action, claiming more-
over that being is not readymade but is created, both in its essence and in all of 
its particular forms: nature, history, societies, cultures, personalities and persons. 
Here I can no more than mention the philosophical inspirations of this passage, 
chief of which was doubtless Marx’s thought understood as a critical historical 
materialism and Nietzsche’s radical critique of science and history. 
In my opinion, as the critical side of the philosophy of action, subsequently 
reformulated into the philosophy of labor, acquired its proper guise in the phi-
losophy of culture, Brzozowski confronted the key problem for the thought of his 
day. If it is true that all known forms of religion, science, and philosophy are 
hardly ‘objective’ revelations about some extra-human essence of our world but 
only ‘subjective’ claims concerning its human qualities, then on what basis can 
we evaluate these claims and accept them as more or less true? As he worked on 
the initial version of the philosophy of action Brzozowski grew aware of its sub-
jectivist and voluntarist limitations (is every act of each person of equal value?) 
and sought to establish the conditions of its validity. He subjected modernist 
                                                             
3  See pp. 159–184 of the present volume. 
4  Brzozowski, Kultura i życie, 273–347. 
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relativism, that he termed an illusionism, to a withering critique: it is not the case 
that every statement is equally valid since not illusions but labor constitutes our 
world. Legitimacy accrues to only those thoughts, forms of consciousness, asser-
tions that stimulate labor so understood. Brzozowski’s sometimes virtually literal 
style of expression imparts a somewhat anachronistic character to his thinking, 
but as soon as its essence is appreciated the difference that separates his thought 
from the dominating trait of contemporary philosophy, as represented emblem-
atically by Rorty, becomes clear. Brzozowski’s main issue was the metaphysical 
problem; he struggled constantly with the classical question⎯why is there some-
thing rather than nothing?⎯and sought an ultimate answer in his own language. 
If the world as a whole and all its concrete forms are of our own making, then 
what must we be like in order to be equal to this task? This doubtless creationist 
cosmology required a counterpart in a creationist anthropology. Ultimately, how-
ever, of utmost importance is the question of what must man be who is able 
responsibly to bring this creation into being. Even though, in what were virtually 
his last words, Brzozowski spoke of poetry, he described it as man’s creative 
self-definition. And it is here, I claim, that Brzozowski’s standpoint outstrips 
Rorty’s philosophy. Happily, Brzozowski knew nothing about the ‘linguistic 
turn’ in philosophy. He was not concerned with the validity of philosophical 
claims but with the validity of man’s standpoint as such. It is in this sense that he 
remains a thinker who is always our contemporary. 
 
Translated by Edward M. Świderski 
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